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Interpretive Notice Concerning the Application of MSRB Rule G-17 to Underwriters of Municipal Securities
Under Rule G-17 of the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB), brokers, dealers, and municipal securities dealers (“dealers”) must, in the conduct of their municipal securities activities, deal fairly with all persons and must not engage in any deceptive, dishonest, or unfair practice. This rule is most often cited in connection with duties owed by dealers to investors; however, it also applies to their interactions with other market participants, including municipal entities[1] such as states and their political subdivisions that are issuers of municipal securities (“issuers”).
The MSRB has previously observed that Rule G-17 requires dealers to deal fairly with issuers.[2] With the passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,[3] the MSRB was expressly directed by Congress to protect municipal entities. Accordingly, in 2012, the MSRB provided additional interpretive guidance that addressed how Rule G-17 applies to dealers acting in the capacity of underwriters in the municipal securities transactions described therein (the “2012 Interpretive Notice”).[4]
This notice supersedes the MSRB’s 2012 Interpretive Notice, dated August 2, 2012, concerning the application of Rule G-17 to underwriters of municipal securities, as well as the related implementation guidance, dated July 18, 2012, and frequently-asked questions, dated March 25, 2013 (the “prior guidance”).[5] The prior guidance will remain applicable to underwriting relationships commencing prior to March 31, 2021. Underwriters will be subject to the amended guidance provided by this notice for all of their underwriting relationships beginning on or after that date. For purposes of this notice, an underwriting relationship is considered to have begun at the time the delivery of the first disclosure is triggered as described under “Timing and Manner of Disclosures” below (i.e., the earliest stages of an underwriter’s relationship with an issuer with respect to an issue, such as in a response to a request for proposal or in promotional materials provided to an issuer).
Applicability of the Notice
Except where a competitive underwriting is specifically mentioned, this notice applies to negotiated underwritings only.[6] This notice does not apply to a dealer acting as a primary distributor in a continuous offering of municipal fund securities, such as interests in 529 savings plans and Achieving a Better Life Experience (ABLE) programs. It does not apply to selling group members. This notice does not address a dealer’s duties when the dealer is serving as an advisor to a municipal entity. This notice applies to a primary offering of a new issue of municipal securities that is placed with investors by a dealer serving as placement agent, although certain disclosures may be omitted as described below.
The fair practice duties outlined in this notice are those duties that a dealer owes to a municipal entity when the dealer underwrites a new issue of municipal securities. This notice does not set out the underwriter’s fair-practice duties to other parties to a municipal securities financing (e.g., conduit borrowers). The MSRB notes, however, that Rule G-17 does require that an underwriter deal fairly with all persons in the course of the dealer’s municipal securities activities. What actions are considered fair will, of necessity, be dependent on the nature of the relationship between a dealer and such other parties, the particular actions undertaken, and all other relevant facts and circumstances. Although this notice does not address what an underwriter’s fair-dealing duties may be with respect to other parties, it may serve as one of many bases for an underwriter to consider how to establish appropriate policies and procedures for ensuring that it meets such fair-practice obligations, in light of its relationship with such other participants and their particular roles.
The examples discussed in this notice are illustrative only and are not meant to encompass all obligations of dealers to municipal entities under Rule G-17. Furthermore, when municipal entities are customers[7] of dealers, they are subject to the same protections under MSRB rules, including Rule G‑17, that apply to other customers.[8] The MSRB notes that an underwriter has a duty of fair dealing to investors in addition to its duty of fair dealing to issuers. An underwriter also has a duty to comply with other MSRB rules as well as other federal and state securities laws.
Basic Fair Dealing Principle
As noted above, Rule G-17 precludes a dealer, in the conduct of its municipal securities activities, from engaging in any deceptive, dishonest, or unfair practice with any person, including an issuer. The rule contains an anti-fraud prohibition. Thus, an underwriter must not misrepresent or omit the facts, risks, potential benefits, or other material information about municipal securities activities undertaken with a municipal issuer. However, Rule G-17 does not merely prohibit deceptive conduct on the part of the dealer; it also establishes a general duty of a dealer to deal fairly with all persons (including, but not limited to, issuers), even in the absence of fraud.
Role of Underwriters and Conflicts of Interest
In negotiated underwritings, underwriters’ Rule G-17 duty to deal fairly with an issuer requires certain disclosures to the issuer in connection with an issue or proposed issue of municipal securities, as provided below.[9]
- The disclosures discussed under “Disclosures Concerning the Underwriters’ Role” and “Disclosures Concerning Underwriters’ Compensation” (the “standard disclosures”) must be provided by the sole underwriter or the syndicate manager[10] to the issuer as described below.
- The disclosures discussed under “Required Disclosures to Issuers” (the “transaction-specific disclosures”) must be provided to the issuer by the underwriter who has recommended a financing structure or product to the issuer as described below.[11]
- The disclosures discussed under “Other Conflicts Disclosures” (the “dealer-specific disclosures”) must be provided by the sole underwriter or each underwriter in a syndicate (as applicable) as described below.[12]
Disclosures Concerning the Underwriter’s Role. The sole underwriter or the syndicate manager[13] must disclose to the issuer that:
| (i) | Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board Rule G-17 requires an underwriter to deal fairly at all times with both issuers and investors; |
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| (ii) | the underwriter’s primary role is to purchase securities with a view to distribution in an arm’s-length commercial transaction with the issuer and it has financial and other interests that differ from those of the issuer;[14] |
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| (iii) | unlike a municipal advisor, the underwriter does not have a fiduciary duty to the issuer under the federal securities laws and is, therefore, not required by federal law to act in the best interests of the issuer without regard to its own financial or other interests;[15] |
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| (iv) | the issuer may choose to engage the services of a municipal advisor with a fiduciary obligation to represent the issuer’s interests in the transaction; |
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| (v) | the underwriter has a duty to purchase securities from the issuer at a fair and reasonable price, but must balance that duty with its duty to sell municipal securities to investors at prices that are fair and reasonable; and |
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| (vi) | the underwriter will review the official statement for the issuer’s securities in accordance with, and as part of, its responsibilities to investors under the federal securities laws, as applied to the facts and circumstances of the transaction.[16] |
Underwriters also must not recommend that issuers not retain a municipal advisor. Accordingly, underwriters may not discourage issuers from using a municipal advisor or otherwise imply that the hiring of a municipal advisor would be redundant because the sole underwriter or underwriting syndicate can provide the services that a municipal advisor would.
Disclosure Concerning the Underwriters’ Compensation. The sole underwriter or syndicate manager must disclose to issuers whether underwriting compensation will be contingent on the closing of a transaction. Sole underwriters or syndicate managers must also disclose that compensation that is contingent on the closing of a transaction or the size of a transaction presents a conflict of interest, because it may cause underwriters to recommend a transaction that is unnecessary or to recommend that the size of a transaction be larger than is necessary.
Other Conflicts Disclosures. The sole underwriter or each underwriter in a syndicate must also, when and if applicable, disclose other dealer-specific actual material conflicts of interest and potential material conflicts of interest,[17] including, but not limited to, the following:
| (i) | any payments described below under “Conflicts of Interest/Payments to or from Third Parties”;[18] |
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| (ii) | any arrangements described below under “Conflicts of Interest/Profit-Sharing with Investors”; |
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| (iii) | the credit default swap disclosures described below under “Conflicts of Interest/Credit Default Swaps”; and |
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| (iv) | any incentives for the underwriter to recommend a complex municipal securities financing and other associated conflicts of interest (as described below under “Required Disclosures to Issuers”).[19] |
These categories of conflicts of interest are not mutually exclusive and, in some cases, a specific conflict may reasonably be viewed as falling into two or even more categories. An underwriter making disclosures of dealer-specific conflicts of interest to an issuer should concentrate on making them in a complete and understandable manner and need not necessarily organize them according to the categories listed above, particularly if adhering to a strict categorization process might interfere with the clarity and conciseness of disclosures.
Where there is a syndicate, each underwriter in the syndicate has a duty to provide its dealer-specific disclosures to the issuer. In general, dealer-specific disclosures for one dealer cannot be satisfied by disclosures made by another dealer (e.g., the syndicate manager) because such disclosures are, by their nature, not uniform, and must be prepared by each dealer. However, a syndicate manager may deliver each of the dealer-specific disclosures to the issuer as part of a single package of disclosures, as long as it is clear to which dealer each disclosure is attributed. An underwriter in the syndicate is not required to notify an issuer if it has determined that it does not have any dealer-specific disclosures to make. However, the obligation to provide dealer-specific disclosures includes material conflicts of interest arising after the time of engagement with the issuer, as noted below.
Timing and Manner of Disclosures. The standard disclosures, transaction-specific disclosures, and dealer-specific disclosures must be made in writing to an official of the issuer identified by the issuer as a primary contact for that issuer for the receipt of the foregoing disclosures. In the absence of such identification, an underwriter may make such disclosures in writing to an official of the issuer that the underwriter reasonably believes has the authority to bind the issuer by contract with the underwriter and that, to the knowledge of the underwriter, is not a party to a disclosed conflict.[20] If provided within the same document as the dealer-specific disclosures and/or transaction-specific disclosures, the standard disclosures must be identified clearly as such and provided apart from the other disclosures (e.g., in an appendix).
Disclosures must be made in a clear and concise manner designed to make clear to such official the subject matter of such disclosures and their implications for the issuer in accordance with the following timelines.
- A sole underwriter or syndicate manager must make the standard disclosure concerning the arm’s-length nature of the underwriter-issuer relationship at the earliest stages of the underwriter’s relationship with the issuer with respect to an issue (e.g., in a response to a request for proposals or in promotional materials provided to an issuer).[21]
- A sole underwriter or syndicate manager must make the other standard disclosures regarding the underwriter’s role and compensation at or before the time the underwriter is engaged to perform underwriting services (e.g., in an engagement letter), not solely in a bond purchase agreement.
- An underwriter must make the dealer-specific disclosures at or before the time the underwriter has been engaged to perform the underwriting services.[22] Thereafter, an underwriter must make any applicable dealer-specific disclosures discovered or arising after being engaged as an underwriter as soon as practicable after being discovered and with sufficient time for the issuer to fully evaluate any such conflict and its implications.[23]
- An underwriter who recommends a financing structure or product to an issuer must make the transaction-specific disclosures in sufficient time before the execution of a commitment by an issuer (which may include a bond purchase agreement) relating to the financing, and with sufficient time to allow the issuer to fully evaluate the features of the financing.
