(First published July 12, 2017)

Effective May 14, 2018, amendments to MSRB Rule G-15 require dealers to disclose additional information on retail customer confirmations for a specified class of principal transactions, including the dealer’s mark-up or mark-down as determined from the prevailing market price (PMP) of the security. Dealers generally also are required to disclose on retail customer confirmations the time of execution and a security-specific URL to the MSRB’s Electronic Municipal Market Access (EMMA®) website.[1] Related amendments to Rule G-30, on prices and commissions, provide guidance on determining the PMP for the purpose of calculating a dealer’s mark-up or mark-down and for other Rule G-30 determinations.

 

Also, effective May 14, 2018, amendments to Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) Rule 2232 create similar confirmation disclosure requirements for other areas of the fixed income markets. Among other things, the FINRA amendments require dealers to determine their disclosed mark-ups and mark-downs from the PMP of the security that is traded, in accordance with existing guidance under FINRA Rule 2121.

 

Below are answers to frequently asked questions (FAQs) about the confirmation disclosure requirements under Rule G-15 and related PMP guidance under Rule G-30, Supplementary Material .06 (also referred to as the “waterfall” guidance or analysis). While these FAQs address MSRB rules only, FINRA has also issued guidance for the FINRA rules applicable to agency and corporate bonds. The MSRB and FINRA worked together to produce this guidance. While each has published its own version to refer to MSRB and FINRA rules and materials, respectively, the versions are materially the same and reflect the organizations’ coordinated approach to enhanced confirmation disclosure for debt securities. To the extent the MSRB and FINRA offer different guidance based on differences between the markets for corporate, agency and municipal securities, those differences are discussed in the context of the relevant question and answer.

 

During the implementation period, the MSRB will continue to work with dealers on questions related to the confirmation disclosure requirements and PMP guidance. Dealers are encouraged to contact the MSRB to suggest additional topics or questions for inclusion in the FAQs. Accordingly, the MSRB may add to, update or revise this guidance. The most recent date for the content of an answer will be clearly marked.

 

For ease of reference, unless otherwise noted, the term “mark-up” refers both to mark-ups applied to sales to customers and mark-downs applied to purchases from customers, and the term “contemporaneous cost” refers both to contemporaneous cost in the context of sales to customers and contemporaneous proceeds in the context of purchases from customers.

 

Section 1:  When Mark-Up Disclosure Is Required

1.1 When does Rule G-15 require mark-up disclosure?

A dealer is required to disclose on a customer confirmation the mark-up on a transaction in municipal securities with a non-institutional customer if the dealer also executes one or more offsetting principal transaction(s) on the same trading day as the customer transaction in an aggregate trading size that meets or exceeds the size of the customer trade. A non-institutional customer is a customer with an account that is not an institutional account, as defined in MSRB Rule G-8(a)(xi).

As noted during the MSRB’s confirmation disclosure rulemaking process, any intentional delay of a customer execution to avoid triggering the mark-up disclosure requirements may violate Rule G-18, on best execution, and Rule G-17, on conduct of municipal securities and municipal advisory activities.

SR-MSRB-2016-12 Proposed Rule Change to MSRB Rules G-15 and G-30, at 7 (September 1, 2016); MSRB Response to Comments on SR-MSRB-2016-12, at 3-4 (November 14, 2016)

(July 12, 2017)

1.2  Is mark-up disclosure required only where the sizes of same-day customer and principal trades offset each other?

Yes. Mark-up disclosure is required only where a customer trade offsets a same-day principal trade in whole or in part. For example, if a dealer purchased 100 bonds at 9:30 a.m., and then, as principal, satisfied three non-institutional customer buy orders for 50 bonds each in the same security on the same trading day without making any other purchases of the bonds that day, mark-up disclosure would be required only on two of the three customer purchases, since one of the trades would need to be satisfied out of the dealer’s prior inventory rather than offset by the dealer’s same-day principal transaction.

SR-MSRB-2016-12 Proposed Rule Change to MSRB Rules G-15 and G-30, at 4; 7-8 (September 1, 2016); MSRB Response to Comments on SR-MSRB-2016-12, at 3-4 (November 14, 2016); Amendment No. 1 to SR-MSRB-2016-12, at 4 (November 14, 2016)

(July 12, 2017)

1.2.1  Are position moves between separate desks within a firm considered “transactions” for purposes of determining whether a dealer has offsetting transactions that trigger a mark-up disclosure requirement?

No. Mark-up disclosure is triggered under Rule G-15 when a customer trade is offset by one or more “transactions.”  For purposes of the rule, the MSRB considers a “transaction” to entail a change of beneficial ownership between parties. Accordingly, if a retail desk within a dealer acquires bonds through a position move from another desk within the same firm and then sells those bonds to a non-institutional customer, the dealer is required to provide the customer with mark-up disclosure only if the dealer bought the bonds in one or more offsetting transactions on the same trading day as the sale to the customer (subject to the exceptions discussed in Question 1.7).

(March 19, 2018)

1.3  When are trades executed by a dealer’s affiliate relevant for determining whether the mark-up disclosure requirements are triggered?

If a dealer’s offsetting principal trade is executed with a dealer affiliate and did not occur at arm’s length, the dealer is required to “look through” to the time and terms of the affiliate’s trade with a third party to determine whether mark-up disclosure is triggered under Rule G-15. On the other hand, if the dealer’s transaction with its affiliate is an arms-length transaction, the dealer would treat that transaction as any other offsetting transaction (i.e., the dealer would not “look through” to the time and terms of the arms-length transaction).

SR-MSRB-2016-12 Proposed Rule Change to MSRB Rules G-15 and G-30, at 9­‑10; 23; 26 (September 1, 2016)

(July 12, 2017)

1.4  What is considered an “arms-length transaction” when considering whether a dealer must “look through” to the time and terms of an affiliate’s trade?

The term “arms-length transaction” is defined in Rule G-15(a)(vi)(I) to mean a transaction that was conducted through a competitive process in which non-affiliate firms could also participate, and where the affiliate relationship did not influence the price paid or proceeds received by the dealer. The MSRB has noted that as a general matter, it expects the competitive process used in an arms-length transaction to be one in which non-affiliates have frequently participated. In other words, the MSRB would not view a process, like a request for pricing protocol or posting of bids and offers, as competitive if non-affiliates responded to requests or otherwise participated in only isolated or limited circumstances.

Factors that may be relevant to a dealer’s determination that a transaction with an affiliate was conducted at arm’s length include, but are not limited to: counterparty anonymity during the competitive process to the time of execution; the presence of other competitive bids or offers, in addition to the affiliate's, in the competitive process; contemporaneous market activity in the same or a similar security (or securities) which is used to evaluate the relative competitiveness of bids or offers received during a competitive process; and a lack of preferential arrangements between the affiliates concerning, or based on, the handling of orders between them. The MSRB notes that no one of these factors is necessarily determinative on its own.

SR-MSRB-2016-12 Proposed Rule Change to MSRB Rules G-15 and G-30, at 9 (September 1, 2016)

(July 12, 2017)

(Updated March 19, 2018)

1.5  If a dealer has an exclusive agreement with a non-affiliated dealer under which it always purchases its securities from, or always sells its securities to, that non-affiliate, would the “look through” requirements apply when the dealer transacts with the non-affiliate?

No. The “look through” applies only to certain transactions between affiliated dealers. Under Rule G-15, a “look through” is required when the dealer’s offsetting transaction is with an affiliate and is not an “arms-length transaction.” A transaction with a non-affiliate would not meet these conditions, so a “look through” would not be required. The MSRB notes that dealers should continue to evaluate the terms and circumstances of any such arrangements in light of other MSRB rules and guidance, including best execution. In evaluating these terms and circumstances, dealers should consider whether they diminish the reliability and utility of mark-up disclosure to investors.

(July 12, 2017)

1.6  Does the mark-up disclosure requirement in Rule G-15 apply to transactions that involve a dealer and a registered investment adviser?

No. To trigger the mark-up disclosure requirement in Rule G-15, a dealer must execute a trade with a non-institutional customer. Under the rule, registered investment advisers are institutional customers; accordingly, mark-up disclosure is not required when dealers transact with registered investment advisers. This is the case even where the registered investment adviser with whom the dealer transacted later allocates all or a portion of the securities to a retail account or where the transaction is executed directly for a retail account if the investment adviser has discretion over the transaction. The MSRB notes that this answer is specific to the mark-up disclosure requirement in Rule G-15; it is not intended to alter any other obligations.

(July 12, 2017)

1.7  Are there any exceptions to the mark-up disclosure trigger requirements?

Yes. There are three exceptions. First, disclosure is not required for transactions in municipal fund securities. Second, mark-up disclosure is not necessarily triggered by principal trades that a dealer executes on a trading desk that is functionally separate from a trading desk that executes customer trades, provided the dealer maintains policies and procedures reasonably designed to ensure that the functionally separate trading desk had no knowledge of the customer trades. For example, the exception allows an institutional desk within a dealer to service an institutional customer without necessarily triggering the disclosure requirement for an unrelated trade performed by a separate retail desk within the dealer. Third, disclosure is not required for transactions that are list offering price transactions, as defined in paragraph (d)(vii)(A) of Rule G-14 RTRS Procedures.

SR-MSRB-2016-12 Proposed Rule Change to MSRB Rules G-15 and G-30, at 10 (September 1, 2016)

(July 12, 2017)

1.8  May dealers voluntarily provide mark-up disclosure on additional transactions that do not trigger mandatory disclosure?

Yes. In disclosing this information on a voluntary basis, dealers should be mindful of any applicable MSRB rules. For example, while mark-up disclosure is voluntary for trades that are not triggered by the relevant provisions of Rule G-15, the process for determining the PMP according to Rule G-30 applies in all cases. In addition, to avoid customer confusion, voluntary disclosure should also follow the same format and labeling requirements applicable to mandatory disclosure.

SR-MSRB-2016-12 Proposed Rule Change to MSRB Rules G-15 and G-30, at 13 n. 27 (September 1, 2016)

(July 12, 2017)

1.9  In arrangements involving clearing dealers and introducing or correspondent dealers, who is responsible for mark-up disclosure?

The introducing or correspondent dealer bears the ultimate responsibility for compliance with the disclosure requirements under Rule G-15. Although an introducing or correspondent dealer may use the assistance of a clearing dealer, as it may use other third-party service providers subject to due diligence and oversight, the introducing or correspondent dealer remains ultimately responsible for compliance.

(July 12, 2017)

Section 2:  Content and Format of Mark-Up Disclosure

2.1  What information must be included when dealers provide mark-up disclosure on a confirmation?

When mark-up disclosure is provided on a customer confirmation, Rule G-15 requires firms to express the disclosed mark-up as both a total dollar amount and a percentage amount of PMP. The mark-up should be calculated and disclosed as the total amount per transaction; disclosure of the per bond dollar amount of mark-up (e.g., $9.45 per bond) would not satisfy the requirement to disclose the total dollar amount of the transaction mark-up.

SR-MSRB-2016-12 Proposed Rule Change to MSRB Rules G-15 and G-30, at 12 (September 1, 2016)

(July 12, 2017)

2.2  Where is mark-up disclosure required to be located on a confirmation?

For printed confirmations, Rule G-15(a)(i)(E) requires the mark-up disclosure to be located on the front of the customer confirmation. For electronic confirmations, the disclosure should appear in a naturally visible place. Because the rule requires mark-up disclosure to be on the confirmation itself, the inclusion of a link on the customer confirmation that a customer could click to obtain his or her mark-up disclosure would not satisfy the requirements of Rule G-15.

(July 12, 2017)

2.3  May dealers use explanatory language to provide context for mark-up disclosure?

Yes. Dealers may include accompanying language to explain mark-up related concepts, or a dealer’s particular methodology for calculating mark-ups according to MSRB guidance (or to note the availability of information about the methodology upon request), provided such statements are accurate and not misleading. However, dealers may not label mark-ups as “estimated” or “approximate” figures, or use other such labels. These types of qualifiers risk diminishing the utility of the disclosure and of the dealer’s own determination of the security’s PMP and mark-up charged, and otherwise risk diminishing the value to retail investors of the disclosure.

MSRB Response to Comments on SR-MSRB-2016-12, at 11-12 (November 14, 2016)

(July 12, 2017)

2.4  If a dealer encounters a situation where a mark-up is negative (i.e., the dealer sold to the customer at a price lower than the PMP), may it choose to disclose a mark-up of zero instead?

