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Confirmation Disclosure and Prevailing Market Price Guidance: Frequently Asked Questions
(First published July 12, 2017)
Effective May 14, 2018, amendments to MSRB Rule G-15 require dealers to disclose additional information on retail customer confirmations for a specified class of principal transactions, including the dealer’s mark-up or mark-down as determined from the prevailing market price (PMP) of the security. Dealers generally also are required to disclose on retail customer confirmations the time of execution and a security-specific URL to the MSRB’s Electronic Municipal Market Access (EMMA®) website.[1] Related amendments to Rule G-30, on prices and commissions, provide guidance on determining the PMP for the purpose of calculating a dealer’s mark-up or mark-down and for other Rule G-30 determinations.
Also, effective May 14, 2018, amendments to Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) Rule 2232 create similar confirmation disclosure requirements for other areas of the fixed income markets. Among other things, the FINRA amendments require dealers to determine their disclosed mark-ups and mark-downs from the PMP of the security that is traded, in accordance with existing guidance under FINRA Rule 2121.
Below are answers to frequently asked questions (FAQs) about the confirmation disclosure requirements under Rule G-15 and related PMP guidance under Rule G-30, Supplementary Material .06 (also referred to as the “waterfall” guidance or analysis). While these FAQs address MSRB rules only, FINRA has also issued guidance for the FINRA rules applicable to agency and corporate bonds. The MSRB and FINRA worked together to produce this guidance. While each has published its own version to refer to MSRB and FINRA rules and materials, respectively, the versions are materially the same and reflect the organizations’ coordinated approach to enhanced confirmation disclosure for debt securities. To the extent the MSRB and FINRA offer different guidance based on differences between the markets for corporate, agency and municipal securities, those differences are discussed in the context of the relevant question and answer.
During the implementation period, the MSRB will continue to work with dealers on questions related to the confirmation disclosure requirements and PMP guidance. Dealers are encouraged to contact the MSRB to suggest additional topics or questions for inclusion in the FAQs. Accordingly, the MSRB may add to, update or revise this guidance. The most recent date for the content of an answer will be clearly marked.
For ease of reference, unless otherwise noted, the term “mark-up” refers both to mark-ups applied to sales to customers and mark-downs applied to purchases from customers, and the term “contemporaneous cost” refers both to contemporaneous cost in the context of sales to customers and contemporaneous proceeds in the context of purchases from customers.
Section 1: When Mark-Up Disclosure Is Required
1.1 When does Rule G-15 require mark-up disclosure?
A dealer is required to disclose on a customer confirmation the mark-up on a transaction in municipal securities with a non-institutional customer if the dealer also executes one or more offsetting principal transaction(s) on the same trading day as the customer transaction in an aggregate trading size that meets or exceeds the size of the customer trade. A non-institutional customer is a customer with an account that is not an institutional account, as defined in MSRB Rule G-8(a)(xi).
As noted during the MSRB’s confirmation disclosure rulemaking process, any intentional delay of a customer execution to avoid triggering the mark-up disclosure requirements may violate Rule G-18, on best execution, and Rule G-17, on conduct of municipal securities and municipal advisory activities.
SR-MSRB-2016-12 Proposed Rule Change to MSRB Rules G-15 and G-30, at 7 (September 1, 2016); MSRB Response to Comments on SR-MSRB-2016-12, at 3-4 (November 14, 2016)
(July 12, 2017)
1.2 Is mark-up disclosure required only where the sizes of same-day customer and principal trades offset each other?
Yes. Mark-up disclosure is required only where a customer trade offsets a same-day principal trade in whole or in part. For example, if a dealer purchased 100 bonds at 9:30 a.m., and then, as principal, satisfied three non-institutional customer buy orders for 50 bonds each in the same security on the same trading day without making any other purchases of the bonds that day, mark-up disclosure would be required only on two of the three customer purchases, since one of the trades would need to be satisfied out of the dealer’s prior inventory rather than offset by the dealer’s same-day principal transaction.
SR-MSRB-2016-12 Proposed Rule Change to MSRB Rules G-15 and G-30, at 4; 7-8 (September 1, 2016); MSRB Response to Comments on SR-MSRB-2016-12, at 3-4 (November 14, 2016); Amendment No. 1 to SR-MSRB-2016-12, at 4 (November 14, 2016)
(July 12, 2017)
1.2.1 Are position moves between separate desks within a firm considered “transactions” for purposes of determining whether a dealer has offsetting transactions that trigger a mark-up disclosure requirement?
No. Mark-up disclosure is triggered under Rule G-15 when a customer trade is offset by one or more “transactions.” For purposes of the rule, the MSRB considers a “transaction” to entail a change of beneficial ownership between parties. Accordingly, if a retail desk within a dealer acquires bonds through a position move from another desk within the same firm and then sells those bonds to a non-institutional customer, the dealer is required to provide the customer with mark-up disclosure only if the dealer bought the bonds in one or more offsetting transactions on the same trading day as the sale to the customer (subject to the exceptions discussed in Question 1.7).
(March 19, 2018)
1.3 When are trades executed by a dealer’s affiliate relevant for determining whether the mark-up disclosure requirements are triggered?
If a dealer’s offsetting principal trade is executed with a dealer affiliate and did not occur at arm’s length, the dealer is required to “look through” to the time and terms of the affiliate’s trade with a third party to determine whether mark-up disclosure is triggered under Rule G-15. On the other hand, if the dealer’s transaction with its affiliate is an arms-length transaction, the dealer would treat that transaction as any other offsetting transaction (i.e., the dealer would not “look through” to the time and terms of the arms-length transaction).
SR-MSRB-2016-12 Proposed Rule Change to MSRB Rules G-15 and G-30, at 9‑10; 23; 26 (September 1, 2016)
(July 12, 2017)
1.4 What is considered an “arms-length transaction” when considering whether a dealer must “look through” to the time and terms of an affiliate’s trade?
The term “arms-length transaction” is defined in Rule G-15(a)(vi)(I) to mean a transaction that was conducted through a competitive process in which non-affiliate firms could also participate, and where the affiliate relationship did not influence the price paid or proceeds received by the dealer. The MSRB has noted that as a general matter, it expects the competitive process used in an arms-length transaction to be one in which non-affiliates have frequently participated. In other words, the MSRB would not view a process, like a request for pricing protocol or posting of bids and offers, as competitive if non-affiliates responded to requests or otherwise participated in only isolated or limited circumstances.
Factors that may be relevant to a dealer’s determination that a transaction with an affiliate was conducted at arm’s length include, but are not limited to: counterparty anonymity during the competitive process to the time of execution; the presence of other competitive bids or offers, in addition to the affiliate's, in the competitive process; contemporaneous market activity in the same or a similar security (or securities) which is used to evaluate the relative competitiveness of bids or offers received during a competitive process; and a lack of preferential arrangements between the affiliates concerning, or based on, the handling of orders between them. The MSRB notes that no one of these factors is necessarily determinative on its own.
SR-MSRB-2016-12 Proposed Rule Change to MSRB Rules G-15 and G-30, at 9 (September 1, 2016)
(July 12, 2017)
(Updated March 19, 2018)
1.5 If a dealer has an exclusive agreement with a non-affiliated dealer under which it always purchases its securities from, or always sells its securities to, that non-affiliate, would the “look through” requirements apply when the dealer transacts with the non-affiliate?
No. The “look through” applies only to certain transactions between affiliated dealers. Under Rule G-15, a “look through” is required when the dealer’s offsetting transaction is with an affiliate and is not an “arms-length transaction.” A transaction with a non-affiliate would not meet these conditions, so a “look through” would not be required. The MSRB notes that dealers should continue to evaluate the terms and circumstances of any such arrangements in light of other MSRB rules and guidance, including best execution. In evaluating these terms and circumstances, dealers should consider whether they diminish the reliability and utility of mark-up disclosure to investors.
(July 12, 2017)
1.6 Does the mark-up disclosure requirement in Rule G-15 apply to transactions that involve a dealer and a registered investment adviser?
No. To trigger the mark-up disclosure requirement in Rule G-15, a dealer must execute a trade with a non-institutional customer. Under the rule, registered investment advisers are institutional customers; accordingly, mark-up disclosure is not required when dealers transact with registered investment advisers. This is the case even where the registered investment adviser with whom the dealer transacted later allocates all or a portion of the securities to a retail account or where the transaction is executed directly for a retail account if the investment adviser has discretion over the transaction. The MSRB notes that this answer is specific to the mark-up disclosure requirement in Rule G-15; it is not intended to alter any other obligations.
(July 12, 2017)
1.7 Are there any exceptions to the mark-up disclosure trigger requirements?
Yes. There are three exceptions. First, disclosure is not required for transactions in municipal fund securities. Second, mark-up disclosure is not necessarily triggered by principal trades that a dealer executes on a trading desk that is functionally separate from a trading desk that executes customer trades, provided the dealer maintains policies and procedures reasonably designed to ensure that the functionally separate trading desk had no knowledge of the customer trades. For example, the exception allows an institutional desk within a dealer to service an institutional customer without necessarily triggering the disclosure requirement for an unrelated trade performed by a separate retail desk within the dealer. Third, disclosure is not required for transactions that are list offering price transactions, as defined in paragraph (d)(vii)(A) of Rule G-14 RTRS Procedures.
SR-MSRB-2016-12 Proposed Rule Change to MSRB Rules G-15 and G-30, at 10 (September 1, 2016)
(July 12, 2017)
1.8 May dealers voluntarily provide mark-up disclosure on additional transactions that do not trigger mandatory disclosure?
Yes. In disclosing this information on a voluntary basis, dealers should be mindful of any applicable MSRB rules. For example, while mark-up disclosure is voluntary for trades that are not triggered by the relevant provisions of Rule G-15, the process for determining the PMP according to Rule G-30 applies in all cases. In addition, to avoid customer confusion, voluntary disclosure should also follow the same format and labeling requirements applicable to mandatory disclosure.
SR-MSRB-2016-12 Proposed Rule Change to MSRB Rules G-15 and G-30, at 13 n. 27 (September 1, 2016)
(July 12, 2017)
1.9 In arrangements involving clearing dealers and introducing or correspondent dealers, who is responsible for mark-up disclosure?
The introducing or correspondent dealer bears the ultimate responsibility for compliance with the disclosure requirements under Rule G-15. Although an introducing or correspondent dealer may use the assistance of a clearing dealer, as it may use other third-party service providers subject to due diligence and oversight, the introducing or correspondent dealer remains ultimately responsible for compliance.