Unless directed otherwise by an issuer, an underwriter may update selected portions of disclosures previously provided so long as such updates clearly identify the additions or deletions and are capable of being read independently of the prior disclosures.[24]
Acknowledgement of Disclosures. When delivering a disclosure, the underwriter must attempt to receive written acknowledgement[25] from an official of the issuer identified by the issuer as a primary contact for the issuer’s receipt of the foregoing disclosures.[26] In the absence of such identification, an underwriter may seek acknowledgement from an official of the issuer whom the underwriter reasonably believes has the authority to bind the issuer by contract with the underwriter and that, to the knowledge of the underwriter, is not party to a disclosed conflict. This notice does not specify the particular form of acknowledgement, but may include, for example, an e-mail read receipt.[27] An underwriter may proceed with a receipt of a written acknowledgement that includes an issuer’s reservation of rights or other self-protective language. If the official of the issuer agrees to proceed with the underwriting engagement after receipt of the disclosures but will not provide written acknowledgement of receipt, the underwriter responsible for making the requisite disclosure may proceed with the engagement after documenting with specificity why it was unable to obtain such written acknowledgement. Additionally, an underwriter must be able to produce evidence (including, for example, by automatic e-mail delivery receipt) that the disclosures were delivered with sufficient time for evaluation by the issuer before proceeding with the transaction. An issuer’s written acknowledgement of the receipt of disclosure is not dispositive of whether such disclosures were made with an appropriate amount of time. The analysis of whether disclosures were provided with sufficient time for an issuer’s review is based on the totality of the facts and circumstances.
Representations to Issuers
All representations made by underwriters to issuers in connection with municipal securities underwritings, whether written or oral, must be truthful and accurate and must not misrepresent or omit material facts. Underwriters must have a reasonable basis for the representations and other material information contained in documents they prepare and must refrain from including representations or other information they know or should know is inaccurate or misleading. For example, in connection with a certificate signed by the underwriter that will be relied upon by the issuer or other relevant parties to an underwriting (e.g., an issue price certificate), the dealer must have a reasonable basis for the representations and other material information contained therein.[28] In addition, an underwriter’s response to an issuer’s request for proposals or qualifications must fairly and accurately describe the underwriter’s capacity, resources, and knowledge to perform the proposed underwriting as of the time the proposal is submitted and must not contain any representations or other material information about such capacity, resources, or knowledge that the underwriter knows or should know to be inaccurate or misleading.[29] Matters not within the personal knowledge of those preparing the response (e.g., pending litigation) must be confirmed by those with knowledge of the subject matter. An underwriter must not represent that it has the requisite knowledge or expertise with respect to a particular financing if the personnel that it intends to work on the financing do not have the requisite knowledge or expertise.
Required Disclosures to Issuers
Many municipal securities are issued using financing structures that are routine and well understood by the typical municipal market professional, including most issuer personnel that have the lead responsibilities in connection with the issuance of municipal securities. For example, absent unusual circumstances or features, the typical fixed rate offering may be presumed to be well understood. Nevertheless, in the case of issuer personnel that the underwriter reasonably believes lack the requisite knowledge or experience to fully understand or assess the implications of a financing structures or products recommended by an underwriter, the underwriter making such recommendation must provide disclosures on the material aspects of such financing structures or product that it recommends (i.e., the “transaction-specific disclosures”).[30]
In some cases, issuer personnel responsible for the issuance of municipal securities would not be well positioned to fully understand or assess the implications of a recommended financing structure in its totality, because it is structured in a unique, atypical, or otherwise complex manner or incorporates unique, atypical, or otherwise complex features or products (a “complex municipal securities financing”).[31] Examples of complex municipal securities financings include, but are not limited to, variable rate demand obligations (“VRDOs”), financings involving derivatives (such as swaps), and financings in which interest rates are benchmarked to an index (such as LIBOR, SIFMA, or SOFR).[32] When a recommendation regarding a complex municipal securities financing structure has been made by an underwriter in a negotiated offering,[33] the underwriter making the recommendation has an obligation under Rule G-17 to communicate more particularized transaction-specific disclosures than those that may be required in the case of the recommendation of routine financing structures or products.[34] The underwriter making the recommendation must also disclose the material financial characteristics of the complex municipal securities financing, as well as the material financial risks of the financing that are known to the underwriter and reasonably foreseeable at the time of the disclosure.[35] It must also disclose any incentives for the recommendation of the complex municipal securities financing and other associated material conflicts of interest.[36] Such disclosures must be made in a fair and balanced manner based on principles of fair dealing and good faith.
The level of transaction-specific disclosure required may vary according to the issuer’s knowledge or experience with the proposed financing structure or similar structures, capability of evaluating the risks of the recommended financing structure or product, and financial ability to bear the risks of the recommended financing structure or product, in each case based on the reasonable belief of the underwriter.[37] Consequently, the level of transaction-specific disclosure to be provided to a particular issuer also can vary over time. In all events, the underwriter must disclose any incentives for the recommendation of the complex municipal securities financing and other associated conflicts of interest.
As previously mentioned, the transaction-specific disclosures must be made in writing to an official of the issuer identified by the issuer as a primary contact for the issuer for the receipt of such disclosures, or, in the absence of such identification, an underwriter may make such disclosures in writing to an issuer official whom the underwriter reasonably believes has the authority to bind the issuer by contract with the underwriter(s), and that, to the knowledge of the underwriter delivering the disclosure, is not a party to a disclosed conflict: (i) in sufficient time before the execution of a contract with the underwriter to allow the official to evaluate the recommendation (including consultation with any of its counsel or advisors) and (ii) in a manner designed to make clear to such official the subject matter of such disclosures and their implications for the issuer.
The disclosures concerning a complex municipal securities financing must address the specific elements of, and/or relevant products incorporated, into the recommended financing structure, rather than being general in nature.[38] An underwriter making a Complex Municipal Securities Financing Recommendation to an issuer cannot satisfy its fair dealing obligations by providing an issuer a single document setting out general descriptions of the various financing structures and/or products that may be recommended from time to time to various issuer clients that would effectively require issuer personnel to discover which disclosures apply to a particular recommendation and to the particular circumstances of that issuer. Underwriters can create, in anticipation of making such a recommendation, individualized descriptions, with appropriate levels of detail, of the material financial characteristics and risks for each of the various complex municipal securities financing structures and/or products (including any typical variations) they may recommend from time to time to various issuer clients, with such standardized descriptions serving as the base for more particularized disclosures for the specific complex financing the underwriter recommends to particular issuers.[39] In making a recommendation, an underwriter could incorporate, to the extent applicable, any refinements to the base description needed to fully describe the material financial features and risks unique to that financing.[40]
If the underwriter who has made a recommendation does not reasonably believe that the official to whom the disclosures are addressed is capable of independently evaluating the disclosures, the underwriter must make additional efforts reasonably designed to inform the official or its employees or agent. The underwriter also must make an independent assessment that such disclosures are appropriately tailored to the issuer’s level of sophistication.
Underwriter Duties in Connection with Issuer Disclosure Documents
Underwriters often play an important role in assisting issuers in the preparation of disclosure documents, such as preliminary official statements and official statements.[41] These documents are critical to the municipal securities transaction, because investors rely on the representations contained in such documents in making their investment decisions. Moreover, investment professionals, such as municipal securities analysts and ratings services, rely on the representations in forming an opinion regarding the credit. A dealer’s duty to have a reasonable basis for the representations it makes, and other material information it provides, to an issuer and to ensure that such representations and information are accurate and not misleading, as described above, extends to representations and information provided by the underwriter in connection with the preparation by the issuer of its disclosure documents (e.g., cash flows).
Underwriter Compensation and New Issue Pricing
Excessive Compensation. An underwriter’s compensation for a new issue (including both direct compensation paid by the issuer and other separate payments, values, or credits received by the underwriter from the issuer or any other party in connection with the underwriting), in certain cases and depending upon the specific facts and circumstances of the offering, may be so disproportionate to the nature of the underwriting and related services performed as to constitute an unfair practice with regard to the issuer that it is a violation of Rule G-17. Among the factors relevant to whether an underwriter’s compensation is disproportionate to the nature of the underwriting and related services performed, are the credit quality of the issue, the size of the issue, market conditions, the length of time spent structuring the issue, and whether the underwriter is paying the fee of the underwriter’s counsel or any other relevant costs related to the financing.
Fair Pricing. The duty of fair dealing under Rule G-17 includes an implied representation that the price an underwriter pays to an issuer is fair and reasonable, taking into consideration all relevant factors, including the best judgment of the underwriter as to the fair market value of the issue at the time it is priced.[42] In general, a dealer purchasing bonds in a competitive underwriting for which the issuer may reject any and all bids will be deemed to have satisfied its duty of fairness to the issuer with respect to the purchase price of the issue as long as the dealer’s bid is a bona fide bid (as defined in MSRB Rule G‑13)[43] that is based on the dealer’s best judgment of the fair market value of the securities that are the subject of the bid. In a negotiated underwriting, the underwriter has a duty under Rule G-17 to negotiate in good faith with the issuer. This duty includes the obligation of the dealer to ensure the accuracy of representations made during the course of such negotiations, including representations regarding the price negotiated and the nature of investor demand for the securities (e.g., the status of the order period and the order book). If, for example, the dealer represents to the issuer that it is providing the “best” market price available on the new issue, or that it will exert its best efforts to obtain the “most favorable” pricing, the dealer may violate Rule G-17 if its actions are inconsistent with such representations.[44]
Conflicts of Interest
Payments to or from Third Parties. In certain cases, compensation received by an underwriter from third parties, such as the providers of derivatives and investments (including affiliates of an underwriter), may color the underwriter’s judgment and cause it to recommend products, structures, and pricing levels to an issuer when it would not have done so absent such payments. The MSRB views the failure of an underwriter to disclose to the issuer the existence of payments, values, or credits received by an underwriter in connection with its underwriting of the new issue from parties other than the issuer, and payments made by the underwriter in connection with such new issue to parties other than the issuer (in either case including payments, values, or credits that relate directly or indirectly to collateral transactions integrally related to the issue being underwritten), to be a violation of an underwriter’s obligation to the issuer under Rule G-17.[45] For example, it would be a violation of Rule G-17 for an underwriter to compensate an undisclosed third party in order to secure municipal securities business. Similarly, it would be a violation of Rule G-17 for an underwriter to receive undisclosed compensation from a third party in exchange for recommending that third party’s services or product to an issuer, including business related to municipal securities derivative transactions. This notice does not require that the amount of such third-party payments be disclosed. The underwriter must also disclose to the issuer whether it has entered into any third-party arrangements for the marketing of the issuer’s securities.
Profit-Sharing with Investors. Arrangements between the underwriter and an investor purchasing new issue securities from the underwriter (including purchases that are contingent upon the delivery by the issuer to the underwriter of the securities) according to which profits realized from the resale by such investor of the securities are directly or indirectly split or otherwise shared with the underwriter also would, depending on the facts and circumstances (including in particular if such resale occurs reasonably close in time to the original sale by the underwriter to the investor), constitute a violation of the underwriter’s fair dealing obligation under Rule G-17.[46] Such arrangements could also constitute a violation of Rule G‑25(c), which precludes a dealer from sharing, directly or indirectly, in the profits or losses of a transaction in municipal securities with or for a customer. An underwriter should carefully consider whether any such arrangement, regardless of whether it constitutes a violation of Rule G-25(c), may evidence a potential failure of the underwriter’s duty with regard to new issue pricing described above.