The MSRB believes that negative mark-ups will be very infrequent; however, if such a case arises, a dealer may not disclose a mark-up of zero where the mark-up is not, in fact, zero. Dealers should disclose the mark-up that they calculate based on their determination of PMP consistent with Rule G-30. As an alternative to disclosing a negative mark-up, dealers are permitted to disclose “N/A” in the mark-up/mark-down field if the confirmation also includes a brief explanation of the “N/A” disclosure and the reason it has been provided. Dealers also have the flexibility to provide an explanation for trades with disclosed negative or zero mark-ups as well, consistent with Question 2.3 above.

(July 12, 2017)

2.5  How many decimal places should dealers use when disclosing the mark-up as a percentage amount?

Dealers should disclose the percentage amount rounded to at least two decimal places (e.g., hundredths of a percent). For example, if a dealer charged a $120 mark-up on a 10-bond transaction where the PMP was 99, the mark-up percentage should be disclosed to at least the hundredth of a percentage point, as 1.21% (as opposed to 1.2% or 1%). However, if a dealer charged a $100 mark-up on a 10-bond transaction where the PMP was 100, the mark-up percentage could be disclosed as 1.00% or 1%.

(March 19, 2018)

Section 3:  Determining Prevailing Market Price

3.1  How should dealers determine PMP to calculate mark-ups?

Dealers must calculate mark-ups from a municipal security’s PMP, consistent with Rule G-30 and the supplementary material thereunder, particularly Supplementary Material .06 (sometimes referred to as the “waterfall” guidance or analysis). Under the applicable standard of “reasonable diligence” (discussed below), dealers may rely on reasonable policies and procedures to facilitate PMP determination, provided the policies and procedures are consistent with Rule G-30 and are consistently applied.

SR-MSRB-2016-12 Proposed Rule Change to MSRB Rules G-15 and G-30, at 12 (September 1, 2016)

(July 12, 2017)

3.2  Does the PMP guidance in Rule G-30, Supplementary Material .06 apply for mark-up (and mark-down) disclosure purposes under Rule G-15 and for fair pricing purposes under Rule G-30?

Yes. Dealers should read the guidance in Supplementary Material .06 together with Rule G-30 and all the other supplementary material thereto. For example, while Supplementary Material .06 provides guidance in determining the PMP, Supplementary Material .01(a) explains that dealers must exercise “reasonable diligence” in establishing the market value of a security, and Supplementary Material .01(d) states that dealer compensation on a principal transaction with a customer is determined from the PMP of the security, as described in Supplementary Material .06. Read as a whole, Rule G-30 requires dealers to use reasonable diligence to determine the PMP of a municipal security in accordance with Supplementary Material .06.[2] This standard applies for mark-up disclosure purposes under Rule G-15 and for fair pricing purposes under Rule G-30.

SR-MSRB-2016-12 Proposed Rule Change to MSRB Rules G-15 and G-30, at 25; 28 (September 1, 2016); MSRB Response to Comments on SR-MSRB-2016-12, at 9-11 (November 14, 2016)

(July 12, 2017)

(Updated March 19, 2018)

3.2.1  Does the functionally separate trading desk exception apply for purposes of determining the PMP of a security?

No. As explained in the rule filing, this exception “would only apply to determine whether or not the [mark-up] disclosure requirement has been triggered; it does not change the dealer’s requirements relating to the calculation of its mark-up or mark-down under Rule G-30.”

SR-MSRB-2016-12 Proposed Rule Change to MSRB Rules G-15 and G-30, at n. 20 (September 1, 2016)

(March 19, 2018)

3.3  When reading the PMP guidance in Rule G-30, Supplementary Material .06, what does the language in parentheses mean?

Unless the context requires otherwise, language in parentheses that is not preceded by an “i.e.,” or “e.g.,” within sentences refers to scenarios where a dealer is charging a customer a mark-down. Thus, for example, in the phrase, “contemporaneous dealer purchases (sales) in the municipal security in question from (to) institutional accounts,” the terms “(sales)” and “(to)” apply where a dealer is charging a customer a mark-down.

(July 12, 2017)

3.4  When should dealers determine PMP and calculate the mark-up to be disclosed on a confirmation?

The MSRB recognizes that dealers may employ different processes for generating customer confirmations such that this may occur at the end of the day, or during the day for firms that use real-time, intra-day confirmation generation processes. Therefore, although the objective must always be to determine the price prevailing at the time of the customer transaction, different dealers may consistently conduct the analysis to make that determination at different times. Specifically, dealers may base their mark-up calculations for confirmation disclosure purposes on the information they have available to them (based on the exercise of reasonable diligence) at the time they systematically input relevant transaction information into the systems they use to generate confirmations.

This means that a dealer that systematically inputs the information at the time of trade may determine the PMP—and therefore, the mark-up—at the same time (even if the confirmation itself is not printed until the end of day). On the other hand, if a dealer systematically inputs such information at the end of the day, the dealer must use the information available to the dealer at that time to determine the price prevailing at the time of the customer transaction—and, therefore, the mark-up.

The timing of the determination must be applied consistently across all transactions in municipal securities (e.g., the dealer may not enter information into its systems at the time of trade and determine the PMP at the time of trade for some trades but at the end of the day for others).

SR-MSRB-2016-12 Proposed Rule Change to MSRB Rules G-15 and G-30, at 24 (September 1, 2016); MSRB Response to Comments on SR-MSRB-2016-12, at 10 (November 14, 2016)

(July 12, 2017)

3.4.1  May a dealer determine PMP between the time of trade and the end of the day? 

Yes. The MSRB recognizes that firms may employ different processes for generating customer confirmations, and dealers are not limited to determining PMP for purposes of confirmation disclosure only at the times provided as examples in Question 3.4 (i.e., the time of trade or the end of the day). While the objective must always be to determine the price prevailing at the time of the customer transaction, as noted above in Question 3.4, PMP may be determined for disclosure purposes when a firm systematically enters the information into its confirmation generation system, based on information that is reasonably available to it at that time. Accordingly, a dealer may determine PMP at various times, including at the time of the trade, at the end of the day, or at times in between, provided the dealer does so according to reasonable, consistently applied policies and procedures and does not “cherry pick” favorable data.

(March 19, 2018)

3.4.2  May a dealer determine PMP at the time of trade (or at some other time before the end of the day) and wait until later in the day to analyze which trades triggered the disclosure requirement?

Yes. A dealer may determine PMP, enter the PMP information into a confirmation generation system, and later populate the mark-up field only on confirmations of trades that trigger disclosure. The MSRB would expect in such cases that the PMP determination would not be subject to change when the dealer performs the trigger analysis later in the day, other than for a reasonable exception review process (as discussed in Question 3.8.1). In all cases, dealers must follow consistently applied policies and procedures and may not “cherry pick” favorable data. Dealers are reminded that when determining PMP, they must use the information reasonably available to them at the time of the PMP determination and that the objective is always to determine the price prevailing at the time of the customer transaction.

(March 19, 2018)

3.4.3  What is considered a confirmation generation system, for purposes of the guidance on when dealers may determine PMP for disclosure purposes?

As noted above in Question 3.4, the MSRB recognizes that dealers may employ different processes for generating customer confirmations. For purposes of this guidance, the MSRB would consider a dealer to enter information systematically into a confirmation generation system when it stores the information in a location that is part of the confirmation generation process. The MSRB expects that the stored PMP information would not be subject to change, other than for a reasonable exception review process (as discussed in Question 3.8.1). The MSRB also expects that a dealer will clearly explain in its policies and procedures its confirmation generation process, including the timing and role of each material step in the process.

(March 19, 2018)

3.5  Once dealers determine PMP and input relevant information into their confirmation generation systems, would they be required to cancel and correct a confirmation to revise a disclosed mark-up if later events might contribute to a different PMP determination?

No. The disclosure must be accurate, based on the dealer’s exercise of reasonable diligence, as of the time the dealer systematically inputs the information into its systems to generate the disclosure. Once the dealer has input the information into its confirmation generation systems, the MSRB does not expect dealers to send revised confirmations solely based on the occurrence of a subsequent transaction or event that would otherwise be relevant to PMP determination under Rule G-30. On a voluntary basis, dealers may correct a confirmation, pursuant to reasonable and consistently applied policies and procedures.

SR-MSRB-2016-12 Proposed Rule Change to MSRB Rules G-15 and G-30, at 24 (September 1, 2016)

(July 12, 2017)

3.5.1 If a dealer corrects the price to a customer or determines that, at the time the dealer systematically entered the information into its systems to generate the mark-up disclosure, the PMP was inaccurate, must the dealer send a corrected confirmation that reflects a corrected mark-up disclosure and price?

Yes. Consistent with Question 3.5, dealers are not required to cancel and correct a confirmation to revise a disclosed mark-up solely based on the occurrence of a subsequent transaction or event that would otherwise be relevant to PMP determination under Rule G-30. However, if the dealer corrects the price to the customer or determines that a PMP was inaccurate at the time it was systematically entered into the dealer’s confirmation generation system, the dealer must send a confirmation that reflects an accurate mark-up and price.

(March 19, 2018)

3.6  May dealers engage third-party vendors to perform some or all of the steps required to fulfill the mark-up disclosure requirements?

Yes. Dealers may engage third-party service providers to facilitate mark-up disclosure consistent with Rules G-15 and G-30. For example, dealers that wish to perform most of the steps of the waterfall internally may choose to use the services of a vendor at the economic models level of the waterfall. Other dealers may wish to use the services of a vendor to perform most or all of the steps of the waterfall. In either case, the dealers retain the responsibility for ensuring the PMP is determined in accordance with Rule G-30 and that the mark-up is disclosed in compliance with Rule G-15 and must exercise due diligence and oversight over their third-party relationships.

As a policy matter, the MSRB does not endorse or approve the use of any specific vendors.

MSRB Response to Comments on SR-MSRB-2016-12, at 8 (November 14, 2016)

(July 12, 2017)

3.7  May dealers use a third-party evaluated pricing service as an economic model at the final step of the waterfall?

Yes. However, before doing so, the dealer should have a reasonable basis for believing the third-party pricing service’s pricing methodologies produce evaluated prices that reflect actual prevailing market prices. A dealer would not have a reasonable basis for such a belief, for example, where a periodic review of the evaluated prices provided by the pricing service frequently (over the course of multiple trades) reveals a substantial difference between the evaluated prices and the prices at which actual transactions in the relevant securities occurred. In choosing to use evaluated prices from any pricing service, a dealer should assess, among other things, the quality of the evaluated prices provided by the service and the extent to which the service determines its evaluated prices on an intra-day basis.

To be clear, dealers are not required to use such pricing services at this stage of the waterfall analysis. Rather, third-party evaluated pricing services are only one type of economic model. Other types of economic models may include internally developed models such as a discounted cash flow model or a reasonable and consistent methodology to be used in connection with an applicable index or benchmark. Dealers are reminded that when using an internally developed model, the dealer must be able to provide information that the dealer used on the day of the transaction to develop the pricing information (i.e., the data that was input and the data that the model generated and the dealer used to arrive at the PMP).

MSRB Response to Comments on SR-MSRB-2016-12, at 8 (November 14, 2016)

(July 12, 2017)

(Updated March 19, 2018)

3.8  May dealers use or rely on automated systems to determine PMP?

Yes. While dealers are not required to automate the PMP determination and mark-up disclosure, they may choose to do so, provided they (and/or their vendors) do so consistent with Rule G-30 and Rule G-15, and all other applicable rules. The MSRB has provided guidance in several areas during the rulemaking process to facilitate automation for firms that choose to employ it. First, as noted above in Question 3.4, dealers are permitted on certain conditions to determine PMP on an intra-day basis (e.g., at the time of trade), allowing dealers that generate confirmations intra-day to continue to do so. Second, as noted in Question 3.1 and discussed throughout this guidance, the MSRB has acknowledged that dealers may develop policies and procedures that rely on reasonable, objective criteria to apply the PMP guidance in Supplementary Material .06 at a systematic level. Consistent with the reasonable policies and procedures approach, the MSRB further recognized during the rulemaking process that reasonable policies and procedures could result in different firms making different PMP determinations for the same security. (The MSRB would expect, however, that the consistent application of policies and procedures within a dealer would result in different traders or desks arriving at PMP determinations that are substantially the same under comparable facts and circumstances.)

