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Interpretive Notice Concerning the Application of MSRB Rule G-17 to Underwriters of Municipal Securities
Under Rule G-17 of the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB), brokers, dealers, and municipal securities dealers (“dealers”) must, in the conduct of their municipal securities activities, deal fairly with all persons and must not engage in any deceptive, dishonest, or unfair practice. This rule is most often cited in connection with duties owed by dealers to investors; however, it also applies to their interactions with other market participants, including municipal entities[1] such as states and their political subdivisions that are issuers of municipal securities (“issuers”).
The MSRB has previously observed that Rule G-17 requires dealers to deal fairly with issuers.[2] With the passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,[3] the MSRB was expressly directed by Congress to protect municipal entities. Accordingly, in 2012, the MSRB provided additional interpretive guidance that addressed how Rule G-17 applies to dealers acting in the capacity of underwriters in the municipal securities transactions described therein (the “2012 Interpretive Notice”).[4]
This notice supersedes the MSRB’s 2012 Interpretive Notice, dated August 2, 2012, concerning the application of Rule G-17 to underwriters of municipal securities, as well as the related implementation guidance, dated July 18, 2012, and frequently-asked questions, dated March 25, 2013 (the “prior guidance”).[5] The prior guidance will remain applicable to underwriting relationships commencing prior to March 31, 2021. Underwriters will be subject to the amended guidance provided by this notice for all of their underwriting relationships beginning on or after that date. For purposes of this notice, an underwriting relationship is considered to have begun at the time the delivery of the first disclosure is triggered as described under “Timing and Manner of Disclosures” below (i.e., the earliest stages of an underwriter’s relationship with an issuer with respect to an issue, such as in a response to a request for proposal or in promotional materials provided to an issuer).
Applicability of the Notice
Except where a competitive underwriting is specifically mentioned, this notice applies to negotiated underwritings only.[6] This notice does not apply to a dealer acting as a primary distributor in a continuous offering of municipal fund securities, such as interests in 529 savings plans and Achieving a Better Life Experience (ABLE) programs. It does not apply to selling group members. This notice does not address a dealer’s duties when the dealer is serving as an advisor to a municipal entity. This notice applies to a primary offering of a new issue of municipal securities that is placed with investors by a dealer serving as placement agent, although certain disclosures may be omitted as described below.
The fair practice duties outlined in this notice are those duties that a dealer owes to a municipal entity when the dealer underwrites a new issue of municipal securities. This notice does not set out the underwriter’s fair-practice duties to other parties to a municipal securities financing (e.g., conduit borrowers). The MSRB notes, however, that Rule G-17 does require that an underwriter deal fairly with all persons in the course of the dealer’s municipal securities activities. What actions are considered fair will, of necessity, be dependent on the nature of the relationship between a dealer and such other parties, the particular actions undertaken, and all other relevant facts and circumstances. Although this notice does not address what an underwriter’s fair-dealing duties may be with respect to other parties, it may serve as one of many bases for an underwriter to consider how to establish appropriate policies and procedures for ensuring that it meets such fair-practice obligations, in light of its relationship with such other participants and their particular roles.
The examples discussed in this notice are illustrative only and are not meant to encompass all obligations of dealers to municipal entities under Rule G-17. Furthermore, when municipal entities are customers[7] of dealers, they are subject to the same protections under MSRB rules, including Rule G‑17, that apply to other customers.[8] The MSRB notes that an underwriter has a duty of fair dealing to investors in addition to its duty of fair dealing to issuers. An underwriter also has a duty to comply with other MSRB rules as well as other federal and state securities laws.
Basic Fair Dealing Principle
As noted above, Rule G-17 precludes a dealer, in the conduct of its municipal securities activities, from engaging in any deceptive, dishonest, or unfair practice with any person, including an issuer. The rule contains an anti-fraud prohibition. Thus, an underwriter must not misrepresent or omit the facts, risks, potential benefits, or other material information about municipal securities activities undertaken with a municipal issuer. However, Rule G-17 does not merely prohibit deceptive conduct on the part of the dealer; it also establishes a general duty of a dealer to deal fairly with all persons (including, but not limited to, issuers), even in the absence of fraud.
Role of Underwriters and Conflicts of Interest
In negotiated underwritings, underwriters’ Rule G-17 duty to deal fairly with an issuer requires certain disclosures to the issuer in connection with an issue or proposed issue of municipal securities, as provided below.[9]
- The disclosures discussed under “Disclosures Concerning the Underwriters’ Role” and “Disclosures Concerning Underwriters’ Compensation” (the “standard disclosures”) must be provided by the sole underwriter or the syndicate manager[10] to the issuer as described below.
- The disclosures discussed under “Required Disclosures to Issuers” (the “transaction-specific disclosures”) must be provided to the issuer by the underwriter who has recommended a financing structure or product to the issuer as described below.[11]
- The disclosures discussed under “Other Conflicts Disclosures” (the “dealer-specific disclosures”) must be provided by the sole underwriter or each underwriter in a syndicate (as applicable) as described below.[12]
Disclosures Concerning the Underwriter’s Role. The sole underwriter or the syndicate manager[13] must disclose to the issuer that:
| (i) | Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board Rule G-17 requires an underwriter to deal fairly at all times with both issuers and investors; |
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| (ii) | the underwriter’s primary role is to purchase securities with a view to distribution in an arm’s-length commercial transaction with the issuer and it has financial and other interests that differ from those of the issuer;[14] |
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| (iii) | unlike a municipal advisor, the underwriter does not have a fiduciary duty to the issuer under the federal securities laws and is, therefore, not required by federal law to act in the best interests of the issuer without regard to its own financial or other interests;[15] |
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| (iv) | the issuer may choose to engage the services of a municipal advisor with a fiduciary obligation to represent the issuer’s interests in the transaction; |
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| (v) | the underwriter has a duty to purchase securities from the issuer at a fair and reasonable price, but must balance that duty with its duty to sell municipal securities to investors at prices that are fair and reasonable; and |
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| (vi) | the underwriter will review the official statement for the issuer’s securities in accordance with, and as part of, its responsibilities to investors under the federal securities laws, as applied to the facts and circumstances of the transaction.[16] |
Underwriters also must not recommend that issuers not retain a municipal advisor. Accordingly, underwriters may not discourage issuers from using a municipal advisor or otherwise imply that the hiring of a municipal advisor would be redundant because the sole underwriter or underwriting syndicate can provide the services that a municipal advisor would.
Disclosure Concerning the Underwriters’ Compensation. The sole underwriter or syndicate manager must disclose to issuers whether underwriting compensation will be contingent on the closing of a transaction. Sole underwriters or syndicate managers must also disclose that compensation that is contingent on the closing of a transaction or the size of a transaction presents a conflict of interest, because it may cause underwriters to recommend a transaction that is unnecessary or to recommend that the size of a transaction be larger than is necessary.
Other Conflicts Disclosures. The sole underwriter or each underwriter in a syndicate must also, when and if applicable, disclose other dealer-specific actual material conflicts of interest and potential material conflicts of interest,[17] including, but not limited to, the following:
| (i) | any payments described below under “Conflicts of Interest/Payments to or from Third Parties”;[18] |
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| (ii) | any arrangements described below under “Conflicts of Interest/Profit-Sharing with Investors”; |
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| (iii) | the credit default swap disclosures described below under “Conflicts of Interest/Credit Default Swaps”; and |
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| (iv) | any incentives for the underwriter to recommend a complex municipal securities financing and other associated conflicts of interest (as described below under “Required Disclosures to Issuers”).[19] |
These categories of conflicts of interest are not mutually exclusive and, in some cases, a specific conflict may reasonably be viewed as falling into two or even more categories. An underwriter making disclosures of dealer-specific conflicts of interest to an issuer should concentrate on making them in a complete and understandable manner and need not necessarily organize them according to the categories listed above, particularly if adhering to a strict categorization process might interfere with the clarity and conciseness of disclosures.
Where there is a syndicate, each underwriter in the syndicate has a duty to provide its dealer-specific disclosures to the issuer. In general, dealer-specific disclosures for one dealer cannot be satisfied by disclosures made by another dealer (e.g., the syndicate manager) because such disclosures are, by their nature, not uniform, and must be prepared by each dealer. However, a syndicate manager may deliver each of the dealer-specific disclosures to the issuer as part of a single package of disclosures, as long as it is clear to which dealer each disclosure is attributed. An underwriter in the syndicate is not required to notify an issuer if it has determined that it does not have any dealer-specific disclosures to make. However, the obligation to provide dealer-specific disclosures includes material conflicts of interest arising after the time of engagement with the issuer, as noted below.
Timing and Manner of Disclosures. The standard disclosures, transaction-specific disclosures, and dealer-specific disclosures must be made in writing to an official of the issuer identified by the issuer as a primary contact for that issuer for the receipt of the foregoing disclosures. In the absence of such identification, an underwriter may make such disclosures in writing to an official of the issuer that the underwriter reasonably believes has the authority to bind the issuer by contract with the underwriter and that, to the knowledge of the underwriter, is not a party to a disclosed conflict.[20] If provided within the same document as the dealer-specific disclosures and/or transaction-specific disclosures, the standard disclosures must be identified clearly as such and provided apart from the other disclosures (e.g., in an appendix).
Disclosures must be made in a clear and concise manner designed to make clear to such official the subject matter of such disclosures and their implications for the issuer in accordance with the following timelines.