Credit Default Swaps. The issuance or purchase by a dealer of credit default swaps for which the reference is the issuer for which the dealer is serving as underwriter, or an obligation of that issuer, may pose a conflict of interest, including a dealer-specific conflict of interest, because trading in such municipal credit default swaps has the potential to affect the pricing of the underlying reference obligations, as well as the pricing of other obligations brought to market by that issuer. Rule G-17 requires, therefore, that a dealer disclose the fact that it engages in such activities to the issuers for which it serves as underwriter. Activities with regard to credit default swaps based on baskets or indexes of municipal issuers that include the issuer or its obligation(s) need not be disclosed, unless the issuer or its obligation(s) represents more than 2% of the total notional amount of the credit default swap or the underwriter otherwise caused the issuer or its obligation(s) to be included in the basket or index.
Retail Order Periods
Rule G-17 requires an underwriter that has agreed to underwrite a transaction with a retail order period to, in fact, honor such agreement.[47]A dealer that wishes to allocate securities in a manner that is inconsistent with an issuer’s requirements must not do so without the issuer’s consent. In addition, Rule G-17 requires an underwriter that has agreed to underwrite a transaction with a retail order period to take reasonable measures to ensure that retail clients are bona fide. An underwriter that knowingly accepts an order that has been framed as a retail order when it is not (e.g., a number of small orders placed by an institutional investor that would otherwise not qualify as a retail customer) would violate Rule G-17 if its actions are inconsistent with the issuer’s expectations regarding retail orders. In addition, a dealer that places an order that is framed as a qualifying retail order but in fact represents an order that does not meet the qualification requirements to be treated as a retail order (e.g., an order by a retail dealer without “going away” orders[48] from retail customers, when such orders are not within the issuer’s definition of “retail”) violates its Rule G-17 duty of fair dealing. The MSRB will continue to review activities relating to retail order periods to ensure that they are conducted in a fair and orderly manner consistent with the intent of the issuer and the MSRB’s investor protection mandate.
Dealer Payments to Issuer Personnel
Dealers are reminded of the application of MSRB Rule G-20, on gifts, gratuities, and non-cash compensation, and Rule G-17, in connection with certain payments made to, and expenses reimbursed for, issuer personnel during the municipal bond issuance process.[49] These rules are designed to avoid conflicts of interest and to promote fair practices in the municipal securities market.
Dealers should consider carefully whether payments they make in regard to expenses of issuer personnel in the course of the bond issuance process, including in particular, but not limited to, payments for which dealers seek reimbursement from bond proceeds or issuers, comport with the requirements of Rule G‑20. For example, a dealer acting as a financial advisor or underwriter may violate Rule G-20 by paying for excessive or lavish travel, meal, lodging and entertainment expenses in connection with an offering (such as may be incurred for rating agency trips, bond closing dinners, and other functions) that inure to the personal benefit of issuer personnel and that exceed the limits or otherwise violate the requirements of the rule.[50]
[1] For purposes of this notice, the term “municipal entity” is used as defined by Section 15B(e)(8) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”), 17 CFR 240.15Ba1-1(g), and other rules and regulations thereunder.
[2] See Reminder Notice on Fair Practice Duties to Issuers of Municipal Securities, MSRB Notice 2009-54 (September 29, 2009); Rule G-17 Interpretive Letter – Purchase of new issue from issuer, MSRB interpretation of December 1, 1997, reprinted in MSRB Rule Book (“1997 Interpretation”).
[3] Pub. L. No. 111-203 § 975, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
[4] See Interpretive Notice Concerning the Application of MSRB Rule G-17 to Underwriters of Municipal Securities (Aug. 2, 2012) (superseded upon the effective date of this notice as described below).
[5] See MSRB Notice 2012-38 (July 18, 2012); MSRB Notice 2013-08 (Mar. 25, 2013).
[6] The MSRB has always viewed competitive offerings narrowly to mean new issues sold by the issuer to the underwriter on the basis of the lowest price bid by potential underwriters – that is, the fact that an issuer publishes a request for proposals and potential underwriters compete to be selected based on their professional qualifications, experience, financing ideas, and other subjective factors would not be viewed as representing a competitive offering for purposes of this notice. In light of this meaning of the term “competitive underwriting,” it should be clear that, although most of the examples relating to misrepresentations and fairness of financial aspects of an offering consist of situations that would only arise in a negotiated offering, Rule G-17 should not be viewed as allowing an underwriter in a competitive underwriting to make misrepresentations to the issuer or to act unfairly in regard to the financial aspects of the new issue.
[7] MSRB Rule D-9 defines the term “customer” as follows: “Except as otherwise specifically provided by rule of the Board, the term ‘Customer’ shall mean any person other than a broker, dealer, or municipal securities dealer acting in its capacity as such or an issuer in transactions involving the sale by the issuer of a new issue of its securities.”
[8] See MSRB Reminds Firms of Their Sales Practice and Due Diligence Obligations When Selling Municipal Securities in the Secondary Market, MSRB Notice 2010-37 (September 20, 2010).
[9] For purposes of this notice, underwriters are only required to provide written disclosure of their applicable conflicts and are not required to make any written disclosures on the part of issuer personnel or any other parties to the transaction as part of the standard disclosures, dealer-specific disclosures, or the transaction-specific disclosures.
[10] For purposes of this notice, the term “syndicate manager” refers to the lead manager, senior manager, or bookrunning manager of the syndicate. In circumstances where an underwriting syndicate is formed, only that single syndicate manager is obligated to make the standard disclosures under this notice. In the event that there are joint-bookrunning senior managers, only one of the joint-bookrunning senior managers would be obligated under this notice to make the standard disclosures. Unless otherwise agreed to, such as pursuant to an agreement among underwriters, the joint-bookrunning senior manager responsible for maintaining the order book of the syndicate would be responsible for providing the standard disclosures. Notwithstanding the fair dealing obligation of a syndicate manager to deliver the standard disclosures under this notice, nothing herein would prohibit an underwriter from making a disclosure in order to, for example, comply with another regulatory or statutory obligation.
[11] Where an underwriting syndicate is formed, the syndicate manager has the sole responsibility hereunder for providing the standard disclosures. Consistent with this obligation placed on the syndicate manager, only the syndicate manager must maintain and preserve records of the standard disclosures in accordance with MSRB rules. Further, the MSRB acknowledges that an underwriter may not know if a syndicate will form at the time that certain disclosures are sent. In instances in which an underwriter has provided a standard disclosure prior to or concurrent with the formation of a syndicate, it shall suffice that the then-underwriter (later syndicate manager) has delivered a standard disclosure, and no affirmative statement is necessary that a disclosure is being made on behalf of any existing or future syndicate members for the syndicate manager to have met its fair dealing obligations in this regard. Notwithstanding the obligation of a syndicate manager to deliver the standard disclosures, nothing herein would prohibit, or should be construed as prohibiting, another underwriter from delivering a standard disclosure in order to, for example, comply with another regulatory or statutory obligation.
[12] Each underwriter, whether a sole underwriter, syndicate manager, or other member of the underwriting syndicate, has a fair dealing obligation under this notice to deliver transaction-specific disclosures where such underwriter has made a recommendation to an issuer regarding a financing structure or product. The fair dealing obligation to deliver such a transaction-specific disclosure, includes, but is not limited to, determining the level of disclosure required based on the type of financing structure or product recommended and a reasonable belief of the issuer’s knowledge and experience regarding that particular type of financing structure or product. In such cases, as further discussed below, a sole underwriter, syndicate manager, or other member of the underwriting syndicate who has not made such a recommendation would not need to deliver transaction-specific disclosures in order to meet its fair dealing obligation under this notice.
[13] See also note 30 infra.
[14] As a threshold matter, the disclosures delivered by an underwriter to an issuer must not be inaccurate or misleading, and nothing in this notice should be construed as requiring an underwriter to make a disclosure to an issuer that is false. For example, in a private placement where a dealer acting as an agent to place securities on behalf of an issuer does not take a principal position (including not taking a “riskless principal” position) in the securities being placed, the standard disclosure relating to an “arm’s length” relationship may be inapplicable and in such case may be omitted due to the agent-principal relationship between the dealer and issuer that commonly gives rise to other duties as a matter of common law or another statutory or regulatory regime – whether termed as a fiduciary or other obligation of trust. See Exchange Act Release No. 66927 (May 4, 2012), 77 FR 27509 (May 10, 2012) (SR-MSRB-2011-09). In certain other contexts, depending on the specific facts and circumstances, a dealer acting as an underwriter may take on, either through an agency arrangement or other purposeful understanding, a fiduciary relationship with the issuer. In such case, it would be appropriate for an underwriter to omit those disclosures deemed inapplicable as a result of such relationship.
A dealer acting as a placement agent in the primary offering of a new issuance of municipal securities should also consider how the scope of its activities may interact with the registration and record-keeping requirements for municipal advisors adopted by the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Commission”) under Section 15B of the Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. 78o-4), including the application of the exclusion from the definition of “municipal advisor” applicable to a dealer acting as an underwriter pursuant to Exchange Act Rule 15Ba1-1(d)(2)(i). See Registration of Municipal Advisors, Exchange Act Release No. 70462 (September 20, 2013), 78 FR 67467 (hereinafter, the “MA Rule Adopting Release”), at 67515 – 67516 (November 12, 2013) (available at https://www.sec.gov/files/rules/final/2013/34-70462.pdf) (stating: “The Commission does not believe that the underwriter exclusion should be limited to a particular type of underwriting or a particular type of offering. Therefore, if a registered broker-dealer, acting as a placement agent, performs municipal advisory activities that otherwise would be considered within the scope of the underwriting of a particular issuance of municipal securities as discussed [therein], the broker-dealer would not have to register as a municipal advisor.”); see also the MA Rule Adopting Release, 78 FR at 67513 – 67514 (discussing activities within and outside the scope of serving as an underwriter of a particular issuance of municipal securities for purposes of the underwriter exclusion).
[15] Id.
[16] In many private placements, as well as in certain other types of new issue offerings, no official statement may be produced, so that, to the extent that such an offering occurs without the production of an official statement, a dealer would not be required to disclose its role with regard to the review of an official statement.
[17] For purposes hereof, a potential material conflict of interest must be disclosed if, but only if, it is reasonably likely to mature into an actual material conflict of interest during the course of the transaction between the issuer and the underwriter.
[18] The third-party payments to which the disclosure standard would apply are those that give rise to actual material conflicts of interest or potential material conflicts of interest only.
[19] The specific standard with respect to complex financings does not obviate a dealer’s fair dealing obligation to disclose the existence of payments, values, or credits received by the underwriter or of other material conflicts of interest in connection with any negotiated underwriting, whether it be complex or routine.
[20] Absent red flags, an underwriter may reasonably rely on a written statement from an issuer official that he or she is not a party to a disclosed conflict. The reasonableness of an underwriter’s reliance on such a written statement will depend on all the relevant facts and circumstances, including the facts revealed in connection with the underwriter’s due diligence in regards to the transaction generally or in determining whether the underwriter itself has any actual material conflicts of interest or potential material conflicts of interest that must be disclosed.