MSRB Response to Comments on SR-MSRB-2016-12, at 7-8 (November 14, 2016)

(July 12, 2017)

3.8.1 May dealers adopt a reasonable exception review process to evaluate PMP determinations?

Yes. As a general matter, the MSRB expects that dealers will employ supervisory review processes that consider, among other things, the reliability of their (or their vendors’) PMP determinations. To review reliability, a dealer might review PMP determinations that result in mark-ups that exceed pre-determined thresholds, and it also might compare PMP determinations with some other measure of market value to ascertain whether the PMP determinations fall outside pre-established ranges.

In cases where a dealer reviews PMP determinations before the associated trade confirmations are sent, dealers may correct PMP determinations to promote more accurate mark-up calculations, provided they do so according to reasonable and consistently applied policies and procedures. As a general matter, however, the MSRB expects that it will be rare for a dealer to correct the PMP of a security based on exception reporting, and documentation in such situations will be paramount. To prevent “cherry picking,” the dealer’s policies and procedures should be specific in describing the PMP review process and the conditions under which the dealer may show that a PMP was erroneous (e.g., the PMP determination was based on an isolated transaction, or a PMP determined through the use of an economic model did not reflect recent news about the security). If a dealer determines that a PMP is erroneous, it must correct it consistent with Rule G-30, and it must do so using the information reasonably available to it at the time it makes the correction.

There may also be cases where a dealer’s exception review process results in corrected customer trade prices. For example, a dealer may review a trade where the mark-up exceeded a pre-determined threshold and the PMP was determined correctly. Dealers may refer to Question 3.5.1 in these cases.

(March 19, 2018)

3.9  May dealers develop objective criteria to automatically determine whether a trade is “contemporaneous” for purposes of establishing a presumptive PMP at the first step of the waterfall analysis?

Yes. Dealers may establish an objective set of criteria to determine whether a trade is contemporaneous, provided the objective criteria are established based on the exercise of reasonable diligence. For example, dealers could define an objective period of time as a default proxy for determining whether the trade is contemporaneous. Dealers could also define criteria to consider other relevant factors, such as whether intervening trades by other firms occurred at prices sufficiently different than the dealer’s trade to suggest that the dealer’s trade no longer reasonably reflects the current market price for the security, or whether changes in interest rates or the credit quality of the security, or news reports were significant enough to reasonably change the PMP of the security.

Given the different trading characteristics of different municipal securities, and relevant court and SEC case law applicable to debt securities in general, it likely would not be reasonable for a dealer’s policies and procedures to determine categorically that all transactions that occur outside of a specified time frame are not “contemporaneous.” Accordingly, dealers should include in their policies and procedures an opportunity to review and override the automatic application of default proxies (e.g., by reconsidering the application for transactions identified through reasonable exception reporting and specifying designated time intervals (or market events) after which such proxies will be reviewed).

(July 12, 2017)

3.10  Since Rule G-15 adopts a same-day trigger standard for mark-up disclosure, would it be reasonable to assume a same-day standard for determining whether trades are contemporaneous for purposes of determining PMP under Rule G-30?

The MSRB notes that the determination of whether mark-up disclosure is required under Rule G-15 is distinct from the determination of whether a transaction is contemporaneous under the waterfall analysis. The PMP guidance under Rule G-30 provides that a dealer’s cost is considered contemporaneous if the transaction occurs close enough in time to the subject transaction that it would reasonably be expected to reflect the current market price for the municipal security. While same-day transactions may often be contemporaneous according to this meaning, the MSRB has not set forth a specific time-period that is categorically contemporaneous. As noted above in Question 3.9, the MSRB would expect that dealers developing objective criteria for this purpose would base the determination of such criteria on the exercise of reasonable diligence.

(July 12, 2017)

3.11  How should dealers determine their contemporaneous cost if they have multiple contemporaneous purchases?

Dealers may rely on reasonable and consistently applied policies and procedures that employ methodologies to establish PMP where they have multiple contemporaneous principal trades. For example, a dealer could employ consistently an average weighted price or a last price methodology. Such methodologies could further account for the type of principal trade, giving greater weight to principal trades with other dealers than to principal trades with customers.

MSRB Response to Comments on SR-MSRB-2016-12, at 12-13 (November 14, 2016)

(July 12, 2017)

3.12  What is the next step in the analysis, when determining contemporaneous cost or proceeds, if a dealer has no contemporaneous transactions with another dealer?

Where the dealer has no contemporaneous cost or proceeds, as applicable, from an inter-dealer transaction, the dealer must then consider whether it has contemporaneous cost or proceeds, as applicable, from a customer transaction. Note that, because the dealer’s contemporaneous cost or proceeds from a customer transaction will also include the mark-up or mark-down charged in that transaction, the dealer should adjust its contemporaneous cost or proceeds from that customer transaction to account for the mark-up or mark-down included in the price. In these instances, the difference between the dealer’s “adjusted contemporaneous cost or proceeds” (the dealer’s contemporaneous cost or proceeds in the customer transaction, adjusted by the mark-up or mark-down) and the price to its customer is equal to the mark-up (or mark-down) to be disclosed on customer confirmations under Rule G-15. The MSRB has noted that this approach allows the dealer to avoid “double counting” in the mark-up and mark-down it discloses to each customer. For example, if a dealer buys 100 bonds from Customer A at a price of 98 and immediately sells 100 of the same bonds to Customer B at a price of 100, the dealer may apportion the mark-up and mark-down paid by each customer. Assuming for illustration that the dealer determines the PMP in accordance with the waterfall guidance to be 99, then the dealer would disclose to Customer A a total dollar amount mark-down of $1,000, also expressed as 1.01% of PMP, and it would disclose to Customer B a total dollar amount mark-up of $1,000, also expressed as 1.01% of PMP.[3]

SR-MSRB-2016-12 Proposed Rule Change to MSRB Rules G-15 and G-30, at 21 (September 1, 2016)

(July 12, 2017)

(Updated March 19, 2018)

3.12.1  May dealers adopt a reasonable default proxy or process to apportion the mark-up and mark-down on contemporaneous customer buy and sell transactions, as contemplated in Question 3.12? 
Yes. As explained in Question 3.12, the purpose of adjusting a dealer’s contemporaneous cost or proceeds in the case of contemporaneous customer buy and sell transactions is to arrive at a more accurate indication of the PMP of the securities, for example, by avoiding “double counting” in the mark-up and mark-down disclosed. Consistent with this goal, as an alternative to the process described in Question 3.12, dealers may adopt a reasonable default proxy or process to apportion the amount of the total mark-up and mark-down charged on contemporaneous customer transactions. Such proxy or process should be based upon and not inconsistent with a reasonable review of the typical mark-ups and mark-downs actually charged in the dealer’s municipal securities transactions. For example, assume that, based upon a review of the actual mark-ups and mark-downs charged on a dealer’s municipal securities transactions, a dealer determines that its mark-ups on municipal securities transactions are typically larger than its mark-downs by a quantifiable amount. The dealer may use such information to develop a consistently applied apportionment methodology—for example, by consistently apportioning x% of the total mark-up and mark-down to the customer buy transaction and y% of the total mark-up and mark-down to the sale transaction. If such a default proxy or process is adopted, a dealer should be mindful to review its continued appropriateness over time in a manner that is consistent with the dealer’s ongoing supervisory and compliance obligations.

(June 10, 2020)

3.13  May dealers adjust their contemporaneous cost to reflect what they believe to be a more accurate PMP, or their role taking risk to provide liquidity?

Dealers may adjust their contemporaneous cost only in one case: where a dealer’s offsetting trades that trigger disclosure under Rule G-15 are both customer transactions (discussed above at Question 3.12). Other adjustments to reflect the size or side of market for a dealer’s contemporaneous cost are not permitted.

(July 12, 2017)

3.14  May dealers apportion their expected aggregate monthly fees—for example to access an alternative trading system (ATS) or other trading platform—to individual contemporaneous transactions to be included in their contemporaneous costs?

No. For any given mark-up on a transaction, Supplementary Material .06 requires dealers to look first to their contemporaneous cost as incurred. The MSRB does not believe it would be consistent with Rule G-30 for dealers to consider an estimated apportionment of a future charge to be part of the specific cost they incurred in a contemporaneous transaction.

(July 12, 2017)

3.15  In determining contemporaneous cost, may dealers include transaction fees—for example to access an ATS or other trading platform—that were included in the price they paid?

Yes, provided the transaction fee is reflected in the price of the contemporaneous trade that is reported to EMMA, consistent with MSRB rules and guidance on pricing, trade reporting and fees. The MSRB will monitor and adjust this guidance as needed if it determines that pricing practices change in a way that diminishes the utility and reliability of mark-up disclosure.

(July 12, 2017)

3.16  May a dealer treat its own contemporaneous transaction as “isolated” and therefore disregard it when determining PMP?

No. Under Supplementary Material .06, isolated transactions or isolated quotations generally will have little or no weight or relevance in establishing PMP. The guidance also specifically provides that, in the municipal market, an “off-market” transaction may qualify as an isolated transaction. Through cross-references, Supplementary Material .06 makes clear that a dealer may deem a transaction or quotation at the hierarchy of pricing factors or similar-securities level of the waterfall to be isolated. However, the concept of “isolated” transactions or quotations does not apply to a dealer’s contemporaneous cost, which presumptively determines PMP.

SR-MSRB-2016-12 Proposed Rule Change to MSRB Rules G-15 and G-30, at 19; 21 (September 1, 2016)

(July 12, 2017)

3.17  Supplementary Material .06 notes that changes in interest rates may allow a dealer to overcome the presumption that its own contemporaneous cost is the best measure of PMP. Does this refer only to formal policy interest rate changes, or does it also contemplate market changes in interest rates?

It refers to any change in interest rates, whether the change is caused by formal policy decisions or market events. However, Supplementary Material .06 notes that a dealer may overcome the presumption that its contemporaneous cost is the best measure of PMP based on a change in interest rates only in instances where they have changed after the dealer’s transaction to a degree that such change would reasonably cause a change in municipal securities pricing.

(July 12, 2017)

3.18  Supplementary Material .06 notes that changes in the credit quality of the municipal security may allow a dealer to overcome the presumption that its own contemporaneous cost is the best measure of PMP. Does this refer only to formal credit rating changes, or does it also contemplate market changes in implied or observed credit spreads such as those due to market-wide credit spread volatility or anticipated changes in the credit quality of the individual issuer?

It refers to any changes to credit quality, with respect to that particular security or the particular issuer of that security, whether the change is caused by a formal ratings announcement or market events. Thus, for example, this could include changes in the guarantee or collateral supporting repayment as well as significant recent information concerning the issuer that is not yet incorporated in credit ratings (e.g., changes to ratings outlooks). However, Supplementary Material .06 notes that a dealer may overcome the presumption that its contemporaneous cost is the best measure of PMP based on a change in credit quality only in instances where it has changed significantly after the dealer’s transaction.

(July 12, 2017)

3.18.1 When considering inter-dealer trades at the hierarchy of pricing factors level of the waterfall analysis, if the only contemporaneous inter-dealer trades in the security are executed at the same time and involve a broker’s broker or an ATS, may a dealer choose to determine PMP by reference to the inter-dealer trade price which is reasonably likely to be on the opposite side of the market from the dealer seeking to determine PMP?

Yes. Consistent with the standard of reasonable diligence, dealers may adopt a reasonable approach to consistently choosing between or referring to multiple contemporaneous inter-dealer trades. If the only contemporaneous inter-dealer trades in the security are executed at the same time and involve a broker’s broker or an ATS in the security, it may be reasonable for the dealer seeking to determine PMP to do so by reference to the trade price which is reasonably likely to be on the opposite side of the market from the dealer seeking to determine PMP.

For example, assume that Dealer XYZ is selling a municipal security to a retail customer. Also, assume that the dealer lacks contemporaneous cost and that there are only two contemporaneous inter-dealer transactions in the security, and that both of those transactions occur at the exact same time and in the exact same trade amount. Additionally, both inter-dealer transactions are identified by an ATS special condition indicator on EMMA. One transaction is executed at a price of 113.618 and the other is executed at a price of 113.868. Assume further that the difference between these two ATS transaction prices is in the customary and typical range of the fee an ATS would charge for its services. In this case, it may be reasonable for Dealer XYZ to conclude that the transaction at 113.618 reflects a sale from a dealer to an ATS taking a principal position in the security, and that the transaction at 113.868 reflects a sale from that ATS to another dealer. Under these circumstances, Dealer XYZ may reasonably determine the PMP by reference to the transaction at 113.868, because the counterparty to the ATS in that transaction was purchasing the security and thus on the opposite side of the market from the side of Dealer XYZ in its customer trade.