(July 12, 2017)
Section 2: Content and Format of Mark-Up Disclosure
2.1 What information must be included when dealers provide mark-up disclosure on a confirmation?
When mark-up disclosure is provided on a customer confirmation, Rule G-15 requires firms to express the disclosed mark-up as both a total dollar amount and a percentage amount of PMP. The mark-up should be calculated and disclosed as the total amount per transaction; disclosure of the per bond dollar amount of mark-up (e.g., $9.45 per bond) would not satisfy the requirement to disclose the total dollar amount of the transaction mark-up.
SR-MSRB-2016-12 Proposed Rule Change to MSRB Rules G-15 and G-30, at 12 (September 1, 2016)
(July 12, 2017)
2.2 Where is mark-up disclosure required to be located on a confirmation?
For printed confirmations, Rule G-15(a)(i)(E) requires the mark-up disclosure to be located on the front of the customer confirmation. For electronic confirmations, the disclosure should appear in a naturally visible place. Because the rule requires mark-up disclosure to be on the confirmation itself, the inclusion of a link on the customer confirmation that a customer could click to obtain his or her mark-up disclosure would not satisfy the requirements of Rule G-15.
(July 12, 2017)
2.3 May dealers use explanatory language to provide context for mark-up disclosure?
Yes. Dealers may include accompanying language to explain mark-up related concepts, or a dealer’s particular methodology for calculating mark-ups according to MSRB guidance (or to note the availability of information about the methodology upon request), provided such statements are accurate and not misleading. However, dealers may not label mark-ups as “estimated” or “approximate” figures, or use other such labels. These types of qualifiers risk diminishing the utility of the disclosure and of the dealer’s own determination of the security’s PMP and mark-up charged, and otherwise risk diminishing the value to retail investors of the disclosure.
MSRB Response to Comments on SR-MSRB-2016-12, at 11-12 (November 14, 2016)
(July 12, 2017)
2.4 If a dealer encounters a situation where a mark-up is negative (i.e., the dealer sold to the customer at a price lower than the PMP), may it choose to disclose a mark-up of zero instead?
The MSRB believes that negative mark-ups will be very infrequent; however, if such a case arises, a dealer may not disclose a mark-up of zero where the mark-up is not, in fact, zero. Dealers should disclose the mark-up that they calculate based on their determination of PMP consistent with Rule G-30. As an alternative to disclosing a negative mark-up, dealers are permitted to disclose “N/A” in the mark-up/mark-down field if the confirmation also includes a brief explanation of the “N/A” disclosure and the reason it has been provided. Dealers also have the flexibility to provide an explanation for trades with disclosed negative or zero mark-ups as well, consistent with Question 2.3 above.
(July 12, 2017)
2.5 How many decimal places should dealers use when disclosing the mark-up as a percentage amount?
Dealers should disclose the percentage amount rounded to at least two decimal places (e.g., hundredths of a percent). For example, if a dealer charged a $120 mark-up on a 10-bond transaction where the PMP was 99, the mark-up percentage should be disclosed to at least the hundredth of a percentage point, as 1.21% (as opposed to 1.2% or 1%). However, if a dealer charged a $100 mark-up on a 10-bond transaction where the PMP was 100, the mark-up percentage could be disclosed as 1.00% or 1%.
(March 19, 2018)
Section 3: Determining Prevailing Market Price
3.1 How should dealers determine PMP to calculate mark-ups?
Dealers must calculate mark-ups from a municipal security’s PMP, consistent with Rule G-30 and the supplementary material thereunder, particularly Supplementary Material .06 (sometimes referred to as the “waterfall” guidance or analysis). Under the applicable standard of “reasonable diligence” (discussed below), dealers may rely on reasonable policies and procedures to facilitate PMP determination, provided the policies and procedures are consistent with Rule G-30 and are consistently applied.
SR-MSRB-2016-12 Proposed Rule Change to MSRB Rules G-15 and G-30, at 12 (September 1, 2016)
(July 12, 2017)
3.2 Does the PMP guidance in Rule G-30, Supplementary Material .06 apply for mark-up (and mark-down) disclosure purposes under Rule G-15 and for fair pricing purposes under Rule G-30?
Yes. Dealers should read the guidance in Supplementary Material .06 together with Rule G-30 and all the other supplementary material thereto. For example, while Supplementary Material .06 provides guidance in determining the PMP, Supplementary Material .01(a) explains that dealers must exercise “reasonable diligence” in establishing the market value of a security, and Supplementary Material .01(d) states that dealer compensation on a principal transaction with a customer is determined from the PMP of the security, as described in Supplementary Material .06. Read as a whole, Rule G-30 requires dealers to use reasonable diligence to determine the PMP of a municipal security in accordance with Supplementary Material .06.[2] This standard applies for mark-up disclosure purposes under Rule G-15 and for fair pricing purposes under Rule G-30.
SR-MSRB-2016-12 Proposed Rule Change to MSRB Rules G-15 and G-30, at 25; 28 (September 1, 2016); MSRB Response to Comments on SR-MSRB-2016-12, at 9-11 (November 14, 2016)
(July 12, 2017)
(Updated March 19, 2018)
3.2.1 Does the functionally separate trading desk exception apply for purposes of determining the PMP of a security?
No. As explained in the rule filing, this exception “would only apply to determine whether or not the [mark-up] disclosure requirement has been triggered; it does not change the dealer’s requirements relating to the calculation of its mark-up or mark-down under Rule G-30.”
SR-MSRB-2016-12 Proposed Rule Change to MSRB Rules G-15 and G-30, at n. 20 (September 1, 2016)
(March 19, 2018)
3.3 When reading the PMP guidance in Rule G-30, Supplementary Material .06, what does the language in parentheses mean?
Unless the context requires otherwise, language in parentheses that is not preceded by an “i.e.,” or “e.g.,” within sentences refers to scenarios where a dealer is charging a customer a mark-down. Thus, for example, in the phrase, “contemporaneous dealer purchases (sales) in the municipal security in question from (to) institutional accounts,” the terms “(sales)” and “(to)” apply where a dealer is charging a customer a mark-down.
(July 12, 2017)
3.4 When should dealers determine PMP and calculate the mark-up to be disclosed on a confirmation?
The MSRB recognizes that dealers may employ different processes for generating customer confirmations such that this may occur at the end of the day, or during the day for firms that use real-time, intra-day confirmation generation processes. Therefore, although the objective must always be to determine the price prevailing at the time of the customer transaction, different dealers may consistently conduct the analysis to make that determination at different times. Specifically, dealers may base their mark-up calculations for confirmation disclosure purposes on the information they have available to them (based on the exercise of reasonable diligence) at the time they systematically input relevant transaction information into the systems they use to generate confirmations.
This means that a dealer that systematically inputs the information at the time of trade may determine the PMP—and therefore, the mark-up—at the same time (even if the confirmation itself is not printed until the end of day). On the other hand, if a dealer systematically inputs such information at the end of the day, the dealer must use the information available to the dealer at that time to determine the price prevailing at the time of the customer transaction—and, therefore, the mark-up.
The timing of the determination must be applied consistently across all transactions in municipal securities (e.g., the dealer may not enter information into its systems at the time of trade and determine the PMP at the time of trade for some trades but at the end of the day for others).
SR-MSRB-2016-12 Proposed Rule Change to MSRB Rules G-15 and G-30, at 24 (September 1, 2016); MSRB Response to Comments on SR-MSRB-2016-12, at 10 (November 14, 2016)
(July 12, 2017)
3.4.1 May a dealer determine PMP between the time of trade and the end of the day?
Yes. The MSRB recognizes that firms may employ different processes for generating customer confirmations, and dealers are not limited to determining PMP for purposes of confirmation disclosure only at the times provided as examples in Question 3.4 (i.e., the time of trade or the end of the day). While the objective must always be to determine the price prevailing at the time of the customer transaction, as noted above in Question 3.4, PMP may be determined for disclosure purposes when a firm systematically enters the information into its confirmation generation system, based on information that is reasonably available to it at that time. Accordingly, a dealer may determine PMP at various times, including at the time of the trade, at the end of the day, or at times in between, provided the dealer does so according to reasonable, consistently applied policies and procedures and does not “cherry pick” favorable data.
(March 19, 2018)
3.4.2 May a dealer determine PMP at the time of trade (or at some other time before the end of the day) and wait until later in the day to analyze which trades triggered the disclosure requirement?
Yes. A dealer may determine PMP, enter the PMP information into a confirmation generation system, and later populate the mark-up field only on confirmations of trades that trigger disclosure. The MSRB would expect in such cases that the PMP determination would not be subject to change when the dealer performs the trigger analysis later in the day, other than for a reasonable exception review process (as discussed in Question 3.8.1). In all cases, dealers must follow consistently applied policies and procedures and may not “cherry pick” favorable data. Dealers are reminded that when determining PMP, they must use the information reasonably available to them at the time of the PMP determination and that the objective is always to determine the price prevailing at the time of the customer transaction.
(March 19, 2018)
3.4.3 What is considered a confirmation generation system, for purposes of the guidance on when dealers may determine PMP for disclosure purposes?
As noted above in Question 3.4, the MSRB recognizes that dealers may employ different processes for generating customer confirmations. For purposes of this guidance, the MSRB would consider a dealer to enter information systematically into a confirmation generation system when it stores the information in a location that is part of the confirmation generation process. The MSRB expects that the stored PMP information would not be subject to change, other than for a reasonable exception review process (as discussed in Question 3.8.1). The MSRB also expects that a dealer will clearly explain in its policies and procedures its confirmation generation process, including the timing and role of each material step in the process.
(March 19, 2018)
3.5 Once dealers determine PMP and input relevant information into their confirmation generation systems, would they be required to cancel and correct a confirmation to revise a disclosed mark-up if later events might contribute to a different PMP determination?
No. The disclosure must be accurate, based on the dealer’s exercise of reasonable diligence, as of the time the dealer systematically inputs the information into its systems to generate the disclosure. Once the dealer has input the information into its confirmation generation systems, the MSRB does not expect dealers to send revised confirmations solely based on the occurrence of a subsequent transaction or event that would otherwise be relevant to PMP determination under Rule G-30. On a voluntary basis, dealers may correct a confirmation, pursuant to reasonable and consistently applied policies and procedures.
SR-MSRB-2016-12 Proposed Rule Change to MSRB Rules G-15 and G-30, at 24 (September 1, 2016)
(July 12, 2017)
3.5.1 If a dealer corrects the price to a customer or determines that, at the time the dealer systematically entered the information into its systems to generate the mark-up disclosure, the PMP was inaccurate, must the dealer send a corrected confirmation that reflects a corrected mark-up disclosure and price?
Yes. Consistent with Question 3.5, dealers are not required to cancel and correct a confirmation to revise a disclosed mark-up solely based on the occurrence of a subsequent transaction or event that would otherwise be relevant to PMP determination under Rule G-30. However, if the dealer corrects the price to the customer or determines that a PMP was inaccurate at the time it was systematically entered into the dealer’s confirmation generation system, the dealer must send a confirmation that reflects an accurate mark-up and price.