[21] See also note 30 infra.
[22] In offerings where a syndicate is formed, the disclosure obligation for an underwriter to make its dealer-specific disclosures is triggered – if any such actual material conflicts of interest or potential material conflicts of interest must be so disclosed – when such underwriter becomes engaged as a member of the underwriting syndicate (except with regard to conflicts discovered or arising after such co-managing underwriter has been engaged). Consistent with the obligation of sole underwriters and syndicate managers, each underwriter in the syndicate must make any applicable dealer-specific disclosures discovered or arising after being engaged as an underwriter in the syndicate as soon as practicable after being discovered and with sufficient time for the issuer to fully evaluate such a conflict and its implications.
[23] For example, an actual material conflict of interest or potential material conflict of interest may not be present until an underwriter has recommended a particular financing structure. In that case, the disclosure must be provided in sufficient time before the execution of a contract with the underwriter to allow the issuer official to fully evaluate the recommendation, as described under “Required Disclosures to Issuers.”
[24] The MSRB acknowledges that not all transactions proceed along the same timeline or pathway. The timeframes expressed herein should be viewed in light of the overarching goals of Rule G-17 and the purposes that the disclosures are intended to serve as further described in this notice. The various timeframes set out in this notice are not intended to establish strict, hair-trigger tripwires resulting in mere technical rule violations, so long as an underwriter acts in substantial compliance with such timeframes and meets the key objectives for providing disclosure under the notice. Nevertheless, an underwriter’s fair dealing obligation to an issuer in particular facts and circumstances may demand prompt adherence to the timelines set out in this notice. Stated differently, if an underwriter does not timely deliver a disclosure and, as a result, the issuer: (i) does not have clarity throughout all substantive stages of a financing regarding the roles of its professionals, (ii) is not aware of conflicts of interest promptly after they arise and well before the issuer effectively becomes fully committed – either formally (e.g., through execution of a contract) or informally (e.g., due to having already expended substantial time and effort ) – to completing the transaction with the underwriter, and/or (iii) does not have the information required to be disclosed with sufficient time to take such information into consideration and, thereby, to make an informed decision about the key decisions on the financing, then the underwriter generally will have violated its fair-dealing obligations under Rule G-17, absent other mitigating facts and circumstances.
[25] An underwriter delivering a disclosure in order to meet a fair dealing obligation must obtain (or attempt to obtain) proper acknowledgement. When there is an underwriting syndicate, only the syndicate manager, as the dealer responsible for delivering the standard disclosures to the issuer, must obtain (or attempt to obtain) proper acknowledgement from the issuer for such disclosures.
[26] Absent red flags, and subject to an underwriter’s ability to reasonably rely on a representation from an issuer official that he or she has the authority to bind the issuer by contract with the underwriter, an underwriter may reasonably rely on a written delegation by an authorized issuer official in, among other things, the issuer’s request for proposals to another issuer official to receive and acknowledge receipt of a disclosure. The reasonableness of an underwriter’s reliance upon an issuer’s representation as to these matters will depend on all of the relevant facts and circumstances, including the facts revealed in connection with the underwriter’s due diligence in regards to the transaction generally.
[27] For purposes of this notice, the term “e-mail read receipt” means an automatic response generated by a recipient issuer official confirming that an e-mail has been opened. While an e-mail read receipt may generally be an acceptable form of an issuer’s written acknowledgement under this notice, an underwriter may not rely on such an e-mail read receipt as an issuer’s written acknowledgement where such reliance is unreasonable under all of the facts and circumstances, such as where the underwriter is on notice that the issuer official to whom the e-mail is addressed has not in fact received or opened the e-mail.
[28] The need for underwriters to have a reasonable basis for representations and other material information provided to issuers extends to the reasonableness of assumptions underlying the material information being provided. If an underwriter would not rely on any statements made or information provided for its own purposes, it should refrain from making the statement or providing the information to the issuer, or should provide any appropriate disclosures or other information that would allow the issuer to adequately assess the reliability of the statement or information before relying upon it. Further, underwriters should be careful to distinguish statements made to issuers that represent opinion rather than factual information and to ensure that the issuer is aware of this distinction.
[29] As a general matter, a response to a request for proposal should not be treated as merely a sales pitch without regulatory consequence, but instead should be treated with full seriousness that issuers have the expectation that representations made in such responses are true and accurate.
[30] In the circumstance where a dealer proposing to act as an underwriter in a negotiated offering recommends a financing structure or product prior to the time at which an underwriting syndicate is formed, such dealer shall have the same obligations to make any applicable standard disclosures, as if it were a sole underwriter or syndicate manager for purposes of the obligations described under “Required Disclosure to the Issuer” (e.g., to make the standard disclosure concerning the arm’s-length nature of the underwriter-issuer relationship at the earliest stages of the underwriter’s relationship with the issuer with respect to an issue), including complying with corresponding requirements to maintain and preserve records.
[31] If a complex municipal securities financing consists of an otherwise routine financing structure that incorporates a unique, atypical, or complex element or product and the issuer personnel have knowledge or experience with respect to the routine elements of the financing, the disclosure of material risks and characteristics may be limited to those relating to such specific element or product and any material impact such element or product may have on other features that would normally be viewed as routine.
[32] Respectively, the London Inter-bank Offered Rate (i.e., “LIBOR”), the SIFMA Municipal Swap Index (i.e., “SIFMA”), and Secured Overnight Financing Rate (“SOFR”). The MSRB notes that its references to LIBOR, SIFMA, and SOFR are illustrative only and non-exclusive. Any financings involving a benchmark interest rate index may be complex, particularly if an issuer is unlikely to fully understand the components of that index, its material risks, or its possible interaction with other indexes.
[33] For purposes of determining when an underwriter recommends a financing structure in a negotiated offering or recommends a complex municipal securities financing in a negotiated offering (a “Complex Municipal Securities Financing Recommendation”), the MSRB’s guidance on the meaning of “recommendation” for dealers in MSRB Notice 2014-07: SEC Approves MSRB Rule G-47 on Time-of-Trade Disclosure Obligations, MSRB Rules D-15 and G-48 on Sophisticated Municipal Market Professionals, and Revisions to MSRB Rule G-19 on Suitability of Recommendations and Transactions (March 12, 2014) is applicable by analogy. For example, whether an underwriter has made a Complex Municipal Securities Financing Recommendation is not susceptible to a bright line definition but turns on the facts and circumstances of the particular situation. An important factor in determining whether a Complex Municipal Securities Financing Recommendation has been made is whether – given its content, context, and manner of presentation— a particular communication from an underwriter to an issuer regarding a financing structure or product reasonably would be viewed as a call to action or reasonably would influence an issuer to engage in a such a financing structure or product deemed a complex municipal securities financing structure. In general, the more individually tailored the underwriter’s communication is to a specific issuer about a complex municipal securities financing structure, the greater the likelihood that the communication reasonably would be viewed as a Complex Municipal Securities Financing Recommendation.
[34] An underwriter must make reasonable judgments regarding whether it has recommended a financing structure or product to an issuer and whether a particular financing structure or product recommended by the underwriter to the issuer is complex, understanding that the fact that a structure or product has become relatively common in the market does not reduce its complexity. Not all negotiated offerings involve a recommendation by the underwriter(s), such as where a sole underwriter merely executes a transaction already structured by the issuer or its municipal advisor.
[35] For example, when a Complex Municipal Securities Financing Recommendation for a VRDO is made, the underwriter who recommends a VRDO should inform the issuer of the risk of interest rate fluctuations and material risks of any associated credit or liquidity facilities (e.g., the risk that the issuer might not be able to replace the facility upon its expiration and might be required to repay the facility provider over a short period of time). As an additional example, if the underwriter recommends that the issuer swap the floating rate interest payments on the VRDOs to fixed rate payments under a swap, the underwriter must disclose the material financial risks (including market, credit, operational, and liquidity risks) and material financial characteristics of the recommended swap (e.g., the material economic terms of the swap, the material terms relating to the operation of the swap, and the material rights and obligations of the parties during the term of the swap), as well as the material financial risks associated with the VRDO. Such disclosure should be sufficient to allow the issuer to assess the magnitude of its potential exposure as a result of the complex municipal securities financing. Such disclosures must also inform the issuer that there may be accounting, legal, and other risks associated with the swap and that the issuer should consult with other professionals concerning such risks. If the underwriter who has made a Complex Municipal Financing Securities Recommendation is affiliated with the swap dealer proposed to be the executing swap dealer, the underwriter may satisfy its disclosure obligation with respect to the swap if such disclosure has been provided to the issuer by the affiliated swap dealer or the issuer’s swap or other financial advisor that is independent of such underwriter and the swap dealer, as long as the underwriter has a reasonable basis for belief in the truthfulness and completeness of such disclosure. If the issuer decides to enter into a swap with another dealer, the underwriter is not required to make disclosures with regard to that swap product under this notice. The MSRB notes that a dealer who recommends a swap or security-based swap to a municipal entity may also be subject to rules of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission or those of the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”).
[36] For example, a conflict of interest may exist when the underwriter who makes a Complex Municipal Securities Financing Recommendation to an issuer is also the provider, or an affiliate of the provider, of a swap used by an issuer to hedge a municipal securities offering or when an underwriter receives compensation from a swap provider for recommending the swap. See also “Conflicts of Interest/Payments to or from Third Parties” herein.
[37] Even a financing in which the interest rate is benchmarked to an index that is commonly used in the municipal marketplace (e.g., SIFMA) may be complex to an issuer that does not understand the components of that index or its possible interaction with other indexes.
[38] See note 19 supra.
[39] Page after page of complex legal jargon in small print would not be consistent with an underwriter’s fair dealing obligation under this notice.
[40] Underwriters should be able to leverage such materials for internal training and risk management purposes.
[41] Underwriters that assist issuers in preparing official statements must remain cognizant of their duties under federal securities laws. With respect to primary offerings of municipal securities, the SEC has noted, “By participating in an offering, an underwriter makes an implied recommendation about the securities.” See Exchange Act Release No. 26100 (Sept. 22, 1988) (proposing Exchange Act Rule 15c2-12) at text following fn. 70. The SEC has stated that “this recommendation itself implies that the underwriter has a reasonable basis for belief in the truthfulness and completeness of the key representations made in any disclosure documents used in the offerings.” Furthermore, pursuant to Exchange Act Rule 15c2-12(b)(5), an underwriter may not purchase or sell municipal securities in most primary offerings unless the underwriter has reasonably determined that the issuer or an obligated person has entered into a written undertaking to provide certain types of secondary market disclosure and has a reasonable basis for relying on the accuracy of the issuer’s ongoing disclosure representations. Exchange Act Release No. 34961 (Nov. 10, 1994) (adopting continuing disclosure provisions of Exchange Act Rule 15c2-12) at text following fn. 52.