(March 19, 2018)

3.19 May dealers adopt a reasonable default proxy where the waterfall guidance refers to trades between dealers and institutional accounts with which any dealer regularly effects transactions in the same security, if such information cannot be ascertained through reasonable diligence?

Yes. Consistent with the Rule G-30 standard of “reasonable diligence” in establishing the PMP of a municipal security, dealers reasonably may use objective criteria as a proxy for the elements of these steps of the waterfall that they cannot reasonably ascertain, such as whether a customer transaction involves an institutional customer and whether that institutional customer regularly trades in the same security with any dealer. A reasonable approach might assume that transactions at or above a $1,000,000 par amount involve institutional customers, since that size transaction is conventionally considered to be an institutional-sized transaction. In addition, because institutional investors transacting at or above this size threshold are typically sophisticated investors, the same size proxy might be used to assume that the institutional customer regularly transacts with a dealer in the same security.

(July 12, 2017)

3.19.1 May a dealer reasonably determine that new issue trade prices executed at list offering/takedown prices are not reflective of the PMP at the time of their execution?

Yes. Because new issues may be priced days before the transactions are executed and reported to RTRS, a dealer may, but is not required to, determine that new issue trades executed at list offering or takedown prices are not reflective of the PMP at the time of their execution. These transactions generally are denoted by a list offering price/takedown indicator on EMMA and in the MSRB Transaction Subscription Service. Market participants may also determine the list offering price by viewing the security’s home page (i.e., the Security Details page) on EMMA.

(March 19, 2018)

3.20  Can an “all-to-all” platform (i.e., one that allows non-dealers to participate) qualify as an inter-dealer mechanism at the step of the waterfall that refers to bids and offers for actively traded securities?

Yes, provided that the dealer determines that the prices available on an “all-to-all” platform are generally consistent with inter-dealer prices. Dealers should include in their policies and procedures how they will periodically review a platform’s activity to make such a determination.

(July 12, 2017)

3.21  When considering bid and offer quotations from an inter-dealer mechanism, how many inter-dealer mechanisms must a dealer check before considering the next category of factors under the waterfall analysis?

The obligation to determine PMP requires a dealer to use reasonable diligence. It does not require a dealer to seek out and consider every potentially relevant data point available in the market. With respect to this factor in the waterfall analysis, a dealer must only seek out and consider enough information to reasonably determine that there is no probative information to determine PMP before proceeding to the next category of factors.

(July 12, 2017)

3.22  In considering bids and offers for actively traded securities made through an inter-dealer mechanism, how can a dealer determine that transactions generally occur at the displayed quotations on the inter-dealer mechanism?

Consistent with the Rule G-30 standard of reasonable diligence and a reasonable policies and procedures approach, a dealer could request and assess from the platform relevant statistics and relevant information reasonably sufficient to conclude that the inter-dealer mechanism meets the applicable requirements under Supplementary Material .06. A dealer could then periodically request and assess updated statistics and relevant information to confirm that the inter-dealer mechanism continues to satisfy the requirements.

(July 12, 2017)

3.23  At the similar securities stage of the waterfall analysis, how can a dealer determine on a systematic basis that an inter-dealer quotation is “validated”?

Consistent with the standard of reasonable diligence and a reasonable and consistently applied policies and procedures approach to the PMP determination, for example, a dealer could determine that a bid (offer) quotation is validated if it is quoted on an “inter-dealer mechanism” (including the all-to-all platforms that qualify, as discussed above). With respect to a dealer’s own bids or offers, dealers are reminded of their existing regulatory obligations under applicable MSRB rules regarding bona fide bids or offers and the requirement that any published quotations must be based on the dealer’s best judgment of the fair market value of the securities. See, e.g., Rule G-13 and MSRB Notice to Dealers That Use the Services of Broker’s Brokers (December 22, 2012). Dealers are also reminded that under Rule G-30, Supplementary Material .06, isolated transactions or isolated quotations (including those that are off-market) generally will have little or no weight or relevance in establishing the PMP of a security.

Due to the lack of bid (offer) quotations for many municipal securities, under the waterfall analysis, dealers in the municipal securities market may not often find information from contemporaneous bid (offer) quotations in the municipal securities market.

(July 12, 2017)

(Updated March 19, 2018)

3.24  May a dealer use the same process it uses to identify a “similar” security for best-execution purposes to identify “similar” securities for PMP purposes?

Yes. Assuming the dealer’s process for identifying “similar” securities for Rule G-18 best-execution purposes is reasonable and in compliance with Rule G-18, a dealer may rely on the same process in connection with identifying similar securities under Rule G-30, Supplementary Material .06.

Alternatively, due to the different purposes of the “similar” security analysis for best-execution purposes as compared to PMP determination purposes, dealers reasonably may adopt a more restrictive approach to identifying “similar” securities for Rule G-30 than they may for Rule G-18. While the relevant part of the best-execution analysis under Rule G-18 seeks to identify the best market to address a customer’s order or inquiry by reference to another security, the relevant part of the waterfall analysis seeks to identify the PMP of one security by reference to another security. Further, Rule G-30 Supplementary Material .06 provides that, in order to qualify as a “similar” security, at a minimum, the municipal security should be sufficiently similar that a market yield for the subject security can be fairly estimated from the yield of the “similar” security. Due to the large number and diversity of municipal securities, the MSRB is of the view that, generally, if the prices or yields of a security would require an adjustment in order to account for differences between the security and the subject security, it would be reasonable for a dealer to determine that that security is not sufficiently “similar” to the subject security for purposes of Supplementary Material .06. To be clear, dealers have the flexibility to determine that a security that requires an immaterial adjustment in order to account for differences is sufficiently “similar” for these purposes, but they are not required to do so. This approach also is consistent with the MSRB’s view that, in order for a security to qualify as sufficiently “similar,” the security must be at least highly similar to the subject security with respect to nearly all the “similar” security factors listed in Rule G-30 Supplementary Material .06(b)(ii) that are relevant to the subject security.

Whichever approach a dealer chooses to apply, the dealer must apply that approach consistently across all municipal securities.

Due to the lack of active trading in many municipal securities and the above discussion regarding the identification of “similar” securities in the municipal securities market, under the waterfall analysis, dealers in the municipal securities market may not often find information from sufficiently similar securities as compared to dealers in other fixed income markets.

Because of the unique characteristics of the municipal securities market, the MSRB response to this question may differ from the FINRA interpretation under FINRA Rule 2121.

(July 12, 2017)

3.24.1 How many “similar” securities must a dealer consider at the “similar” securities stage of the waterfall analysis?

The obligation to determine PMP requires a dealer to use reasonable diligence. It does not require a dealer to seek out and consider every potentially relevant data point available in the market. At this point in the waterfall analysis, a dealer must only seek out and consider enough information to reasonably determine that it has identified the prevailing market price of the security (or that there is no probative information to determine PMP before proceeding to the next level). A dealer’s policies and procedures should explain the process for identifying similar securities (and, if relevant, how the dealer may adjust the prices or yields of identified similar securities). Because the reasonable diligence standard is often guided by industry norms, dealers should periodically revisit their policies and procedures to ensure that their established processes continue to remain reasonable.

Due to the unique characteristics of the municipal securities market, including the large number of issuers and the bespoke nature of many municipal securities, it is unlikely that the dealer will identify a substantial number of “similar” securities for many municipal securities. For example, it would be reasonable for a dealer to determine that a comparison security is not sufficiently “similar” to the subject security for purposes of Supplementary Material .06 if the prices or yields of the comparison security would require an adjustment in order to account for differences between that security and the subject security.

(March 19, 2018)

3.25  How is the “relative weight” provision in paragraphs (a)(v) (regarding the hierarchy of pricing factors) and (a)(vi) (regarding similar securities) of Supplementary Material .06 meant to be used in operation?

This provision is meant to be used when there is more than one comparison transaction or quotation within the categories specified in the hierarchy of pricing factors and when there is more than one comparison transaction or quotation within the similar securities level of the waterfall analysis. In these cases, a dealer may consider the facts and circumstances of the comparison transactions or quotations to determine the weight or degree of influence to attribute to a particular transaction or quotation. For example, a dealer might give greater weight to more recent (timely) comparison transactions or quotations. Similarly, to the extent a dealer considers comparison transactions or quotations in which the dealer is on the same side of the market as the dealer in the subject transaction (if known from dealer customer trade reports),[4] a dealer might give relatively less weight or influence to such information in determining PMP than information from transactions or quotations in which the dealer was on the opposite side of the market from the dealer in the subject transaction.

Consistent with the standard of reasonable diligence and a reasonable policies and procedures approach to the PMP determination, a dealer may adopt a reasonable methodology that it will consistently apply when considering the facts and circumstances of comparison transactions or quotations and assigning relative weight to such transactions or quotations. For example, a dealer might employ an average weighted price methodology (if all relevant trade sizes are publicly available) or last price methodology, provided its policies and procedures called for the reasonable and consistent use of the methodology and did not ignore potentially relevant facts and circumstances, such as side of the market.

Due to the unique characteristics of the municipal securities market, the MSRB response to this question may differ from the FINRA interpretation under FINRA Rule 2121.

(July 12, 2017)

(Updated March 19, 2018)

3.26  When dealers consider the hierarchy of pricing factors under Supplementary Material .06(a)(v), or similar securities factors under paragraph (a)(vi), may they consider the size of comparison transactions to determine their relative weight?

Yes. Paragraphs (a)(v) and (a)(vi) include a non-exhaustive list of facts and circumstances that may impact the “relative weight” of comparison transactions or quotations that may be considered at that point in the waterfall analysis. The MSRB believes it would be reasonable to consider the size of a comparison transaction when considering its relative weight.

(July 12, 2017)

3.27  What is an “applicable index” as that term is used at the “similar securities” level of Supplementary Material .06?

Supplementary Material .06 lists a number of non-exclusive factors that a dealer can look to in determining whether a security is sufficiently “similar” to the subject security. One of these factors is how comparably they trade over an applicable index or U.S. Treasury securities of a similar duration. The inclusion of the more general term “applicable index,” is intended to give dealers flexibility to consider, for example, commonly used municipal market bond indices, yield curves and benchmarks as these may be more relevant than data on Treasury securities (especially for tax-exempt bonds).

Amendment No. 1 to SR-MSRB-2016-12, at 5 (November 14, 2016)

(July 12, 2017)

3.28  Must dealers keep their PMP determination for each trade in their books and records?

The MSRB believes that dealers should keep records to demonstrate their compliance with Rule G-30, particularly where they have the evidentiary burden to demonstrate why a contemporaneous transaction was not the best measure of PMP for a given trade. The MSRB further notes that it would expect PMP documentation to be an important component of a firm’s system to supervise compliance with Rules G-15 and G-30.

SR-MSRB-2016-12 Proposed Rule Change to MSRB Rules G-15 and G-30, at 20 n. 39 (September 1, 2016); MSRB Response to Comments on SR-MSRB-2016-12, at 8 (November 14, 2016)

(July 12, 2017)

(Updated March 19, 2018)

3.29  Is there a difference between the PMP that is determined for mark-up disclosure purposes under Rule G-15 and for fair pricing purposes under Rule G-30?

As noted during the rulemaking process, the MSRB recognizes that by allowing dealers to determine PMP for mark-up disclosure purposes at the time of entry of information into systems for confirmation generation, a mark-up disclosed on a confirmation may not reflect subsequent trades that could be considered “contemporaneous” under Supplementary Material .06. However, the MSRB does not believe it is necessary to make a formal distinction between a PMP determined for disclosure purposes and a PMP determined for other regulatory purposes. Still, in connection with any post-transaction fair pricing review process, dealers should not disregard any new information relevant under Supplementary Material .06 that occurs after the mark-up determination (e.g., contemporaneous proceeds obtained after the customer transaction).