- A sole underwriter or syndicate manager must make the standard disclosure concerning the arm’s-length nature of the underwriter-issuer relationship at the earliest stages of the underwriter’s relationship with the issuer with respect to an issue (e.g., in a response to a request for proposals or in promotional materials provided to an issuer).[21]
- A sole underwriter or syndicate manager must make the other standard disclosures regarding the underwriter’s role and compensation at or before the time the underwriter is engaged to perform underwriting services (e.g., in an engagement letter), not solely in a bond purchase agreement.
- An underwriter must make the dealer-specific disclosures at or before the time the underwriter has been engaged to perform the underwriting services.[22] Thereafter, an underwriter must make any applicable dealer-specific disclosures discovered or arising after being engaged as an underwriter as soon as practicable after being discovered and with sufficient time for the issuer to fully evaluate any such conflict and its implications.[23]
- An underwriter who recommends a financing structure or product to an issuer must make the transaction-specific disclosures in sufficient time before the execution of a commitment by an issuer (which may include a bond purchase agreement) relating to the financing, and with sufficient time to allow the issuer to fully evaluate the features of the financing.
Unless directed otherwise by an issuer, an underwriter may update selected portions of disclosures previously provided so long as such updates clearly identify the additions or deletions and are capable of being read independently of the prior disclosures.[24]
Acknowledgement of Disclosures. When delivering a disclosure, the underwriter must attempt to receive written acknowledgement[25] from an official of the issuer identified by the issuer as a primary contact for the issuer’s receipt of the foregoing disclosures.[26] In the absence of such identification, an underwriter may seek acknowledgement from an official of the issuer whom the underwriter reasonably believes has the authority to bind the issuer by contract with the underwriter and that, to the knowledge of the underwriter, is not party to a disclosed conflict. This notice does not specify the particular form of acknowledgement, but may include, for example, an e-mail read receipt.[27] An underwriter may proceed with a receipt of a written acknowledgement that includes an issuer’s reservation of rights or other self-protective language. If the official of the issuer agrees to proceed with the underwriting engagement after receipt of the disclosures but will not provide written acknowledgement of receipt, the underwriter responsible for making the requisite disclosure may proceed with the engagement after documenting with specificity why it was unable to obtain such written acknowledgement. Additionally, an underwriter must be able to produce evidence (including, for example, by automatic e-mail delivery receipt) that the disclosures were delivered with sufficient time for evaluation by the issuer before proceeding with the transaction. An issuer’s written acknowledgement of the receipt of disclosure is not dispositive of whether such disclosures were made with an appropriate amount of time. The analysis of whether disclosures were provided with sufficient time for an issuer’s review is based on the totality of the facts and circumstances.
Representations to Issuers
All representations made by underwriters to issuers in connection with municipal securities underwritings, whether written or oral, must be truthful and accurate and must not misrepresent or omit material facts. Underwriters must have a reasonable basis for the representations and other material information contained in documents they prepare and must refrain from including representations or other information they know or should know is inaccurate or misleading. For example, in connection with a certificate signed by the underwriter that will be relied upon by the issuer or other relevant parties to an underwriting (e.g., an issue price certificate), the dealer must have a reasonable basis for the representations and other material information contained therein.[28] In addition, an underwriter’s response to an issuer’s request for proposals or qualifications must fairly and accurately describe the underwriter’s capacity, resources, and knowledge to perform the proposed underwriting as of the time the proposal is submitted and must not contain any representations or other material information about such capacity, resources, or knowledge that the underwriter knows or should know to be inaccurate or misleading.[29] Matters not within the personal knowledge of those preparing the response (e.g., pending litigation) must be confirmed by those with knowledge of the subject matter. An underwriter must not represent that it has the requisite knowledge or expertise with respect to a particular financing if the personnel that it intends to work on the financing do not have the requisite knowledge or expertise.
Required Disclosures to Issuers
Many municipal securities are issued using financing structures that are routine and well understood by the typical municipal market professional, including most issuer personnel that have the lead responsibilities in connection with the issuance of municipal securities. For example, absent unusual circumstances or features, the typical fixed rate offering may be presumed to be well understood. Nevertheless, in the case of issuer personnel that the underwriter reasonably believes lack the requisite knowledge or experience to fully understand or assess the implications of a financing structures or products recommended by an underwriter, the underwriter making such recommendation must provide disclosures on the material aspects of such financing structures or product that it recommends (i.e., the “transaction-specific disclosures”).[30]
In some cases, issuer personnel responsible for the issuance of municipal securities would not be well positioned to fully understand or assess the implications of a recommended financing structure in its totality, because it is structured in a unique, atypical, or otherwise complex manner or incorporates unique, atypical, or otherwise complex features or products (a “complex municipal securities financing”).[31] Examples of complex municipal securities financings include, but are not limited to, variable rate demand obligations (“VRDOs”), financings involving derivatives (such as swaps), and financings in which interest rates are benchmarked to an index (such as LIBOR, SIFMA, or SOFR).[32] When a recommendation regarding a complex municipal securities financing structure has been made by an underwriter in a negotiated offering,[33] the underwriter making the recommendation has an obligation under Rule G-17 to communicate more particularized transaction-specific disclosures than those that may be required in the case of the recommendation of routine financing structures or products.[34] The underwriter making the recommendation must also disclose the material financial characteristics of the complex municipal securities financing, as well as the material financial risks of the financing that are known to the underwriter and reasonably foreseeable at the time of the disclosure.[35] It must also disclose any incentives for the recommendation of the complex municipal securities financing and other associated material conflicts of interest.[36] Such disclosures must be made in a fair and balanced manner based on principles of fair dealing and good faith.
The level of transaction-specific disclosure required may vary according to the issuer’s knowledge or experience with the proposed financing structure or similar structures, capability of evaluating the risks of the recommended financing structure or product, and financial ability to bear the risks of the recommended financing structure or product, in each case based on the reasonable belief of the underwriter.[37] Consequently, the level of transaction-specific disclosure to be provided to a particular issuer also can vary over time. In all events, the underwriter must disclose any incentives for the recommendation of the complex municipal securities financing and other associated conflicts of interest.
As previously mentioned, the transaction-specific disclosures must be made in writing to an official of the issuer identified by the issuer as a primary contact for the issuer for the receipt of such disclosures, or, in the absence of such identification, an underwriter may make such disclosures in writing to an issuer official whom the underwriter reasonably believes has the authority to bind the issuer by contract with the underwriter(s), and that, to the knowledge of the underwriter delivering the disclosure, is not a party to a disclosed conflict: (i) in sufficient time before the execution of a contract with the underwriter to allow the official to evaluate the recommendation (including consultation with any of its counsel or advisors) and (ii) in a manner designed to make clear to such official the subject matter of such disclosures and their implications for the issuer.
The disclosures concerning a complex municipal securities financing must address the specific elements of, and/or relevant products incorporated, into the recommended financing structure, rather than being general in nature.[38] An underwriter making a Complex Municipal Securities Financing Recommendation to an issuer cannot satisfy its fair dealing obligations by providing an issuer a single document setting out general descriptions of the various financing structures and/or products that may be recommended from time to time to various issuer clients that would effectively require issuer personnel to discover which disclosures apply to a particular recommendation and to the particular circumstances of that issuer. Underwriters can create, in anticipation of making such a recommendation, individualized descriptions, with appropriate levels of detail, of the material financial characteristics and risks for each of the various complex municipal securities financing structures and/or products (including any typical variations) they may recommend from time to time to various issuer clients, with such standardized descriptions serving as the base for more particularized disclosures for the specific complex financing the underwriter recommends to particular issuers.[39] In making a recommendation, an underwriter could incorporate, to the extent applicable, any refinements to the base description needed to fully describe the material financial features and risks unique to that financing.[40]
If the underwriter who has made a recommendation does not reasonably believe that the official to whom the disclosures are addressed is capable of independently evaluating the disclosures, the underwriter must make additional efforts reasonably designed to inform the official or its employees or agent. The underwriter also must make an independent assessment that such disclosures are appropriately tailored to the issuer’s level of sophistication.
Underwriter Duties in Connection with Issuer Disclosure Documents
Underwriters often play an important role in assisting issuers in the preparation of disclosure documents, such as preliminary official statements and official statements.[41] These documents are critical to the municipal securities transaction, because investors rely on the representations contained in such documents in making their investment decisions. Moreover, investment professionals, such as municipal securities analysts and ratings services, rely on the representations in forming an opinion regarding the credit. A dealer’s duty to have a reasonable basis for the representations it makes, and other material information it provides, to an issuer and to ensure that such representations and information are accurate and not misleading, as described above, extends to representations and information provided by the underwriter in connection with the preparation by the issuer of its disclosure documents (e.g., cash flows).
Underwriter Compensation and New Issue Pricing
Excessive Compensation. An underwriter’s compensation for a new issue (including both direct compensation paid by the issuer and other separate payments, values, or credits received by the underwriter from the issuer or any other party in connection with the underwriting), in certain cases and depending upon the specific facts and circumstances of the offering, may be so disproportionate to the nature of the underwriting and related services performed as to constitute an unfair practice with regard to the issuer that it is a violation of Rule G-17. Among the factors relevant to whether an underwriter’s compensation is disproportionate to the nature of the underwriting and related services performed, are the credit quality of the issue, the size of the issue, market conditions, the length of time spent structuring the issue, and whether the underwriter is paying the fee of the underwriter’s counsel or any other relevant costs related to the financing.