[42]The MSRB has previously observed that whether an underwriter has dealt fairly with an issuer for purposes of Rule G-17 is dependent upon all of the facts and circumstances of an underwriting and is not dependent solely on the price of the issue. See MSRB Notice 2009-54 (Sept. 29, 2009) and the 1997 Interpretation (note 2 supra). See also “Retail Order Periods” herein.
[43] Rule G-13(b)(iii) provides: “For purposes of subparagraph (i), a quotation shall be deemed to represent a ‘bona fide bid for, or offer of, municipal securities’ if the broker, dealer or municipal securities dealer making the quotation is prepared to purchase or sell the security which is the subject of the quotation at the price stated in the quotation and under such conditions, if any, as are specified at the time the quotation is made.”
[44]See 1997 Interpretation (note 2 supra).
[45] See also “Required Disclosures to Issuers” herein.
[46] Underwriters should be mindful that, depending on the facts and circumstances, such an arrangement may be inferred from a purposeful but not otherwise justified pattern of transactions or other course of action, even without the existence of a formal written agreement.
[47]See MSRB Interpretation on Priority of Orders for Securities in a Primary Offering under Rule G-17, MSRB interpretation of October 12, 2010, reprinted in MSRB Rule Book. The MSRB also reminds underwriters of previous MSRB guidance on the pricing of securities sold to retail investors. See Guidance on Disclosure and Other Sales Practice Obligations to Individual and Other Retail Investors in Municipal Securities, MSRB Notice 2009-42 (July 14, 2009).
[48] In general, a “going away” order is an order for new issue securities for which a customer is already conditionally committed. See Exchange Act Release No. 62715, File No. SR-MSRB-2009-17 (August 13, 2010).
[49]See MSRB Rule G-20 Interpretation — Dealer Payments in Connection With the Municipal Securities Issuance Process (January 29, 2007), reprinted in MSRB Rule Book.
[50]See In the Matter of RBC Capital Markets Corporation, Exchange Act Release No. 59439 (Feb. 24, 2009) (settlement in connection with broker-dealer alleged to have violated MSRB Rules G-20 and G‑17 for payment of lavish travel and entertainment expenses of city officials and their families associated with rating agency trips, which expenditures were subsequently reimbursed from bond proceeds as costs of issuance); In the Matter of Merchant Capital, L.L.C., Exchange Act Release No. 60043 (June 4, 2009) (settlement in connection with broker-dealer alleged to have violated MSRB rules for payment of travel and entertainment expenses of family and friends of senior officials of issuer and reimbursement of the expenses from issuers and from proceeds of bond offerings).
Day Counting: Day Counts on Notes
Day counting: day counts on notes. As I indicated in my letter of October 4, your September 27 letter regarding the inclusion on a customer confirmation of information with respect to the day count method used on a transaction was referred to the Board for its consideration at the December meeting. In your letter you noted that Board rule G-33 on calculations requires that
[c]omputations under the requirements of [the] rule shall be made on the basis of a thirty-day month and a three-hundred-sixty-day year, or, in the case of computations on securities paying interest solely at redemption, on the day count basis selected by the issuer of the securities.
You indicated that your bank has recently experienced problems with transactions in municipal notes ("securities paying interest solely at redemption") on which the issuer has selected a day count basis other than the traditional "30/360" basis, with the problems resulting from one party to the transaction using an incorrect day count method. You suggested that this type of problem could be partially alleviated by requiring that a municipal securities dealer selling a security on which an unusual day count method is used specify the day count method on the confirmation of the transaction.
The Board shares your concern that a failure to identify the day count method used on a particular security may subsequently cause problems in completing a transaction. Therefore, the Board believes that the parties to a transaction should exchange information at the time of trade concerning any unusual day count method used on the securities involved in the transaction. Since the party selling the securities is more likely to be aware of the unusual day count, it would be desirable that sellers take steps to ensure that they advise the contra-parties on transactions of the method to be used.
The Board does not, however, believe that it would be appropriate to require that this information be stated on the confirmation. The Board reached this determination based on its perception that the space available on the confirmation for the details of the securities description is quite limited and its belief that information regarding the day count method may not be sufficiently material to warrant its inclusion in the securities description. MSRB interpretation of December 9, 1982.
Securities Description: Securities Backed by Letters of Credit
Securities description: securities backed by letters of credit. I am writing in connection with our previous telephone conversation of last June regarding the confirmation of a transaction in a municipal issue secured by an irrevocable letter of credit issued by a bank. In our conversation you noted that both rules G-12 and G-15 require confirmations to contain a:
description of the securities including at a minimum..., if necessary for a materially complete description of the securities, the name of any company or other person in addition to the issuer obligated, directly or indirectly, with respect to debt service...
You inquired whether the name of the bank issuing a letter of credit securing principal and interest payments on an issue, or securing payments under the exercise of a put option or tender option feature, need be stated on the confirmation.
At that time I indicated to you that the identity of the bank issuing the letter of credit would have to be disclosed on the confirmation if the letter of credit could be drawn upon to cover scheduled interest and principal payments when due, since the bank would be "obligated ... with respect to debt service." I am writing to advise that the committee of the Board which reviewed a memorandum of our conversation has concluded that a bank issuing a letter of credit which secures a put option or tender option feature on an issue is similarly "obligated ... with respect to debt service" on such issue. The identity of the bank issuing the letter of credit securing the put option must therefore also be indicated on the confirmation. MSRB interpretation of December 2, 1982.
Securities Description: Revenue Securities
Securities description: revenue securities. I am writing in response to your letter of September 30, 1982 regarding the confirmation description of revenue securities. In your letter you note that the designation "revenue" is often not included in the title of the security, and you raise several questions concerning the method of deriving a proper confirmation description of revenue securities.
As you know, rule G-15(a)(v)[*] requires that customer confirmations set forth a description of the securities [involved in the transaction] including at a minimum the name of the issuer, interest rate, maturity date and if the securities are ... revenue bonds, an indication to such effect, including in the case of revenue bonds the type of revenue, if necessary for a materially complete description of the securities...[1] [emphasis added]
The rule requires, therefore, that revenue securities be designated as such, regardless of whether or not such designation appears in the formal title of the security. The dealer preparing the confirmation is responsible for ensuring that the designation is included in the securities description. In circumstances in which standard sources of descriptive information (e.g., official statements, rating agency and service bureau publications, and the like) do not include such a designation in the security title, therefore, the dealer must augment this title to include the requisite information.
In your letter you inquire as to who is responsible for providing this type of descriptive information to the facilities manager of the CUSIP system. Although the Board does not currently have any requirements concerning this matter, proposed rule G-34 will, when approved by the Securities and Exchange Commission, require that the managing underwriter of a new issue of municipal securities apply for the assignment of CUSIP numbers of such new issue if no other person (i.e., the issuer or a person acting on behalf of the issuer) has already applied for number assignment. In connection with such application, if one is necessary, the managing underwriter is required, under the proposed rule, to provide certain information about the new issue, including a designation of the "type of issue (e.g., general obligation, limited tax, or revenue)" and an indication of the "type of revenue, if the issue is a revenue issue."
In your letter you also ask for "the official definition of a 'revenue' issue." There is no "official definition" of what constitutes a revenue issue. Various publications include a definition of the term (e.g., the PSA's Fundamentals of Municipal Bonds, the State of Florida's Glossary of Municipal Securities Terms, etc.) and I would urge you to consult these for further information. MSRB interpretation of December 1, 1982.
[1] Rule G-12(c)(v)(E) sets forth the same requirement with respect to inter-dealer confirmations.
[*] [Currently codified at rules G-15(a)(i)(B) and G-15(a)(i)(C)]
Confirmation: Mailing of WAII, "All or None" Confirmation
Confirmation: Mailing of WAII, "all or none" confirmation. I understand that certain ... firms ... have raised questions concerning the application of a recent Board interpretive letter to certain types of municipal securities underwritings. I am writing to advise that these questions were recently reviewed by the Board which has authorized my sending you the following response.
The letter in question, reprinted in the Commerce Clearing House Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board Manual at ¶ 3556.55 [*], discusses the timing of the mailing of initial "when, as and if issued" confirmations on "pre-sale" orders to which new issue municipal securities have been allocated. Among other matters, the letter states that such confirmations may not be sent out prior to the date of award of the new issue, in the case of an issue purchased at competitive bid, or the date of execution of a bond purchase agreement on the new issue, in the case of a negotiated issue. [Certain] ... firms have questioned whether this interpretation ... is intended to apply to "all or none" underwritings, in which confirmations have been, at times, sent out prior to the execution of a formal purchase agreement.
As the Board understands it, an "all or none" underwriting of a new issue of municipal securities is an underwriting in which the municipal securities dealer agrees to accept liability for the issue at a given price only under a stated contingency, usually that the entire issue is sold within a stated period. The dealer typically "presettles" with the purchasers of the securities, with the customers receiving confirmations and paying for the securities while the underwriting is taking place. Pursuant to SEC rule 15c2-4 all customer funds must be held in a special escrow account for the issue until such time as the contingency is met (e.g., the entire issue is sold) and the funds are released to the issuer; if the contingency is not met, the funds are returned to the purchasers and the securities are not issued. [1]
The Board is of the view that an initial "when, as and if issued" confirmation of a transaction in a security which is the subject of an "all or none" underwriting may be sent out prior to the time a formal bond purchase agreement is executed. This would be permissible, however, only if two conditions are met: (1) that such confirmations clearly indicate the contingent nature of the transaction, through a statement that the securities are the subject of an "all or none" underwriting or otherwise; and (2) that the dealer has established, or has arranged to have established, the escrow account for the issue as required pursuant to rule 15c2-4. MSRB interpretation of October 7, 1982.
[1] I note also that SEC rule 10b-9 sets forth certain conditions which must be met before a dealer is permitted to represent an underwriting as an "all or none" underwriting.
[*] [See Rule G-12 Interpretive Letter - Confirmation: mailing of WAII confirmation, MSRB interpretation of April 30, 1982.]
Municipal Securities Principal: Numerical Requirements
Municipal securities principal: numerical requirements. This is in response to your letter of September 28, 1982 concerning the numerical requirements for municipal securities principals in Board rule G-3 . . . Rule G-3(b)(i)(B)[*] requires that
every municipal securities broker or municipal securities dealer having fewer than eleven persons associated with it in whatever capacity on a full-time or full-time equivalent basis who are engaged in the performance of its municipal securities activities, or, in the case of a bank dealer, in the performance of its municipal securities dealer activities, shall have at least one municipal securities principal.
You inquired as to the meaning of "full-time equivalent basis" in the reference language. This phrase is intended to require the inclusion of individuals who should be considered as full-time employees, but because of some distinctive employment arrangement do not fit the norm of a full-time employee. For example, a municipal securities representative who usually works out of his home which is in a remote location might not fit the firm's norm for "full-time employment" but should nevertheless be counted for purposes of the rule as an associated person.