(March 19, 2018)
3.6 May dealers engage third-party vendors to perform some or all of the steps required to fulfill the mark-up disclosure requirements?
Yes. Dealers may engage third-party service providers to facilitate mark-up disclosure consistent with Rules G-15 and G-30. For example, dealers that wish to perform most of the steps of the waterfall internally may choose to use the services of a vendor at the economic models level of the waterfall. Other dealers may wish to use the services of a vendor to perform most or all of the steps of the waterfall. In either case, the dealers retain the responsibility for ensuring the PMP is determined in accordance with Rule G-30 and that the mark-up is disclosed in compliance with Rule G-15 and must exercise due diligence and oversight over their third-party relationships.
As a policy matter, the MSRB does not endorse or approve the use of any specific vendors.
MSRB Response to Comments on SR-MSRB-2016-12, at 8 (November 14, 2016)
(July 12, 2017)
3.7 May dealers use a third-party evaluated pricing service as an economic model at the final step of the waterfall?
Yes. However, before doing so, the dealer should have a reasonable basis for believing the third-party pricing service’s pricing methodologies produce evaluated prices that reflect actual prevailing market prices. A dealer would not have a reasonable basis for such a belief, for example, where a periodic review of the evaluated prices provided by the pricing service frequently (over the course of multiple trades) reveals a substantial difference between the evaluated prices and the prices at which actual transactions in the relevant securities occurred. In choosing to use evaluated prices from any pricing service, a dealer should assess, among other things, the quality of the evaluated prices provided by the service and the extent to which the service determines its evaluated prices on an intra-day basis.
To be clear, dealers are not required to use such pricing services at this stage of the waterfall analysis. Rather, third-party evaluated pricing services are only one type of economic model. Other types of economic models may include internally developed models such as a discounted cash flow model or a reasonable and consistent methodology to be used in connection with an applicable index or benchmark. Dealers are reminded that when using an internally developed model, the dealer must be able to provide information that the dealer used on the day of the transaction to develop the pricing information (i.e., the data that was input and the data that the model generated and the dealer used to arrive at the PMP).
MSRB Response to Comments on SR-MSRB-2016-12, at 8 (November 14, 2016)
(July 12, 2017)
(Updated March 19, 2018)
3.8 May dealers use or rely on automated systems to determine PMP?
Yes. While dealers are not required to automate the PMP determination and mark-up disclosure, they may choose to do so, provided they (and/or their vendors) do so consistent with Rule G-30 and Rule G-15, and all other applicable rules. The MSRB has provided guidance in several areas during the rulemaking process to facilitate automation for firms that choose to employ it. First, as noted above in Question 3.4, dealers are permitted on certain conditions to determine PMP on an intra-day basis (e.g., at the time of trade), allowing dealers that generate confirmations intra-day to continue to do so. Second, as noted in Question 3.1 and discussed throughout this guidance, the MSRB has acknowledged that dealers may develop policies and procedures that rely on reasonable, objective criteria to apply the PMP guidance in Supplementary Material .06 at a systematic level. Consistent with the reasonable policies and procedures approach, the MSRB further recognized during the rulemaking process that reasonable policies and procedures could result in different firms making different PMP determinations for the same security. (The MSRB would expect, however, that the consistent application of policies and procedures within a dealer would result in different traders or desks arriving at PMP determinations that are substantially the same under comparable facts and circumstances.)
MSRB Response to Comments on SR-MSRB-2016-12, at 7-8 (November 14, 2016)
(July 12, 2017)
3.8.1 May dealers adopt a reasonable exception review process to evaluate PMP determinations?
Yes. As a general matter, the MSRB expects that dealers will employ supervisory review processes that consider, among other things, the reliability of their (or their vendors’) PMP determinations. To review reliability, a dealer might review PMP determinations that result in mark-ups that exceed pre-determined thresholds, and it also might compare PMP determinations with some other measure of market value to ascertain whether the PMP determinations fall outside pre-established ranges.
In cases where a dealer reviews PMP determinations before the associated trade confirmations are sent, dealers may correct PMP determinations to promote more accurate mark-up calculations, provided they do so according to reasonable and consistently applied policies and procedures. As a general matter, however, the MSRB expects that it will be rare for a dealer to correct the PMP of a security based on exception reporting, and documentation in such situations will be paramount. To prevent “cherry picking,” the dealer’s policies and procedures should be specific in describing the PMP review process and the conditions under which the dealer may show that a PMP was erroneous (e.g., the PMP determination was based on an isolated transaction, or a PMP determined through the use of an economic model did not reflect recent news about the security). If a dealer determines that a PMP is erroneous, it must correct it consistent with Rule G-30, and it must do so using the information reasonably available to it at the time it makes the correction.
There may also be cases where a dealer’s exception review process results in corrected customer trade prices. For example, a dealer may review a trade where the mark-up exceeded a pre-determined threshold and the PMP was determined correctly. Dealers may refer to Question 3.5.1 in these cases.
(March 19, 2018)
3.9 May dealers develop objective criteria to automatically determine whether a trade is “contemporaneous” for purposes of establishing a presumptive PMP at the first step of the waterfall analysis?
Yes. Dealers may establish an objective set of criteria to determine whether a trade is contemporaneous, provided the objective criteria are established based on the exercise of reasonable diligence. For example, dealers could define an objective period of time as a default proxy for determining whether the trade is contemporaneous. Dealers could also define criteria to consider other relevant factors, such as whether intervening trades by other firms occurred at prices sufficiently different than the dealer’s trade to suggest that the dealer’s trade no longer reasonably reflects the current market price for the security, or whether changes in interest rates or the credit quality of the security, or news reports were significant enough to reasonably change the PMP of the security.
Given the different trading characteristics of different municipal securities, and relevant court and SEC case law applicable to debt securities in general, it likely would not be reasonable for a dealer’s policies and procedures to determine categorically that all transactions that occur outside of a specified time frame are not “contemporaneous.” Accordingly, dealers should include in their policies and procedures an opportunity to review and override the automatic application of default proxies (e.g., by reconsidering the application for transactions identified through reasonable exception reporting and specifying designated time intervals (or market events) after which such proxies will be reviewed).
(July 12, 2017)
3.10 Since Rule G-15 adopts a same-day trigger standard for mark-up disclosure, would it be reasonable to assume a same-day standard for determining whether trades are contemporaneous for purposes of determining PMP under Rule G-30?
The MSRB notes that the determination of whether mark-up disclosure is required under Rule G-15 is distinct from the determination of whether a transaction is contemporaneous under the waterfall analysis. The PMP guidance under Rule G-30 provides that a dealer’s cost is considered contemporaneous if the transaction occurs close enough in time to the subject transaction that it would reasonably be expected to reflect the current market price for the municipal security. While same-day transactions may often be contemporaneous according to this meaning, the MSRB has not set forth a specific time-period that is categorically contemporaneous. As noted above in Question 3.9, the MSRB would expect that dealers developing objective criteria for this purpose would base the determination of such criteria on the exercise of reasonable diligence.
(July 12, 2017)
3.11 How should dealers determine their contemporaneous cost if they have multiple contemporaneous purchases?
Dealers may rely on reasonable and consistently applied policies and procedures that employ methodologies to establish PMP where they have multiple contemporaneous principal trades. For example, a dealer could employ consistently an average weighted price or a last price methodology. Such methodologies could further account for the type of principal trade, giving greater weight to principal trades with other dealers than to principal trades with customers.
MSRB Response to Comments on SR-MSRB-2016-12, at 12-13 (November 14, 2016)
(July 12, 2017)
3.12 What is the next step in the analysis, when determining contemporaneous cost or proceeds, if a dealer has no contemporaneous transactions with another dealer?
Where the dealer has no contemporaneous cost or proceeds, as applicable, from an inter-dealer transaction, the dealer must then consider whether it has contemporaneous cost or proceeds, as applicable, from a customer transaction. Note that, because the dealer’s contemporaneous cost or proceeds from a customer transaction will also include the mark-up or mark-down charged in that transaction, the dealer should adjust its contemporaneous cost or proceeds from that customer transaction to account for the mark-up or mark-down included in the price. In these instances, the difference between the dealer’s “adjusted contemporaneous cost or proceeds” (the dealer’s contemporaneous cost or proceeds in the customer transaction, adjusted by the mark-up or mark-down) and the price to its customer is equal to the mark-up (or mark-down) to be disclosed on customer confirmations under Rule G-15. The MSRB has noted that this approach allows the dealer to avoid “double counting” in the mark-up and mark-down it discloses to each customer. For example, if a dealer buys 100 bonds from Customer A at a price of 98 and immediately sells 100 of the same bonds to Customer B at a price of 100, the dealer may apportion the mark-up and mark-down paid by each customer. Assuming for illustration that the dealer determines the PMP in accordance with the waterfall guidance to be 99, then the dealer would disclose to Customer A a total dollar amount mark-down of $1,000, also expressed as 1.01% of PMP, and it would disclose to Customer B a total dollar amount mark-up of $1,000, also expressed as 1.01% of PMP.[3]
SR-MSRB-2016-12 Proposed Rule Change to MSRB Rules G-15 and G-30, at 21 (September 1, 2016)
(July 12, 2017)
(Updated March 19, 2018)
3.13 May dealers adjust their contemporaneous cost to reflect what they believe to be a more accurate PMP, or their role taking risk to provide liquidity?
Dealers may adjust their contemporaneous cost only in one case: where a dealer’s offsetting trades that trigger disclosure under Rule G-15 are both customer transactions (discussed above at Question 3.12). Other adjustments to reflect the size or side of market for a dealer’s contemporaneous cost are not permitted.
(July 12, 2017)
3.14 May dealers apportion their expected aggregate monthly fees—for example to access an alternative trading system (ATS) or other trading platform—to individual contemporaneous transactions to be included in their contemporaneous costs?
No. For any given mark-up on a transaction, Supplementary Material .06 requires dealers to look first to their contemporaneous cost as incurred. The MSRB does not believe it would be consistent with Rule G-30 for dealers to consider an estimated apportionment of a future charge to be part of the specific cost they incurred in a contemporaneous transaction.
(July 12, 2017)
3.15 In determining contemporaneous cost, may dealers include transaction fees—for example to access an ATS or other trading platform—that were included in the price they paid?
Yes, provided the transaction fee is reflected in the price of the contemporaneous trade that is reported to EMMA, consistent with MSRB rules and guidance on pricing, trade reporting and fees. The MSRB will monitor and adjust this guidance as needed if it determines that pricing practices change in a way that diminishes the utility and reliability of mark-up disclosure.
(July 12, 2017)
3.16 May a dealer treat its own contemporaneous transaction as “isolated” and therefore disregard it when determining PMP?