Fair Pricing. The duty of fair dealing under Rule G-17 includes an implied representation that the price an underwriter pays to an issuer is fair and reasonable, taking into consideration all relevant factors, including the best judgment of the underwriter as to the fair market value of the issue at the time it is priced.[42] In general, a dealer purchasing bonds in a competitive underwriting for which the issuer may reject any and all bids will be deemed to have satisfied its duty of fairness to the issuer with respect to the purchase price of the issue as long as the dealer’s bid is a bona fide bid (as defined in MSRB Rule G‑13)[43] that is based on the dealer’s best judgment of the fair market value of the securities that are the subject of the bid. In a negotiated underwriting, the underwriter has a duty under Rule G-17 to negotiate in good faith with the issuer. This duty includes the obligation of the dealer to ensure the accuracy of representations made during the course of such negotiations, including representations regarding the price negotiated and the nature of investor demand for the securities (e.g., the status of the order period and the order book). If, for example, the dealer represents to the issuer that it is providing the “best” market price available on the new issue, or that it will exert its best efforts to obtain the “most favorable” pricing, the dealer may violate Rule G-17 if its actions are inconsistent with such representations.[44]
Conflicts of Interest
Payments to or from Third Parties. In certain cases, compensation received by an underwriter from third parties, such as the providers of derivatives and investments (including affiliates of an underwriter), may color the underwriter’s judgment and cause it to recommend products, structures, and pricing levels to an issuer when it would not have done so absent such payments. The MSRB views the failure of an underwriter to disclose to the issuer the existence of payments, values, or credits received by an underwriter in connection with its underwriting of the new issue from parties other than the issuer, and payments made by the underwriter in connection with such new issue to parties other than the issuer (in either case including payments, values, or credits that relate directly or indirectly to collateral transactions integrally related to the issue being underwritten), to be a violation of an underwriter’s obligation to the issuer under Rule G-17.[45] For example, it would be a violation of Rule G-17 for an underwriter to compensate an undisclosed third party in order to secure municipal securities business. Similarly, it would be a violation of Rule G-17 for an underwriter to receive undisclosed compensation from a third party in exchange for recommending that third party’s services or product to an issuer, including business related to municipal securities derivative transactions. This notice does not require that the amount of such third-party payments be disclosed. The underwriter must also disclose to the issuer whether it has entered into any third-party arrangements for the marketing of the issuer’s securities.
Profit-Sharing with Investors. Arrangements between the underwriter and an investor purchasing new issue securities from the underwriter (including purchases that are contingent upon the delivery by the issuer to the underwriter of the securities) according to which profits realized from the resale by such investor of the securities are directly or indirectly split or otherwise shared with the underwriter also would, depending on the facts and circumstances (including in particular if such resale occurs reasonably close in time to the original sale by the underwriter to the investor), constitute a violation of the underwriter’s fair dealing obligation under Rule G-17.[46] Such arrangements could also constitute a violation of Rule G‑25(c), which precludes a dealer from sharing, directly or indirectly, in the profits or losses of a transaction in municipal securities with or for a customer. An underwriter should carefully consider whether any such arrangement, regardless of whether it constitutes a violation of Rule G-25(c), may evidence a potential failure of the underwriter’s duty with regard to new issue pricing described above.
Credit Default Swaps. The issuance or purchase by a dealer of credit default swaps for which the reference is the issuer for which the dealer is serving as underwriter, or an obligation of that issuer, may pose a conflict of interest, including a dealer-specific conflict of interest, because trading in such municipal credit default swaps has the potential to affect the pricing of the underlying reference obligations, as well as the pricing of other obligations brought to market by that issuer. Rule G-17 requires, therefore, that a dealer disclose the fact that it engages in such activities to the issuers for which it serves as underwriter. Activities with regard to credit default swaps based on baskets or indexes of municipal issuers that include the issuer or its obligation(s) need not be disclosed, unless the issuer or its obligation(s) represents more than 2% of the total notional amount of the credit default swap or the underwriter otherwise caused the issuer or its obligation(s) to be included in the basket or index.
Retail Order Periods
Rule G-17 requires an underwriter that has agreed to underwrite a transaction with a retail order period to, in fact, honor such agreement.[47]A dealer that wishes to allocate securities in a manner that is inconsistent with an issuer’s requirements must not do so without the issuer’s consent. In addition, Rule G-17 requires an underwriter that has agreed to underwrite a transaction with a retail order period to take reasonable measures to ensure that retail clients are bona fide. An underwriter that knowingly accepts an order that has been framed as a retail order when it is not (e.g., a number of small orders placed by an institutional investor that would otherwise not qualify as a retail customer) would violate Rule G-17 if its actions are inconsistent with the issuer’s expectations regarding retail orders. In addition, a dealer that places an order that is framed as a qualifying retail order but in fact represents an order that does not meet the qualification requirements to be treated as a retail order (e.g., an order by a retail dealer without “going away” orders[48] from retail customers, when such orders are not within the issuer’s definition of “retail”) violates its Rule G-17 duty of fair dealing. The MSRB will continue to review activities relating to retail order periods to ensure that they are conducted in a fair and orderly manner consistent with the intent of the issuer and the MSRB’s investor protection mandate.
Dealer Payments to Issuer Personnel
Dealers are reminded of the application of MSRB Rule G-20, on gifts, gratuities, and non-cash compensation, and Rule G-17, in connection with certain payments made to, and expenses reimbursed for, issuer personnel during the municipal bond issuance process.[49] These rules are designed to avoid conflicts of interest and to promote fair practices in the municipal securities market.
Dealers should consider carefully whether payments they make in regard to expenses of issuer personnel in the course of the bond issuance process, including in particular, but not limited to, payments for which dealers seek reimbursement from bond proceeds or issuers, comport with the requirements of Rule G‑20. For example, a dealer acting as a financial advisor or underwriter may violate Rule G-20 by paying for excessive or lavish travel, meal, lodging and entertainment expenses in connection with an offering (such as may be incurred for rating agency trips, bond closing dinners, and other functions) that inure to the personal benefit of issuer personnel and that exceed the limits or otherwise violate the requirements of the rule.[50]
[1] For purposes of this notice, the term “municipal entity” is used as defined by Section 15B(e)(8) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”), 17 CFR 240.15Ba1-1(g), and other rules and regulations thereunder.
[2] See Reminder Notice on Fair Practice Duties to Issuers of Municipal Securities, MSRB Notice 2009-54 (September 29, 2009); Rule G-17 Interpretive Letter – Purchase of new issue from issuer, MSRB interpretation of December 1, 1997, reprinted in MSRB Rule Book (“1997 Interpretation”).
[3] Pub. L. No. 111-203 § 975, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
[4] See Interpretive Notice Concerning the Application of MSRB Rule G-17 to Underwriters of Municipal Securities (Aug. 2, 2012) (superseded upon the effective date of this notice as described below).
[5] See MSRB Notice 2012-38 (July 18, 2012); MSRB Notice 2013-08 (Mar. 25, 2013).
[6] The MSRB has always viewed competitive offerings narrowly to mean new issues sold by the issuer to the underwriter on the basis of the lowest price bid by potential underwriters – that is, the fact that an issuer publishes a request for proposals and potential underwriters compete to be selected based on their professional qualifications, experience, financing ideas, and other subjective factors would not be viewed as representing a competitive offering for purposes of this notice. In light of this meaning of the term “competitive underwriting,” it should be clear that, although most of the examples relating to misrepresentations and fairness of financial aspects of an offering consist of situations that would only arise in a negotiated offering, Rule G-17 should not be viewed as allowing an underwriter in a competitive underwriting to make misrepresentations to the issuer or to act unfairly in regard to the financial aspects of the new issue.
[7] MSRB Rule D-9 defines the term “customer” as follows: “Except as otherwise specifically provided by rule of the Board, the term ‘Customer’ shall mean any person other than a broker, dealer, or municipal securities dealer acting in its capacity as such or an issuer in transactions involving the sale by the issuer of a new issue of its securities.”
[8] See MSRB Reminds Firms of Their Sales Practice and Due Diligence Obligations When Selling Municipal Securities in the Secondary Market, MSRB Notice 2010-37 (September 20, 2010).
[9] For purposes of this notice, underwriters are only required to provide written disclosure of their applicable conflicts and are not required to make any written disclosures on the part of issuer personnel or any other parties to the transaction as part of the standard disclosures, dealer-specific disclosures, or the transaction-specific disclosures.
[10] For purposes of this notice, the term “syndicate manager” refers to the lead manager, senior manager, or bookrunning manager of the syndicate. In circumstances where an underwriting syndicate is formed, only that single syndicate manager is obligated to make the standard disclosures under this notice. In the event that there are joint-bookrunning senior managers, only one of the joint-bookrunning senior managers would be obligated under this notice to make the standard disclosures. Unless otherwise agreed to, such as pursuant to an agreement among underwriters, the joint-bookrunning senior manager responsible for maintaining the order book of the syndicate would be responsible for providing the standard disclosures. Notwithstanding the fair dealing obligation of a syndicate manager to deliver the standard disclosures under this notice, nothing herein would prohibit an underwriter from making a disclosure in order to, for example, comply with another regulatory or statutory obligation.