SR-MSRB-2016-12 Proposed Rule Change to MSRB Rules G-15 and G-30, at 14; 25; 28 (September 1, 2016); MSRB Response to Comments on SR-MSRB-2016-12, at 10 (November 14, 2016)

(July 12, 2017)

Section 4:  Time of Execution and Security-Specific URL Disclosures

4.1  When must dealers disclose the time of execution on a customer confirmation?

Under Rule G-15, dealers must disclose the time of execution for all transactions, including principal and agency transactions. However, for transactions in municipal fund securities and transactions for an institutional account, as defined in Rule G-8(a)(xi), in lieu of disclosing the time of execution, dealers may instead include on the confirmation a statement that the time of execution will be furnished upon written request of the customer. This time-of-execution disclosure requirement is not limited to circumstances where mark-up disclosure is triggered; therefore, it is required even where mark-up disclosure is not.

SR-MSRB-2016-12 Proposed Rule Change to MSRB Rules G-15 and G-30, at 13-14 (September 1, 2016); Amendment No. 1 to SR-MSRB-2016-12, at 4-5 (November 14, 2016)

(July 12, 2017)

4.2  How should the time of execution be disclosed?

Dealers have an obligation under Rule G-14, on reports of sales or purchases of municipal securities, to report the “time of trade” to the MSRB’s Real-Time Transaction Reporting System. In addition, dealers have an obligation under Rule G-8(a)(vii) to make and keep records of the time of execution of principal transactions in municipal securities. The time of execution for confirmation disclosure purposes is the same as the time of trade for Rule G-14 reporting purposes and the time of execution for purposes of Rule G-8(a)(vii), except that dealers should omit all seconds, without rounding to the minute, from the time-of-execution disclosure because the trade data displayed on EMMA does not include seconds.

Alternatively, if disclosure in this format is operationally challenging or burdensome for a dealer, a dealer may choose to disclose the seconds, again without rounding to the minute (e.g., a time of trade of 10:00:59 may be disclosed as 10:00:59 or 10:00). Additionally, because EMMA displays the time of trade in eastern standard time (EST), dealers may disclose on the customer confirmation the time of execution in either military time (as reported to RTRS under Rule G-14) or in traditional EST with an AM or PM indicator (e.g., a time of trade of 14:00:59 may be disclosed on a confirmation as 14:00:59, 14:00, 2:00:59 PM or 02:00 PM). The time-of-execution disclosure format used by a dealer should be consistent for all municipal securities transaction confirmations on which the disclosure is provided.

SR-MSRB-2016-12 Proposed Rule Change to MSRB Rules G-15 and G-30, at 14 n. 29 (September 1, 2016); MSRB Response to Comments on SR-MSRB-2016-12, at 6 n. 11 (November 14, 2016)

(July 12, 2017)

(Updated March 19, 2018)

4.3  When must dealers disclose a security-specific URL on a customer confirmation?

Under Rule G-15, dealers must disclose a security-specific URL, in a format specified by the MSRB as discussed below, for all non-institutional customer trades other than transactions in municipal fund securities, even where mark-up disclosure is not required. In the rare situations where there is no CUSIP assigned for a security that is subject to Rule G-15 at the time the dealer trades the security with a customer, the dealer is not required to include the security-specific URL on the customer confirmation.

SR-MSRB-2016-12 Proposed Rule Change to MSRB Rules G-15 and G-30, at 13-14; 27; 35 (September 1, 2016); Amendment No. 1 to SR-MSRB-2016-12, at 4 (November 14, 2016)

(July 12, 2017)

(Updated March 19, 2018)

4.4  What is the security-specific URL that must be disclosed?

The template for the URL that must be disclosed under Rule G-15 is:  https://emma.msrb.org/cusip/[insert CUSIP number]. [5] The URL is currently live and operational. Paper confirmations must include this URL with the security-specific CUSIP in print form; electronic confirmations must include the security-specific URL as a hyperlink to the web page.

MSRB Response to Comments on SR-MSRB-2016-12, at 6 (November 14, 2016)

FINRA has provided its own security-specific URL template in its guidance.

(July 12, 2017)

(Updated March 19, 2018)

4.5  Do dealers need to provide any other disclosure concerning the security-specific URL?

Yes. Dealers must include a brief description of the type of information that is available on the security-specific web page for the subject security, such as information about the prices of other transactions in the same security, the official statement and other disclosures for the security, ratings and other market data and educational material. To be clear, the disclosure does not need to describe with specificity all of the information available on the relevant web page. As described above, the description should be brief. Additionally, it only needs to describe enough information about the relevant web page that a reasonable investor would understand the type of information available on that page. For example, the following language would satisfy this obligation: “For more information about this security (including the official statement and trade and price history), visit [insert link]."[6]  Because this language is an example only, dealers may use other language to describe the content of the web page.

As a reminder, Rule G-15(a)(i)(E) requires all requirements to be clearly and specifically indicated on the front of the confirmation, subject to limited exceptions. Because the description of the type of information available on the security-specific web page is not listed as an exception, it must be on the front of the confirmation.

SR-MSRB-2016-12 Proposed Rule Change to MSRB Rules G-15 and G-30, at 13; 27 (September 1, 2016); MSRB Response to Comments on SR-MSRB-2016-12, at 6 n. 9 (November 14, 2016)

(July 12, 2017)

(Updated March 19, 2018)

4.6 Is disclosure of the time of execution or security-specific URL required for transactions that involve a dealer and a registered investment adviser?

No. Disclosure of the time of execution and security-specific URL is not required for transactions with an institutional customer. Under Rule G-15, a registered investment adviser is an institutional accountholder; accordingly, disclosure is not required for these transactions. This is the case even if the registered investment adviser with whom the dealer transacted later allocates all or a portion of the securities to a retail account or where the transaction is executed directly for a retail account if the investment adviser has discretion over the transaction. The MSRB notes that this answer is specific to the time-of-execution and security-specific URL disclosure requirements in Rule G-15; it is not intended to alter any other obligations.

(July 12, 2017)

[1] EMMA is a registered trademark of the MSRB.

[2] Prior to May 14, 2018, Supplementary Material .01(d) provides that dealer compensation on a principal transaction is considered to be a mark-up or mark-down that is computed from the inter-dealer market price prevailing at the time of the customer transaction. As of May 14, 2018, the reference to the prevailing “inter-dealer” price is amended to instead, as noted above, reference the “prevailing market price,” as described in Supplementary Material .06. Supplementary Material .06, which applies to customer transactions and not internal position movements, generally embodies the principle that the PMP of a security is generally the price at which dealers trade with one another. This underlying principle does not mean that dealers may avoid following the steps of the waterfall analysis in the specific order prescribed in Supplementary Material .06. However, it remains a useful principle that dealers may wish to consider in approaching certain unspecified aspects of the waterfall analysis. The MSRB’s responses to Questions 3.11, 3.12, 3.20 and 3.23, in part, are reflective of this underlying principle. Other answers, including those in response to Questions 3.9, 3.10, 3.21 and 3.25 are reflective of the MSRB’s longstanding “reasonable diligence” standard, discussed above.

[3] This example assumes that the dealer has identified that it has contemporaneous cost and proceeds at the time that it is determining the mark-up and mark-down to each customer. If this is not the case, however, because the dealer systematically inputs information into its systems for the generation of PMP at the time of trade, then there is a different result. For example, assume that the trade at 98 occurs at 10:00 AM, the trade at 100 occurs at 3:00 PM and these trades are contemporaneous. If the dealer systematically determines PMP at the time of trade, consistent with Question 3.4, at the time of the 10:00 AM trade, the dealer may simply proceed down the waterfall to determine the PMP for the security without the need to adjust that PMP. At the time of the 3:00 PM trade, however, the dealer should adjust its contemporaneous cost as described above to account for the mark-down included in the price.

[4] At the institutional transactions and quotations categories in the hierarchy of pricing factors level of the waterfall, generally, dealers consider information from only one side of the market, depending on whether the dealer is charging a mark-up or mark-down. However, pursuant to reasonable and consistently applied policies and procedures, a dealer may consider information from transactions in which the dealer is on the other side of the market when reasonable to do so. For example, this may be reasonable where the dealer has identified no comparison transactions in which the dealer is on the opposite side of the market as the dealer in the subject transaction. In this case, the dealer may reasonably adjust the transaction price by an amount to account for the price at which that transaction might have occurred had it been a transaction in which the dealer was on the opposite side of the market from the dealer in the subject transaction. Also for example, where the dealer has identified comparison transactions on both sides of the market, the dealer reasonably may perform a similar adjustment (i.e., adjust a price from a transaction in which the dealer is on the same side of the market as the dealer in the subject transaction by an amount to account for the price at which that transaction might have occurred had it been a transaction in which the dealer was on the opposite side of the market from the dealer in the subject transaction). A dealer’s ability to consider such information may be particularly important in the municipal market in which securities often trade infrequently and in which dealers may often have such limited information available to them at the time of their PMP determination.

[5] The MSRB previously announced the URL template as: http://emma.msrb.org/cusip/[insert CUSIP number]. Accordingly, confirmations for dealers that began to program their confirmations in accordance with the previously announced URL template may begin with the http format, rather than the https format. The MSRB does not expect such dealers to reprogram the URLs provided on customer confirmations as the http format will continue to function and will automatically redirect to the more secure https site.

[6] As a reminder, for dealers that currently seek to satisfy their obligation to provide a copy of the official statement to customers under Rule G-32(a)(iii) by notifying customers of the availability of the official statement through EMMA, the provision of the link described in this set of FAQs would satisfy both the relevant Rule G-15 security-specific URL obligation and the Rule G-32(a)(iii), provided that, for purposes of Rule G-32(a)(iii), the URL address also is accompanied by the additional information described. For example, if a dealer included the sample description included in this question, the addition of the language “Copies of the official statement are also available from [insert dealer name] upon request” would satisfy both the Rule G-15 security-specific URL obligation and Rule G-32(a)(iii) obligations. 

Background

In November 1998, the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (the “MSRB” or “Board”) published an interpretation about the use of electronic media to deliver and receive information by brokers, dealers and municipal securities dealers (collectively, “dealers”) under Board rules (the “1998 Interpretation”).[1] The 1998 Interpretation addresses how dealers may use electronic media to satisfy their delivery obligations under MSRB rules, including communications among dealers and between dealers and issuers. It states, “. . . a dealer that undertakes communications required under Board rules with other dealers and with issuers in a manner that conforms with the principles stated [in the 1998 Interpretation] relating to customer communications will have met its obligations with respect to such communications.”[2]

Discussion

The MSRB wishes to remind dealers of the 1998 Interpretation, particularly in light of the January 13, 2020 compliance date for certain amendments to MSRB Rule G-11, on primary offering practices.[3] Among other modifications, the amendments to Rule G-11 require senior syndicate managers to provide certain information to issuers regarding allocations and net designations.

The MSRB understands that dealers acting as senior syndicate managers may use external third-party electronic systems or proprietary electronic systems to manage aspects of the primary offering process, such as the tracking of orders, the automated communication of certain information to syndicate members, and other electronic data sharing features (“electronic bookrunning systems”). With respect to certain information required to be delivered to other dealers and issuers under Rule G-11, the Board believes that such information may be provided by electronic means so long as the standards established in the 1998 Interpretation with respect to electronic communications are met, including providing timely and adequate notice that such information may be accessed electronically. For example, with respect to Rule G-11(g)(ii), within two business days following the date of sale, a senior syndicate manager can inform an issuer that allocation information is available electronically (e.g., on an electronic bookrunning system that an issuer has access to) by pushing notice to the issuer (e.g., email). Additionally, consistent with the 1998 Interpretation, a dealer should provide a paper version of the allocation information should an issuer request or object to receiving the information electronically.

[1] See Exchange Act Release No. 40848 (Dec. 28, 1998), 64 FR 544 (Jan. 5, 1999) (File No. SR-MSRB-98-12); see also Notice Regarding Electronic Delivery and Receipt of Information by Brokers, Dealers and Municipal Securities Dealers (Nov. 20, 1998).

[2] Id. 

[3] See MSRB Notice 2019-15 (June 28, 2019).

The Board has received questions concerning the appropriate allocation of supervisory responsibility between municipal securities principals and the new category of municipal securities sales principals. The Board recently amended its rule G-3 to permit a person associated with a securities firm whose activities with respect to municipal securities are limited to supervising sales to and purchases from customers to qualify as a "municipal securities sales principal" ("sales principal"). The Board also amended rules G-8 on recordkeeping, G-26 on the administration of customer accounts, and G-27 on supervision to permit securities firms to designate sales principals as responsible for certain supervisory functions insofar as they relate directly to transactions in municipal securities with customers.