You also inquired as to whether a bank dealer is required to have only one municipal securities principal even if it has fifteen full-time persons working in the municipal securities business. The provisions of the rule apply equally to securities firms and to bank dealers. Therefore, a bank dealer with eleven or more associated persons "engaged in the performance of its municipal securities dealer activities" is required to have at least two municipal securities principals.
[*] [Currently codified at rule G-3(b)(iii)(B)]
Recordkeeping by Introducing Brokers
Recordkeeping by introducing brokers. Your letter of September 16, 1982, has been referred to me for response. In your letter you indicate that your firm functions as an "introducing broker", and, in such capacity, effects an occasional transaction in municipal securities. You inquire as to the recordkeeping requirements applying to a firm acting in this capacity, and you also inquire as to the possibility of an exemption from the Board's rules, in view of the extremely limited nature of your municipal securities business.
As you recognize, the provision Board rule G-8 on recordkeeping with particular relevance to introducing brokers is section (d), which provides as follows:
A municipal securities broker or municipal securities dealer which, as an introducing municipal securities broker or municipal securities dealer, clears all transactions with and for customers on a fully disclosed basis with a clearing broker, dealer or municipal securities dealer, and which promptly transmits all customer funds and securities to the clearing broker, dealer or municipal securities dealer which carries all of the accounts of such customers, shall not be required to make and keep such books and records prescribed in this rule as are customarily made and kept by a clearing broker, dealer or municipal securities dealer and which are so made and kept; and such clearing broker, dealer or municipal securities dealer shall be responsible for the accurate maintenance and preservation of such books and records. (emphasis supplied)
As you can see, this provision states that the introducing broker need not make and keep those records which are "customarily made and kept by" the clearing dealer, as long as the clearing dealer does, in fact, make and keep those records. The introducing broker is still required, however, to make and keep those records which are not "customarily made and kept by" the clearing firm.
The majority of the specific records you name in your letter fall into the latter category of records which are not customarily made and kept by the clearing firm and therefore remain the responsibility of the introducing broker. Your firm would, therefore, be required to make the records of customer account information required under rule G-8(a)(xi), with all of the itemized details of information recorded on such records. Your firm would also be required to maintain the records of agency and principal transactions ("order tickets") required under rules G-8(a)(vi) and (vii) respectively. In both cases, however, if, for some reason, the clearing firm does make and keep these records, your firm would not be required to make and keep duplicates.
In the case of the requirement to keep confirmation copies, it is my understanding that the clearing firm generally maintains such records. If the clearing firm to which you introduce transactions follows this practice and maintain copies of the confirmations of such transactions, you would not be required to maintain the same record.
In adopting each of these recordkeeping requirements the Board concluded that the information required to be recorded was the minimum basic data necessary to ensure proper handling and recordation of the transaction and customer protection. I note also that these requirements parallel in most respects those of Commission rule 17a-3, to which you are already subject by virtue of your registration as a broker/dealer.
With respect to your inquiry regarding an exemption from the Board's requirements, I must advise that the Board does not have the authority to grant such exemptions. The Securities and Exchange Commission does have the authority to grant such an exemption in unusual circumstances. Any letter regarding such an exemption should be directed to the Commission's Division of Market Regulation. MSRB interpretation of September 21, 1982.
Callable Securities: Disclosure
Callable securities: disclosure. I am writing in response to your letter of August 17, 1982, concerning the requirements of Board rules G-12(c)(v)(E) and G-15(a)(v)[*] concerning securities descriptions set forth on confirmations. In your letter you note that certain descriptive details are required to be disclosed on the confirmation only "if necessary for a materially complete description of the securities," and you inquire whether information as to a security's callability is one of these details.
Rules G-12(c)(v)(E) and G-15(a)(v)[*] require confirmations to set forth a
description of the securities, including at a minimum the name of the issuer, interest rate, maturity date, and if the securities are limited tax, subject to redemption prior to maturity (callable) or revenue bonds, an indication to such effect, including in the case of revenue bonds the type of revenue, if necessary for a materially complete description of the securities, and in the case of any securities, if necessary for a materially complete description of the securities, the name of any company or other person in addition to the issuer obligated, directly or indirectly, with respect to debt service or, if there is more than one such obligor, the statement 'multiple obligators' may be shown." (emphasis added)
As you can see, the phrase "if necessary for a materially complete description of the securities" modifies only the requirements for disclosure of "the type of revenue," or ... disclosure of "the name of any company or other person obligated ... with respect to debt service...," and does not modify the requirements for disclosure of the other listed information. Both rules, therefore, deem information as to the "name of the issuer, interest rate, maturity date and if the securities are limited tax, subject to redemption prior to maturity (callable) or revenue bonds" to be necessarily material and subject to disclosure on the confirmation. In the specific case which you cite, that of a security with an "in-part" sinking fund call feature, the confirmation of a transaction in such security would be required to identify the security as "callable." MSRB interpretation of August 23, 1982.
[*] [Currently codified at rules G-15(a)(i)(B) and G-15(a)(i)(C)]
Advertisements of Securities Not Owned
Advertisements of securities not owned. This is in response to your letter of May 5, 1982 concerning a dealer bank’s advertising practices. Your letter states that the dealer bank has recently published newspaper advertisements which list specific municipal securities as "Current Offerings," and that your review of the dealer’s inventory positions has disclosed that "on the date the advertisement was published the dealer held no position in four of the issues advertised and a nominal position in the fifth advertised issue." Your letter reports that the dealer stated that it was his intention to obtain the advertised issues from other dealers when customer orders were received. Your first question is whether "it is misleading and thus in violation of rule G-21, to advertise securities which the dealer does not own..."
The Board has recently considered this advertising practice and concluded that it would not violate Board rules provided that: (1) the advertisement indicates that the securities are advertised "subject to availability;" (2) the dealer placing the advertisement is not aware that the bonds are no longer available in the market; and (3) the dealer would attempt to acquire the bonds advertised if contacted by a potential customer.
Your letter also expresses concern that this type of advertising might be seriously misleading to customers since the advertisement must be prepared and the printer’s proof copy approved five days in advance of the date of publication. You note that "significant changes in the market can occur over a five, or even three-day period" and that, if such market changes had occurred between submission and publication of the advertisement, the customer could be seriously misled. The Board is aware that delays occur between the time an advertisement is composed and approved for publication by a municipal securities dealer and the time it is actually published. The Board believes that inclusion in the advertisement of a statement indicating that the securities are advertised subject to change in price provides adequate notice to a potential customer that the prices and yields quoted in the advertisement may not represent market yields and prices at the time the customer contacts the dealer. MSRB interpretation of July 1, 1982.
Original Issue Discount, Zero Coupon Securities: Disclosure of, Pricing to Call Feature
Original issue discount, zero coupon securities: disclosure of, pricing to call feature. I am writing in response to your inquiry in our recent telephone conversation regarding the application of Board rules to the recent original issue discount on "zero coupon" new issues of municipal securities. In particular, you indicated that these types of securities are often subject to somewhat unusual call provisions, and you inquired as to the application to these types of securities of Board rules concerning the disclosure of call provisions and the use of such call provisions in dollar price and yield computations.
Subsequent to our conversation, I obtained several examples of these call provisions, which were provided to the Board in connection with your inquiry. In the first of these examples, involving an original issue discount security, the call provision commences ten years after issuance, with the redemption price initially set at 90 and increasing by 2 points every three years, reaching a redemption price of 100 twenty-five years after issuance. In the second example, involving a "zero coupon" security, the call provision commences ten years after issuance; the redemption price is based on the compound accreted value of the security (plus a stated redemption premium for the first five years of the call provision), with certain of the securities initially redeemable at an approximate dollar price of 18.
As you know, the call provisions on "zero coupon" and original issue discount securities are one of the special characteristics of such securities, but are not, by any means, the sole special characteristic. The Board is of the view that municipal securities brokers and dealers selling such securities are obliged, under Board rule G-17 as well as under the anti-fraud rules under the Securities Exchange Act, to disclose to customers all material information regarding such special characteristics. As the Board stated in its April 27, 1982 "Notice Concerning 'Zero Coupon' and 'Stepped Coupon' Securities,"
persons selling such securities to the public have an obligation to adequately disclose the special characteristics of such securities so as to comply with the Board's fair practice rules.
Therefore, in selling an original issue discount or "zero coupon" security to a customer, a dealer would be obliged to disclose, among other matters, any material information with respect to the call provisions of such securities.
I note also that Rule G-15 requires customer confirmations of transactions in callable securities to indicate that the securities are "callable," and to contain a legend stating, in part, that information concerning the call provisions of such securities will be made available upon the customer's request. Customer confirmations of transactions in callable original issue discount or "zero coupon" securities would have to contain such a legend, in addition to the designation "callable," and the details of the call provisions of such securities would have to be provided to the customer in writing upon the customer's request.
The requirement under rules G-12 and G-15 for the computation of dollar price and (under rule G-15) yield to a call or option feature would apply to a transaction in an original issue discount or "zero coupon" security. Therefore, if the dollar price to the call on a transaction in such securities is lower than the price to maturity, such dollar price should be used. In the case of customer confirmations, if the yield to call on a transaction in such securities is lower, such yield must be shown. As you noted in our conversation, in view of the redemption price structure of the call provisions on such securities, the price or yield to call on a particular transaction might be lower than the price or yield to maturity, even though the transaction is effected at a price below par. Since heretofore the industry has been accustomed to call provisions at prices at or above par, industry members may wish to pay particular attention to the processing of transactions in original issue discount or "zero coupon" securities with these unusual types of call provisions, to ensure that the dollar price or yield of such transactions is not inadvertently overstated due to a failure to check the price or yield to call. MSRB interpretation of June 30, 1982.
Authorization of Sales Contests
Authorization of sales contests. Your letter of May 27, 1982 has been referred to me for response. In your letter you request an interpretation regarding the applicability of Board rule G-20 concerning gifts and gratuities to sales contests offered by an underwriter to participating members of a syndicate. Your letter asks specifically whether such sales contests are considered compensation for services as described in paragraph (c) of rule G-20, and, if they are, whether the requirements of rule G-20 imposed on agreements for the compensation of services must be met by the underwriter sponsoring the sales contest.
The Board believes that sales contests which provide gifts or payments to employees of municipal securities brokers and municipal securities dealers other than the broker or dealer sponsoring the contest constitute compensation for services as described in rule G-20(c). Consequently, the requirements of that rule must be met: that is, the sponsoring dealer must obtain
prior to the time of employment or before the services are rendered a written agreement between the municipal securities broker or municipal securities dealer subject to this rule and the person who is to perform such services; ... such agreement [to] include the nature of the proposed services, the amount of the proposed compensation, and the written consent of such person's employer.
In the context of sales contests, agreements of the kind referred to in the rule are required between the municipal securities broker or municipal securities dealer sponsoring the contest and all contestants employed by other municipal securities brokers and municipal securities dealers.
Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have further questions concerning this matter. MSRB interpretation of June 25, 1982.
