Under Rule G-17 of the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB), brokers, dealers, and municipal securities dealers (“dealers”) must, in the conduct of their municipal securities activities, deal fairly with all persons and must not engage in any deceptive, dishonest, or unfair practice. This rule is most often cited in connection with duties owed by dealers to investors; however, it also applies to their interactions with other market participants, including municipal entities[1] such as states and their political subdivisions that are issuers of municipal securities (“issuers”).

The MSRB has previously observed that Rule G-17 requires dealers to deal fairly with issuers.[2] With the passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,[3] the MSRB was expressly directed by Congress to protect municipal entities. Accordingly, in 2012, the MSRB provided additional interpretive guidance that addressed how Rule G-17 applies to dealers acting in the capacity of underwriters in the municipal securities transactions described therein (the “2012 Interpretive Notice”).[4]

This notice supersedes the MSRB’s 2012 Interpretive Notice, dated August 2, 2012, concerning the application of Rule G-17 to underwriters of municipal securities, as well as the related implementation guidance, dated July 18, 2012, and frequently-asked questions, dated March 25, 2013 (the “prior guidance”).[5] The prior guidance will remain applicable to underwriting relationships commencing prior to March 31, 2021. Underwriters will be subject to the amended guidance provided by this notice for all of their underwriting relationships beginning on or after that date. For purposes of this notice, an underwriting relationship is considered to have begun at the time the delivery of the first disclosure is triggered as described under “Timing and Manner of Disclosures” below (i.e., the earliest stages of an underwriter’s relationship with an issuer with respect to an issue, such as in a response to a request for proposal or in promotional materials provided to an issuer).

Applicability of the Notice

Except where a competitive underwriting is specifically mentioned, this notice applies to negotiated underwritings only.[6] This notice does not apply to a dealer acting as a primary distributor in a continuous offering of municipal fund securities, such as interests in 529 savings plans and Achieving a Better Life Experience (ABLE) programs. It does not apply to selling group members. This notice does not address a dealer’s duties when the dealer is serving as an advisor to a municipal entity. This notice applies to a primary offering of a new issue of municipal securities that is placed with investors by a dealer serving as placement agent, although certain disclosures may be omitted as described below.

The fair practice duties outlined in this notice are those duties that a dealer owes to a municipal entity when the dealer underwrites a new issue of municipal securities. This notice does not set out the underwriter’s fair-practice duties to other parties to a municipal securities financing (e.g., conduit borrowers). The MSRB notes, however, that Rule G-17 does require that an underwriter deal fairly with all persons in the course of the dealer’s municipal securities activities. What actions are considered fair will, of necessity, be dependent on the nature of the relationship between a dealer and such other parties, the particular actions undertaken, and all other relevant facts and circumstances. Although this notice does not address what an underwriter’s fair-dealing duties may be with respect to other parties, it may serve as one of many bases for an underwriter to consider how to establish appropriate policies and procedures for ensuring that it meets such fair-practice obligations, in light of its relationship with such other participants and their particular roles.

The examples discussed in this notice are illustrative only and are not meant to encompass all obligations of dealers to municipal entities under Rule G-17. Furthermore, when municipal entities are customers[7] of dealers, they are subject to the same protections under MSRB rules, including Rule G‑17, that apply to other customers.[8] The MSRB notes that an underwriter has a duty of fair dealing to investors in addition to its duty of fair dealing to issuers. An underwriter also has a duty to comply with other MSRB rules as well as other federal and state securities laws.

Basic Fair Dealing Principle

As noted above, Rule G-17 precludes a dealer, in the conduct of its municipal securities activities, from engaging in any deceptive, dishonest, or unfair practice with any person, including an issuer. The rule contains an anti-fraud prohibition. Thus, an underwriter must not misrepresent or omit the facts, risks, potential benefits, or other material information about municipal securities activities undertaken with a municipal issuer. However, Rule G-17 does not merely prohibit deceptive conduct on the part of the dealer; it also establishes a general duty of a dealer to deal fairly with all persons (including, but not limited to, issuers), even in the absence of fraud.

Role of Underwriters and Conflicts of Interest

In negotiated underwritings, underwriters’ Rule G-17 duty to deal fairly with an issuer requires certain disclosures to the issuer in connection with an issue or proposed issue of municipal securities, as provided below.[9]

• The disclosures discussed under “Disclosures Concerning the Underwriters’ Role” and “Disclosures Concerning Underwriters’ Compensation” (the “standard disclosures”) must be provided by the sole underwriter or the syndicate manager[10] to the issuer as described below.
• The disclosures discussed under “Required Disclosures to Issuers” (the “transaction-specific disclosures”) must be provided to the issuer by the underwriter who has recommended a financing structure or product to the issuer as described below.[11]
• The disclosures discussed under “Other Conflicts Disclosures” (the “dealer-specific disclosures”) must be provided by the sole underwriter or each underwriter in a syndicate (as applicable) as described below.[12]

Disclosures Concerning the Underwriter’s Role.  The sole underwriter or the syndicate manager[13] must disclose to the issuer that:

	(i)		Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board Rule G-17 requires an underwriter to deal fairly at all times with both issuers and investors;
	(ii)		the underwriter’s primary role is to purchase securities with a view to distribution in an arm’s-length commercial transaction with the issuer and it has financial and other interests that differ from those of the issuer;[14]
	(iii)		unlike a municipal advisor, the underwriter does not have a fiduciary duty to the issuer under the federal securities laws and is, therefore, not required by federal law to act in the best interests of the issuer without regard to its own financial or other interests;[15]
	(iv)		the issuer may choose to engage the services of a municipal advisor with a fiduciary obligation to represent the issuer’s interests in the transaction;
	(v)		the underwriter has a duty to purchase securities from the issuer at a fair and reasonable price, but must balance that duty with its duty to sell municipal securities to investors at prices that are fair and reasonable; and
	(vi)		the underwriter will review the official statement for the issuer’s securities in accordance with, and as part of, its responsibilities to investors under the federal securities laws, as applied to the facts and circumstances of the transaction.[16]

Underwriters also must not recommend that issuers not retain a municipal advisor. Accordingly, underwriters may not discourage issuers from using a municipal advisor or otherwise imply that the hiring of a municipal advisor would be redundant because the sole underwriter or underwriting syndicate can provide the services that a municipal advisor would.