[11] Where an underwriting syndicate is formed, the syndicate manager has the sole responsibility hereunder for providing the standard disclosures. Consistent with this obligation placed on the syndicate manager, only the syndicate manager must maintain and preserve records of the standard disclosures in accordance with MSRB rules. Further, the MSRB acknowledges that an underwriter may not know if a syndicate will form at the time that certain disclosures are sent. In instances in which an underwriter has provided a standard disclosure prior to or concurrent with the formation of a syndicate, it shall suffice that the then-underwriter (later syndicate manager) has delivered a standard disclosure, and no affirmative statement is necessary that a disclosure is being made on behalf of any existing or future syndicate members for the syndicate manager to have met its fair dealing obligations in this regard. Notwithstanding the obligation of a syndicate manager to deliver the standard disclosures, nothing herein would prohibit, or should be construed as prohibiting, another underwriter from delivering a standard disclosure in order to, for example, comply with another regulatory or statutory obligation.
[12] Each underwriter, whether a sole underwriter, syndicate manager, or other member of the underwriting syndicate, has a fair dealing obligation under this notice to deliver transaction-specific disclosures where such underwriter has made a recommendation to an issuer regarding a financing structure or product. The fair dealing obligation to deliver such a transaction-specific disclosure, includes, but is not limited to, determining the level of disclosure required based on the type of financing structure or product recommended and a reasonable belief of the issuer’s knowledge and experience regarding that particular type of financing structure or product. In such cases, as further discussed below, a sole underwriter, syndicate manager, or other member of the underwriting syndicate who has not made such a recommendation would not need to deliver transaction-specific disclosures in order to meet its fair dealing obligation under this notice.
[13] See also note 30 infra.
[14] As a threshold matter, the disclosures delivered by an underwriter to an issuer must not be inaccurate or misleading, and nothing in this notice should be construed as requiring an underwriter to make a disclosure to an issuer that is false. For example, in a private placement where a dealer acting as an agent to place securities on behalf of an issuer does not take a principal position (including not taking a “riskless principal” position) in the securities being placed, the standard disclosure relating to an “arm’s length” relationship may be inapplicable and in such case may be omitted due to the agent-principal relationship between the dealer and issuer that commonly gives rise to other duties as a matter of common law or another statutory or regulatory regime – whether termed as a fiduciary or other obligation of trust. See Exchange Act Release No. 66927 (May 4, 2012), 77 FR 27509 (May 10, 2012) (SR-MSRB-2011-09). In certain other contexts, depending on the specific facts and circumstances, a dealer acting as an underwriter may take on, either through an agency arrangement or other purposeful understanding, a fiduciary relationship with the issuer. In such case, it would be appropriate for an underwriter to omit those disclosures deemed inapplicable as a result of such relationship.
A dealer acting as a placement agent in the primary offering of a new issuance of municipal securities should also consider how the scope of its activities may interact with the registration and record-keeping requirements for municipal advisors adopted by the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Commission”) under Section 15B of the Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. 78o-4), including the application of the exclusion from the definition of “municipal advisor” applicable to a dealer acting as an underwriter pursuant to Exchange Act Rule 15Ba1-1(d)(2)(i). See Registration of Municipal Advisors, Exchange Act Release No. 70462 (September 20, 2013), 78 FR 67467 (hereinafter, the “MA Rule Adopting Release”), at 67515 – 67516 (November 12, 2013) (available at https://www.sec.gov/files/rules/final/2013/34-70462.pdf) (stating: “The Commission does not believe that the underwriter exclusion should be limited to a particular type of underwriting or a particular type of offering. Therefore, if a registered broker-dealer, acting as a placement agent, performs municipal advisory activities that otherwise would be considered within the scope of the underwriting of a particular issuance of municipal securities as discussed [therein], the broker-dealer would not have to register as a municipal advisor.”); see also the MA Rule Adopting Release, 78 FR at 67513 – 67514 (discussing activities within and outside the scope of serving as an underwriter of a particular issuance of municipal securities for purposes of the underwriter exclusion).
[15] Id.
[16] In many private placements, as well as in certain other types of new issue offerings, no official statement may be produced, so that, to the extent that such an offering occurs without the production of an official statement, a dealer would not be required to disclose its role with regard to the review of an official statement.
[17] For purposes hereof, a potential material conflict of interest must be disclosed if, but only if, it is reasonably likely to mature into an actual material conflict of interest during the course of the transaction between the issuer and the underwriter.
[18] The third-party payments to which the disclosure standard would apply are those that give rise to actual material conflicts of interest or potential material conflicts of interest only.
[19] The specific standard with respect to complex financings does not obviate a dealer’s fair dealing obligation to disclose the existence of payments, values, or credits received by the underwriter or of other material conflicts of interest in connection with any negotiated underwriting, whether it be complex or routine.
[20] Absent red flags, an underwriter may reasonably rely on a written statement from an issuer official that he or she is not a party to a disclosed conflict. The reasonableness of an underwriter’s reliance on such a written statement will depend on all the relevant facts and circumstances, including the facts revealed in connection with the underwriter’s due diligence in regards to the transaction generally or in determining whether the underwriter itself has any actual material conflicts of interest or potential material conflicts of interest that must be disclosed.
[21] See also note 30 infra.
[22] In offerings where a syndicate is formed, the disclosure obligation for an underwriter to make its dealer-specific disclosures is triggered – if any such actual material conflicts of interest or potential material conflicts of interest must be so disclosed – when such underwriter becomes engaged as a member of the underwriting syndicate (except with regard to conflicts discovered or arising after such co-managing underwriter has been engaged). Consistent with the obligation of sole underwriters and syndicate managers, each underwriter in the syndicate must make any applicable dealer-specific disclosures discovered or arising after being engaged as an underwriter in the syndicate as soon as practicable after being discovered and with sufficient time for the issuer to fully evaluate such a conflict and its implications.
[23] For example, an actual material conflict of interest or potential material conflict of interest may not be present until an underwriter has recommended a particular financing structure. In that case, the disclosure must be provided in sufficient time before the execution of a contract with the underwriter to allow the issuer official to fully evaluate the recommendation, as described under “Required Disclosures to Issuers.”
[24] The MSRB acknowledges that not all transactions proceed along the same timeline or pathway. The timeframes expressed herein should be viewed in light of the overarching goals of Rule G-17 and the purposes that the disclosures are intended to serve as further described in this notice. The various timeframes set out in this notice are not intended to establish strict, hair-trigger tripwires resulting in mere technical rule violations, so long as an underwriter acts in substantial compliance with such timeframes and meets the key objectives for providing disclosure under the notice. Nevertheless, an underwriter’s fair dealing obligation to an issuer in particular facts and circumstances may demand prompt adherence to the timelines set out in this notice. Stated differently, if an underwriter does not timely deliver a disclosure and, as a result, the issuer: (i) does not have clarity throughout all substantive stages of a financing regarding the roles of its professionals, (ii) is not aware of conflicts of interest promptly after they arise and well before the issuer effectively becomes fully committed – either formally (e.g., through execution of a contract) or informally (e.g., due to having already expended substantial time and effort ) – to completing the transaction with the underwriter, and/or (iii) does not have the information required to be disclosed with sufficient time to take such information into consideration and, thereby, to make an informed decision about the key decisions on the financing, then the underwriter generally will have violated its fair-dealing obligations under Rule G-17, absent other mitigating facts and circumstances.
[25] An underwriter delivering a disclosure in order to meet a fair dealing obligation must obtain (or attempt to obtain) proper acknowledgement. When there is an underwriting syndicate, only the syndicate manager, as the dealer responsible for delivering the standard disclosures to the issuer, must obtain (or attempt to obtain) proper acknowledgement from the issuer for such disclosures.
[26] Absent red flags, and subject to an underwriter’s ability to reasonably rely on a representation from an issuer official that he or she has the authority to bind the issuer by contract with the underwriter, an underwriter may reasonably rely on a written delegation by an authorized issuer official in, among other things, the issuer’s request for proposals to another issuer official to receive and acknowledge receipt of a disclosure. The reasonableness of an underwriter’s reliance upon an issuer’s representation as to these matters will depend on all of the relevant facts and circumstances, including the facts revealed in connection with the underwriter’s due diligence in regards to the transaction generally.
[27] For purposes of this notice, the term “e-mail read receipt” means an automatic response generated by a recipient issuer official confirming that an e-mail has been opened. While an e-mail read receipt may generally be an acceptable form of an issuer’s written acknowledgement under this notice, an underwriter may not rely on such an e-mail read receipt as an issuer’s written acknowledgement where such reliance is unreasonable under all of the facts and circumstances, such as where the underwriter is on notice that the issuer official to whom the e-mail is addressed has not in fact received or opened the e-mail.
[28] The need for underwriters to have a reasonable basis for representations and other material information provided to issuers extends to the reasonableness of assumptions underlying the material information being provided. If an underwriter would not rely on any statements made or information provided for its own purposes, it should refrain from making the statement or providing the information to the issuer, or should provide any appropriate disclosures or other information that would allow the issuer to adequately assess the reliability of the statement or information before relying upon it. Further, underwriters should be careful to distinguish statements made to issuers that represent opinion rather than factual information and to ensure that the issuer is aware of this distinction.
[29] As a general matter, a response to a request for proposal should not be treated as merely a sales pitch without regulatory consequence, but instead should be treated with full seriousness that issuers have the expectation that representations made in such responses are true and accurate.