No. Under Supplementary Material .06, isolated transactions or isolated quotations generally will have little or no weight or relevance in establishing PMP. The guidance also specifically provides that, in the municipal market, an “off-market” transaction may qualify as an isolated transaction. Through cross-references, Supplementary Material .06 makes clear that a dealer may deem a transaction or quotation at the hierarchy of pricing factors or similar-securities level of the waterfall to be isolated. However, the concept of “isolated” transactions or quotations does not apply to a dealer’s contemporaneous cost, which presumptively determines PMP.
SR-MSRB-2016-12 Proposed Rule Change to MSRB Rules G-15 and G-30, at 19; 21 (September 1, 2016)
(July 12, 2017)
3.17 Supplementary Material .06 notes that changes in interest rates may allow a dealer to overcome the presumption that its own contemporaneous cost is the best measure of PMP. Does this refer only to formal policy interest rate changes, or does it also contemplate market changes in interest rates?
It refers to any change in interest rates, whether the change is caused by formal policy decisions or market events. However, Supplementary Material .06 notes that a dealer may overcome the presumption that its contemporaneous cost is the best measure of PMP based on a change in interest rates only in instances where they have changed after the dealer’s transaction to a degree that such change would reasonably cause a change in municipal securities pricing.
(July 12, 2017)
3.18 Supplementary Material .06 notes that changes in the credit quality of the municipal security may allow a dealer to overcome the presumption that its own contemporaneous cost is the best measure of PMP. Does this refer only to formal credit rating changes, or does it also contemplate market changes in implied or observed credit spreads such as those due to market-wide credit spread volatility or anticipated changes in the credit quality of the individual issuer?
It refers to any changes to credit quality, with respect to that particular security or the particular issuer of that security, whether the change is caused by a formal ratings announcement or market events. Thus, for example, this could include changes in the guarantee or collateral supporting repayment as well as significant recent information concerning the issuer that is not yet incorporated in credit ratings (e.g., changes to ratings outlooks). However, Supplementary Material .06 notes that a dealer may overcome the presumption that its contemporaneous cost is the best measure of PMP based on a change in credit quality only in instances where it has changed significantly after the dealer’s transaction.
(July 12, 2017)
3.18.1 When considering inter-dealer trades at the hierarchy of pricing factors level of the waterfall analysis, if the only contemporaneous inter-dealer trades in the security are executed at the same time and involve a broker’s broker or an ATS, may a dealer choose to determine PMP by reference to the inter-dealer trade price which is reasonably likely to be on the opposite side of the market from the dealer seeking to determine PMP?
Yes. Consistent with the standard of reasonable diligence, dealers may adopt a reasonable approach to consistently choosing between or referring to multiple contemporaneous inter-dealer trades. If the only contemporaneous inter-dealer trades in the security are executed at the same time and involve a broker’s broker or an ATS in the security, it may be reasonable for the dealer seeking to determine PMP to do so by reference to the trade price which is reasonably likely to be on the opposite side of the market from the dealer seeking to determine PMP.
For example, assume that Dealer XYZ is selling a municipal security to a retail customer. Also, assume that the dealer lacks contemporaneous cost and that there are only two contemporaneous inter-dealer transactions in the security, and that both of those transactions occur at the exact same time and in the exact same trade amount. Additionally, both inter-dealer transactions are identified by an ATS special condition indicator on EMMA. One transaction is executed at a price of 113.618 and the other is executed at a price of 113.868. Assume further that the difference between these two ATS transaction prices is in the customary and typical range of the fee an ATS would charge for its services. In this case, it may be reasonable for Dealer XYZ to conclude that the transaction at 113.618 reflects a sale from a dealer to an ATS taking a principal position in the security, and that the transaction at 113.868 reflects a sale from that ATS to another dealer. Under these circumstances, Dealer XYZ may reasonably determine the PMP by reference to the transaction at 113.868, because the counterparty to the ATS in that transaction was purchasing the security and thus on the opposite side of the market from the side of Dealer XYZ in its customer trade.
(March 19, 2018)
3.19 May dealers adopt a reasonable default proxy where the waterfall guidance refers to trades between dealers and institutional accounts with which any dealer regularly effects transactions in the same security, if such information cannot be ascertained through reasonable diligence?
Yes. Consistent with the Rule G-30 standard of “reasonable diligence” in establishing the PMP of a municipal security, dealers reasonably may use objective criteria as a proxy for the elements of these steps of the waterfall that they cannot reasonably ascertain, such as whether a customer transaction involves an institutional customer and whether that institutional customer regularly trades in the same security with any dealer. A reasonable approach might assume that transactions at or above a $1,000,000 par amount involve institutional customers, since that size transaction is conventionally considered to be an institutional-sized transaction. In addition, because institutional investors transacting at or above this size threshold are typically sophisticated investors, the same size proxy might be used to assume that the institutional customer regularly transacts with a dealer in the same security.
(July 12, 2017)
3.19.1 May a dealer reasonably determine that new issue trade prices executed at list offering/takedown prices are not reflective of the PMP at the time of their execution?
Yes. Because new issues may be priced days before the transactions are executed and reported to RTRS, a dealer may, but is not required to, determine that new issue trades executed at list offering or takedown prices are not reflective of the PMP at the time of their execution. These transactions generally are denoted by a list offering price/takedown indicator on EMMA and in the MSRB Transaction Subscription Service. Market participants may also determine the list offering price by viewing the security’s home page (i.e., the Security Details page) on EMMA.
(March 19, 2018)
3.20 Can an “all-to-all” platform (i.e., one that allows non-dealers to participate) qualify as an inter-dealer mechanism at the step of the waterfall that refers to bids and offers for actively traded securities?
Yes, provided that the dealer determines that the prices available on an “all-to-all” platform are generally consistent with inter-dealer prices. Dealers should include in their policies and procedures how they will periodically review a platform’s activity to make such a determination.
(July 12, 2017)
3.21 When considering bid and offer quotations from an inter-dealer mechanism, how many inter-dealer mechanisms must a dealer check before considering the next category of factors under the waterfall analysis?
The obligation to determine PMP requires a dealer to use reasonable diligence. It does not require a dealer to seek out and consider every potentially relevant data point available in the market. With respect to this factor in the waterfall analysis, a dealer must only seek out and consider enough information to reasonably determine that there is no probative information to determine PMP before proceeding to the next category of factors.
(July 12, 2017)
3.22 In considering bids and offers for actively traded securities made through an inter-dealer mechanism, how can a dealer determine that transactions generally occur at the displayed quotations on the inter-dealer mechanism?
Consistent with the Rule G-30 standard of reasonable diligence and a reasonable policies and procedures approach, a dealer could request and assess from the platform relevant statistics and relevant information reasonably sufficient to conclude that the inter-dealer mechanism meets the applicable requirements under Supplementary Material .06. A dealer could then periodically request and assess updated statistics and relevant information to confirm that the inter-dealer mechanism continues to satisfy the requirements.
(July 12, 2017)
3.23 At the similar securities stage of the waterfall analysis, how can a dealer determine on a systematic basis that an inter-dealer quotation is “validated”?
Consistent with the standard of reasonable diligence and a reasonable and consistently applied policies and procedures approach to the PMP determination, for example, a dealer could determine that a bid (offer) quotation is validated if it is quoted on an “inter-dealer mechanism” (including the all-to-all platforms that qualify, as discussed above). With respect to a dealer’s own bids or offers, dealers are reminded of their existing regulatory obligations under applicable MSRB rules regarding bona fide bids or offers and the requirement that any published quotations must be based on the dealer’s best judgment of the fair market value of the securities. See, e.g., Rule G-13 and MSRB Notice to Dealers That Use the Services of Broker’s Brokers (December 22, 2012). Dealers are also reminded that under Rule G-30, Supplementary Material .06, isolated transactions or isolated quotations (including those that are off-market) generally will have little or no weight or relevance in establishing the PMP of a security.
Due to the lack of bid (offer) quotations for many municipal securities, under the waterfall analysis, dealers in the municipal securities market may not often find information from contemporaneous bid (offer) quotations in the municipal securities market.
(July 12, 2017)
(Updated March 19, 2018)
3.24 May a dealer use the same process it uses to identify a “similar” security for best-execution purposes to identify “similar” securities for PMP purposes?
Yes. Assuming the dealer’s process for identifying “similar” securities for Rule G-18 best-execution purposes is reasonable and in compliance with Rule G-18, a dealer may rely on the same process in connection with identifying similar securities under Rule G-30, Supplementary Material .06.
Alternatively, due to the different purposes of the “similar” security analysis for best-execution purposes as compared to PMP determination purposes, dealers reasonably may adopt a more restrictive approach to identifying “similar” securities for Rule G-30 than they may for Rule G-18. While the relevant part of the best-execution analysis under Rule G-18 seeks to identify the best market to address a customer’s order or inquiry by reference to another security, the relevant part of the waterfall analysis seeks to identify the PMP of one security by reference to another security. Further, Rule G-30 Supplementary Material .06 provides that, in order to qualify as a “similar” security, at a minimum, the municipal security should be sufficiently similar that a market yield for the subject security can be fairly estimated from the yield of the “similar” security. Due to the large number and diversity of municipal securities, the MSRB is of the view that, generally, if the prices or yields of a security would require an adjustment in order to account for differences between the security and the subject security, it would be reasonable for a dealer to determine that that security is not sufficiently “similar” to the subject security for purposes of Supplementary Material .06. To be clear, dealers have the flexibility to determine that a security that requires an immaterial adjustment in order to account for differences is sufficiently “similar” for these purposes, but they are not required to do so. This approach also is consistent with the MSRB’s view that, in order for a security to qualify as sufficiently “similar,” the security must be at least highly similar to the subject security with respect to nearly all the “similar” security factors listed in Rule G-30 Supplementary Material .06(b)(ii) that are relevant to the subject security.
Whichever approach a dealer chooses to apply, the dealer must apply that approach consistently across all municipal securities.
Due to the lack of active trading in many municipal securities and the above discussion regarding the identification of “similar” securities in the municipal securities market, under the waterfall analysis, dealers in the municipal securities market may not often find information from sufficiently similar securities as compared to dealers in other fixed income markets.
Because of the unique characteristics of the municipal securities market, the MSRB response to this question may differ from the FINRA interpretation under FINRA Rule 2121.
(July 12, 2017)
3.24.1 How many “similar” securities must a dealer consider at the “similar” securities stage of the waterfall analysis?
The obligation to determine PMP requires a dealer to use reasonable diligence. It does not require a dealer to seek out and consider every potentially relevant data point available in the market. At this point in the waterfall analysis, a dealer must only seek out and consider enough information to reasonably determine that it has identified the prevailing market price of the security (or that there is no probative information to determine PMP before proceeding to the next level). A dealer’s policies and procedures should explain the process for identifying similar securities (and, if relevant, how the dealer may adjust the prices or yields of identified similar securities). Because the reasonable diligence standard is often guided by industry norms, dealers should periodically revisit their policies and procedures to ensure that their established processes continue to remain reasonable.