Disclosure Concerning the Underwriters’ Compensation. The sole underwriter or syndicate manager must disclose to issuers whether underwriting compensation will be contingent on the closing of a transaction. Sole underwriters or syndicate managers must also disclose that compensation that is contingent on the closing of a transaction or the size of a transaction presents a conflict of interest, because it may cause underwriters to recommend a transaction that is unnecessary or to recommend that the size of a transaction be larger than is necessary.

Other Conflicts Disclosures. The sole underwriter or each underwriter in a syndicate must also, when and if applicable, disclose other dealer-specific actual material conflicts of interest and potential material conflicts of interest,[17] including, but not limited to, the following:

	(i)		any payments described below under “Conflicts of Interest/Payments to or from Third Parties”;[18]
	(ii)		any arrangements described below under “Conflicts of Interest/Profit-Sharing with Investors”;
	(iii)		the credit default swap disclosures described below under “Conflicts of Interest/Credit Default Swaps”; and
	(iv)		any incentives for the underwriter to recommend a complex municipal securities financing and other associated conflicts of interest (as described below under “Required Disclosures to Issuers”).[19]

These categories of conflicts of interest are not mutually exclusive and, in some cases, a specific conflict may reasonably be viewed as falling into two or even more categories. An underwriter making disclosures of dealer-specific conflicts of interest to an issuer should concentrate on making them in a complete and understandable manner and need not necessarily organize them according to the categories listed above, particularly if adhering to a strict categorization process might interfere with the clarity and conciseness of disclosures.

Where there is a syndicate, each underwriter in the syndicate has a duty to provide its dealer-specific disclosures to the issuer. In general, dealer-specific disclosures for one dealer cannot be satisfied by disclosures made by another dealer (e.g., the syndicate manager) because such disclosures are, by their nature, not uniform, and must be prepared by each dealer. However, a syndicate manager may deliver each of the dealer-specific disclosures to the issuer as part of a single package of disclosures, as long as it is clear to which dealer each disclosure is attributed. An underwriter in the syndicate is not required to notify an issuer if it has determined that it does not have any dealer-specific disclosures to make. However, the obligation to provide dealer-specific disclosures includes material conflicts of interest arising after the time of engagement with the issuer, as noted below.

Timing and Manner of Disclosures.  The standard disclosures, transaction-specific disclosures, and dealer-specific disclosures must be made in writing to an official of the issuer identified by the issuer as a primary contact for that issuer for the receipt of the foregoing disclosures. In the absence of such identification, an underwriter may make such disclosures in writing to an official of the issuer that the underwriter reasonably believes has the authority to bind the issuer by contract with the underwriter and that, to the knowledge of the underwriter, is not a party to a disclosed conflict.[20] If provided within the same document as the dealer-specific disclosures and/or transaction-specific disclosures, the standard disclosures must be identified clearly as such and provided apart from the other disclosures (e.g., in an appendix).

Disclosures must be made in a clear and concise manner designed to make clear to such official the subject matter of such disclosures and their implications for the issuer in accordance with the following timelines.

• A sole underwriter or syndicate manager must make the standard disclosure concerning the arm’s-length nature of the underwriter-issuer relationship at the earliest stages of the underwriter’s relationship with the issuer with respect to an issue (e.g., in a response to a request for proposals or in promotional materials provided to an issuer).[21]

• A sole underwriter or syndicate manager must make the other standard disclosures regarding the underwriter’s role and compensation at or before the time the underwriter is engaged to perform underwriting services (e.g., in an engagement letter), not solely in a bond purchase agreement.

• An underwriter must make the dealer-specific disclosures at or before the time the underwriter has been engaged to perform the underwriting services.[22] Thereafter, an underwriter must make any applicable dealer-specific disclosures discovered or arising after being engaged as an underwriter as soon as practicable after being discovered and with sufficient time for the issuer to fully evaluate any such conflict and its implications.[23]

• An underwriter who recommends a financing structure or product to an issuer must make the transaction-specific disclosures in sufficient time before the execution of a commitment by an issuer (which may include a bond purchase agreement) relating to the financing, and with sufficient time to allow the issuer to fully evaluate the features of the financing.