[30] In the circumstance where a dealer proposing to act as an underwriter in a negotiated offering recommends a financing structure or product prior to the time at which an underwriting syndicate is formed, such dealer shall have the same obligations to make any applicable standard disclosures, as if it were a sole underwriter or syndicate manager for purposes of the obligations described under “Required Disclosure to the Issuer” (e.g., to make the standard disclosure concerning the arm’s-length nature of the underwriter-issuer relationship at the earliest stages of the underwriter’s relationship with the issuer with respect to an issue), including complying with corresponding requirements to maintain and preserve records.
[31] If a complex municipal securities financing consists of an otherwise routine financing structure that incorporates a unique, atypical, or complex element or product and the issuer personnel have knowledge or experience with respect to the routine elements of the financing, the disclosure of material risks and characteristics may be limited to those relating to such specific element or product and any material impact such element or product may have on other features that would normally be viewed as routine.
[32] Respectively, the London Inter-bank Offered Rate (i.e., “LIBOR”), the SIFMA Municipal Swap Index (i.e., “SIFMA”), and Secured Overnight Financing Rate (“SOFR”). The MSRB notes that its references to LIBOR, SIFMA, and SOFR are illustrative only and non-exclusive. Any financings involving a benchmark interest rate index may be complex, particularly if an issuer is unlikely to fully understand the components of that index, its material risks, or its possible interaction with other indexes.
[33] For purposes of determining when an underwriter recommends a financing structure in a negotiated offering or recommends a complex municipal securities financing in a negotiated offering (a “Complex Municipal Securities Financing Recommendation”), the MSRB’s guidance on the meaning of “recommendation” for dealers in MSRB Notice 2014-07: SEC Approves MSRB Rule G-47 on Time-of-Trade Disclosure Obligations, MSRB Rules D-15 and G-48 on Sophisticated Municipal Market Professionals, and Revisions to MSRB Rule G-19 on Suitability of Recommendations and Transactions (March 12, 2014) is applicable by analogy. For example, whether an underwriter has made a Complex Municipal Securities Financing Recommendation is not susceptible to a bright line definition but turns on the facts and circumstances of the particular situation. An important factor in determining whether a Complex Municipal Securities Financing Recommendation has been made is whether – given its content, context, and manner of presentation— a particular communication from an underwriter to an issuer regarding a financing structure or product reasonably would be viewed as a call to action or reasonably would influence an issuer to engage in a such a financing structure or product deemed a complex municipal securities financing structure. In general, the more individually tailored the underwriter’s communication is to a specific issuer about a complex municipal securities financing structure, the greater the likelihood that the communication reasonably would be viewed as a Complex Municipal Securities Financing Recommendation.
[34] An underwriter must make reasonable judgments regarding whether it has recommended a financing structure or product to an issuer and whether a particular financing structure or product recommended by the underwriter to the issuer is complex, understanding that the fact that a structure or product has become relatively common in the market does not reduce its complexity. Not all negotiated offerings involve a recommendation by the underwriter(s), such as where a sole underwriter merely executes a transaction already structured by the issuer or its municipal advisor.
[35] For example, when a Complex Municipal Securities Financing Recommendation for a VRDO is made, the underwriter who recommends a VRDO should inform the issuer of the risk of interest rate fluctuations and material risks of any associated credit or liquidity facilities (e.g., the risk that the issuer might not be able to replace the facility upon its expiration and might be required to repay the facility provider over a short period of time). As an additional example, if the underwriter recommends that the issuer swap the floating rate interest payments on the VRDOs to fixed rate payments under a swap, the underwriter must disclose the material financial risks (including market, credit, operational, and liquidity risks) and material financial characteristics of the recommended swap (e.g., the material economic terms of the swap, the material terms relating to the operation of the swap, and the material rights and obligations of the parties during the term of the swap), as well as the material financial risks associated with the VRDO. Such disclosure should be sufficient to allow the issuer to assess the magnitude of its potential exposure as a result of the complex municipal securities financing. Such disclosures must also inform the issuer that there may be accounting, legal, and other risks associated with the swap and that the issuer should consult with other professionals concerning such risks. If the underwriter who has made a Complex Municipal Financing Securities Recommendation is affiliated with the swap dealer proposed to be the executing swap dealer, the underwriter may satisfy its disclosure obligation with respect to the swap if such disclosure has been provided to the issuer by the affiliated swap dealer or the issuer’s swap or other financial advisor that is independent of such underwriter and the swap dealer, as long as the underwriter has a reasonable basis for belief in the truthfulness and completeness of such disclosure. If the issuer decides to enter into a swap with another dealer, the underwriter is not required to make disclosures with regard to that swap product under this notice. The MSRB notes that a dealer who recommends a swap or security-based swap to a municipal entity may also be subject to rules of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission or those of the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”).
[36] For example, a conflict of interest may exist when the underwriter who makes a Complex Municipal Securities Financing Recommendation to an issuer is also the provider, or an affiliate of the provider, of a swap used by an issuer to hedge a municipal securities offering or when an underwriter receives compensation from a swap provider for recommending the swap. See also “Conflicts of Interest/Payments to or from Third Parties” herein.
[37] Even a financing in which the interest rate is benchmarked to an index that is commonly used in the municipal marketplace (e.g., SIFMA) may be complex to an issuer that does not understand the components of that index or its possible interaction with other indexes.
[38] See note 19 supra.
[39] Page after page of complex legal jargon in small print would not be consistent with an underwriter’s fair dealing obligation under this notice.
[40] Underwriters should be able to leverage such materials for internal training and risk management purposes.
[41] Underwriters that assist issuers in preparing official statements must remain cognizant of their duties under federal securities laws. With respect to primary offerings of municipal securities, the SEC has noted, “By participating in an offering, an underwriter makes an implied recommendation about the securities.” See Exchange Act Release No. 26100 (Sept. 22, 1988) (proposing Exchange Act Rule 15c2-12) at text following fn. 70. The SEC has stated that “this recommendation itself implies that the underwriter has a reasonable basis for belief in the truthfulness and completeness of the key representations made in any disclosure documents used in the offerings.” Furthermore, pursuant to Exchange Act Rule 15c2-12(b)(5), an underwriter may not purchase or sell municipal securities in most primary offerings unless the underwriter has reasonably determined that the issuer or an obligated person has entered into a written undertaking to provide certain types of secondary market disclosure and has a reasonable basis for relying on the accuracy of the issuer’s ongoing disclosure representations. Exchange Act Release No. 34961 (Nov. 10, 1994) (adopting continuing disclosure provisions of Exchange Act Rule 15c2-12) at text following fn. 52.
[42]The MSRB has previously observed that whether an underwriter has dealt fairly with an issuer for purposes of Rule G-17 is dependent upon all of the facts and circumstances of an underwriting and is not dependent solely on the price of the issue. See MSRB Notice 2009-54 (Sept. 29, 2009) and the 1997 Interpretation (note 2 supra). See also “Retail Order Periods” herein.
[43] Rule G-13(b)(iii) provides: “For purposes of subparagraph (i), a quotation shall be deemed to represent a ‘bona fide bid for, or offer of, municipal securities’ if the broker, dealer or municipal securities dealer making the quotation is prepared to purchase or sell the security which is the subject of the quotation at the price stated in the quotation and under such conditions, if any, as are specified at the time the quotation is made.”
[44]See 1997 Interpretation (note 2 supra).
[45] See also “Required Disclosures to Issuers” herein.
[46] Underwriters should be mindful that, depending on the facts and circumstances, such an arrangement may be inferred from a purposeful but not otherwise justified pattern of transactions or other course of action, even without the existence of a formal written agreement.
[47]See MSRB Interpretation on Priority of Orders for Securities in a Primary Offering under Rule G-17, MSRB interpretation of October 12, 2010, reprinted in MSRB Rule Book. The MSRB also reminds underwriters of previous MSRB guidance on the pricing of securities sold to retail investors. See Guidance on Disclosure and Other Sales Practice Obligations to Individual and Other Retail Investors in Municipal Securities, MSRB Notice 2009-42 (July 14, 2009).
[48] In general, a “going away” order is an order for new issue securities for which a customer is already conditionally committed. See Exchange Act Release No. 62715, File No. SR-MSRB-2009-17 (August 13, 2010).
[49]See MSRB Rule G-20 Interpretation — Dealer Payments in Connection With the Municipal Securities Issuance Process (January 29, 2007), reprinted in MSRB Rule Book.
[50]See In the Matter of RBC Capital Markets Corporation, Exchange Act Release No. 59439 (Feb. 24, 2009) (settlement in connection with broker-dealer alleged to have violated MSRB Rules G-20 and G‑17 for payment of lavish travel and entertainment expenses of city officials and their families associated with rating agency trips, which expenditures were subsequently reimbursed from bond proceeds as costs of issuance); In the Matter of Merchant Capital, L.L.C., Exchange Act Release No. 60043 (June 4, 2009) (settlement in connection with broker-dealer alleged to have violated MSRB rules for payment of travel and entertainment expenses of family and friends of senior officials of issuer and reimbursement of the expenses from issuers and from proceeds of bond offerings).
Uniform Practice and Rule G-15 on Customer Confirmations
This notice addresses several questions that have arisen concerning Board rules G-12 and G-15. Board rule G-12 establishes uniform industry procedures for the processing, clearance, and settlement of transactions in municipal securities... Board rule G-15 requires municipal securities professionals to send written confirmations of transactions to customers, and specifies the information required to be set forth on the confirmation.