Due to the unique characteristics of the municipal securities market, including the large number of issuers and the bespoke nature of many municipal securities, it is unlikely that the dealer will identify a substantial number of “similar” securities for many municipal securities. For example, it would be reasonable for a dealer to determine that a comparison security is not sufficiently “similar” to the subject security for purposes of Supplementary Material .06 if the prices or yields of the comparison security would require an adjustment in order to account for differences between that security and the subject security.
(March 19, 2018)
3.25 How is the “relative weight” provision in paragraphs (a)(v) (regarding the hierarchy of pricing factors) and (a)(vi) (regarding similar securities) of Supplementary Material .06 meant to be used in operation?
This provision is meant to be used when there is more than one comparison transaction or quotation within the categories specified in the hierarchy of pricing factors and when there is more than one comparison transaction or quotation within the similar securities level of the waterfall analysis. In these cases, a dealer may consider the facts and circumstances of the comparison transactions or quotations to determine the weight or degree of influence to attribute to a particular transaction or quotation. For example, a dealer might give greater weight to more recent (timely) comparison transactions or quotations. Similarly, to the extent a dealer considers comparison transactions or quotations in which the dealer is on the same side of the market as the dealer in the subject transaction (if known from dealer customer trade reports),[4] a dealer might give relatively less weight or influence to such information in determining PMP than information from transactions or quotations in which the dealer was on the opposite side of the market from the dealer in the subject transaction.
Consistent with the standard of reasonable diligence and a reasonable policies and procedures approach to the PMP determination, a dealer may adopt a reasonable methodology that it will consistently apply when considering the facts and circumstances of comparison transactions or quotations and assigning relative weight to such transactions or quotations. For example, a dealer might employ an average weighted price methodology (if all relevant trade sizes are publicly available) or last price methodology, provided its policies and procedures called for the reasonable and consistent use of the methodology and did not ignore potentially relevant facts and circumstances, such as side of the market.
Due to the unique characteristics of the municipal securities market, the MSRB response to this question may differ from the FINRA interpretation under FINRA Rule 2121.
(July 12, 2017)
(Updated March 19, 2018)
3.26 When dealers consider the hierarchy of pricing factors under Supplementary Material .06(a)(v), or similar securities factors under paragraph (a)(vi), may they consider the size of comparison transactions to determine their relative weight?
Yes. Paragraphs (a)(v) and (a)(vi) include a non-exhaustive list of facts and circumstances that may impact the “relative weight” of comparison transactions or quotations that may be considered at that point in the waterfall analysis. The MSRB believes it would be reasonable to consider the size of a comparison transaction when considering its relative weight.
(July 12, 2017)
3.27 What is an “applicable index” as that term is used at the “similar securities” level of Supplementary Material .06?
Supplementary Material .06 lists a number of non-exclusive factors that a dealer can look to in determining whether a security is sufficiently “similar” to the subject security. One of these factors is how comparably they trade over an applicable index or U.S. Treasury securities of a similar duration. The inclusion of the more general term “applicable index,” is intended to give dealers flexibility to consider, for example, commonly used municipal market bond indices, yield curves and benchmarks as these may be more relevant than data on Treasury securities (especially for tax-exempt bonds).
Amendment No. 1 to SR-MSRB-2016-12, at 5 (November 14, 2016)
(July 12, 2017)
3.28 Must dealers keep their PMP determination for each trade in their books and records?
The MSRB believes that dealers should keep records to demonstrate their compliance with Rule G-30, particularly where they have the evidentiary burden to demonstrate why a contemporaneous transaction was not the best measure of PMP for a given trade. The MSRB further notes that it would expect PMP documentation to be an important component of a firm’s system to supervise compliance with Rules G-15 and G-30.
SR-MSRB-2016-12 Proposed Rule Change to MSRB Rules G-15 and G-30, at 20 n. 39 (September 1, 2016); MSRB Response to Comments on SR-MSRB-2016-12, at 8 (November 14, 2016)
(July 12, 2017)
(Updated March 19, 2018)
3.29 Is there a difference between the PMP that is determined for mark-up disclosure purposes under Rule G-15 and for fair pricing purposes under Rule G-30?
As noted during the rulemaking process, the MSRB recognizes that by allowing dealers to determine PMP for mark-up disclosure purposes at the time of entry of information into systems for confirmation generation, a mark-up disclosed on a confirmation may not reflect subsequent trades that could be considered “contemporaneous” under Supplementary Material .06. However, the MSRB does not believe it is necessary to make a formal distinction between a PMP determined for disclosure purposes and a PMP determined for other regulatory purposes. Still, in connection with any post-transaction fair pricing review process, dealers should not disregard any new information relevant under Supplementary Material .06 that occurs after the mark-up determination (e.g., contemporaneous proceeds obtained after the customer transaction).
SR-MSRB-2016-12 Proposed Rule Change to MSRB Rules G-15 and G-30, at 14; 25; 28 (September 1, 2016); MSRB Response to Comments on SR-MSRB-2016-12, at 10 (November 14, 2016)
(July 12, 2017)
Section 4: Time of Execution and Security-Specific URL Disclosures
4.1 When must dealers disclose the time of execution on a customer confirmation?
Under Rule G-15, dealers must disclose the time of execution for all transactions, including principal and agency transactions. However, for transactions in municipal fund securities and transactions for an institutional account, as defined in Rule G-8(a)(xi), in lieu of disclosing the time of execution, dealers may instead include on the confirmation a statement that the time of execution will be furnished upon written request of the customer. This time-of-execution disclosure requirement is not limited to circumstances where mark-up disclosure is triggered; therefore, it is required even where mark-up disclosure is not.
SR-MSRB-2016-12 Proposed Rule Change to MSRB Rules G-15 and G-30, at 13-14 (September 1, 2016); Amendment No. 1 to SR-MSRB-2016-12, at 4-5 (November 14, 2016)
(July 12, 2017)
4.2 How should the time of execution be disclosed?
Dealers have an obligation under Rule G-14, on reports of sales or purchases of municipal securities, to report the “time of trade” to the MSRB’s Real-Time Transaction Reporting System. In addition, dealers have an obligation under Rule G-8(a)(vii) to make and keep records of the time of execution of principal transactions in municipal securities. The time of execution for confirmation disclosure purposes is the same as the time of trade for Rule G-14 reporting purposes and the time of execution for purposes of Rule G-8(a)(vii), except that dealers should omit all seconds, without rounding to the minute, from the time-of-execution disclosure because the trade data displayed on EMMA does not include seconds.
Alternatively, if disclosure in this format is operationally challenging or burdensome for a dealer, a dealer may choose to disclose the seconds, again without rounding to the minute (e.g., a time of trade of 10:00:59 may be disclosed as 10:00:59 or 10:00). Additionally, because EMMA displays the time of trade in eastern standard time (EST), dealers may disclose on the customer confirmation the time of execution in either military time (as reported to RTRS under Rule G-14) or in traditional EST with an AM or PM indicator (e.g., a time of trade of 14:00:59 may be disclosed on a confirmation as 14:00:59, 14:00, 2:00:59 PM or 02:00 PM). The time-of-execution disclosure format used by a dealer should be consistent for all municipal securities transaction confirmations on which the disclosure is provided.
SR-MSRB-2016-12 Proposed Rule Change to MSRB Rules G-15 and G-30, at 14 n. 29 (September 1, 2016); MSRB Response to Comments on SR-MSRB-2016-12, at 6 n. 11 (November 14, 2016)
(July 12, 2017)
(Updated March 19, 2018)
4.3 When must dealers disclose a security-specific URL on a customer confirmation?
Under Rule G-15, dealers must disclose a security-specific URL, in a format specified by the MSRB as discussed below, for all non-institutional customer trades other than transactions in municipal fund securities, even where mark-up disclosure is not required. In the rare situations where there is no CUSIP assigned for a security that is subject to Rule G-15 at the time the dealer trades the security with a customer, the dealer is not required to include the security-specific URL on the customer confirmation.
SR-MSRB-2016-12 Proposed Rule Change to MSRB Rules G-15 and G-30, at 13-14; 27; 35 (September 1, 2016); Amendment No. 1 to SR-MSRB-2016-12, at 4 (November 14, 2016)
(July 12, 2017)
(Updated March 19, 2018)
4.4 What is the security-specific URL that must be disclosed?
The template for the URL that must be disclosed under Rule G-15 is: https://emma.msrb.org/cusip/[insert CUSIP number]. [5] The URL is currently live and operational. Paper confirmations must include this URL with the security-specific CUSIP in print form; electronic confirmations must include the security-specific URL as a hyperlink to the web page.
MSRB Response to Comments on SR-MSRB-2016-12, at 6 (November 14, 2016)
FINRA has provided its own security-specific URL template in its guidance.
(July 12, 2017)
(Updated March 19, 2018)
4.5 Do dealers need to provide any other disclosure concerning the security-specific URL?
Yes. Dealers must include a brief description of the type of information that is available on the security-specific web page for the subject security, such as information about the prices of other transactions in the same security, the official statement and other disclosures for the security, ratings and other market data and educational material. To be clear, the disclosure does not need to describe with specificity all of the information available on the relevant web page. As described above, the description should be brief. Additionally, it only needs to describe enough information about the relevant web page that a reasonable investor would understand the type of information available on that page. For example, the following language would satisfy this obligation: “For more information about this security (including the official statement and trade and price history), visit [insert link]."[6] Because this language is an example only, dealers may use other language to describe the content of the web page.
As a reminder, Rule G-15(a)(i)(E) requires all requirements to be clearly and specifically indicated on the front of the confirmation, subject to limited exceptions. Because the description of the type of information available on the security-specific web page is not listed as an exception, it must be on the front of the confirmation.
SR-MSRB-2016-12 Proposed Rule Change to MSRB Rules G-15 and G-30, at 13; 27 (September 1, 2016); MSRB Response to Comments on SR-MSRB-2016-12, at 6 n. 9 (November 14, 2016)
(July 12, 2017)
(Updated March 19, 2018)
4.6 Is disclosure of the time of execution or security-specific URL required for transactions that involve a dealer and a registered investment adviser?
No. Disclosure of the time of execution and security-specific URL is not required for transactions with an institutional customer. Under Rule G-15, a registered investment adviser is an institutional accountholder; accordingly, disclosure is not required for these transactions. This is the case even if the registered investment adviser with whom the dealer transacted later allocates all or a portion of the securities to a retail account or where the transaction is executed directly for a retail account if the investment adviser has discretion over the transaction. The MSRB notes that this answer is specific to the time-of-execution and security-specific URL disclosure requirements in Rule G-15; it is not intended to alter any other obligations.
