Under Rule G-17 of the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB), brokers, dealers, and municipal securities dealers (“dealers”) must, in the conduct of their municipal securities activities, deal fairly with all persons and must not engage in any deceptive, dishonest, or unfair practice. This rule is most often cited in connection with duties owed by dealers to investors; however, it also applies to their interactions with other market participants, including municipal entities[1] such as states and their political subdivisions that are issuers of municipal securities (“issuers”).

The MSRB has previously observed that Rule G-17 requires dealers to deal fairly with issuers.[2] With the passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,[3] the MSRB was expressly directed by Congress to protect municipal entities. Accordingly, in 2012, the MSRB provided additional interpretive guidance that addressed how Rule G-17 applies to dealers acting in the capacity of underwriters in the municipal securities transactions described therein (the “2012 Interpretive Notice”).[4]

This notice supersedes the MSRB’s 2012 Interpretive Notice, dated August 2, 2012, concerning the application of Rule G-17 to underwriters of municipal securities, as well as the related implementation guidance, dated July 18, 2012, and frequently-asked questions, dated March 25, 2013 (the “prior guidance”).[5] The prior guidance will remain applicable to underwriting relationships commencing prior to March 31, 2021. Underwriters will be subject to the amended guidance provided by this notice for all of their underwriting relationships beginning on or after that date. For purposes of this notice, an underwriting relationship is considered to have begun at the time the delivery of the first disclosure is triggered as described under “Timing and Manner of Disclosures” below (i.e., the earliest stages of an underwriter’s relationship with an issuer with respect to an issue, such as in a response to a request for proposal or in promotional materials provided to an issuer).

Applicability of the Notice

Except where a competitive underwriting is specifically mentioned, this notice applies to negotiated underwritings only.[6] This notice does not apply to a dealer acting as a primary distributor in a continuous offering of municipal fund securities, such as interests in 529 savings plans and Achieving a Better Life Experience (ABLE) programs. It does not apply to selling group members. This notice does not address a dealer’s duties when the dealer is serving as an advisor to a municipal entity. This notice applies to a primary offering of a new issue of municipal securities that is placed with investors by a dealer serving as placement agent, although certain disclosures may be omitted as described below.

The fair practice duties outlined in this notice are those duties that a dealer owes to a municipal entity when the dealer underwrites a new issue of municipal securities. This notice does not set out the underwriter’s fair-practice duties to other parties to a municipal securities financing (e.g., conduit borrowers). The MSRB notes, however, that Rule G-17 does require that an underwriter deal fairly with all persons in the course of the dealer’s municipal securities activities. What actions are considered fair will, of necessity, be dependent on the nature of the relationship between a dealer and such other parties, the particular actions undertaken, and all other relevant facts and circumstances. Although this notice does not address what an underwriter’s fair-dealing duties may be with respect to other parties, it may serve as one of many bases for an underwriter to consider how to establish appropriate policies and procedures for ensuring that it meets such fair-practice obligations, in light of its relationship with such other participants and their particular roles.

The examples discussed in this notice are illustrative only and are not meant to encompass all obligations of dealers to municipal entities under Rule G-17. Furthermore, when municipal entities are customers[7] of dealers, they are subject to the same protections under MSRB rules, including Rule G‑17, that apply to other customers.[8] The MSRB notes that an underwriter has a duty of fair dealing to investors in addition to its duty of fair dealing to issuers. An underwriter also has a duty to comply with other MSRB rules as well as other federal and state securities laws.

Basic Fair Dealing Principle

As noted above, Rule G-17 precludes a dealer, in the conduct of its municipal securities activities, from engaging in any deceptive, dishonest, or unfair practice with any person, including an issuer. The rule contains an anti-fraud prohibition. Thus, an underwriter must not misrepresent or omit the facts, risks, potential benefits, or other material information about municipal securities activities undertaken with a municipal issuer. However, Rule G-17 does not merely prohibit deceptive conduct on the part of the dealer; it also establishes a general duty of a dealer to deal fairly with all persons (including, but not limited to, issuers), even in the absence of fraud.

Role of Underwriters and Conflicts of Interest

In negotiated underwritings, underwriters’ Rule G-17 duty to deal fairly with an issuer requires certain disclosures to the issuer in connection with an issue or proposed issue of municipal securities, as provided below.[9]

• The disclosures discussed under “Disclosures Concerning the Underwriters’ Role” and “Disclosures Concerning Underwriters’ Compensation” (the “standard disclosures”) must be provided by the sole underwriter or the syndicate manager[10] to the issuer as described below.
• The disclosures discussed under “Required Disclosures to Issuers” (the “transaction-specific disclosures”) must be provided to the issuer by the underwriter who has recommended a financing structure or product to the issuer as described below.[11]
• The disclosures discussed under “Other Conflicts Disclosures” (the “dealer-specific disclosures”) must be provided by the sole underwriter or each underwriter in a syndicate (as applicable) as described below.[12]

Disclosures Concerning the Underwriter’s Role.  The sole underwriter or the syndicate manager[13] must disclose to the issuer that:

Underwriters also must not recommend that issuers not retain a municipal advisor. Accordingly, underwriters may not discourage issuers from using a municipal advisor or otherwise imply that the hiring of a municipal advisor would be redundant because the sole underwriter or underwriting syndicate can provide the services that a municipal advisor would.