In particular, rule G-27 concerning supervision requires municipal securities dealers to designate at least one municipal securities principal as responsible for supervising its municipal securities activities, including the municipal securities activities of branch offices or similar locations. In addition, rule G-27 permits the municipal securities dealer to designate a sales principal (e.g., a branch office manager) as responsible for the "direct supervision of sales to and purchases from customers." The rule also requires that a dealer adopt written supervisory procedures which, among other matters, reflect the delegation of supervisory authority to these personnel.

As a result of these amendments, in designating under rule G-27 one or more municipal securities principals as responsible for supervising the business and activities of the firm’s associated persons, a securities firm may choose to designate a qualified sales principal with limited responsibility for the direct supervision of sales to and purchases from customers. If so, the firm’s written supervisory procedures may allocate responsibility to a sales principal for reviewing and approving (to the extent that they relate to sales to and purchases from customers) the suitability of the opening of, and transactions in, customer accounts, the handling of customer complaints and other correspondence, and other matters permitted by Board rule to be reviewed or approved by a sales principal. A municipal securities principal, however, must be responsible for directly supervising the firm’s other municipal securities activities such as underwriting, trading, and pricing of inventories.

With respect to the relationship between a sales principal and the designated municipal securities principal, Board rule G-27 provides that a branch office manager who acts as the sales principal for his office will be responsible for the municipal securities sales activities under his direct supervision. Rule G-27 also provides that a designated municipal securities principal will be responsible for all municipal securities activities of the branch office including those that may be under the direct supervision of a sales principal. However, the branch office manager, under the particular organizational structure of a firm, may be responsible to some other designated supervisor for the discharge of his other duties.

Syndicate records: participations. This will acknowledge receipt of your letter of November 24, 1981 concerning certain of the requirements of Board rule G-8(a)(viii) regarding syndicate records to be maintained by managers of underwritings of new issues of municipal securities.

You note that this provision requires, in pertinent part, that,

[w]ith respect to each syndicate..., records shall be maintained ... showing ... the name and percentage of participation of each member of the syndicate or account...

You inquire whether this provision necessitates the designation of an actual percentage or decimal participation, or, alternatively,

whether a listing of the ... dollar participation [of each member] ... along with [the] aggregate par value of the syndicate meets the requirement ... of the Rule.

The rule should not be construed to require in all cases an indication of a numerical percentage for each member's participation, if other information from which a numerical percentage can easily be determined is set forth. The method you propose, showing the par value amount of the member's participation, is certainly acceptable for purposes of compliance with this provision of the rule. MSRB interpretation of December 8, 1981.

Records of original entry: unit system. This will acknowledge receipt of your letter of November 20, 1981 concerning compliance with certain of the provisions of Board rule G-8 through the use of a "unit system" method of recordkeeping. In your letter you indicate that the bank wishes to maintain the record of original entry required under rule G-8(a)(i) in the form of a collection of duplicate copies of confirmations filed in transaction settlement date order; in addition, you enclose a copy of the confirmation form used by the bank. You inquire whether maintaining the record in this manner would be satisfactory for purposes of the rule.

In a July 29, 1977 interpretive notice on rule G-8 the Board stated:

Under rule G-8, records may be maintained in a variety of ways, including a unit system of recordkeeping. In such a system, records are kept in the form of a group of documents or related groups of documents....

A unit system of recordkeeping is an acceptable system for purposes of rule G-8 if the information required to be shown is clearly and accurately reflected and there is an adequate basis for audit. This would require in most instances that each record in a unit system be arranged in appropriate sequence, whether chronological or numerical, and fully integrated into the over-all recordkeeping system for purposes of posting to general ledger accounts.

Therefore, the type of recordkeeping system you propose may be used for purposes of compliance with rule G-8 if (1) the records show, in a clear and accurate fashion, all of the information that is required to be shown, and (2) the records are maintained in a form that provides an adequate basis for audit by bank employees or examiners. It is my understanding that recordkeeping systems similar to that which you propose have been inspected by banking regulatory authorities during examinations of other bank municipal securities dealer departments, and have been found to meet these two criteria.

In your letter you indicate that the confirmation form used by your bank "contains all the information needed" to meet the recordkeeping requirement. Our review of your form indicates that this is not the case. The rule requires the record of original entry to contain

an itemized daily record of all purchases and sales of municipal securities, all receipts and deliveries of municipal securities (including bond or note numbers and, if the securities are in registered form, an indication to such effect), all receipts and disbursements of cash with respect to transactions in municipal securities, [and] all other debits and credits pertaining to transactions in municipal securities ... The records of original entry shall show the name or other designation of the account for which each such transaction was effected (whether effected for the account of such municipal securities broker or municipal securities dealer, the account of a customer, or otherwise), the description of the securities, the aggregate par value of the securities, the dollar price or yield and aggregate purchase or sale price of the securities, accrued interest, the trade date, and the name or other designation of the person from whom purchased or received or to whom sold or delivered.

The confirmation form you enclosed does not appear to provide a space for notation of "the name or other designation of the account for which [the] transaction was effected." This information is distinct from "the name or other designation of the person from whom purchased ... or to whom sold ..." (which would appear in the "name and address" portion of your form) and requires an indication of the account, whether it be the bank's trading inventory or portfolio, or the contra-principal on an agency transaction, in which the securities were held prior to a sale or will be held subsequent to a purchase. For example, if the bank sells $100,000 par value securities from its trading account to "Mr. Smith", the record of original entry would reflect that this transaction was effected for the account of the [bank's] trading account. A subsequent sale of these securities effected as agent for the customer would be reflected on the record of original entry as for the account of "Mr. Smith."

I note also that, in addition to a record of purchase and sale transactions (which could easily be maintained in the form of duplicate copies of confirmations), the record of original entry must contain information about transactions cleared on the date of the record as well as cash disbursements and receipts. Your letter does not indicate how your bank would comply with these latter requirements. As you may be aware, other banks using unit recordkeeping systems use additional copies of the confirmation as "clearance" records, with information on receipts and deliveries of securities and movements of cash noted on these copies. These "clearance" records are then aggregated with the purchase and sale records to form a complete record of original entry.

In summary, the method of maintaining a record of original entry which your bank proposes can be used to comply with the requirements of the rule. Certain aspects of the information required by the rule are not contained on the document you propose to use, however, and provision would have to be made for inclusion of these items in the records before the system you propose would be satisfactory for compliance with the rule's requirements. MSRB interpretation of November 24, 1981.

Syndicate records. I am writing in response to your letters of October 2 and October 19, 1981 concerning a particular recordkeeping arrangement used by an NASD-member firm in connection with its underwriting activities. In your letters you indicate that the firm conducts its underwriting activities from its main office and four regional branch office "commitment centers," with the committing branch offices authorized to commit to underwriting new issues on the firm's behalf. You inquire whether the firm is in compliance with the Board's recordkeeping and record retention rules if it maintains only part of the records on its underwritings in the main office. Correspondence from a field examiner attached to your letters indicates that the committing branch office originating a particular underwriting maintains all of the records with respect to such underwriting. The majority of these records are the original copies; the copies of confirmations, good faith checks, and syndicate settlement checks maintained at the committing branch office are duplicates of original records maintained at the firm's main office.

Rule G-9(d) requires that books and records shall be maintained and preserved in an easily accessible place for two years and shall be available for ready inspection by the proper regulatory authorities. The fact that the member firm does not maintain all records with respect to all of its underwriting activities in a single location does not contravene these provisions of Board rule G-9. Rule G-9 would permit the arrangement described in your letters, whereby a firm maintains copies of all of the records pertaining to a particular underwriting in the office responsible for that underwriting.

Thank you for your prompt assistance in providing the additional information we needed in order to respond to your inquiry. MSRB interpretation of October 21, 1981.

Settlement of syndicate accounts. This is in response to your letter of July 28, 1981, suggesting that requirements analogous to those placed on syndicate managers in rule G-12(j) be imposed on syndicate members who must remit their share of syndicate losses to their syndicate managers. You state that syndicate members frequently do not remit their losses to the manager in a timely fashion and that such a requirement would establish an "equitable balance between the interests of syndicate members and syndicate managers."

Rule G-12(j) provides:

Final settlement of a syndicate or similar account formed for the purchase of securities shall be made within 60 days following the date all securities have been delivered by the syndicate or account manager to the syndicate or account members.

The rule is not expressly limited to money payments by syndicate managers, but broadly requires that final settlement shall be made within 60 days following the date the manager delivers the securities to the syndicate members. Thus, the rule requires syndicate members to remit their share of syndicate losses to the syndicate manager within the 60-day period set forth in the rule. Since a syndicate member cannot remit his share of losses until he is apprised by the syndicate manager of the amount of his share, a member should remit his share of the losses to the manager within a reasonable period of time after receiving the syndicate accounting required by rule G-11(h). MSRB interpretation of September 28, 1981.

Certain amendments to Board rule G-15 on customer confirmations became effective on December 1, 1980. Among other matters, these amendments require that customer confirmations of transactions effected on the basis of dollar price, including confirmations of purchases from customers, set forth certain yield information concerning the transaction. Confirmations of dollar price transactions in non-callable securities, or in callable securities traded at prices below par, must set forth the yield to maturity resulting from the dollar price. Confirmations of dollar price transactions in securities which have been called or prerefunded must show the yield to the maturity date established by the call or prerefunding. Confirmations of transactions in callable securities traded at dollar prices in excess of par are exempt from yield disclosure requirements until October 1, 1981; after that date such confirmations must show the lowest of the yield to premium call, yield to par option, or yield to maturity resulting from such dollar price.[1]

Since the effective date of these amendments, the Board has received several inquiries as to whether all confirmations of purchases from customers, including purchases effected at a price derived from a yield price less a spread or concession, must show the yield resulting from the actual unit dollar price of the transaction.

The Board is of the view that all confirmations of purchasers from customers (except for purchases at par) must set forth the net or effective yield resulting from the actual unit dollar price of the transaction. The yield disclosure on confirmations of purchases from customers is intended to provide customers with a means of assessing the merits of alternative investment strategies (such as different possible reinvestment transactions) and the merits of the particular transaction being confirmed. The Board believes that the disclosure of the net or effective yield (i.e., that derived from the actual unit dollar price of the transaction) best serves these purposes.

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[1] Confirmations of transactions effected at a dollar price of par ("100") continue to be exempt from any yield disclosure requirements.

The Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board has recently received inquiries concerning the provisions of rule G-12(h)(iii) regarding close-out procedures in the event of a firm's liquidation. The Board has been advised that a SIPC trustee has been appointed in connection with the liquidation of a general securities firm with which certain municipal securities brokers and dealers have uncompleted transactions in municipal securities, and that the New York Stock Exchange and the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., have notified their respective members that they may institute "immediate" close-out procedures on open transactions with the firm in liquidation. In accordance with a previous understanding between the Board and the NASD, the NASD has also advised municipal securities brokers and dealers that, pursuant to rule G-12(h)(iii), they may execute "immediate" close-outs on open transactions in municipal securities.

Rule G-12(h)(iii) provides:

Nothing herein contained shall be construed to prevent brokers, dealers or municipal securities dealers from closing out transactions as directed by a ruling of a national securities exchange, a registered securities by a ruling of a national securities exchange, a registered securities association or an appropriate regulatory agency issued in connection with the liquidation of a broker, dealer or municipal securities dealer.

Therefore, in the event that a national securities exchange or registered securities association makes a ruling that close-outs may be effected "immediately" on transactions with a firm in liquidation, municipal securities brokers and dealers may take such action. In these circumstances, a purchasing dealer seeking to execute such a close-out need not follow the procedures for initiation of a close-out procedure, nor is the dealer required to wait the prescribed time periods prior to executing the close-out notice. Similarly, a selling dealer need not attempt delivery prior to using the procedure for close-outs by sellers. In both cases dealers may proceed to execute the close-out immediately--that is, the purchasing dealer may immediately "buy in" the securities in question for the account and liability of the firm in liquidation (or utilize one of the other options available for execution of the close-out), and a selling dealer may immediately "sell out" the subject securities. Notification of the execution of the close-out should be provided in accordance with the normal procedure.

Dealers executing close-outs in these circumstances should advise the trustee of the firm in liquidation of their actions in closing out these transactions. If proceeds from the close-out execution are due to the firm in liquidation, they should be remitted to the trustee. Requests for payment of amounts due on close-out executions should also be sent to the trustee; the trustee will resolve these claims in the course of the liquidation.