Settlement Dates
In order to establish uniform settlement dates for "regular way" transactions in municipal securities, rule G-12(b)(i)(B) defines the term "business day" as "a day recognized by the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. [the "NASD"] as a day on which securities transactions may be settled." The practice of the NASD has been to exclude from the category of "business day," any day widely designated as a legal bank holiday, and to notify the NASD membership accordingly. Such notices set forth the NASD’s trade and settlement date schedules for periods which include a legal holiday.
"Catastrophe" Call Features
Rules G-12 and G-15 require that confirmations of transactions set forth a "description of the securities, including at a minimum… if the securities are subject to redemption prior to maturity (callable)… an indication to such effect…" (paragraphs G-12(c)(v)(E) and G-15(a)(v)[*]). Both rules also require that in transactions in callable securities effected on a yield basis, dollar price must be shown and "the calculation of dollar price shall be to the lower of price to call or price to maturity" (paragraphs G-12(c)(v)(I) and G-15(a)(viii)[†]).
The references to "callable" securities and pricing to call in rules G-12 and G-15 do not refer to "catastrophe" call features, such as those relating to acts of God or eminent domain, which are beyond the control of the issuer of the securities.
[*] [Currently codified at rule G-15(a)(i)(C)(2)(a)]
[†] [Currently codified at rule G-15(a)(i)(A)(5)]
Agency Transactions: Remuneration
Agency transactions: remuneration. This will acknowledge receipt of your letter dated November 1, 1977 in which you request an interpretation concerning the provision in Board rule G-15(b)(ii)[*] which requires that "the source and amount of any commission or other remuneration" received by a municipal securities dealer in a transaction in which the municipal securities dealer is acting as agent for a customer be disclosed on the confirmation to the customer.
The reference to the "amount of any commission or other remuneration" requires that an aggregate dollar amount be shown, in a purchase transaction on behalf of an equivalent of the dealer concession, and, if applicable, any additional charge to the customer above the price paid to the seller of the securities. In a sale transaction on behalf of a customer, this would normally be the difference between the net price paid by the purchaser of the securities and the proceeds to the customer. If a percentage of par value or unit profit were shown it would be difficult for many customers to relate this information to the "total dollar amount of [the] transaction" required by rule G-15(a)(xi)[†] to be shown on the confirmation.
The reference in rule G-15(b)(ii)[*] to the "source" of remuneration would not require you to differentiate between the concession and any additional charge. Standard language could be included on the confirmation to indicate that your remuneration may include dealer concessions and other charges. MSRB interpretation of November 10, 1977.
[†] [Currently codified at rule G-15(a)(i)(A)(6)(a)]
[*] [Currently codified at rule G-15(a)(i)(A)(1)(e)]
Callable Securities: "Catastrophe" Calls
Callable securities: "catastrophe" calls. This will acknowledge receipt of your letter dated October 20, 1977 which has been referred to me for reply. In your letter you request an interpretation of the provisions in rules G-12 and G-15 requiring that the dollar price for transactions in callable securities effected on a yield basis be priced to the lower of price to call or price to maturity. (See rules G-12(c)(v)(I) and G-15(a)(viii))[*].
At its meeting held October 25-26, 1977, the Board confirmed that the requirements in rules G-12 and G-15 relating to pricing to call do not include "catastrophe" calls, that is, calls which occur as a result of events specified in the bond indenture which are beyond the control of the issuer. MSRB interpretation of November 7, 1977.
[*] [Currently codified at rule G-15(a)(i)(A)(5)]
INTERPRETIVE NOTICE ON RECORDKEEPING
The Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (the "Board") has received a number of inquiries concerning Board rules G-8 and G-9. These rules require municipal securities brokers and municipal securities dealers to make and keep current certain specified records concerning their municipal securities business and to preserve such records for specified periods of time. This interpretive notice addresses several of the more frequent inquiries received by the Board regarding these rules.
General Purposes of Recordkeeping Rules
The Board’s recordkeeping rules are designed to require organizations engaged in the municipal securities business to maintain appropriate records concerning their activities in such business. In writing the rules, the Board adopted the approach of specifying in some detail the information to be reflected in the various records. The Board believed that this approach would provide helpful guidance to municipal securities professionals as well as the regulatory agencies charged with the responsibility of examining the records of such firms. At the same time, the Board attempted to provide a degree of flexibility to firms concerning the manner in which their records are to be maintained, recognizing that various recordkeeping systems could provide a complete and accurate record of a firm’s municipal securities activities. The interpretations set forth in this notice are intended to be consistent with the foregoing purposes.
This notice is not intended to address all of the questions which have arisen, or may arise; the Board will continue its policy of responding to written requests for individual interpretations and may issue further interpretive notices on recordkeeping should additional questions of general interest arise.
The following topics are covered in this interpretive notice:General Purposes of Recordkeeping Rules
Election to Follow Board or Commission Recordkeeping Rules
Maintenance of Records on a Trade Date or Settlement Date Basis
Current Posting of Records
Unit System Method of Recordkeeping
Rule G-8(a)(ii)—Account Records
Rule G-8(a)(iii)—Securities Records
Rules G-8(a)(vi) and (vii)—Records for Agency and Principal Transactions
Rule G-8(a)(xi)—Customer Account Information
Rule G-8(c)—Non-Clearing Municipal Securities Brokers and Municipal Securities Dealers
Rule G-9(b)(viii)(C)—Preservation of Written Communications
Election to Follow Board or Commission Recordkeeping Rules
Rules G-8(f) and G-9(g) provide that municipal securities brokers and municipal securities dealers other than bank dealers, who are in compliance with the recordkeeping rules of the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Commission"), will be deemed to be in compliance with Board rules G-8 and G-9, provided that the following additional records, not specified in the Commission’s rules, are maintained by such firms: records of uncompleted transactions involving customers (subparagraph (a)(iv)(D)); records relating to syndicate transactions (paragraph (a)(viii)); new account information (paragraph (a)(xi)); and information concerning customer complaints (paragraph (a)(xii)). Conversely, Commission rules 17a-3 and 17a-4 provide that securities firms engaged in the municipal securities business will satisfy all regulatory requirements concerning recordkeeping with respect to their municipal securities business if they are in compliance with the Board’s rules.
Securities firms must determine to comply with either the Board or Commission rules, but are not required to file with either the Board or the commission a formal written notice of election. Satisfactory compliance with either set of rules will be subject to determination in the course of periodic compliance examinations conducted by the regulatory organizations charged with enforcement of Board and Commission rules.
Maintenance of Records on a Trade Date or Settlement Date Basis
Under rule G-8, records concerning purchases and sales of municipal securities may be maintained on either a trade date or settlement date basis, provided that all records relating to purchases and sales are maintained on a consistent basis. For example, if a municipal securities broker or municipal securities dealer maintains its records of original entry concerning purchases and sales (rule G-8(a)(i)) on a settlement date basis, the municipal securities broker or municipal securities dealer must also maintain its account records (rule G-8(a)(ii)) and securities records (rule G-8(a)(iii)) on the same basis.
The above records may not be maintained on a clearance date basis, that is, the date the securities are actually delivered or received. Records maintained on a clearance date basis would not accurately reflect obligations of a municipal securities broker or municipal securities dealer to deliver or accept delivery of securities. Of course, the date of clearance should be noted in the records of original entry, account records and securities records, regardless of whether these records are kept on a trade date or settlement date basis.
Current Posting of Records
Rule G-8 provides that every municipal securities broker or municipal securities dealer must make and keep current the records specified in the rule. The Board has received inquiries as to the time within which records must be posted to satisfy the currency requirement.
Blotters or other records of original entry showing purchases and sales of municipal securities should be prepared no later than the end of the business day following the trade date. Transactions involving the purchase and sale of securities should be posted to the account records no later than settlement date and to the securities records no later than the end of the business day following the settlement date. Records relating to securities movements and cash receipts and disbursements should reflect such events on the date they occur and should be posted to the appropriate records no later than the end of the following business day.
Commission rule 17a-11 requires municipal securities dealers, other than bank dealers, to give immediate notice to the Commission and their designated examining authorities of any failure to make and keep current the required records, and to take corrective action within forty-eight hours after the transmittal of such notice.
Unit System Method of Recordkeeping
Under rule G-8, records may be maintained in a variety of ways, including a unit system of recordkeeping. In such a system, records are kept in the form of a group of documents or related groups of documents. For example, customer account records may consist of copies of confirmations and other related source documents, if necessary, arranged by customer.
A unit system of recordkeeping is an acceptable system for purposes of rule G-8 if the information required to be shown is clearly and accurately reflected and there is an adequate basis for audit. This would require in most instances that each record in a unit system be arranged in appropriate sequence, whether chronological or numerical, and fully integrated into the overall recordkeeping system for purposes of posting to general ledger accounts.
Rules G-8(a)(ii)—Account Records
Rule G-8(a)(ii) requires every municipal securities broker and municipal securities dealer to maintain account records for each customer account and the account of the municipal securities broker and municipal securities dealer, showing all purchases and sales, all receipts and deliveries of securities, all receipts and disbursements of cash, and all other debits and credits to such account.
The account records may be kept in several different formats. Ledger entries organized separately for each customer and for the municipal securities broker or municipal securities dealer, showing the requisite information, would clearly satisfy the requirements of rule G-8(a)(ii).