Municipal securities principal
Municipal securities principal. This will acknowledge receipt of your letter of June 10, 1981. In your letter you indicate that the dealer department of [the bank] has recently been inspected by examiners from the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and that, during the course of such inspection, the examiners indicated that they believed certain persons should be qualified as municipal securities principals. You indicate your disagreement with the examiners' conclusions, and request an opinion from the Board concerning the need to qualify these personnel.
The two cases you describe are as follows:
(1) Mr. "X", as head of the Operations Division of the bank's Financial Markets Group, is in charge of the operational support services for the bank's securities activities, including the Tax-Exempt Operations Department. The Tax-Exempt Operations Department is under the immediate supervision of yourself. For purposes of bank organizational structure you report to Mr. "X"; however, you also report to the head of the Tax-Exempt Securities Division in connection with "supporting the Tax-Exempt business operation." You are qualified as a municipal securities principal, as is the head of the Tax-Exempt Securities Division; Mr. "X", however, is not. The national bank examiners have expressed the view that he should be.
(2) Two "senior traders" in the Municipal Dealer Department act under the supervision of the department head with regard to the trading and positioning of municipal securities. In connection with these activities they "direct more junior traders" in their municipal securities activities. These persons are not qualified as municipal securities principals; the national bank examiners contend that they should be.
As a general matter we would hesitate to disagree with the opinion expressed by an on-site examiner in a matter of this sort. The examiner is, of course, in direct contact with the matter in question, and has access to the full details of the situation, rather than an abstraction or summary of the particulars. Accordingly, we are unable to express a view that the examiner's conclusions are incorrect in the circumstances you describe.
With respect to the specific situations presented in your letter, it is certainly not impossible to establish a reporting and supervisory structure such that a person who is in charge of the division which includes the operational aspects of a bank's municipal securities dealer department need not be qualified as a municipal securities principal. As is indicated in a Board interpretive notice concerning qualifications matters, qualification as a municipal securities principal is required of a person who supervises a bank dealer's processing and clearance activities with respect to municipal securities only to the extent that such person has policy-making authority over such activities. If such person does not have policy-making authority, or if such person's authority extends to the establishment of general guidelines or an overall framework for activities, with the specific function of making policy within that framework reserved for other persons, then such person would not be deemed to be a municipal securities principal.
Further, it is a not uncommon arrangement to have the policy-making authority with respect to the municipal dealer operations activities of a bank allocated between the immediate supervisor of the municipal operations function and a principal in the dealer department itself. In these circumstances the operation supervisor reports to the principal in connection with the municipal dealer activities, and also reports to other, non-qualified persons in connection with bank organizational requirements.
Therefore, the arrangement which you describe would not necessarily require that Mr. "X" be qualified as a municipal securities principal. Whether he should, in fact, be qualified as a municipal securities principal depends, of course, on the extent to which he does exercise policy-making authority over the municipal dealer operations functions; this is a determination that, we suggest, is most appropriately made by yourselves and the national bank examiners.
In the second situation you describe it appears to us clear that the "senior traders" are functioning as municipal securities principals and should be qualified as such. As you may know, the Board's rule defines the term "municipal securities principal" to include persons "who [are] directly engaged in the . . . direction or supervision of . . . underwriting, trading or sales of municipal securities. . ." Your description of the activities of these "senior traders" indicates that they "direct" other persons in trading activities. This certainly supports the conclusion that they are functioning as municipal securities principals. MSRB interpretation of June 24, 1981.
Persons Engaged in Financial Advisory Activities.
Persons engaged in financial advisory activities. I am writing to confirm our telephone conversation of this afternoon concerning the registration and qualification requirements applicable to persons in your firm's public finance department. In our conversation you inquired whether persons who function as financial advisors to municipal issuers, providing advice to such issuers regarding the structure, timing and terms of new issues of municipal securities to be sold by such issuers, are required to be qualified. As I indicated, such persons are required to be registered and qualified as municipal securities representatives. Furthermore, persons who supervise representatives performing such financial advisory services are required to be registered and qualified as municipal securities principals.
For your information, the provision of financial advisory services to municipal issuers is defined to be a municipal securities representative function in Board rule G-3(a)(iii)(B)[*]. The requirement that persons performing such function be qualified is set forth generally in rules G-2 and G-3, and the specific qualification requirements applicable to such persons are stated in rules G-3(e)[†] and (i)[‡]. MSRB interpretation of June 10, 1982.
[*] [Currently codified at rule G-3(a)(i)(B)]
[†] [Currently codified at rule G-3(a)(ii)]
[‡] [Currently codified at rule G-3(a)(iii)]
Day Counting: Securities Dated on the 15th of a Month
Day counting: securities dated on the 15th of a month. I am writing in response to your letter of May 26, 1982 in which you inquire as to the correct day count for calculation purposes on a security which is dated on the 15th of a month and pays interest on the first of a following month. In your letter you pose the example of a security dated on June 15, 1982 and paying interest on July 1, 1982, and you inquire whether the July 1, 1982 coupon on such security should have a value of 15 or 16 days of accrued interest.
As you know, Board rule G-33 provides the following formula for use on computations of day counts on securities calculated on a "30/360" day basis:
Number of days = (Y2 - Y1) 360 + (M2 - M1) 30 + (D2 - D1)
In this formula, the variables "Y1," "M1," and "D1" are defined as the year, month, and day, respectively, of the date on which the computation period begins (June 15, 1982, in your example), and "Y2," "M2," and "D2" as the year, month, and day of the date on which the computation period ends (July 1, 1982, in your example). In the situation you present, therefore, the number of days in the period would correctly be computed as follows:
Number of days = (1982 - 1982) 360 + (7 - 6) 30 + (1 - 15)
or
Number of days = (0) 360 + (1) 30 + (- 14)
or
Number of days = 0 + 30 + ( - 14)
or
Number of days = 16 days
If figured correctly, therefore, the coupon for such a period should have a value of 16 days of accrued interest. If the coupon is for a longer period of time, this particular portion of that longer period would still correctly be counted as 16 days (e.g., the day count on a coupon for the period June 15 to September 1 would correctly be figured as 76 days, consisting of 16 days for the period June 15 to July 1, and 30 days each for the months of July and August).
The error of computing the day count for such a period as 15 days apparently arises from an assumption that, on a security dated on the 15th of a month, accrued interest is owed only for the "second half" of that month. In reality, of course, the 15th of a month is not the first day of the "second half" of that month, but rather is the last day of the "first half" of that month (since a 30-day month consists of two 15-day half-months, the first half being from the 1st to the 15th, and the second half being from the 16th to the 30th). Again, it can clearly be seen that the correct day count for such a period is 16 days. MSRB interpretation of June 2, 1982.
Customer Account Information
Customer account information. I am writing in response to your letter of May 25, 1982 concerning the maintenance of customer account information records in connection with certain orders placed with you by a correspondent bank. In your letter you indicate that a correspondent bank periodically purchases securities from your dealer department for the accounts of specified customers. The confirmations of these transactions are sent to the correspondent bank, with a statement on each confirmation designating, by customer name, the account for which the transaction was effected. No confirmations or copies of confirmations are sent to the customers identified by the correspondent bank. You inquire whether customer account information records designating these customers as the "beneficial owners" of these accounts need be maintained by your dealer department.
As you know, rule G-8(a)(xi) requires a municipal securities dealer to record certain information about each customer for which it maintains an account. Subparagraph (G) of such paragraph requires that this record identify the
name and address of beneficial owner or owners of such account if other than the customer and transactions are to be confirmed to such owner or owners...(emphasis added)
If the transactions are not to be confirmed to the customers identified as the owners of the accounts for which the transactions are effected, then such information need not be recorded.
In the situation you cite, therefore, the names of the customers need not be recorded on the customer account information record. MSRB interpretation of June 1, 1982.
Notice Concerning "Zero Coupon" and "Stepped Coupon" Securities
The Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board has recently received inquiries concerning the application of the confirmation disclosure requirements of Board rules G-12 and G-15 to transactions in municipal securities with "zero coupons" or "stepped coupons." Certain recent new issues of municipal securities have had several maturities paying 0% interest; securities of these maturities are sold at deep discounts, with the investor's return received in the form of an accretion of this discount to par. Other issues have been sold which have "stepped coupons;" that is, all outstanding bonds pay the same interest rate each year, with the interest rate periodically rising, on a pre-established schedule, on all securities yet to be redeemed. Interested persons have inquired concerning how the description requirements of the rules apply to such securities, and whether the yield disclosure requirements of rule G-15 apply to confirmations of transactions in such securities for the accounts of customers.
Rule G-12(c)(v)(E) requires a municipal securities dealer to set forth on an inter-dealer confirmation a description of the securities which are the subject of the transaction, including the interest rate. Rule G-15(a)(i)(E)[*] imposes the same requirement with respect to customer confirmations. Further, rule G-15(a)(i)(I)(2)[†] requires that customer confirmations of transactions effected at dollar prices (except for transactions at par) state the lowest of the resulting yield to call, yield to par option, or yield to maturity.
A confirmation of a transaction in a "zero coupon" security must state that the interest rate on the security is "0%." A customer confirmation of such a transaction must state the lowest of the yield to call or yield to maturity resulting from the dollar price of the transaction.[1] The Board believes that the disclosure of the resulting yield is particularly important on such transactions, since it provides the only indication to the investor of the return he or she can expect from the investment.
A confirmation of a transaction in a "stepped coupon" security must state the interest rate currently being paid on the securities, and must identify the securities as "stepped coupon" securities. A customer confirmation of such a transaction must also state the lowest of the yield to call, yield to par option, or yield to maturity resulting from the dollar price of the transaction.[2] In view of the wide variation in the coupon interest rates that will be received over the life of a "stepped coupon" security, the Board believes that the disclosure of yield will assist customers in determining the actual return to be received on the investment.
In addition to the specific confirmation disclosure requirements of Board rules G-12 and G-15 discussed above, the Board is of the view that persons selling such securities to the public have an obligation to adequately disclose the special characteristics of such securities so as to comply with the Board's fair practice rules. For example, although the details of the increases to the interest rates on "stepped coupon" securities need not be provided on confirmations, such information is, of course, material information regarding the securities, and municipal securities dealers would be obliged to inform customers about this feature of the securities at or before the time of trade.
[1] The Board notes that, upon the effectiveness of Board rule G-33, such yield must be computed on a basis that presumes semi-annual compounding.
[2] In the case of both "zero coupon" and "stepped coupon" securities, if the transaction is effected in a yield basis, the confirmation must show the yield price and the resulting dollar price, computed to the lowest of price to premium call, price to par option, or price to maturity.
[*] [Currently codified at rule G-15(a)(i)(B)(4)]
[†] [Currently codified at rule G-15(a)(i)(A)(5)]
Records of Original Entry; Accessibility of Records
Records of original entry; accessibility of records. As I indicated to you in my previous letter of February 1, 1982, your inquiry of January 21, 1982 was referred to the committee of the Board charged with responsibility for interpreting the requirements of Board rules G-8 and G-9 on books and records. That committee has authorized my sending you this response.