Unless directed otherwise by an issuer, an underwriter may update selected portions of disclosures previously provided so long as such updates clearly identify the additions or deletions and are capable of being read independently of the prior disclosures.[24]

Acknowledgement of Disclosures. When delivering a disclosure, the underwriter must attempt to receive written acknowledgement[25] from an official of the issuer identified by the issuer as a primary contact for the issuer’s receipt of the foregoing disclosures.[26] In the absence of such identification, an underwriter may seek acknowledgement from an official of the issuer whom the underwriter reasonably believes has the authority to bind the issuer by contract with the underwriter and that, to the knowledge of the underwriter, is not party to a disclosed conflict. This notice does not specify the particular form of acknowledgement, but may include, for example, an e-mail read receipt.[27] An underwriter may proceed with a receipt of a written acknowledgement that includes an issuer’s reservation of rights or other self-protective language. If the official of the issuer agrees to proceed with the underwriting engagement after receipt of the disclosures but will not provide written acknowledgement of receipt, the underwriter responsible for making the requisite disclosure may proceed with the engagement after documenting with specificity why it was unable to obtain such written acknowledgement. Additionally, an underwriter must be able to produce evidence (including, for example, by automatic e-mail delivery receipt) that the disclosures were delivered with sufficient time for evaluation by the issuer before proceeding with the transaction. An issuer’s written acknowledgement of the receipt of disclosure is not dispositive of whether such disclosures were made with an appropriate amount of time. The analysis of whether disclosures were provided with sufficient time for an issuer’s review is based on the totality of the facts and circumstances.

Representations to Issuers

All representations made by underwriters to issuers in connection with municipal securities underwritings, whether written or oral, must be truthful and accurate and must not misrepresent or omit material facts. Underwriters must have a reasonable basis for the representations and other material information contained in documents they prepare and must refrain from including representations or other information they know or should know is inaccurate or misleading. For example, in connection with a certificate signed by the underwriter that will be relied upon by the issuer or other relevant parties to an underwriting (e.g., an issue price certificate), the dealer must have a reasonable basis for the representations and other material information contained therein.[28] In addition, an underwriter’s response to an issuer’s request for proposals or qualifications must fairly and accurately describe the underwriter’s capacity, resources, and knowledge to perform the proposed underwriting as of the time the proposal is submitted and must not contain any representations or other material information about such capacity, resources, or knowledge that the underwriter knows or should know to be inaccurate or misleading.[29] Matters not within the personal knowledge of those preparing the response (e.g., pending litigation) must be confirmed by those with knowledge of the subject matter. An underwriter must not represent that it has the requisite knowledge or expertise with respect to a particular financing if the personnel that it intends to work on the financing do not have the requisite knowledge or expertise.

Required Disclosures to Issuers

Many municipal securities are issued using financing structures that are routine and well understood by the typical municipal market professional, including most issuer personnel that have the lead responsibilities in connection with the issuance of municipal securities. For example, absent unusual circumstances or features, the typical fixed rate offering may be presumed to be well understood. Nevertheless, in the case of issuer personnel that the underwriter reasonably believes lack the requisite knowledge or experience to fully understand or assess the implications of a financing structures or products recommended by an underwriter, the underwriter making such recommendation must provide disclosures on the material aspects of such financing structures or product that it recommends (i.e., the “transaction-specific disclosures”).[30]

In some cases, issuer personnel responsible for the issuance of municipal securities would not be well positioned to fully understand or assess the implications of a recommended financing structure in its totality, because it is structured in a unique, atypical, or otherwise complex manner or incorporates unique, atypical, or otherwise complex features or products (a “complex municipal securities financing”).[31] Examples of complex municipal securities financings include, but are not limited to, variable rate demand obligations (“VRDOs”), financings involving derivatives (such as swaps), and financings in which interest rates are benchmarked to an index (such as LIBOR, SIFMA, or SOFR).[32] When a recommendation regarding a complex municipal securities financing structure has been made by an underwriter in a negotiated offering,[33] the underwriter making the recommendation has an obligation under Rule G-17 to communicate more particularized transaction-specific disclosures than those that may be required in the case of the recommendation of routine financing structures or products.[34] The underwriter making the recommendation must also disclose the material financial characteristics of the complex municipal securities financing, as well as the material financial risks of the financing that are known to the underwriter and reasonably foreseeable at the time of the disclosure.[35] It must also disclose any incentives for the recommendation of the complex municipal securities financing and other associated material conflicts of interest.[36] Such disclosures must be made in a fair and balanced manner based on principles of fair dealing and good faith.

The level of transaction-specific disclosure required may vary according to the issuer’s knowledge or experience with the proposed financing structure or similar structures, capability of evaluating the risks of the recommended financing structure or product, and financial ability to bear the risks of the recommended financing structure or product, in each case based on the reasonable belief of the underwriter.[37] Consequently, the level of transaction-specific disclosure to be provided to a particular issuer also can vary over time. In all events, the underwriter must disclose any incentives for the recommendation of the complex municipal securities financing and other associated conflicts of interest.

As previously mentioned, the transaction-specific disclosures must be made in writing to an official of the issuer identified by the issuer as a primary contact for the issuer for the receipt of such disclosures, or, in the absence of such identification, an underwriter may make such disclosures in writing to an issuer official whom the underwriter reasonably believes has the authority to bind the issuer by contract with the underwriter(s), and that, to the knowledge of the underwriter delivering the disclosure, is not a party to a disclosed conflict: (i) in sufficient time before the execution of a contract with the underwriter to allow the official to evaluate the recommendation (including consultation with any of its counsel or advisors) and (ii) in a manner designed to make clear to such official the subject matter of such disclosures and their implications for the issuer.