(July 12, 2017)
[1] EMMA is a registered trademark of the MSRB.
[2] Prior to May 14, 2018, Supplementary Material .01(d) provides that dealer compensation on a principal transaction is considered to be a mark-up or mark-down that is computed from the inter-dealer market price prevailing at the time of the customer transaction. As of May 14, 2018, the reference to the prevailing “inter-dealer” price is amended to instead, as noted above, reference the “prevailing market price,” as described in Supplementary Material .06. Supplementary Material .06, which applies to customer transactions and not internal position movements, generally embodies the principle that the PMP of a security is generally the price at which dealers trade with one another. This underlying principle does not mean that dealers may avoid following the steps of the waterfall analysis in the specific order prescribed in Supplementary Material .06. However, it remains a useful principle that dealers may wish to consider in approaching certain unspecified aspects of the waterfall analysis. The MSRB’s responses to Questions 3.11, 3.12, 3.20 and 3.23, in part, are reflective of this underlying principle. Other answers, including those in response to Questions 3.9, 3.10, 3.21 and 3.25 are reflective of the MSRB’s longstanding “reasonable diligence” standard, discussed above.
[3] This example assumes that the dealer has identified that it has contemporaneous cost and proceeds at the time that it is determining the mark-up and mark-down to each customer. If this is not the case, however, because the dealer systematically inputs information into its systems for the generation of PMP at the time of trade, then there is a different result. For example, assume that the trade at 98 occurs at 10:00 AM, the trade at 100 occurs at 3:00 PM and these trades are contemporaneous. If the dealer systematically determines PMP at the time of trade, consistent with Question 3.4, at the time of the 10:00 AM trade, the dealer may simply proceed down the waterfall to determine the PMP for the security without the need to adjust that PMP. At the time of the 3:00 PM trade, however, the dealer should adjust its contemporaneous cost as described above to account for the mark-down included in the price.
[4] At the institutional transactions and quotations categories in the hierarchy of pricing factors level of the waterfall, generally, dealers consider information from only one side of the market, depending on whether the dealer is charging a mark-up or mark-down. However, pursuant to reasonable and consistently applied policies and procedures, a dealer may consider information from transactions in which the dealer is on the other side of the market when reasonable to do so. For example, this may be reasonable where the dealer has identified no comparison transactions in which the dealer is on the opposite side of the market as the dealer in the subject transaction. In this case, the dealer may reasonably adjust the transaction price by an amount to account for the price at which that transaction might have occurred had it been a transaction in which the dealer was on the opposite side of the market from the dealer in the subject transaction. Also for example, where the dealer has identified comparison transactions on both sides of the market, the dealer reasonably may perform a similar adjustment (i.e., adjust a price from a transaction in which the dealer is on the same side of the market as the dealer in the subject transaction by an amount to account for the price at which that transaction might have occurred had it been a transaction in which the dealer was on the opposite side of the market from the dealer in the subject transaction). A dealer’s ability to consider such information may be particularly important in the municipal market in which securities often trade infrequently and in which dealers may often have such limited information available to them at the time of their PMP determination.
[5] The MSRB previously announced the URL template as: http://emma.msrb.org/cusip/[insert CUSIP number]. Accordingly, confirmations for dealers that began to program their confirmations in accordance with the previously announced URL template may begin with the http format, rather than the https format. The MSRB does not expect such dealers to reprogram the URLs provided on customer confirmations as the http format will continue to function and will automatically redirect to the more secure https site.
[6] As a reminder, for dealers that currently seek to satisfy their obligation to provide a copy of the official statement to customers under Rule G-32(a)(iii) by notifying customers of the availability of the official statement through EMMA, the provision of the link described in this set of FAQs would satisfy both the relevant Rule G-15 security-specific URL obligation and the Rule G-32(a)(iii), provided that, for purposes of Rule G-32(a)(iii), the URL address also is accompanied by the additional information described. For example, if a dealer included the sample description included in this question, the addition of the language “Copies of the official statement are also available from [insert dealer name] upon request” would satisfy both the Rule G-15 security-specific URL obligation and Rule G-32(a)(iii) obligations.
Notice of Interpretation of Rule G-17 Concerning Prompt Delivery of Securities
From time to time the Board has received inquiries from purchasers of municipal securities concerning the duty of municipal securities brokers and dealers to deliver securities to customers under the Board’s rules. In particular, customers have asked what, if any, remedies are available when long delays occur between the purchase, payment and delivery of municipal securities. The Board has advised such individuals that under rule G-17, the Board’s fair dealing rule, a municipal securities broker or dealer has a duty to deliver securities sold to customers in a prompt fashion.
The Board is mindful that a dealer’s failure to deliver municipal securities often is caused by its failure to receive delivery of the securities from another dealer or by other circumstances beyond its control. It nevertheless believes that a dealer’s duty to deliver securities promptly to customers is inherent in rule G-17.[1] A violation of that duty could occur, for example, if a dealer sells securities to a customer when it knows that it cannot effect delivery by the specified settlement date or within a reasonable length of time thereafter and does not disclose that fact to its customer.
The Board notes that customers who fail to receive securities are not entitled to take advantage of the Board’s procedures to close out a failed transaction which are available only for inter-dealer transactions under rule G-12. However, if a customer sustains a loss or otherwise is damaged by his dealer’s failure to deliver securities, he may seek recovery through the Board’s arbitration program or through litigation. These remedies may accrue to the customer whether or not a dealer’s failure to deliver violates rule G-17.
[1] The duty of a securities professional to complete promptly transactions with customers also has been found to flow from the federal securities laws by the SEC and the courts.
Automated Clearance: "Internal" Transactions
Automated clearance: "internal" transactions. As you are aware, the Board has been considering for the past year the adoption of amendments to the Board rules to mandate the use of automated confirmation/comparison and book-entry settlement systems in connection with the clearance of certain inter-dealer and customer transactions in municipal securities. In connection with its consideration of this matter, the Board released, in July 1982, an exposure draft of a proposal to apply such requirements to customer transactions, and, in March 1983, two exposure drafts of comparable proposals with respect to customer transactions and inter-dealer transactions. The Board has recently taken action on these proposals, and adopted amendments to its rules, substantially along the lines of the March 1983 proposals, for filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission; a copy of the notice of filing of these amendments is enclosed for your information.
[The bank] commented to the Board on both the July 1982 exposure draft, by letter dated October 15, 1982 from [name omitted] of the bank's Operations Department, and on the March 1983 exposure drafts, by letter dated June 1, 1983 from yourself. In these letters, among other comments, the bank suggested that the proposed requirement for the use of automated confirmation and book-entry settlement systems on certain customer transactions should not apply in circumstances where the transaction is between the bank's dealer department and a customer who clears or safekeeps securities through the dealer department or through the bank's custodian or safekeeping department. Your June 1983 letter, for example, commented as follows:
Internal trades [with] customers of a dealer bank are not exempt from the amendment. This seems inconsistent with operating efficiency and the objectives of the amendment. Technically, a bank dealer would have to submit to [an automated confirmation and book-entry settlement system] trades made with customers who clear or safekeep through another department in the bank. If adopted, the amendment should allow for such an exemption.
I am writing to advise you that, in reviewing the comments on the July 1982 and March 1983 proposals, the Board concurred with this suggestion. The Board is of the view that the proposed requirement for the automated confirmation and book-entry settlement of certain customer transactions does not apply to a purchase or sale of municipal securities effected by a broker, dealer, or municipal securities dealer for the account of a customer in circumstances where the securities are to be delivered to or received from a clearance or safekeeping account maintained by the customer with the broker, dealer, or municipal securities dealer itself, or with a clearance or safekeeping department of an organization of which the broker, dealer, or municipal securities dealer is a division or department. MSRB interpretation of September 21, 1983.
Financial Advisory Relationship: Potential Underwriter
Financial advisory relationship: potential underwriter. This responds to your letter of July 20, 1983, requesting our view on the applicability of Board rule G-23 to the following situation:
Your firm, a registered municipal securities dealer, along with an architectural firm and a construction firm, plans to present to a municipality a proposal to design, build and finance a criminal justice facility. If the municipality shows interest, the team members will suggest that the municipality engage them to put together a specific, customized proposal for review. If the municipality accepts this proposal, the team will ask the municipality to execute a contract covering the additional services. This contract will provide for compensation to be paid to the firm in connection with the creation of a financing proposal. This proposal could encompass such issues as those set forth in Rule G-23(b). Further, it is the intent of the team members that a project may ultimately be brought to fruition by all or any one of the team members. Therefore, the firm may make the final financing proposal but fail to be retained by the municipality to actually finance the construction. In this event, the other two team members will proceed and the municipality will obtain another underwriter. However, it will be the firm's intent throughout the negotiation phase to ultimately be retained as the municipality's underwriter.
You express concern whether the above facts create a financial advisory relationship under rule G-23(b). Board rule G-23(b), concerning activities of financial advisors, provides that a financial advisory relationship shall be deemed to exist:
"when a broker, dealer, or municipal securities dealer renders or enters into an agreement to render financial advisory or consultant services to or on behalf of an issuer with respect to a new issue or issues of municipal securities,..."
The rule provides, however, that a financial advisory relationship shall not be deemed to exist
"when, in the course of acting as an underwriter , a municipal securities dealer renders advice to an issuer, including advice with respect to the structure, timing, terms and other similar matters concerning a new issue of municipal securities." [Emphasis added]
It does not appear that your firm would be rendering advice to the municipality "in the course of acting as an underwriter." In the beginning of the firm's relationship with the municipality, it is acting as a financial advisor, and being compensated as such. No underwriting agreement has been executed with the municipality. Therefore, based upon the representations in your letter, it appears that the firm's activities would be subject to the requirements of rule G-23. MSRB interpretation of September 7, 1983.
Inclusion of IDB-Related Activities
Inclusion of IDB-related activities. This responds to your letter of June 14, 1983 concerning your request for an interpretation of Board rule G-1, which defines a "separately identifiable department or division" of a bank. In particular, you request our advice concerning whether certain activities engaged in by your Corporate Finance Division (the "Division") should be considered "municipal securities dealer activities" for purposes of the rule. Your letter and a subsequent telephone conversation set forth the following facts:
The Division acts as financial advisor to certain corporate customers of the Bank. Some of these customers wish to raise money through the issuance of IDBs. In order to assist these corporations in the placement of the IDBs, the Division contacts from one to ten institutional investors and provides them with information regarding the terms of the proposed financing and basic facts about the corporation. If the investor expresses interest in the financing, a confidential memorandum describing the financing, prepared by the corporation with the assistance of the Division, is sent.