The requirements of rule G-8(a)(ii) can also be satisfied by a unit system of recordkeeping. See discussion above. Under such a system, a municipal securities professional might maintain files, organized by customer, containing copies of confirmations and other pertinent documents, if necessary, which reflect all the information required by rule G-8(a)(ii).
The question has also been raised whether the account records requirement of rule G-8(a)(ii) can be satisfied by an electronic data processing system which can produce account records by tracing through separate transactions. The Board is of the view that such a system is acceptable if the account records should be obtainable without delay, although the records need not be maintained by customer prior to being produced. The account records so produced must also reflect clearly and accurately all the required information, provide an adequate basis for audit and be fully integrated into the overall recordkeeping system. Under rule G-27, on supervision, a municipal securities principal is required to supervise the activities of municipal securities representatives with respect to customer accounts and other matters. In this connection, it may be appropriate to obtain printouts of customer accounts on a periodic basis.
The Board believes that it is important to maintain account records in the fashion described above in view of several of the Board’s fair practice rules, such as the rules on suitability and churning. Account records will be important both as a tool for management to detect violations of these rules and for enforcement of these rules by the regulatory agencies conducting compliance examinations or responding to complaints.
The requirement to maintain account records does not apply to a firm which effects transactions exclusively with other municipal securities professionals and has no customers, as defined in paragraph (e) of rule G-8.
Rule G-8(a)(iii)—Securities Records
Rule G-8(a)(iii) requires that records be kept showing separately for each municipal security all long and short positions carried by a municipal securities broker or municipal securities dealer for its account or for the account of a customer, the location of all such securities long and the offsetting position to all such securities short, and the name or other designation of the account in which each position is carried.
The securities records should reflect not only purchases and sales, but also any movement of securities, such as whether securities have been sent out for validation or transfer. If there is no activity with respect to a particular security, it is not necessary to make daily entries for the security in the securities records. The last entry will be deemed to be carried forward until there is further activity involving the security.
Rule G-8(a)(iii) requires that the securities records show all long security count differences and short count differences classified by the date of physical count and verification on which they were discovered. The Board currently has no rule requiring municipal securities professionals to make periodic securities counts. However, if such counts are made, all count differences must be noted as provided in this section. Commission rule 17a-13 requires municipal securities dealers, other than bank dealers and certain securities firms exempted from the rule, to examine and count securities at least once in each quarter.
The requirement to maintain securities records under rule G-8 does not apply to a firm which effects municipal securities transactions exclusively with other municipal securities professionals and has no customers, as defined in paragraph (e) of rule G-8, provided the firm does not carry positions for its own account and records or fails to deliver, fails to receive and bank loans are reflected in other records of the firm.
Rules G-8(a)(vi) and (vii)—Records for Agency and Principal Transactions
Rules G-8(a)(vi) and (vii) require municipal securities brokers and municipal securities dealers to make and keep records for each agency order and each transaction effected by the municipal securities broker or municipal securities dealer as principal. The records may be in the form of trading tickets or similar documents. In each case, the records must contain certain specified information, including "to the extent feasible, the time of execution."
The phrase "to the extent feasible" is intended to require municipal securities professionals to note the time of execution for each agency and principal transaction except in extraordinary circumstances when it is impossible to determine the exact time of execution. In such cases, the municipal securities professional should note the approximate time of execution and indicate that it is an approximation.
Rule G-8(a)(xi)—Customer Account Information
Rule G-8(a)(xi) requires a municipal securities broker or municipal securities dealer to obtain certain information for each customer. Several distinct questions have been raised with respect to this provision.
The requirement to obtain the requisite information may be satisfied in a number of ways. Some municipal securities brokers and municipal securities dealers have prepared questionnaires which they have had their customers complete and return. Others have instructed their salesmen to obtain the information from customers over the telephone at the time orders are placed. It is not necessary to obtain a written statement from a customer to be in compliance with the provision.
Except for the tax identification or social security number of a customer, the customer account information required by this provision must be obtained prior to the settlement of a transaction. The Board believes that such a requirement is reasonable since the information is basic and important.
The requirement in subparagraph (C) of rule G-8(a)(xi) to obtain the tax identification or social security number of a customer tracks the requirement in section 103.35, Part 103 of Title 31 of the Code of Federal Regulations, which was adopted by the Treasury Department and became effective in June 1972. Under this section, every broker, dealer and bank must obtain the tax identification or social security number of customers. If a broker, dealer or bank is unable to secure such information after reasonable effort, it must maintain a record identifying all such accounts. The Board interprets subparagraph (C) of rule G-8(a)(xi) in a similar fashion to require municipal securities professionals to make a reasonable effort to obtain a customer’s tax identification or social security number and, if they are unable to do so, to keep a record of that fact.
Several inquiries have focused on the scope of subparagraph (G) of rule G-8(a)(xi) which requires that a record be made and kept of the name and address of the beneficial owner or owners of such account if other than the customer and transactions are to be confirmed to such owner or owners.
This provision applies to the situation in which securities are confirmed to an account which has not directly placed the order for the securities. This frequently occurs in connection with investment advisory accounts, where the investment advisor places an order for a client and directs the executing firm to confirm the transaction directly to the investment advisor’s client.
Under rule G-8, the only information which must be obtained in such circumstances for the account to which the transaction is confirmed is the name and address of the account, information which would have to be obtained in any event in order to transmit the confirmation. Since the investment advisor itself is the customer, the other items of customer account information set forth in rule G-8(a)(xi) need not be obtained for the investment advisor’s client. The customer account information applicable to institutional accounts, however, must be obtained with respect to the investment advisor. Also, the account records required by rule G-8(a)(ii) would not be required to be maintained for the investment advisor’s client, although such records would have to be maintained with respect to the account of the investment advisor.
A municipal securities professional is not required to ascertain the name and address of the beneficial owner or owners of an account if such information is not voluntarily furnished. Subparagraph G-8(a)(xi)(G) applies only when an order is entered on behalf of another person and the transaction is to be confirmed directly to the other person.
A recent court decision, Rolf v. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co. Inc., et al. issued on January 17, 1977, in the United States District Court, Southern District of New York, may have important implications with respect to the obligations generally of securities professionals to beneficial owners of accounts, especially to clients of investment advisors. We commend your attention to this decision, which has been appealed.
Rule G-8(c)—Non-Clearing Municipal Securities Brokers and Municipal Securities Dealers
Rule G-8(c) provides that a non-clearing municipal securities broker or municipal securities dealer is not required to make and keep the books and records prescribed by rule G-8 if they are made and kept by a clearing broker, dealer, bank or clearing agency. Accordingly, to the extent that records required by rule G-8 are maintained for a municipal securities broker or municipal securities dealer by a clearing agent, the municipal securities broker or municipal securities dealer does not have to maintain such records. A non-clearing municipal securities broker or municipal securities dealer is still responsible for the accurate maintenance and preservation of the records if they are maintained by a clearing agent other than a clearing broker or dealer, and should assure itself that the records are being maintained by the clearing agent in accordance with applicable recordkeeping requirements of the Board.
In the case of a bank dealer, clearing arrangements must be approved by the appropriate regulatory agency for the bank dealer. The bank regulatory agencies are each considering the adoption of procedures to approve clearing arrangements. It is contemplated that these procedures will require the inclusion of certain provisions in clearing agreements, such as an undertaking by the clearing agent to maintain the bank dealer’s records in compliance with rules G-8 and G-9, and will specify the mechanics for having such arrangements considered and approved. The bank regulatory agencies indicate that they will advise bank dealers subject to their respective jurisdictions on this matter in the near future.
In the case of a securities firm, Commission approval is required for all clearing arrangements with entities other than a broker, dealer or bank. The Commission has recently proposed an amendment to its rule 17a-4 which would eliminate the need to obtain Commission approval of clearing arrangements with such other entities, provided that certain specified conditions are met. If the proposed rule is adopted, the Board would make a corresponding change in rule G-8.
If an agent clears transactions, but transmits copies of all records to the municipal securities broker or municipal securities dealer, and these records are preserved by the municipal securities broker or municipal securities dealer in accordance with rule G-9, the clearing arrangement is not subject to the rule G-8(c).
Rule G-9(b)(viii)(C)—Preservation of Written Communications
Subparagraph (C) of rule G-9(b)(viii) requires municipal securities brokers and municipal securities dealers to preserve for three years all written communications received or sent, including inter-office memoranda, relating to the conduct of the activities of such municipal securities broker or municipal securities dealer with respect to municipal securities.
The communications required to be preserved by this provision relate to the conduct of a firm’s activities with respect to municipal securities. Accordingly, such documents as internal memoranda regarding offerings or bids, letters to or from customers and other municipal securities professionals regarding municipal securities, and research reports must be preserved. Documents pertaining purely to administrative matters, such as vacation policy and the like, would not have to be preserved for purposes of the rule.
Quotation of municipal securities
Quotation of municipal securities. This will acknowledge receipt of your letter dated February 9, 1977 concerning the Board’s proposed rule G-13 on quotations relating to municipal securities. In your letter you raise certain questions concerning the intent and application of paragraph (b)(ii) of proposed rule G-13, which prohibits a municipal securities professional from distributing or publishing a municipal securities quotation, or causing such a quotation to be distributed or published, unless the quotation is based upon the professional’s best judgment as to the fair market value of the security.