The disclosures concerning a complex municipal securities financing must address the specific elements of, and/or relevant products incorporated, into the recommended financing structure, rather than being general in nature.[38] An underwriter making a Complex Municipal Securities Financing Recommendation to an issuer cannot satisfy its fair dealing obligations by providing an issuer a single document setting out general descriptions of the various financing structures and/or products that may be recommended from time to time to various issuer clients that would effectively require issuer personnel to discover which disclosures apply to a particular recommendation and to the particular circumstances of that issuer. Underwriters can create, in anticipation of making such a recommendation, individualized descriptions, with appropriate levels of detail, of the material financial characteristics and risks for each of the various complex municipal securities financing structures and/or products (including any typical variations) they may recommend from time to time to various issuer clients, with such standardized descriptions serving as the base for more particularized disclosures for the specific complex financing the underwriter recommends to particular issuers.[39] In making a recommendation, an underwriter could incorporate, to the extent applicable, any refinements to the base description needed to fully describe the material financial features and risks unique to that financing.[40]

If the underwriter who has made a recommendation does not reasonably believe that the official to whom the disclosures are addressed is capable of independently evaluating the disclosures, the underwriter must make additional efforts reasonably designed to inform the official or its employees or agent. The underwriter also must make an independent assessment that such disclosures are appropriately tailored to the issuer’s level of sophistication.

Underwriter Duties in Connection with Issuer Disclosure Documents

Underwriters often play an important role in assisting issuers in the preparation of disclosure documents, such as preliminary official statements and official statements.[41] These documents are critical to the municipal securities transaction, because investors rely on the representations contained in such documents in making their investment decisions. Moreover, investment professionals, such as municipal securities analysts and ratings services, rely on the representations in forming an opinion regarding the credit. A dealer’s duty to have a reasonable basis for the representations it makes, and other material information it provides, to an issuer and to ensure that such representations and information are accurate and not misleading, as described above, extends to representations and information provided by the underwriter in connection with the preparation by the issuer of its disclosure documents (e.g., cash flows).

Underwriter Compensation and New Issue Pricing

Excessive Compensation. An underwriter’s compensation for a new issue (including both direct compensation paid by the issuer and other separate payments, values, or credits received by the underwriter from the issuer or any other party in connection with the underwriting), in certain cases and depending upon the specific facts and circumstances of the offering, may be so disproportionate to the nature of the underwriting and related services performed as to constitute an unfair practice with regard to the issuer that it is a violation of Rule G-17. Among the factors relevant to whether an underwriter’s compensation is disproportionate to the nature of the underwriting and related services performed, are the credit quality of the issue, the size of the issue, market conditions, the length of time spent structuring the issue, and whether the underwriter is paying the fee of the underwriter’s counsel or any other relevant costs related to the financing.

Fair Pricing. The duty of fair dealing under Rule G-17 includes an implied representation that the price an underwriter pays to an issuer is fair and reasonable, taking into consideration all relevant factors, including the best judgment of the underwriter as to the fair market value of the issue at the time it is priced.[42] In general, a dealer purchasing bonds in a competitive underwriting for which the issuer may reject any and all bids will be deemed to have satisfied its duty of fairness to the issuer with respect to the purchase price of the issue as long as the dealer’s bid is a bona fide bid (as defined in MSRB Rule G‑13)[43] that is based on the dealer’s best judgment of the fair market value of the securities that are the subject of the bid. In a negotiated underwriting, the underwriter has a duty under Rule G-17 to negotiate in good faith with the issuer. This duty includes the obligation of the dealer to ensure the accuracy of representations made during the course of such negotiations, including representations regarding the price negotiated and the nature of investor demand for the securities (e.g., the status of the order period and the order book). If, for example, the dealer represents to the issuer that it is providing the “best” market price available on the new issue, or that it will exert its best efforts to obtain the “most favorable” pricing, the dealer may violate Rule G-17 if its actions are inconsistent with such representations.[44]

Conflicts of Interest

Payments to or from Third Parties. In certain cases, compensation received by an underwriter from third parties, such as the providers of derivatives and investments (including affiliates of an underwriter), may color the underwriter’s judgment and cause it to recommend products, structures, and pricing levels to an issuer when it would not have done so absent such payments. The MSRB views the failure of an underwriter to disclose to the issuer the existence of payments, values, or credits received by an underwriter in connection with its underwriting of the new issue from parties other than the issuer, and payments made by the underwriter in connection with such new issue to parties other than the issuer (in either case including payments, values, or credits that relate directly or indirectly to collateral transactions integrally related to the issue being underwritten), to be a violation of an underwriter’s obligation to the issuer under Rule G-17.[45] For example, it would be a violation of Rule G-17 for an underwriter to compensate an undisclosed third party in order to secure municipal securities business. Similarly, it would be a violation of Rule G-17 for an underwriter to receive undisclosed compensation from a third party in exchange for recommending that third party’s services or product to an issuer, including business related to municipal securities derivative transactions. This notice does not require that the amount of such third-party payments be disclosed. The underwriter must also disclose to the issuer whether it has entered into any third-party arrangements for the marketing of the issuer’s securities.

Profit-Sharing with Investors. Arrangements between the underwriter and an investor purchasing new issue securities from the underwriter (including purchases that are contingent upon the delivery by the issuer to the underwriter of the securities) according to which profits realized from the resale by such investor of the securities are directly or indirectly split or otherwise shared with the underwriter also would, depending on the facts and circumstances (including in particular if such resale occurs reasonably close in time to the original sale by the underwriter to the investor), constitute a violation of the underwriter’s fair dealing obligation under Rule G-17.[46] Such arrangements could also constitute a violation of Rule G‑25(c), which precludes a dealer from sharing, directly or indirectly, in the profits or losses of a transaction in municipal securities with or for a customer. An underwriter should carefully consider whether any such arrangement, regardless of whether it constitutes a violation of Rule G-25(c), may evidence a potential failure of the underwriter’s duty with regard to new issue pricing described above.