During negotiations between the corporation and the investor, the Division may act as a liaison between the two parties in the communication of comments on the financing documents. According to the bank, the Division is not an agent of the corporation and is not authorized to act on behalf of the corporation in accepting any terms or conditions associated with the proposed financing. For its services, the Division usually receives a percentage of the total dollar amount of securities issued, with a minimum contingent on the successful completion of the deal. While the bank has established a separately identifiable division pursuant to rule G-1, the Division is not part of it.
Your inquiry was discussed by the Board at its July meeting. The Board is of the view that the activities of the Division, as described, constitute the sales of municipal securities for purposes of the definition of municipal securities dealer activities in Board rule G-1. Therefore, these activities should be conducted in the bank's registered separately identifiable department by persons qualified under the Board's professional qualifications rules. MSRB interpretation of July 26, 1983.
Use of Formulas: Annual Interest Securities
Use of formulas: annual interest securities. I am writing in response to your letter of June 1, 1983 regarding the appropriate method of calculating yield and dollar price on periodic-interest municipal securities which pay interest on an annual, rather than the more customary semi-annual, basis. You note in your letter that Board rule G-33 requires the use for purposes of computations of yield and dollar price on such securities of a formula which presumes semi-annual payment of interest (i.e., that formula set forth in subparagraph (b)(i)(B)(2) of the rule). You suggest that the rule should be amended to require the use of a formula that recognizes the annual interest payment cycle on the securities.
As I indicated to you in our previous telephone conversation on this subject, the industry has traditionally disregarded the unusual nature of the interest payment cycle on these securities when computing yields and dollar prices on them, and has followed the practice of using the standard formula for computing yield and dollar price on a security paying interest on a semi-annual basis for these purposes. As a result of this traditional practice, all of the calculators presently available for use by industry members when computing yields and dollar prices have been designed in accordance with the assumption that all periodic-interest municipal securities pay interest on a semi-annual basis; these calculator models cannot be used to compute yields and dollar prices on such securities on any other basis. Therefore, the adoption of a requirement that yields and dollar prices on securities which pay interest on an annual basis be computed by means of a formula which recognizes the annual nature of the interest payment cycle, such as you suggest, would render all of the existing calculator models obsolete, and require that all industry members incur the cost of purchasing new calculator equipment capable of performing such computations (equipment which does not, to my knowledge, exist as of yet).
It is because of the substantial compliance expense that would have been imposed on the industry that the Board declined to adopt a requirement such as you suggest at the time rule G-33 was promulgated, even though it recognized that the requirement that was adopted mandated the use of a formula that would produce slightly less accurate results. MSRB interpretation of June 6, 1983.
Microfilming of Records
Microfilming of records. I am writing in response to your letter of May 20, 1983 regarding our previous conversations about the requirements of Board rules G-1 and G-9 as they would apply to the bank's retention of dealer department records on microfilm. In your letter and our previous conversations you indicated that the bank wishes to retain all of the records required to be maintained by its municipal securities dealer department on microfilm, with the hard copy of each record destroyed immediately after it has been microfilmed. You inquired as to the circumstances under which this method of record retention could be used. You also inquired about the extent to which municipal securities dealer department records could be commingled with records of other departments on the same strips of microfilm.
As you are aware, Board rule G-9(e) provides that
a record...required to be preserved by this rule...may be retained...on microfilm, electronic or magnetic tape, or by the other similar medium of record retention, provided that [the] municipal securities broker or municipal securities dealer shall have available adequate facilities for ready retrieval and inspection of any such record and for production of easily readable facsimile copies thereof and, in the case of records retained on microfilm, electronic or magnetic tape, or other similar medium of record retention, duplicates of such records shall be stored separately from each other for the periods of time required by this rule.
Therefore, the following three conditions must be met, if records are to be retained on microfilm:
(1) facilities for ready retrieval and inspection of the records (such as a microfilm reader or other similar piece of equipment) must be available;
(2) facilities for the reproduction of a hard copy facsimile of a particular record must also be available; and
(3) duplicate copies of the microfilm must be made and stored separately for the necessary time periods.
If these conditions are met, the retention of records by means of microfilm is satisfactory for purposes of the Board's rules, and hard copy records need not be retained after the microfilming is completed.
With respect to the establishment of a separately identifiable municipal securities dealer department of a bank, Board rule G-1 provides that all of the records relating to the municipal securities activities of such department must be
separately maintained in or separately extractable from such [department's] own facilities or the facilities of the bank...[and must be] so maintained or otherwise accessible as to permit independent examination thereof and enforcement of applicable provisions of the Act, the rules and regulations thereunder and the rules of the Board.
These requirements would not preclude you from maintaining the required records on microfilm which also contained other bank records, as long as the required records were "separately extractable." The course of action you propose, maintaining all municipal securities dealer department records together as the first items on a roll of microfilm, would seem to be an appropriate way of complying with these requirements. MSRB interpretation of June 6, 1983.
Application of Board Rules to Financial Advisory Services Rendered to Corporate Obligors on Industrial Development Bonds
In a recent letter to the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the staff of the Securities and Exchange Commission has taken the position that private placements of industrial development bonds ("IDBs") constitute transactions in municipal securities as defined in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended. The Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board has received a number of inquiries concerning this letter. The Board is publishing this notice for the purposes of: (1) reviewing the application of its rules to private placements of municipal securities and (2) expressing its views concerning whether certain Board rules apply to financial advisory services rendered by municipal securities dealers and brokers to corporate obligors on IDBs.
A. Private Placements of IDBs
The Board’s rules apply, of course, to all transactions in municipal securities, including securities which are IDBs. The SEC letter dealt in particular with the activities of commercial banks. That letter pointed out that if a commercial bank has a registered municipal securities dealer department, under Board rule G-1, which defines the term "separately identifiable department or division of a bank," any private placement activities of the bank in securities which are IDBs must be conducted as a part of the registered dealer department. The Board urges all bank dealers which have registered as a separately identifiable department or division to review their organizations and assure that all departments or units which engage in the private placement of IDBs are designated on the bank’s Form MSD registration and other applicable bank records as part of its separately identifiable department or division. The Board also notes that such activities must be under the supervision of a person designated by the bank’s board of directors as responsible for these activities. In addition, under Board rule G-3, concerning professional qualifications, persons who are engaged in privately placing municipal securities must be qualified as municipal securities representatives and be supervised with respect to that activity by a qualified municipal securities principal.
B. Financial Advisory Services Rendered to Corporate Obligors on IDBs
Board rules G-1 and G-3 provide that rendering "financial advisory or consultant services for issuers" is an activity to which those rules are applicable (emphasis added). Similarly, Board rule G-23, on the activities of financial advisors, applies to brokers, dealers, and municipal securities dealers who agree to render "financial advisory or consultant services to or on behalf of an issuer" (emphasis added). Clearly these rules are applicable to financial advisory services rendered to state or local governments and their agencies, as well as to municipal corporations. In the Board’s view, however, rules G-1, G-3, and G-23 do not apply to financial advisory services which are provided to corporate obligors in connection with proposed IDB financings.
The Board wishes to emphasize that the scope of its definition of financial advisory services is limited to "advice with respect to the structure, timing, terms, and other similar matters" concerning a proposed issue.[1] If persons providing such advice to the corporate obligor on an IDB issue also participate in negotiations with prospective purchasers or are otherwise engaged in effecting placement of the issue, then, as indicated above, rules G-1 and G-3 would apply to their activities.
[Excerpts of the Commission letter follow:]
This is in response to your letter of December 1, 1981, requesting our views concerning certain activities by commercial banks in connection with industrial development bonds ("IDBs").[2] Specifically, you asked (1) whether the private placement activities of banks in IDBs involve transactions in municipal securities, (2) whether involvement in such activities alone would require such banks to register with the Commission under Section 15B of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act") as municipal securities dealers, (3) whether a bank that had registered a separately identifiable department or division with the Commission as a municipal securities dealer would be required to conduct such activities through such separately identifiable department or division, and (4) if such bank activities are required to be conducted in the separately identifiable department or division, whether the advisory services provided by those banks to the corporate obligor on an IDB should be regarded as advisory services provided to an issuer of municipal securities in connection with the issuance of municipal securities. Pursuant to your letter and subsequent telephone conversations, we understand the following facts to be typical of the activities in question.
A commercial bank offers private placement and financial advisory services to corporate entities on a regular and continuous basis. From time to time the bank recommends to the corporate entity that IDBs be used to raise capital. The bank advises the corporate entity regarding the terms and timing of the proposed IDB issuance, prepares the Direct Placement Memorandum describing the terms of the IDB, and contacts potential purchasers of the IDB. Such purchasers then make independent reviews of the corporate entity’s financial status. The bank then obtains comments from the potential buyers and relays such comments to the corporate entity. The bank might also assist the corporate entity in subsequent negotiations with the purchasers. An industrial development authority nominally issues the IDB on behalf of the corporate entity which becomes the economic obligor on the issue.
The bank engages in these activities in order to assist the corporate obligor in the sale of the IDBs. In return for its services, the bank receives from the corporate entity either a fixed fee or a percentage of the proceeds of the sale. The bank does not purchase any of the IDBs. The bank could, however, supply "bridge loans" to the corporate entity pending receipt of the proceeds of the IDB sale. In addition, the bank might provide investors with a letter of credit committing the bank to pay any interest or principal not paid by the corporate issuer. The bank might also act as trustee or paying agent for the nominal issuer of the IDB, for which the bank would receive a set fee.