The Board also notes that dealers having open transactions with a firm in liquidation may, but are not required to, execute "immediate" close-outs in these circumstances. If individual dealers wish to attempt some other means of completing these transactions, such as seeking to complete a transaction with the liquidated firm's other contra-side, they may do so.

Blanket consent. This is in response to your April 7, 1981, letter asking whether, consistent with rule G-23(d)(ii), a municipal securities dealer acting as a financial advisor to an issuer may obtain from the issuer prospective approval to participate in any and all new issues the issuer may sell on a competitive basis at some future date.

Rule G-23(d)(ii) provides that a municipal securities dealer which is acting as a financial advisor may not acquire or participate in the distribution of a new issue unless

if such issue is to be sold by the issuer at competitive bid the issuer has consented in writing to such acquisition or participation.

The rule is designed to minimize the "prima facie" conflict of interest that exists when a municipal securities professional acts as both financial advisor and underwriter with respect to the same issue. Rule G-23(d) speaks in terms of "a new issue" and the implication is that consent should be obtained on an issue-by-issue basis.

The Board believes that such a reading of the rule is consistent with the rule’s rationale—that an issuer should have an opportunity to consider whether, under the particular circumstances of an offering, the financial advisor’s potential conflict of interest is sufficient to warrant not consenting to its participation in the sale. The Board has concluded that an unrestricted consent would not afford an issuer such an opportunity and, accordingly, has determined that such a consent would not satisfy the requirements of rule G-23(d)(ii). MSRB interpretation of July 30, 1981.

Disclosure of pricing: accrued interest. This is in response to your request by telephone for an interpretation of Board rule G-15 which requires that a municipal securities dealer provide to his customer, at or prior to completion of a transaction, a written confirmation containing certain general information including the amount of accrued interest. Specifically, you have asked whether the rule permits a municipal securities dealer, in using one confirmation to confirm transactions in several different municipal securities of one issuer, to disclose the amount of accrued interest for the bonds as an aggregate figure. You have advised us that, typically, such a confirmation will show other items of information required by the rule such as yield and dollar price, separately for each issue.

Rule G-15 was adopted by the Board to assure that confirmations of municipal securities transactions provide investors with certain fundamental information concerning transactions. The Board believes that disclosure of accrued interest as an aggregate sum does not permit investors to determine easily from the confirmation the amount of accrued interest attributable to each security purchased, but rather necessitates the performance of several computations. It, thus, would be more difficult for an investor to determine whether the information concerning accrued interest is correct if the information is presented in aggregate form.

Such a result is inconsistent with the purposes of rule G-15. Accordingly, the Board has concluded that, under rule G-15, the amount of accrued interest must be shown for each issue of bonds to which the customer confirmation relates. MSRB interpretation of July 27, 1981.

Letters of credit. This is in response to your April 9, 1981, letter asking whether Board rule G-22, regarding control relationships, and G-23, regarding financial advisory agreements, would apply if a bank’s issuance of a letter of credit were contingent upon its being named underwriter or manager for the issue, or if a bank issuing a letter of credit retained authority to require an issuer, in effect, to call the securities.

Rule G-22 provides that

a control relationship with respect to a municipal security shall be deemed to exist if a broker, dealer, or municipal securities dealer (or a bank or other person of which the broker, dealer, or municipal securities dealer is a department or division) controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with the issuer of the security or a person other than the issuer who is obligated, directly or indirectly, with respect to debt service on the security.

The existence of a control relationship is a question of fact to be determined from the entire situation. Most recently, the Securities and Exchange Commission suggested that, for purposes of the Regulatory Flexibility Act, a registered broker-dealer would be deemed to be controlled by a person or entity who, among other things, has the ability to direct or cause the direction of management or the policies of the broker-dealer. Based upon the above, it is questionable whether a bank that conditions the issuance of a letter of credit upon being named an underwriter or upon a tie-in deposit arrangement should be deemed to control the issuer. Similarly, it does not appear that a bank that retains discretion under a letter of credit to cause the trustee to call the whole issue has a control relationship with the issuer.

You also ask whether under Board rule G-23 a financial advisory relationship is created if a bank conditions the issuance of a letter of credit upon being named an underwriter or upon obtaining a tie-in deposit arrangement. Under rule G-23, a financial advisory relationship is deemed to exist when a municipal securities professional provides, or enters into an agreement to provide, financial advisory services to, or on behalf of, an issuer with respect to a new issue of securities regarding such matters as the structure, timing or terms of the issue, in return for compensation or for the expectation of compensation. It does not appear that rule G-23 would apply in your example since the bank is not providing financial advisory or consulting services with respect to the structure, timing or other substantive terms of the issue. MSRB interpretation of July 27, 1981.

Yield disclosures. This letter is in response to your inquiry of April 14, 1981 concerning the application of the yield disclosure requirements of Board rule G-15 to a particular transaction effected by your firm. As I indicated to you in my letter of May 9, 1981, the Board was unable to consider your inquiry at its April meeting, and, accordingly, deferred the matter to its July meeting. At that meeting the Board took up your question and authorized my sending you this answer to your inquiry. While we realize that the matter is now moot with respect to the particular transaction about which you were writing, we assume that this question may arise again with respect to future transactions.

In your April 14 letter you inquired concerning a recent sale of new issue securities to a customer. You indicated that the firm had sold all twenty maturities of the new issue to a customer. This sale had been effected at the same premium dollar price for all maturities, and the customer had been advised of the average life of the issue and the yield to the average life. You inquired whether the final money confirmation of this sale should show "one dollar price ... and one yield to the average life," or the dollar price and each of the yields to the twenty different maturities of the issue.[1]

Rule G-15(a)(viii)(B)[*] requires that customer confirmations of transactions in noncallable securities effected on the basis of a dollar price set forth the dollar price and the resulting yield to maturity. In the situation you describe, it would be difficult to conclude that the rule would permit the confirmation to show only a "yield to the average life," omitting any yield to maturity information. Although the "yield to the average life" would provide the customer with some indication of the return on his or her investment, the customer could easily make the mistake of assuming that this would be the yield on all of the securities, and not realize that it is the result of differing yields, with lower yields on the short-term maturities and higher yields on the long-term ones. The Board believes that disclosure of each of the yields to the twenty maturities of the issue would provide the customer with much more accurate information concerning the return on his or her investments. Accordingly, the Board concludes that, in a transaction of this type, the final money confirmation(s) should set forth each of the yields. MSRB interpretation of July 27, 1981.

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[1] Although you did not indicate this, we assume that all of these securities are noncallable.

[*] [Currently codified at rule G-15(a)(i)(A)(5)(b)]

Contents of advertisement: put options. Your letter dated June 15, 1981, has been referred to me for response. In your letter you mention our previous conversation regarding the appropriate definition of "put bonds", which definition your firm would like to use in advertisements offering such securities for sale. You request confirmation of the Board’s views concerning the aspects of the "put option" feature on these securities that would be appropriate to cover in such a definition.

The type of "put option" issue with which the Board is familiar, and which we discussed, has a provision in the indenture which permits the holder of the securities to tender or "put" the securities back to the issuer on specified dates at par. This feature typically commences six (or more) years after the date of issuance, is exercisable only once annually (on an interest payment date), and is exercisable only upon the provision of irrevocable prior notice to the issuer (typically three or more months before the exercise date).

If I remember our conversation correctly, you indicated that the firm wished to describe a security of this type in an advertisement as having a "put option" feature, available once annually, permitting redemption of the securities at par. I suggested that, while the items of information you detailed were appropriate, it might also be advisable to mention in the advertisement the "prior notice" requirement under the option exercise procedure. It would also be helpful to make clear the irrevocable nature of such notice.

If the content of your definition of the "put option" feature goes beyond the items we discussed (for example, by indicating that the "put option" is secured by a bank letter of credit, additional disclosures might also be appropriate. MSRB interpretation of July 13, 1981.

The Board continues to be concerned about industry compliance with certain of the requirements of Board rules G-11, "Sales of New Issue Municipal Securities During the Underwriting Period," and G-12, "Uniform Practice," with respect to the settlement of syndicate accounts. Board rule G-11(g)[*] requires, among other matters, that syndicate managers provide to members at the time of settlement of a syndicate account a detailed statement of the expenses incurred by the syndicate.[1] Rule G-12(j) requires that settlement of a syndicate account and distribution of any profit due to members be made within 60 days of delivery of the syndicate's securities. In addition, rule G-12(i) requires that good faith deposits be returned within two business days of settlement with an issuer, and rule G-12(k) requires that sales credits designated by a customer be distributed within 30 days following delivery of the securities [by the issuer to the syndicate]. 

The Board has from time to time received complaints from industry members concerning certain managers' non-compliance with these requirements. These persons allege that certain managers unduly delay the sending of syndicate settlement checks and other disbursements, and furnish settlement statements that provide little or no detail about the nature of the expenses incurred by the syndicate. These persons have also, on occasion, furnished to the Board copies of syndicate statements which illustrate clearly these managers' failure to provide the requisite information and to meet the time requirement for these disbursements. The Board has referred each of these complaints to the appropriate regulatory agency for investigation and appropriate action.

The Board wishes to emphasize strongly the need for compliance with these provisions. The Board continues to be of the view that the time periods and other requirements of the rules, which were arrived at after considerable deliberation, are fair and reasonable. The Board believes that failure to comply with these provisions is inexcusable. The Board does not accept the rationale offered by some, that the difficulties in obtaining bills for syndicate expenses justify these undue delays; the Board believes that it is incumbent upon managers to assure that such bills are received and processed in timely fashion, to permit compliance with the rule. The Board strongly urges syndicate managers who have failed to comply with these requirements to bring their practices into compliance with the requirements of the rules.

The Board also is communicating these views to the enforcement organizations and stressing its concern with respect to compliance with these provisions. It strongly urges all syndicate members to notify the appropriate enforcement organization of any violations by managers of these provisions.

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[1] The rule contemplates that the statement will set forth a detailed breakdown of expenses into specified categories, such as advertising, printing, legal, computer services, packaging and handling, etc. The statement may include an item for miscellaneous expenses, provided that the amount shown under such an item is not disproportionately large in relation to other items of expense shown and includes only items of expense which cannot be easily categorized elsewhere in the statement.

[*] [Currently codified at rule G-11(h)]

NOTE: Revised to reflect subsequent amendments.

"Finder" of potential issuers. This responds to your letter of May 14, 1981 requesting our advice concerning the application of the qualification provisions of rule G-3 to a person employed by a municipal securities broker or dealer whose activities are limited solely to acting as a "finder" of potential issuers. Based upon the facts contained in your letter, and assuming that such person is not providing financial advisory or consultant services for issuers, it would appear that he or she is not performing functions, which are enumerated in rule G-3(a), the performance of which would require qualification as a municipal securities principal or a municipal securities representative. MSRB interpretation of June 24, 1981.

Registered municipal securities dealer. Your letter dated February 11, 1981 has been referred to me for response.

In your letter you state that [the firm] "has had no transactions in municipal securities since a trade on September 13, 1979." You note that according to rule A-14 of the Board relating to annual fees, a fee . . . is payable for each fiscal year in which the municipal securities broker or municipal securities dealer conducts business. You conclude that "[s]ince we did not conduct any business during the last fiscal year (10/1/79-9/30/80) it would appear that [the firm] should be entitled to a refund" for the fiscal year ending October, 1980, and should not be liable for payment of the annual fee for the fiscal year ending October, 1981.

The purpose of the annual fee imposed by rule A-14 is to defray the costs of the Board's communications with those firms which are qualified to do a municipal securities business. There is no threshold level of municipal securities business which triggers liability for payment of the annual fee. Rather, the fee is imposed on all brokers and dealers who are registered as municipal securities brokers with the S.E.C. Since [the firm] is registered as a municipal securities dealer, it is liable for payment of the annual fee imposed by rule A-14 for the fiscal year ending October 1981.

If your firm no longer intends to do a municipal securities business, rule A-15 of the Board provides a procedure for withdrawal from registration as a municipal securities dealer. Withdrawal from registration would, of course, enable your firm to avoid paying annual fees to the Board. However, at such time as your firm resumes any municipal securities business, it would be required to pay the initial and annual fees imposed by rules A-12 and A-14, respectively. MSRB interpretation of June 11, 1981

Board rule G-3 sets forth standards of qualifications for municipal securities brokers and municipal securities dealers and their associated persons, including examination requirements for municipal securities principals, municipal securities financial and operations principals, municipal securities sales principals, and municipal securities representatives.