Credit Default Swaps. The issuance or purchase by a dealer of credit default swaps for which the reference is the issuer for which the dealer is serving as underwriter, or an obligation of that issuer, may pose a conflict of interest, including a dealer-specific conflict of interest, because trading in such municipal credit default swaps has the potential to affect the pricing of the underlying reference obligations, as well as the pricing of other obligations brought to market by that issuer. Rule G-17 requires, therefore, that a dealer disclose the fact that it engages in such activities to the issuers for which it serves as underwriter. Activities with regard to credit default swaps based on baskets or indexes of municipal issuers that include the issuer or its obligation(s) need not be disclosed, unless the issuer or its obligation(s) represents more than 2% of the total notional amount of the credit default swap or the underwriter otherwise caused the issuer or its obligation(s) to be included in the basket or index.

Retail Order Periods

Rule G-17 requires an underwriter that has agreed to underwrite a transaction with a retail order period to, in fact, honor such agreement.[47]A dealer that wishes to allocate securities in a manner that is inconsistent with an issuer’s requirements must not do so without the issuer’s consent. In addition, Rule G-17 requires an underwriter that has agreed to underwrite a transaction with a retail order period to take reasonable measures to ensure that retail clients are bona fide. An underwriter that knowingly accepts an order that has been framed as a retail order when it is not (e.g., a number of small orders placed by an institutional investor that would otherwise not qualify as a retail customer) would violate Rule G-17 if its actions are inconsistent with the issuer’s expectations regarding retail orders. In addition, a dealer that places an order that is framed as a qualifying retail order but in fact represents an order that does not meet the qualification requirements to be treated as a retail order (e.g., an order by a retail dealer without “going away” orders[48] from retail customers, when such orders are not within the issuer’s definition of “retail”) violates its Rule G-17 duty of fair dealing. The MSRB will continue to review activities relating to retail order periods to ensure that they are conducted in a fair and orderly manner consistent with the intent of the issuer and the MSRB’s investor protection mandate.

Dealer Payments to Issuer Personnel

Dealers are reminded of the application of MSRB Rule G-20, on gifts, gratuities, and non-cash compensation, and Rule G-17, in connection with certain payments made to, and expenses reimbursed for, issuer personnel during the municipal bond issuance process.[49]  These rules are designed to avoid conflicts of interest and to promote fair practices in the municipal securities market.

Dealers should consider carefully whether payments they make in regard to expenses of issuer personnel in the course of the bond issuance process, including in particular, but not limited to, payments for which dealers seek reimbursement from bond proceeds or issuers, comport with the requirements of Rule G‑20. For example, a dealer acting as a financial advisor or underwriter may violate Rule G-20 by paying for excessive or lavish travel, meal, lodging and entertainment expenses in connection with an offering (such as may be incurred for rating agency trips, bond closing dinners, and other functions) that inure to the personal benefit of issuer personnel and that exceed the limits or otherwise violate the requirements of the rule.[50] 

The MSRB has become aware of problems in transaction reporting as a result of dealers "bunching" certain inter-dealer transactions in the comparison system.  Recently, some dealers have reported the sum of two trades as one transaction in instances when two dealers effected two trades with each other in the same issue and at the same price.  When two transactions are effected, two transactions should be reflected in each dealer's books and records and two transactions are required to be reported to the MSRB.  The time of trade for each transaction also must accurately reflect the time at which a contractual commitment was formed for each quantity of securities.  For example, if Dealer A purchases $50,000 of a municipal issue at a price of par from Dealer B at 11:00 am and then purchases an additional $50,000 at par from Dealer B at 2:00 pm, two transactions are required to be reflected on each dealers' books and records and two transactions are required to be reported to the MSRB. 

Since the same inter-dealer trade record submitted for automated comparison under Rule G-12(f) also is used to satisfy the requirements of Rule G-14, on transaction reporting, each inter-dealer transaction should be submitted for automated comparison separately in order to comply with Rule G-14's requirement to report all transactions.  Failure to do so causes erroneous information concerning transaction size and time of trade to appear in the transparency reports published by the MSRB as well as in the audit trail used by regulators and enforcement agencies.  To the extent that dealers use the records generated by the comparison system for purposes of complying with MSRB Rule G-8, on recordkeeping, it may also create erroneous information as to the size of transactions effected or time of trade execution.

In recent months, the MSRB has received a number of questions relating to certain kinds of transactions in which independent investment advisors instruct selling dealers to make deliveries to other dealers.  This notice addresses questions that have been raised relating to Rule G-12(f)(i), on automated comparison, and Rule G-14, on transaction reporting.  It describes existing requirements that follow from the language of the rules and does not set forth any new policies or procedures.

An independent investment advisor purchasing securities from one dealer sometimes instructs that dealer to make delivery of the securities to other dealers where the investment advisor's clients have accounts.  The identities of individual account holders typically are not given.[1] The dealers receiving the deliveries in these cases generally are providing "wrap fee" or similar types of accounts that allow investors to use independent investment advisors to manage their municipal securities portfolios. In these kinds of arrangements, the investment advisor chosen by the account holder may be picked from a list of advisors approved by the dealer; however, dealers offering these accounts have indicated that the investment advisor acts independently in effecting transactions for the client's municipal securities portfolio.