IDBs AS MUNICIPAL SECURITIES
Section 3(a)(10) of the Exchange Act defines a "security" as, among other things, "any note… bond, debenture… investment contract, …or in general, any instrument commonly known as a ‘security’… " Section 3(a)(29) of the Exchange Act defines "municipal securities" to include any security which is an industrial development bond as defined in Section 103(b)(2) of the Code the interest on which is tax-exempt under Sections 103(b)(4) or 103(b)(6) of the Code. In our opinion, the private placement activities you have described involve transactions in municipal securities as defined in the Exchange Act.[3]
REGISTRATION AS MUNICIPAL SECURITIES DEALER
Section 15B(a) of the Exchange Act makes it unlawful for any municipal securities dealer to use the mails or any instrumentality of interstate commerce to "effect any transaction in, or to induce or attempt to induce the purchase or sale of, any municipal security unless such municipal securities dealer is registered" with the Commission. Section 3(a)(30) of the Exchange Act defines "municipal securities dealer" to include a bank or a separately identifiable department or division of a bank if that bank is engaged in the business of buying and selling municipal securities for its own account other than in a fiduciary capacity, through a broker or otherwise. Banks that engage solely in private placement activities in IDBs as described by you would not be required to register as municipal securities dealers since they do not appear to be engaged in the business of buying and selling municipal securities for their own accounts, but rather appear to be acting as brokers. Section 3(a)(4) of the Exchange Act defines the term broker as "any person engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities for the account of others, but does not include a bank." Since they are excluded from the definition of broker, banks that act solely as brokers need not register under the Exchange Act.[4]
INCLUSION IN SEPARATELY IDENTIFIABLE DEPARTMENT OR DIVISION
Section 15B(b)(2)(H) of the Exchange Act authorizes the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (the "MSRB") to make rules defining the term "separately identifiable department or division" ("SID") of a bank as used in Section 3(a)(30) of the Exchange Act. MSRB rule G-1 defines the SID as "that unit of the bank which conducts all the activities of the bank relating to the conduct of business as a municipal securities dealer…" The rule defines municipal securities dealer activities to include "sales of municipal securities" and "financial advisory and consultant services for issuers in connection with the issuance of municipal securities." Therefore, those banks that have registered an SID with the Commission also must conduct the private placement activities within the SID in accordance with MSRB rules…
Based upon the facts and representations set forth in your letter, it would appear that the private placement activities of banks involving IDBs, as described in your example, constitute transactions in municipal securities that, if done alone, would not require a bank to register with the Commission as a municipal securities dealer. However, such activities, when conducted by a bank municipal securities dealer that had registered a separately identifiable department or division, would be treated as municipal securities dealer activities and, therefore, would be required to be conducted in the bank’s dealer department…
[1] Rule G-23(b).
[2] You have represented that the IDBs involved would be primarily those defined in Section 103(b)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (the "Code"), the interest on which is tax-exempt under Sections 103(b)(4) and 103(b)(6) of the Code.
[3]This determination is based on an analysis of the specific facts as described by you. Different facts and circumstances could result in a transaction involving municipal debt instruments being treated as loan participations not subject to the federal securities laws. Such determinations can only be made on a case by case basis after a thorough examination of the context of the transaction.
[4] See letter dated February 17, 1977, from Anne E. Chafer, Attorney, Securities and Exchange Commission, to Bruce F. Golden and letter dated January 11, 1982, from Thomas G. Lovett, Attorney, Securities and Exchange Commission, to Harriet E. Munrett regarding Citytrust of Bridgeport, Connecticut.
Municipal Securities Principal: Bank Operations
Municipal securities principal: bank operations. I am writing in response to your letter of April 26, 1983 concerning the results of a recent examination of your bank's municipal securities dealer department by examiners from the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. In your letter you indicate that the examiners expressed the view that the bank's present organizational structure did not comport with the definition of a "separately identifiable department or division of a bank" set forth in Board rule G-1. You note that the examiners' basis for this conclusion was their belief that the municipal securities processing functions of the bank were not under the supervision of a qualified municipal securities principal. You state that you disagree with the examiners' conclusions, and you request that the Board indicate whether, in its view, the organizational structure through which the bank presently carries on its municipal securities activities is satisfactory for purposes of compliance with Board rules.
As a general matter we would hesitate to disagree with the opinion expressed by on-site examiners in a matter of this sort. The examiners are, of course, in direct contact with the matter in question, and have access to the full details of the situation, rather than an abstraction or summary of the particulars. Accordingly, we are unable to express a view that the examiners' conclusions are incorrect in the circumstances you describe.
With respect to the specific issues which you raise, it is not impossible for a bank to establish a "separately identifiable department or division" for purposes of rule G-1 which includes areas in the bank which, for other purposes (e.g., for general bank organizational and reporting purposes), would be considered separate. To the extent that such areas are engaged in municipal securities dealer activities (as enumerated in rule G-1), however, they must be under the supervision of the person or persons designated by the bank's board of directors, in accordance with rule G-1(a)(1), as responsible for the conduct of such activities.
As you are aware, the person or persons who are responsible for the management and supervision of the day-to-day activities of the municipal securities processing area need not be qualified as municipal securities principals if they do not have policy-making authority with respect to such activities. However, such activities must be subject to the supervision of a municipal securities principal. Therefore, if those directly involved in the day-to-day supervision of the municipal securities processing activities do not have policy-making authority over such activities and, as a consequence, are not qualified as municipal securities principals, a person who is qualified as a municipal securities principal (whether that person designated by the bank's board of directors pursuant to rule G-1(a)(1) or some other person who is subordinate to that person) must be designated as having responsibility for the supervision of the processing activities. The bank's supervisory procedures should appropriately reflect such designation and set forth the manner in which the designated person will carry out these responsibilities. MSRB interpretation of May 13, 1983.
Municipal Securities Sales Activities in Branch Affiliate and Correspondent Banks Which Are Municipal Securities Dealers
The Board has received several inquiries from banks concerning the activities which may be performed in connection with the marketing of municipal securities through branch, affiliate, and correspondent banks. Rule G-2 of the Board provides that no municipal securities dealer may effect transactions in, or induce or attempt to induce the purchase or sale of any municipal security, unless the dealer in question and every individual associated with it is qualified in accordance with the rules of the Board. Board rule G-3 establishes qualification requirements for municipal securities representatives and other municipal securities professionals. Board rule G-27 requires supervision of municipal securities activities by qualified municipal securities principals.
Activities of Branch, Affiliate and Correspondent Bank Personnel
Bank employees who are not qualified municipal securities representatives may perform certain limited functions in connection with the marketing of municipal securities. Namely, such persons may:
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advise customers that municipal securities investment services are available in the bank;
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make available to customers material concerning municipal securities investments, such as market letters and listings of issues handled by the bank's dealer department, which has been approved for distribution by the dealer department's municipal securities principal; and,
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establish contact between the customer and the dealer department.
Further sales-related activity would be construed as inducing or attempting to induce the purchase or sales of a municipal security, and may only be engaged in by duly-qualified municipal securities representatives.
The Board wishes to emphasize that each bank dealer should take steps to assure that its branch, correspondent, and affiliate bank personnel understand and observe the restrictions outlined above concerning referrals of municipal securities customers to the bank's dealer department.
Placement and Supervision of Municipal Securities Representatives
Bank dealers have also directed inquiries to the federal bank regulators and to the Board concerning whether qualified municipal securities representatives in affiliates or branches of a bank dealer may respond to customer inquiries concerning municipal securities and take customer orders for municipal securities if no municipal securities principal is located in such affiliates or branches. Board rule G-27 places on each broker, dealer, and municipal securities dealer the obligation to supervise the municipal securities activities of its associated persons and the conduct of its municipal securities business. The rule requires that municipal securities dealers designate a municipal securities principal as responsible for the supervision and review of municipal securities transactions and other activities. There is no requirement that a municipal securities principal be located in each office or branch of a municipal securities dealer, provided that adequate supervision of all municipal securities activities can be assured. For purposes of the Board rules, each employee of a branch or affiliate of a bank dealer who communicates with public customers on investment opportunities in municipal securities and who takes customers' orders for such securities would be considered an "associated person" to whom the Board's qualification and supervision requirements would apply.
Callable Securities: Extraordinary Mandatory Redemption Features
Callable securities: extraordinary mandatory redemption features. I am writing in response to your letter of February 15, 1983 regarding the confirmation disclosure requirements applicable to municipal securities which are subject to extraordinary mandatory redemption features. In your letter you inquire whether such securities need be identified as "callable" securities on the confirmation. You also inquire as to the relationship between an extraordinary mandatory redemption feature and a "catastrophe call" feature, and the disclosure requirements applicable to the latter type of provision.
An extraordinary mandatory redemption feature, in my understanding, is a call provision under which an issuer of securities would be obliged to call all or a part of an issue if certain stated unexpected events occur. For example, many of the recent mortgage revenue issues have extraordinary mandatory redemption provisions under which securities would be called if a portion of the proceeds of the issue has not been used to acquire mortgages by a certain stated date, or if moneys received from principal prepayments have not been used to acquire new mortgages by a certain period following receipt of the prepayment. In general, securities which are subject to extraordinary mandatory redemption provisions must be identified as "callable" securities on any confirmation. Extraordinary redemption provisions would not, however, be used for purposes of computing a yield or dollar price.
One specific type of extraordinary mandatory redemption provision is what has been colloquially termed a "catastrophe" or "calamity" call provision. Under this type of provision the issuer of securities would be obliged to call all or part of an issue if the financed project is destroyed or damaged by some catastrophe (e.g., by fire, flood, lightning or other act of God) or if the tax exempt status of the issue is negated. The Board has previously expressed the view that securities which are callable solely under this type of "catastrophe" call provision, and are not otherwise callable, need not be designated as "callable" securities on a confirmation.
In summary, therefore, securities which are subject to extraordinary mandatory redemption provisions other than "catastrophe" call provisions must be identified as "callable" securities on confirmations. MSRB interpretation of February 18, 1983.
Put Option Bonds: Safekeeping, Pricing
Put option bonds: safekeeping, pricing. I am writing in response to your recent letter regarding issues of municipal securities with put option or tender option features, under which a holder of the securities may put the securities back to the issuer or an agent of the issuer at par on certain stated dates. In your letter you inquire generally as to the confirmation disclosure requirements applicable to such securities. You also raise several questions regarding a dealer’s obligation to advise customers of the existence of the put option provision at times other than the time of sale of the securities to the customer.
Your letter was referred to a committee of the Board which has responsibility for interpreting the Board’s confirmation rules, among other matters. That committee has authorized my sending you the following response.
Both rules G-12(c) and G-15, applicable to inter-dealer and customer confirmations respectively, require that confirmations of transactions in securities which are subject to put option or tender option features must indicate that fact (e.g., through inclusion of the designation “puttable” on the confirmation). the date on which the put option feature first comes into effect need be stated on the confirmation only if the transaction is effected on a yield basis and the parties to the transaction specifically agree that the transaction dollar price should be computed to that date. In the absence of such an agreement, the put date need not be stated on the confirmation, and any yield disclosed should be a yield to maturity.
Of course, municipal securities brokers and dealers selling to customers securities with put option or tender option features are obligated to disclose adequately the special characteristics of these securities at the time of trade. The customer therefore should be advised of information about the put option or tender option feature at this time.
In your letter you inquire whether a dealer who had previously sold securities with a put option or tender option feature to a customer would be obliged to contact that customer around the time the put option comes into effect to remind the customer that the put option is available. You also ask whether such an obligation would exist if the dealer held the securities in safekeeping for the customer. The committee can respond, of course, only in terms of the requirements of Board rules; the committee noted that no Board rule would impose such an obligation on the dealer.
In your letter you also ask whether a dealer who purchased from a customer securities with a put option or tender option feature at the time of the put option exercise date at a price significantly below the put exercise price would be in violation of any Board rules. The committee believes that such a dealer might well be deemed to be in violation of Board rules G-17 on fair dealer and G-30 on prices and commissions. MSRB interpretation of February 18, 1983.