In order to assure that its examinations constitute valid tests of the qualifications of persons who take them, the Board has instituted various procedures, in the question writing as well as the administration phases, which are designed to preserve the confidentiality of the examinations. In addition, on one occasion the Board found it necessary to take legal action, alleging copyright violations, against a securities training school which had used in its training material questions and answers that appeared to have been taken from questions contained in Board qualification examinations.

The Board wishes to point out that the practice of "debriefing" persons who have taken a municipal securities qualifications examination (i.e. requesting or encouraging such persons to reveal the contents of the examinations) may not only give rise to an infringement of the Board's copyright but would, if engaged in by members of the municipal securities industry, constitute a violation of the Board's rules. In this regard, rule G-3(g) [*] provides that no person associated with a municipal securities broker or municipal securities dealer shall (i) disclose to any person any question on any municipal securities qualification examination or the answers to any such questions, (ii) engage in any activity inconsistent with the confidential nature of any such qualification examination or its purpose as a test of the qualifications of persons taking such examination, or (iii) knowingly sign a false certification concerning any such qualification examination.

 

[*] [Currently codified at rule G-3(e)]

Confirmation disclosure: put option bonds. This will acknowledge receipt of your letter of March 17, 1981, with respect to "put option" or "tender option" features on certain new issues of municipal securities. In your letter you note that an increasing number of issues with "put option" features are being brought to market, and you inquire concerning the application of the Board’s rules to these securities.

The issues of this type with which we are familiar have a "put option" or "tender option" feature permitting the holder of securities of an issue to sell the securities back to the trustee of the issue at par. The "put" or "tender option" privilege normally becomes available a stated number of years (e.g., six years) after issuance, and is available on stated dates thereafter (e.g., once annually, on an interest payment date). The holder of the securities must usually give several months prior notice to the trustee of his intention to exercise the "put option."

Most Board rules will, of course, apply to "put option" issues as they would to any other municipal security. As you recognize in your letter, the only requirements raising interpretive questions appear to be the requirements of rules G-12 and G-15 concerning confirmations. These present two interpretive issues: (1) does the existence of the "put option" have to be disclosed and if so, how, and (2) should the "put option" be used in the computation of yield and dollar price.

Both rules require confirmations to set forth a

description of the securities, including ... if the securities are ... subject to redemption prior to maturity ..., an indication to such effect

Confirmations of transactions in "put option" securities would therefore have to indicate the existence of the "put option," much as confirmations concerning callable securities must indicate the existence of the call feature. The confirmation need not set forth the specific details of the "put option" feature.

The requirements of the rules differ with respect to disclosure of yields and dollar prices. Rule G-12, which governs inter-dealer confirmations, requires such confirmations to set forth the

yield at which transaction was effected and resulting dollar price, except in the case of securities which are traded on the basis of dollar price or securities sold at par, in which event only dollar price need be shown (in cases in which securities are priced to premium call or to par option, this must be stated and the call or option date and price used in the calculation must be shown, and where a transaction is effected on a yield basis, the dollar price shall be calculated to the lowest of price to premium call, price to par option, or price to maturity)

Rule G-15 requires customer confirmations to contain yield and dollar price as follows:

(A) for transactions effected on a yield basis, the yield at which transaction was effected and the resulting dollar price shall be shown. Such dollar price shall be calculated to the lowest of price to premium call, price to par option, or price to maturity. In cases in which the dollar price is calculated to premium call or par option, this must be stated, and the call or option date and price used in the calculation must be shown.

(B) for transactions effected on the basis of dollar price, the dollar price at which transaction was effected, and the lowest of the resulting yield to premium call, yield to par option, or yield to maturity shall be shown; provided, however, that yield information for transactions in callable securities effected at a dollar price in excess of par, other than transactions in securities which have been called or prerefunded, is not required to be shown until October 1, 1981.

(C) for transactions at par, the dollar price shall be shown[.]

Therefore, with respect to transactions in "put option" securities effected on the basis of dollar price, rule G-12 requires that confirmations simply set forth the dollar price. Rule G-15 requires that confirmations of such transactions set forth the dollar price and the yield to maturity resulting from such dollar price. With respect to transactions effected on the basis of yield, both rules require that the confirmations set forth the yield at which the transaction was effected and the resulting dollar price. Unless the parties otherwise agree, the yield should be computed to the maturity date when deriving the dollar price. If the parties explicitly agree that the transaction is effected at a yield to the "put option" date, then such yield may be shown on the confirmation, together with a statement that it is a "yield to the [date] put option," and an indication of the date the option first becomes available to the holder.

Since the exercise of the "put option" is at the discretion of the holder of the securities, and not, as in the case of a call feature, at the discretion of someone other than the holder, the Board concludes that the presentation of a yield to maturity on the confirmation, and the computation of yield prices to the maturity date, is appropriate, and accords with the goal of advising the purchaser of the minimum assured yield on the transaction. The Board further believes that the ability of the two parties to a transaction to agree to price the transaction to the "put option" date, should they so desire, provides sufficient additional flexibility in applying the rules to transactions in "put option" securities. MSRB interpretation of April 24, 1981.

Agency transaction: pricing. This will acknowledge receipt of your letter of March 17, 1981 concerning the appropriate method of disclosing remuneration on agency transactions. In your letter you indicate that the bank wishes to use one of the following two legends, as appropriate, in disclosing such remuneration:

1) "Commission: Agency Fee $ ... per $1,000 of par value included in/deducted from net price to customer;" or

2) "Commission: Concession received from broker/dealer $ ... per $1,000 of par value."

You inquire whether these legends, indicating the amount of remuneration on a "dollars per bond" basis, are satisfactory for purposes of rule G-15.

Rule G-15(b)[*] requires that

[i]f the broker, dealer or municipal securities dealer is effecting a transaction as agent for the customer or as agent for both the customer and another person, the confirmation shall set forth ... the source and amount of any commission or other remuneration received or to be received by the broker, dealer or municipal securities dealer in connection with the transaction.

As you are aware, the Board has previously interpreted this provision to require that an aggregate dollar amount be shown. The Board adopted this position due to its belief that many customers would find it difficult to interpret the meaning of a statement disclosing the remuneration as a percentage of par value or a unit profit per bond, or to relate this information to the "total dollar amount of [the] transaction" required to be shown under G-15(a)(xi)[†].

Accordingly, we are unable to conclude that disclosure of the remuneration in the manner in which you suggest would be satisfactory for purposes of the rule. The total dollar amount of the remuneration should be set forth on the confirmation. MSRB interpretation of April 23, 1981.

 

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[*] [Currently codified at rule G-15(a)(i)(A)(1)(e)]

[†] [Currently codified at rule G-15(a)(i)(A)(6)(a)]

Indemnity agreement. This is in response to your letter dated March 18, 1981, regarding your client's (the "Bank") proposal to sell participations in industrial development bonds to one or more unit investment trusts or closed-end investment company (the "trust"), which bonds would be insured against default by the American Municipal Bond Assurance Corporation (AMBAC). Specifically you ask whether an agreement by the Bank to indemnify AMBAC to the extent of 25 percent of any losses suffered in the event of default would violate Board rule G-25(b) which generally prohibits a municipal securities dealer from guaranteeing a customer against loss in municipal securities transactions.

As you note in your letter, the Board has taken the position that a municipal securities bank dealer issuing a letter of credit which is publicly disclosed and for the benefit of all holders of the security would not violate the provisions of rule G-25(b). You state that the Bank’s agreement to indemnify AMBAC would be disclosed to and, at least indirectly would be for the benefit, of all investors.

Based upon the facts contained in your letter, it appears that the proposed agreement would not be prohibited by rule G-25(b). MSRB interpretation of March 26, 1981.

Financial advisory relationship: identity of issuer. This is in response to your letter of February 27, 1981, asking whether a dealer bank which is retained by the Board of Water Governors of a water utility owned by City X to provide advice regarding the structure, timing, and terms of a new issue of mortgage revenue bonds to be issued by City X has entered into a financial advisory agreement for purposes of rule G-23. You note that the bonds would be sold at a competitive underwriting and payable from the revenues of the water utility.

Under rule G-23, a financial advisory relationship is deemed to exist when a broker, dealer, or municipal securities dealer renders or enters into an agreement to render financial advisory services to or on behalf of an issuer with respect to a new issue or issues of municipal securities. Based solely upon the facts contained in your letter, it appears that the Board of Water Commissioners is a political subdivision of City X. It further appears that the Board of Water Governors entered into the financial advisory agreement for the specific purpose of obtaining advice regarding the new issue of bonds on behalf of the City. Thus, the fact that City X, rather than the Board of Water Governors, actually will issue the bonds would not itself support a conclusion that the financial advisory agreement is not subject to the provisions of rule G-23. MSRB interpretation of March 13, 1981.

Disclosure of underwriting spread. As you know, Board rule G-32 provides that a dealer selling new issue municipal securities must furnish its customers with certain information at or prior to sending final money confirmations. Under subparagraph (a)(ii) of the rule, in the case of a negotiated sale, the dealer must furnish certain specified information about the underwriting arrangements, including the "underwriting spread." The Board has interpreted this provision to require that the gross spread (i.e., the difference between the initial reoffering prices and the amount paid to the issuer) be shown. The Board has also indicated that the gross spread may be expressed either in dollars or in points per bond.

The Board recently issued an interpretation of rule G-32(a)(ii) to the effect that the underwriting spread may be expressed either as a total amount or as a listing of the components of the gross spread. Thus, for example, the following disclosure would meet the requirements of the rule:

Application of Proceeds

 

Construction Costs .............................................................$120,000,000

Underwriter’s discount[1]...........................................................2,500,000

Legal expenses ..........................................................................200,000

Printing and Miscellaneous expenses......................................... ..300,000

Principal amount of bonds ....................................................123,000,000

 Should you have any questions concerning this interpretation, please call me. MSRB interpretation of March 9, 1981.

Note: The above letter refers to the text of rule G-32 as in effect prior to amendments effective on August 30, 1985.

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[1] If a dealer expresses the underwriting spread as a listing of the components of the gross spread, that portion of the proceeds which represents compensation to the underwriters must, in the Board's view, be clearly identified as such. Thus, use of the terms "underwriter's discount" or "net to underwriters" would be acceptable; the term "bond discount," however, is confusing and is, therefore, inappropriate.

 

Letters of credit. This is in response to your letter dated August 1, 1980, requesting the Board’s views on the application of rule G-25 to bank standby letters of credit issued in connection with new issues of securities which the dealer department of the bank intends to underwrite. Specifically, you have asked our views on whether such transactions would violate rule G-25(b), which generally prohibits a municipal securities dealer from guaranteeing a customer against loss in municipal securities transactions.

For the reasons discussed below, rule G-25(b) would not prohibit a municipal securities bank dealer from issuing a letter of credit which is publicly disclosed and for the benefit of all holders of the security.

Rule G-25(b) is an antimanipulation rule which is primarily designed to prevent a municipal securities dealer from artificially stimulating the market in a security, for example, by "parking" it with a customer who has assumed no market risk. It does not appear that the issuance of a fully disclosed letter of credit provided by a bank dealer for the benefit of all bondholders could be used to serve a market manipulative purpose, even though the letter would also serve to protect the bank’s own customers. Generally, such letters of credit protect bondholders from particular risks of loss, such as the inability of the issuer to make payments of principal or interest. Bondholders are not protected from general market risks, however, and, like all bona fide purchasers of securities, they incur gains or losses as the market price of the bonds fluctuates. Moreover, unlike the situation contemplated by rule G-25 which addresses guarantees made by dealers to their customers, the bondholders for whose benefit a letter of credit is issued would not necessarily have a customer relationship with the bank dealer issuing the letter. MSRB interpretation of March 6, 1981.

“Wooden tickets.”  This is in response to your letter of February 4, 1981 asking whether the practice of a broker-dealer using “wooden tickets” is prohibited by Board rule G-17. According to your letter, this practice refers to the mailing of confirmations of sales to customers who, in fact, have not placed orders to purchase securities. Thereafter, if any customer objects, stating that it never authorized the transaction, the sale is canceled. You state that, in some cases, customers accept the transaction and make payment.

The Board has determined that the practice by a municipal securities dealer of knowingly issuing confirmations of sales to customers who have not placed orders to purchase the bonds is a deceptive, dishonest, and unfair practice under rule G-17. MSRB interpretation of March 3, 1981.