While the provision in question would undoubtedly apply to situations involving outright fraud, the Board believes the rule to have appropriate application in other circumstances as well. Thus, the Board has attempted in paragraph (b)(ii) to proscribe conduct which, in the Board’s opinion, constitutes bad business practice but may not, depending on the circumstances, constitute fraud. The Board firmly believes that as a matter of just and equitable principles of trade in the municipal securities industry and with a view to promoting free and open markets in municipal securities, certain practices should not be condoned, even though they do not necessarily rise to the level of fraud or cannot be proven to constitute fraud.
Some examples of how paragraph (b)(ii) would operate may be useful. First, assume that a dealer submits a bid for bonds, knowing that they have been called by the issuer. The bonds are not general market bonds and the fact that they have been called is not widely known. While called bonds ordinarily trade at a premium, the dealer’s bid is based on the value of the bonds as though they had not been called and is accepted by the dealer on the other side of the trade who is unaware of the called status of the bonds. In these circumstances, the bid clearly would not have been based upon the best judgment of the dealer making it as to the fair market value of the bonds. While one might argue that the dealer accepting the bid should have known of the called status of the bonds, the dealer making the bid acted unethically and in a manner not conducive to free and open markets in municipal securities. In the Board’s view, the actions of the dealer making the bid should not be condoned, although a charge of fraud might be difficult to sustain in dealings between professionals and might be inappropriate. The improper nature of the dealer’s conduct would be exacerbated, of course, if the person on the other side of the transaction is a non-professional. However, difficulties in proof that the conduct of the dealer was fraudulent suggest that the best judgment rule would provide an appropriate alternative basis for enforcement action.
Another situation that would be covered by the best judgment rule is one in which a dealer submits a bid for bonds based on valuations obtained from independent sources, which in turn are based on mistaken assumptions concerning the nature of the securities in question. The circumstances indicate that the dealer submitting the bid knows that the securities have a substantially greater market value than the price bid, but the fact that independent valuations were obtained, albeit based on mistaken facts, clouds the dealer’s culpability.
A third situation to which the best judgment rule would apply is one in which a dealer makes a bid for or offer of a security without any knowledge as to the value of the security or the value of comparable securities. While the Board does not intend that the best judgment of a dealer as to the fair market value of a security be second-guessed for purposes of the proposed rule, the Board does intend that the dealer be required to act responsibly and to exercise some judgment in submitting a quotation. In other words, a quotation which has been “pulled out of the air” is not based on the best judgment of the dealer and, in the interests of promoting free and open markets in municipal securities, should not be encouraged.
Given the manner in which the Board intends the “best judgment” rule to operate, the Board concluded that it would not have an anti-competitive impact on the municipal markets. The proposed rule is not intended to prohibit legitimate price discounts or mark-ups, as the case may be, based upon a dealer’s anticipation of the direction of the movement of the markets and other factors. The Board does not intend to interfere with legitimate pricing mechanisms and recognizes that there may be a variety of quotations with respect to a given security, each of which would comply with the terms of the proposed rule.
While it is not possible to anticipate all of the specific fact situations that might run afoul of the “best judgment” rule, I would like to make some general observations concerning the operation of the proposed rule. As you know, one of Congress’ principal purposes in calling for the establishment of the Board was to promote the development of a body of rules for the municipal securities industry that would furnish quidelines for good business conduct. The Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs observed in its Report on the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975 that prior to the legislation, the conduct of municipal market professionals could be controlled only after the fact through enforcement by the Commission of the fraud prohibitions of the federal securities laws. The Senate Committee expressed hope that a self-regulatory body like the Board would develop prophylactic rules for the industry which would deter unethical and fraudulent practices in the first instance. See Senate Report 94-75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 42-43. MSRB interpretation of February 24, 1977.
Interpretive Notice on Professional Qualifications
On December 23, 1976, the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (the "Board") issued an interpretive notice addressing certain questions received by the Board with respect to its professional qualifications rules (rules G-2 through G-7). Since that time, the Board has received additional questions concerning rule G-3 which are discussed in this interpretive notice.
1. Requirements for Financial and Operations Principals.
Under the rule G-3(b)(ii)[*], every municipal securities broker and municipal securities dealer other than a bank dealer is required to have at least one qualified financial and operations principal. As defined in the rule, this person is responsible for the overall supervision and preparation of financial reports to the Securities and Exchange Commission and self-regulatory organizations and for the processing, clearance, safekeeping and recordkeeping activities of the firm. If more than one person shares these overall supervisory responsibilities, each such person must be qualified as a financial and operations principal.
The question has been asked whether a financial and operations principal whose duties relate solely to financial and operational matters and not, for example, to underwriting, trading, or sales functions must qualify also as a municipal securities principal by passing the Board's municipal securities principal examination when it is prescribed. The Board does not intend to impose such a requirement on persons whose functions are limited to those set forth in the definition of a financial and operations principal.
The question has also been asked whether a person performing only the functions of a financial and operations principal on and after December 1, 1975 would be "grandfathered" as a municipal securities principal for purposes of taking the Board's municipal securities principal examination when prescribed if such person begins supervising underwriting, trading or sales functions. Activities relating to financial and operational matters are substantially different from those relating to underwriting, trading and sales or other categories of activities supervised by municipal securities principals. The Board does not intend, therefore, that financial and operations principals be "grandfathered" for purposes of the Board's examination requirements for municipal securities principals, or that a financial and operations principal would be qualified to engage in such other supervisory activities solely by reason of having met the Board's requirements for financial and operations principals.
The Board has also been asked whether senior officers or general partners of a firm, who may bear ultimate legal responsibility for the financial and operational activities of the firm, must be qualified as financial and operations principals under the Board's rules. Although the answer depends on the particular factual situation, officers or partners not directly involved in the financial and operations affairs of a firm generally would not be required to qualify as financial and operations principals.
2. Activities Requiring Qualification as a Municipal Securities Principal.
The question has been asked whether supervisory personnel in the processing and clearance areas must qualify as the municipal securities principals under rule G-3. In a securities firm, the financial and operations principal ordinarily would be the only person supervising operations-related activities who will be required to pass an examination. With respect to bank dealer supervisory personnel, to whom the financial and operations principal classification does not apply, qualification in a principal capacity in the operations area will not be required unless the person in question exercises policy-making authority. Thus, an individual may supervise a bank dealer's processing activities without qualifying as a municipal securities principal, regardless of the number of persons supervised by such individual, if policy-making functions and discretionary authority are delegated to a higher level.
Somewhat different considerations apply in determining which persons are required to be qualified as municipal securities principals in connection with underwriting, trading, sales or other activities referred to in the Board's rules as municipal securities principal activities. In these areas, the qualification requirements apply to persons having supervisory responsibility with respect to the day-to-day conduct of the activities in question, even though such persons may not have a policy-making role. The Board's conclusions in this regard are based on the fact that in these other areas the supervisory person is responsible for the activities of personnel who communicate directly with issuers, traders, and investors.
3. Activities Requiring Qualification as a Municipal Securities Representative.
In certain cases, communications from customers may be received at a time when a duly qualified municipal securities representative or municipal securities principal is unavailable. Similarly, there may be situations in which it becomes important to advise a customer promptly of transactions effected and orders confirmed, even though the individual responsible for the account may not be able to communicate with the customer at that time.
In many cases under the rules of other self-regulatory organizations, communications of this nature, which in essence reflect a mechanical function, may be received and made by properly supervised competent individuals whose clerical and ministerial functions would not otherwise subject them to qualification requirements. The Board believes the principle underlying this practice and the application of other self-regulatory organizations' qualification rules is sound.
Accordingly, the Board interprets rule G-3 to permit the recording and transmission in customary channels of orders, the reading of approved quotations, and the giving of reports of transactions by non-qualified clerical personnel when the duly qualified municipal securities representative or municipal securities principal who normally handles the account or customer is unavailable. The foregoing interpretation is applicable only to clerical personnel who are: (a) deemed capable and competent by a municipal securities principal or general securities principal to engage in such activities; (b) specifically authorized in writing to perform such functions on an occasional basis as necessary or directed to perform such functions in specific instances, in either case by a duly qualified municipal securities principal or general securities principal; (c) familiar with the normal type and size of transaction effected with or for the customer or the account; and (d) closely supervised by duly qualified municipal personnel.
All orders for municipal securities received by clerical personnel under the foregoing interpretation must be reviewed and approved by duly qualified municipal personnel familiar with the customer or account prior to being accepted or effected by the municipal securities broker or municipal securities dealer. Solicitation of orders by clerical personnel is not permitted. Confirmations of transactions may be given and quotations read by clerical personnel only when approved by duly qualified municipal personnel. Individuals subject to the 90-day apprenticeship requirements of rule G-3(i)[†] are not clerical personnel and are not authorized or permitted to engage in such activities with members of the public.
Also, the question has been raised whether a bank's branch office personnel, who are not otherwise required to be qualified under rule G-3, will be required to take and pass the qualification examination for municipal securities representatives in order to respond to a depositor's inquiry concerning possible investments in municipal securities. Insofar as the branch office personnel merely refer the depositor to qualified bank dealer personnel for discussion concerning the merits of an investment in municipal securities and execution of the depositor's order, the branch office personnel would not be required to be qualified under the Board's professional qualifications requirements. However, if branch office personnel seek to advise the depositor concerning the merits of a possible investment, or otherwise perform more than a purely ministerial function, qualification under the Board's rules would be required.
[*] [ Currently codified at rule G-3(d)(iii)]
[†] [ Currently codified at rule G-3(a)(iii)]