In your letter you indicate that during the course of an examination of your bank's municipal securities dealer department by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency certain criticisms were made by the examiners regarding the recordkeeping system used by your bank. In particular, the examiners noted that the "record of original entry" maintained by the bank did not contain seven specified items of information,[1] and expressed the view that customer account records more than one year old were not "maintained and preserved in an easily accessible place" within the meaning of rule G-9. You disagree with the examiner's interpretation of "easily accessible." Further, while conceding that the specified items of information are not contained on the record, you indicate that this information is readily available upon specific inquiry to the bank's system data base, and express the view that this should be sufficient for purposes of compliance with Board rule G-8. You request the Board's views on these subjects.
As a general matter we would hesitate to disagree with the opinion expressed by an on-site examiner concerning the auditability of records maintained by a municipal securities dealer. The examiner is, of course, in direct contact with the matter in question, and has access to the full details of the situation, rather than an abstraction or summary of the particulars. Accordingly, we are unable to express a view that the examiner's criticisms are incorrect in the specific circumstances you describe.
With respect to the particular questions which you raise, we note that rule G-8 does require that all of the specified information appear on the record or system of records designated as the dealer's "record of original entry." It is not sufficient that the dealer has the capability of researching specific items, or constructing a record upon request from information maintained in other formats. The record of original entry is intended to provide a journal of all of the basic details of a dealer's activity on a given day. A record that can only be put together on request, or that is missing basic details of information, is not sufficient for this purpose.
We note also that, in reviewing the attachments to your letter, it appears that the absence of several of the specified items of information would be easy to rectify--institution of controls to prevent duplication of customer and security abbreviations would appear to resolve the problems with these details, and a system of grouping transaction input could be devised so that trades for different trade dates are not shown on the same blotter. Similarly, bond or note numbers could be designated on transaction tickets maintained as an augmentation of the computerized records; the attachments indicate that you already maintain such tickets as part of an existing unit system.
With respect to the question of accessibility, we note that this is generally construed by the examining authorities to mean accessibility within 24 or 48 hours. If a system could be devised whereby requests from the dealer department for aged customer account records could be given priority and processed on an expedited basis, this might rectify the problem you describe. MSRB interpretation of April 27, 1982.
[1] Dollar price or yield, trade date, name of contra party (due to use of abbreviations), security identification (due to use of abbreviations), designation of account for which transaction was effected, bond or note numbers, and designation if securities were registered.
Financial Advisory Relationship: Mortgage-Related Services
Financial advisory relationship: mortgage-related services. This is in response to your letter of March 26, 1982 requesting an opinion regarding whether Board rule G-23 concerning the activities of financial advisors applies to certain activities of [name deleted] (the "Company").
Your letter states that the Company, a mortgage banker and wholly-owned subsidiary of [name deleted] (the "Bank"), identifies "proposed real estate development projects which it believes are economically feasible" and attempts to "arrange for the financing of such projects ..." You note that a common means of financing such projects involves the issuance and sale of tax-exempt obligations, with the proceeds of the sale being made available by the issuing entity to a mortgage approved by the Federal Housing Administration ("FHA"), which in turn provides financing secured by the FHA mortgage. You indicate that the services the Company performs in such instances include "... making the initial determination as to whether the contemplated project meets FHA criteria, negotiating with the developer regarding financing terms and conditions relating to the mortgage, contacting the issuer regarding its interest in issuing the bonds for the project, and, in certain cases where the issuer is not familiar or experienced in the area, assisting the issuer in understanding the rules and regulations of the FHA or the Development of Housing and Urban Development ..." You add that "the Company may also act as servicer of the construction loans which entails processing FHA insurance request forms, disbursing funds for completed work, etc." You state that "the Company does not provide financial advice to issuers regarding the structuring of the bond issues, or receive any fees, directly or indirectly, from issuers." You emphasize that any advice regarding the structuring of the actual bond issues is provided by the issuers’ "staffs, financial advisors, bond counsel, or the underwriters of the issues." Your specific question concerns whether rule G-23 applies where the Company acts as mortgage banker and the Bank underwrites the bonds.
As you know, rule G-23(b) states that "... a financial advisory relationship shall be deemed to exist when a broker, dealer, or municipal securities dealer renders or enters into an agreement to render financial advisory or consultant services to or on behalf of an issuer with respect to a new issue or issues of municipal securities, including advice with respect to the structure, timing, terms and other similar matters concerning such issue or issues for a fee or other compensation ..." Based upon the representations contained in your letter, it would appear that the Company does not render financial advisory services to issuers with respect to new issues of municipal securities. Since the activities which you state the Company performs in the ordinary course of its mortgage banking business do not constitute financial advisory activities for the purposes of rule G-23, the rule would not apply to those financings where the Bank serves as underwriter and the Company performs its mortgage banking functions, as described. MSRB interpretation of April 12, 1982.
Yield Disclosures: Transactions at Par
Yield disclosures: transactions at par. I am writing in response to your letter of April 2, 1982, concerning certain of the yield disclosure requirements of Board rule G-15 on customer confirmations. In your letter you note that item (C) of rule G-15(a)(viii)[*] requires that "for transactions at par, the dollar price shall be shown" on the confirmations of such transactions, and you inquire whether it is necessary to show a yield on such confirmations.
Please be advised that a confirmation of a transaction effected at par (i.e., at a dollar price of "100") need show only the dollar price "100" and need not, under the terms of the rule, show the resulting yield.
I note, however, that a transaction effected on the basis of a yield price equal to the interest rate of the security which is the subject of the transaction would be considered, for purposes of the rule, to be a "transaction effected on a yield basis," and therefore would be subject to the requirements of item (A) of rule G-15(a)(viii)[†]. The confirmation of such transaction would therefore be required to state "the yield at which [the] transaction was effected and the resulting dollar price[.]" MSRB interpretation of April 8, 1982.
[*] [Currently codified at rule G-15(a)(i)(A)(5)(b)(ii)]
[†] [Currently codified at rule G-15(a)(i)(A)(5)(a)]
Documentation on Rejection and Reclamation of Deliveries
The Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board has recently received complaints from certain municipal securities brokers and municipal securities dealers concerning problems with the documentation provided on rejections or reclamations of deliveries on municipal securities transactions. These brokers and dealers have alleged that other organizations, when rejecting or reclaiming deliveries, have failed to provide the requisite information regarding the return of the securities, thereby making it very difficult to accomplish prompt resolution of any delivery problems. In particular, these dealers indicate, notices of rejection or reclamation have often failed to state a reason for the rejection or reclamation, or to name a person who can be contacted regarding the delivery problem.
Rule G-12(g)(iv) requires that a dealer rejecting or reclaiming a delivery of securities must provide a notice or other document with the rejected or reclaimed securities, which notice shall include the following information:
(A) the name of the party rejecting or reclaiming the securities;
(B) the name of the party to whom the securities are being rejected or reclaimed;
(C) a description of the securities;
(D) the date the securities were delivered;
(E) the date of rejection or reclamation;
(F) the par value of the securities which are being rejected or reclaimed;
(G) in the case of a reclamation, the amount of money the securities are reclaimed for;
(H) the reason for rejection or reclamation; and
(I) the name and telephone number of the person to contact concerning the rejection or reclamation.
The Uniform Reclamation Form may be used for this purpose.
The Board believes that the required information is the minimum necessary to permit prompt resolution of the problem, and does not view the requirement to provide this information as burdensome. The Board is concerned that failure to provide this information may contribute to inefficiencies in the clearance process, and strongly urges municipal securities brokers and dealers to take steps to ensure that the requirements of the rule are complied with. The Board notes that, in the case of reclaimed securities, failure to provide this information may result in, at minimum, a refusal on the part of the receiving party to honor the reclamation.
Close-out Procedures: Mandatory Repurchase
Close-out procedures: mandatory repurchase. You recently inquired concerning the use of the "mandatory repurchase" option provided under Board rule G-12(h)(i)(D) for execution of a close-out notice. In the situation you presented, a municipal securities dealer executing a notice was requiring, under the provisions of this option, a repurchase at the original contract price. Since the transaction was originally effected on the basis of a yield price, you inquired whether the repurchase should be effected at this yield price (with the dollar price computed to the settlement date of the repurchase transaction), or at the dollar price computed from this yield price at the time of the original transaction.
At the time of your telephone call I responded that, while the Board would have to consider this inquiry, the Board’s response to somewhat similar inquiries in the past suggested that the dollar price of the original contract should be used. I am writing to advise you that the Board did not adopt this position. With respect to the specific circumstances presented in your inquiry, the Board has concluded that the purchasing dealer does have the right, in the appropriate circumstances, to execute a close-out by requiring the seller to repurchase the securities at the yield price of the original contract, with the resulting dollar price computed to the settlement date of the repurchase transaction. The Board notes that, in these circumstances, the selling dealer has failed to fulfill its contractual obligations, and believes that permitting the use of the yield price of the original contract, with the resulting dollar price computed to the settlement date of the repurchase transaction, will in the majority of cases most fairly compensate the purchaser for the time value of the investment for the period from the original execution to the mandatory repurchase.[1]
The Board also is generally of the view that purchasers executing mandatory repurchase transactions may require a mandatory repurchase at the yield basis of the original transaction, with the resulting dollar price computed to the settlement date of the repurchase transaction, except in the case where both parties to the transaction agree that the original transaction was, and the repurchase transaction should be, effected on the basis of a dollar price, or where the terms of the transaction and/or the trading characteristics of the security (e.g., issues with an active sinking fund or tender program) suggest that dollar price rather than yield was the dominant consideration in the original transaction. MSRB interpretation of March 4, 1982.
[1] The Board notes, for example, that, in the case of a security purchased at a discount, the purchaser and the purchaser’s customer would realize the accretion of the discount for the period the security was owned. In the case of a security purchased at a premium, the premium would be amortized for the period the purchaser owned the security.
Underwriting Aassessment: Application to Private Placements
Underwriting assessment: application to private placements. This is in response to your request for a clarification of the application of Board rule A-13, concerning the underwriting assessment for municipal securities brokers and municipal securities dealers, to private placements of municipal securities.
Rule A-13 imposes an assessment fee on the underwriting of new issue municipal securities as an equitable means of defraying the costs and expenses of operating the Board. The assessment fee applies to new issue municipal securities which are "... purchased from an issuer by or through [a] municipal securities broker, or municipal securities dealer, whether acting as principal or agent." The Board has consistently interpreted the rule as requiring payment of the assessment fee where a municipal securities dealer acting as agent for the issuer arranges the direct placement of new issue municipal securities with institutional customers or individuals. In such cases it can be said that the securities are purchased from an issuer "through" the municipal securities dealer.
Of course, a municipal securities dealer who serves in an advisory role to an issuer on such matters as the structure or timing of a new issue, but who plays no part in arranging a private placement of the securities, would not be required to pay the assessment fee prescribed by rule A-13. MSRB interpretation of February 22, 1982.