The following example illustrates the situation. An Investment Advisor purchases a $1 million block of municipal bonds from the Selling Dealer and instructs the Selling Dealer to deliver $300,000 of the bonds to Dealer X and $700,000 to Dealer Y. The Investment Advisor does not give the Selling Dealer the individual client accounts at Dealer X and Dealer Y to which the bonds will be allocated and there is no contact between the Selling Dealer and Dealers X and Y at the time of trade. The Investment Advisor, however, later informs Dealer X and Dealer Y to expect the delivery from the Selling Dealer, and gives the identity and quantity of securities that will be delivered, the final monies, and the individual account allocations. For example, the Investment Advisor may instruct Dealer X to allocate its $300,000 delivery by placing $100,000 in John Doe's account and $200,000 in Mary Smith's account. 

With respect to transaction reporting requirements in this situation, the Selling Dealer should report a $1 million sale to a customer.  No other dealer should report a transaction.  The comparison system should not be used for the inter-dealer transfers between the Selling Dealer and Dealers X and Y because this would cause them to be reported as inter-dealer trades. 

Frequently Asked Questions

One frequently asked question in the context of the above example is whether the transfers of the $300,000 and $700,000 blocks by the Selling Dealer to Dealer X and Dealer Y should be reported as inter-dealer transactions.  Another question is whether these transfers may be accomplished by submitting them to the automated comparison system for inter-dealer transactions.  Based on the information that has been provided to the MSRB, these transfers do not appear to represent inter-dealer trades and thus should not be reported under Rule G-14 or compared under Rule G-12(f)(i) using the current central comparison system. 

One reason for the conclusion that no inter-dealer trade exists is that municipal securities professionals for firms in the roles of Dealer X and Y have stated that the Investment Advisor is acting independently and is not acting as their agent when effecting the trade with the Selling Dealer.  In support of this assertion, they note that they often are not informed of the transaction or the deliveries that they should expect until well after the trade has been effected by the Investment Advisor.  They also note that the actions of the Investment Advisor are not subject to their control or supervision.  Thus, the $300,000 and $700,000 inter-dealer transfers in the above example appear to be simply deliveries made in accordance with a contract made by, and the instructions given by, the Investment Advisor.  The inter-dealer transfers thus do not constitute inter-dealer transactions.

Because Rule G-14 transaction reporting of inter-dealer trades is accomplished through the central comparison system, any dealer submitting the $300,000 and $700,000 inter-dealer transfers to the comparison system is in effect reporting inter-dealer transactions that did not occur.  In addition, this practice tends to drive down comparison rates and the overall performance of dealers in the automated comparison system.  As noted above, the trading desks of Dealer X and Dealer Y generally do not know about the Investment Advisor's transaction at the time of trade.  They consequently cannot submit comparison information to the system unless the Investment Advisor provides them with the trade details in a timely, accurate and complete manner.  Since the Investment Advisor is acting independently and is not supervised by municipal securities professionals at Dealer X and Dealer Y, there is no means for the municipal securities professionals at Dealer X and Dealer Y to ensure that this happens.

Questions also have been received on whether the individual allocations to investor accounts (e.g., the $100,000 and $200,000 allocations to the accounts of John Doe and Mary Smith in the example above) should be reported under Rule G-14 as customer transactions.  Even though the dealer housing these accounts obviously has important obligations to the investor with respect to receiving deliveries, paying the Selling Dealer for the securities, and processing the allocations under the instructions of the Investment Advisor, it does not appear that the dealer entered into a purchase or sale contract with the investor and thus nothing is reportable under Rule G-14.  This conclusion again is based upon statements by dealers providing the "wrap fee" and similar accounts, who indicate that the investment advisor acts independently and not as the dealer's agent when it effects the original block transaction and when it makes allocation decisions. 

For purposes of price transparency, the only transaction to be reported in the above example is a single $1 million sale to a customer.  This is appropriate because the only market price to be reported is the one set between the Selling Dealer and the Investment Advisor for the $1 million block of securities.  It is appropriate that the $300,000 and $700,000 inter-dealer transfers, and the $100,000 or $200,000 investor allocations are not disseminated as transactions since they would have to be reported using the price for the $1 million block.  This could be misleading in that market for $1 million round lots are often different than market prices for smaller transaction sizes.

On April 29, 2003, the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (the “MSRB”) filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) a proposed rule change consisting of an interpretive notice on marketing by brokers, dealers and municipal securities dealers (“dealers”) of 529 college savings plans in the workplace.[1] The proposed interpretive notice provides guidance on the application of Rule G-8, on recordkeeping, Rule G-17, on fair dealing, Rule G-19, on suitability, Rule G-27, on supervision, and Rule G-32, on disclosure, in the context of workplace marketing programs relating to 529 college savings plans. The proposed interpretive notice will become effective upon approval by the SEC.

Draft Interpretive Guidance

On November 18, 2002, the MSRB published for comment draft interpretive guidance on marketing of 529 college savings plan employee payroll deduction programs.[2] The MSRB received six comment letters. After reviewing these comments, the MSRB approved the draft interpretive guidance, with certain modifications, for filing with the SEC. The MSRB modified the draft interpretive guidance to: (i) change the term “introducing broker” to “selling broker;” (ii) reflect the existence of other scenarios in which 529 college savings plans are marketed in the workplace; (iii) provide more guidance as to when dealers may rely on others to fulfill regulatory responsibilities; and (iv) clarify certain recordkeeping obligations. The text of the proposed interpretive notice filed with the SEC appears at the end of this notice.

Summary of Comments on Draft Interpretive Guidance

One commentator fully supported the draft interpretive notice, stating that it “clearly sets out the rationale for providing guidance in this area … [and] will make it possible for our Representatives to assist companies in offering 529 college savings plans to their employees.” Four other commentators generally supported the draft interpretive notice, although each requested that the MSRB further broaden and/or clarify the guidance in various respects.[3]

Three commentators requested that the MSRB substitute the term “selling broker” or “selling dealer” for the term “introducing broker” used in the draft interpretive notice. They stated that the term “introducing broker” is used with different meanings under the federal securities laws applicable to other types of securities and may cause some confusion. In addition, one of these commentators recommended that, for purposes of the interpretation, the term “selling broker” also encompass the primary distributor where it directly establishes the relationship with the employer. It stated, “In addition to recognizing that a selling broker rarely, if ever, has a suitability obligation in the context of a payroll deduction program, the Notice should clarify that a primary distributor who makes 529 Plan investments available through a third-party broker would not have a suitability obligation under Rule G-19, as it too makes no recommendation to an employee.” The MSRB has changed the term “introducing broker” to “selling broker” in the revised interpretive notice. Contrary to the statement that the interpretive notice recognizes “that a selling broker rarely, if ever, has a suitability obligation,” the notice does not assess the likelihood or frequency of recommendations being made by selling brokers. The notice does provide some guidance regarding the factors to consider when determining whether a recommendation has occurred. The MSRB believes that no further guidance in this area is necessary.

Four commentators noted that the scenario described in the draft interpretive notice is not the only form in which dealers may seek to market 529 college savings plans through employers. In addition to arrangements where selling brokers having a contractual relationship with the primary distributor to market through employers, with the employees making investments directly through the primary distributor (as described in the draft interpretive notice), these commentators noted that: (1) primary distributors may themselves market 529 college savings plans through employers; (2) selling brokers sometimes have contractual relationships with the issuer rather than the primary distributor; (3) selling brokers may handle employee investments and maintain long-term relationships with employees, rather than merely introducing employees to the primary distributor; (4) transfer agents may undertake significant responsibilities in connection with employees’ investments; and (5) employees may in some instances use a dealer other than the selling broker or primary distributor to make an investment that may still be considered part of the employer-sponsored program. These commentators requested that the MSRB address some or all of these additional scenarios. In addition, one of these commentators suggested that the MSRB make clear that the scenarios addressed in the draft interpretive notice are illustrative and that other models may be implemented.

The MSRB has made significant modifications to the initial paragraphs of the notice to reflect the existence of these other scenarios. No significant change in interpretation results from a primary distributor acting in the role of a selling broker. The identity of the selling broker’s counterparty on the selling agreement also does not significantly change its regulatory obligations. Selling brokers that make recommendations remain fully obligated under MSRB rules and remain ultimately responsible where the primary distributor has not affirmatively undertaken regulatory obligations on behalf of the selling broker (as discussed below). The guidance provided by the notice is primarily intended for dealers that are formally involved in a workplace marketing program; thus, the notice is of limited applicability to dealers that do not have a formal role in such a program.

A commentator observed that the draft interpretive notice referred to on-line enrollment with the primary distributor and noted that in many circumstances enrollment and investments continue to be handled by mail. Also, three commentators noted that other forms of payment, such as ACH (automated clearing house) bank transfers, may be used in addition to traditional employee payroll deductions. These commentators requested that the MSRB recognize these variants in its final notice. The revised interpretive notice now more clearly acknowledges these different processes.

Four commentators sought further clarification on the circumstances under which selling brokers may rely on other parties to meet their regulatory obligations. Two of these commentators stated that dealers should be able to rely on issuers to distribute official statements to customers. One noted its concern that customers may be confused by the receipt of redundant (and possibly out-dated) disclosure documents if dealers must deliver official statements regardless of whether the issuer has sent them to customers. Another suggested that the ability of the selling broker to rely on the primary distributor for delivery of the official statement as provided in the draft interpretive notice be extended to the ability to rely on other parties, such as other dealers, employers and issuers.

The revised interpretive notice permits a selling broker to conclusively rely on the primary distributor to meet its disclosure obligations and certain supervisory obligations (described below) only under the limited circumstances in which employee orders are not accepted without actual delivery of the official statement and the primary distributor has affirmatively agreed to undertake such regulatory obligations on behalf of the selling broker. In such circumstances, the primary distributor will be responsible for fulfilling such obligations. In all other circumstances, the notice clarifies that a selling broker may agree with another party to take certain actions on its behalf but that if such other party fails to take such actions, the selling broker remains responsible for fulfilling its regulatory obligation.

One commentator suggested that the MSRB should permit selling brokers to enter into arrangements with the primary distributor to meet their supervisory obligations to review and approve customer accounts and transactions based upon having procedures in place that provide assurances to the selling brokers that such review and approval is being undertaken by the primary distributor. Another commentator questioned the value of requiring a selling broker to review customer accounts and transactions well after the transaction is executed, especially if the transaction was not recommended. In addition, it questioned why a requirement for such review and related recordkeeping would be dependent upon whether the selling broker receives compensation for a transaction.

The revised interpretive notice clarifies that, where a selling broker does not make a recommendation and the primary distributor affirmatively agrees to take on both the disclosure responsibilities and the supervisory responsibilities with regard to opening of accounts and approval of transactions, the regulatory obligation may be shifted to the primary distributor. However, supervisory responsibility remains with the selling broker so long as the selling broker retains any affirmative duties to employees. The MSRB believes that the limited recordkeeping obligations imposed on all selling brokers in the notice are appropriate. The revised interpretive notice makes clear that the limited recordkeeping requirements that remain for subsequent transactions effected by the primary distributor where compensation is paid to the selling broker applies only when such compensation is transaction based since, depending on the facts and circumstances, this information may be necessary to determine compliance with MSRB’s fair pricing and fair commission requirements.

With respect to transfer agents, a commentator noted that many plans provide for applications and customer orders to be sent directly to a transfer agent, with the primary distributor’s activities “limited to managing the overall marketing of the program and the production of marketing and promotional materials.” It stated that “only the transfer agent maintains any investor records and these records are the plan’s investor records. Thus, in this model, the primary distributor’s regulatory responsibilities are limited primarily to compliance with applicable rules governing marketing materials but not those rules mandating customer account related procedures.” The commentator sought assurance that primary distributors did not retain residual customer protection obligations under MSRB rules in the scenario where applications and orders are submitted directly to the transfer agent.

The MSRB notes that transfer agents generally are viewed under the Exchange Act as working on behalf of the issuer but that, in the 529 college savings plan market, transfer agents also sometimes contractually agree to act on behalf of the primary distributor. In the revised interpretive notice, where transactions are effected through a transfer agent without the direct involvement of the primary distributor or the selling broker, the selling broker is permitted to conclusively rely on the primary distributor to fulfill certain of the selling broker’s regulatory obligations only if the transfer agent has contractually agreed to act on behalf of the primary distributor. Otherwise, the transfer agent is effectively treated as an agent of the issuer and the dealer that enlisted the corresponding employer to participate in the workplace marketing plan remains ultimately responsible for compliance with MSRB rules.

A commentator asked why a selling broker would have a fair dealing obligation under Rule G-17 to an employer since the employer is not the dealer’s client. It also sought guidance regarding the nature of information that a dealer would be obligated to provide to the employer under the Rule G-17 disclosure obligation. Two commentators also questioned the need for the selling broker to maintain a record of the name and address of an employer that the dealer solicited, as well as for principal review of such solicitation. Another commentator sought assurances that the fair dealing obligation toward the employer would not give rise to any inference that the issuer has any federal securities law obligation to employers under the scenario described in the draft interpretive notice.

The fair dealing requirement of Rule G-17 applies, on its face, to all persons, not just customers. The MSRB believes that it appropriately applies to the selling broker’s relationship with employers, particularly since the selling broker is inducing the employer to create a captive audience of investors and the employer’s agreement to participate in the program may lead employees to believe that the employer endorses investment under the program. Under these circumstances, it is important that selling brokers provide adequate information regarding the program to the employer so that it can make an informed decision with regard to enrollment in the program. The limited recordkeeping regarding the employer required by the notice is important in the context of documenting the ability of a selling broker to rely on the guidance provided in the notice with respect to particular transactions. The revised interpretive notice provides assurances that a dealer’s fair dealing obligation to the employer is not intended to imply that the issuer has a similar legal obligation to the employer.

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[1] The Daily Report is available by subscription at no cost. Currently, "frequently traded" securities are those that traded two or more times during a trading day. As noted below, inter-dealer transactions must be compared on trade date to be eligible for this report.

[2] The MSRB also publishes a "Daily Comprehensive Report," providing details of all municipal securities transactions that were effected during the trading day one week earlier. The Daily Comprehensive Report is available by subscription for $2,000 per year. Along with trades in issues that are not "frequently traded," this report includes transactions reported to the MSRB late, inter-dealer trades compared after trade date, and transaction data corrected by dealers after trade date.

[3] A dealer may call the MSRB at (703) 797-6600 and ask to speak with a Transaction Reporting Assistant who can check to see if its firm is signed up for this free service.

[4] A complete description of the service is available at www.msrb.org in the Municipal Price Reporting / Transaction Reporting System section. NASD also has informed dealers of this service in "Municipal Transaction Reporting Compliance Information," Regulatory and Compliance Alert (Summer 2002).

[5] Under NSCC procedures, no buy-side trade report should be submitted for comparison against a syndicate "takedown" trade submitted by the syndicate manager. Syndicate transactions are "one-sided submissions" and compare automatically after being submitted by the syndicate manager. Paragraph (a) (ii) of Rule G-14 procedures thus requires that only the syndicate manager submit the trade.

[6] The EBS statistics reflect the aggregate number of such errors found in transaction data submitted by a particular NSCC member firm for itself and/or for its correspondents. This statistic cannot be generated individually for each correspondent because the EBS needed to identify the correspondent is itself missing or invalid. EBS statistics only measure the validity of the input the submitter provides to identify its own side of the trade and do not measure the accuracy with which a dealer uses EBSs to identify its contra-parties.

[7] In 1994, the MSRB stated that, "introducing brokers share the responsibility for complying with [Rule G-12(f)] with their clearing brokers. Introducing brokers who fail to submit transaction information in a timely and accurate manner could subject either or both parties to enforcement action for violating [Rule G-12(f)]." See "Enforcement Initiative," MSRB Reports, Vol. 14, No. 3 (June 1994) at 35. NASD has since reiterated this policy; see the following articles in Regulatory and Compliance Alert: "Introducing Firm Responsibility When Reporting Municipal Trades Through Service Bureaus and Clearing Firms" (Winter 2000) and "Municipal Securities Transaction Reporting Compliance Information" (Spring 2001).

[8] As explained above, one of the problems often associated with stamped advisories is that the EBS on transaction records may be missing or inaccurate. Since a clearing broker may have many correspondents, stamping an advisory can make it impossible for market regulators to know which correspondent actually effected the trade.

[9] Of course, if the initial information reported to the MSRB, such as total par value, is changed, the trade record must be amended to make it correct.