Disclosure Concerning the Underwriters’ Compensation. The sole underwriter or syndicate manager must disclose to issuers whether underwriting compensation will be contingent on the closing of a transaction. Sole underwriters or syndicate managers must also disclose that compensation that is contingent on the closing of a transaction or the size of a transaction presents a conflict of interest, because it may cause underwriters to recommend a transaction that is unnecessary or to recommend that the size of a transaction be larger than is necessary.

Other Conflicts Disclosures. The sole underwriter or each underwriter in a syndicate must also, when and if applicable, disclose other dealer-specific actual material conflicts of interest and potential material conflicts of interest,[17] including, but not limited to, the following:

These categories of conflicts of interest are not mutually exclusive and, in some cases, a specific conflict may reasonably be viewed as falling into two or even more categories. An underwriter making disclosures of dealer-specific conflicts of interest to an issuer should concentrate on making them in a complete and understandable manner and need not necessarily organize them according to the categories listed above, particularly if adhering to a strict categorization process might interfere with the clarity and conciseness of disclosures.

Where there is a syndicate, each underwriter in the syndicate has a duty to provide its dealer-specific disclosures to the issuer. In general, dealer-specific disclosures for one dealer cannot be satisfied by disclosures made by another dealer (e.g., the syndicate manager) because such disclosures are, by their nature, not uniform, and must be prepared by each dealer. However, a syndicate manager may deliver each of the dealer-specific disclosures to the issuer as part of a single package of disclosures, as long as it is clear to which dealer each disclosure is attributed. An underwriter in the syndicate is not required to notify an issuer if it has determined that it does not have any dealer-specific disclosures to make. However, the obligation to provide dealer-specific disclosures includes material conflicts of interest arising after the time of engagement with the issuer, as noted below.

Timing and Manner of Disclosures.  The standard disclosures, transaction-specific disclosures, and dealer-specific disclosures must be made in writing to an official of the issuer identified by the issuer as a primary contact for that issuer for the receipt of the foregoing disclosures. In the absence of such identification, an underwriter may make such disclosures in writing to an official of the issuer that the underwriter reasonably believes has the authority to bind the issuer by contract with the underwriter and that, to the knowledge of the underwriter, is not a party to a disclosed conflict.[20] If provided within the same document as the dealer-specific disclosures and/or transaction-specific disclosures, the standard disclosures must be identified clearly as such and provided apart from the other disclosures (e.g., in an appendix).

Disclosures must be made in a clear and concise manner designed to make clear to such official the subject matter of such disclosures and their implications for the issuer in accordance with the following timelines.

• A sole underwriter or syndicate manager must make the standard disclosure concerning the arm’s-length nature of the underwriter-issuer relationship at the earliest stages of the underwriter’s relationship with the issuer with respect to an issue (e.g., in a response to a request for proposals or in promotional materials provided to an issuer).[21]

• A sole underwriter or syndicate manager must make the other standard disclosures regarding the underwriter’s role and compensation at or before the time the underwriter is engaged to perform underwriting services (e.g., in an engagement letter), not solely in a bond purchase agreement.

• An underwriter must make the dealer-specific disclosures at or before the time the underwriter has been engaged to perform the underwriting services.[22] Thereafter, an underwriter must make any applicable dealer-specific disclosures discovered or arising after being engaged as an underwriter as soon as practicable after being discovered and with sufficient time for the issuer to fully evaluate any such conflict and its implications.[23]

• An underwriter who recommends a financing structure or product to an issuer must make the transaction-specific disclosures in sufficient time before the execution of a commitment by an issuer (which may include a bond purchase agreement) relating to the financing, and with sufficient time to allow the issuer to fully evaluate the features of the financing.

Unless directed otherwise by an issuer, an underwriter may update selected portions of disclosures previously provided so long as such updates clearly identify the additions or deletions and are capable of being read independently of the prior disclosures.[24]

Acknowledgement of Disclosures. When delivering a disclosure, the underwriter must attempt to receive written acknowledgement[25] from an official of the issuer identified by the issuer as a primary contact for the issuer’s receipt of the foregoing disclosures.[26] In the absence of such identification, an underwriter may seek acknowledgement from an official of the issuer whom the underwriter reasonably believes has the authority to bind the issuer by contract with the underwriter and that, to the knowledge of the underwriter, is not party to a disclosed conflict. This notice does not specify the particular form of acknowledgement, but may include, for example, an e-mail read receipt.[27] An underwriter may proceed with a receipt of a written acknowledgement that includes an issuer’s reservation of rights or other self-protective language. If the official of the issuer agrees to proceed with the underwriting engagement after receipt of the disclosures but will not provide written acknowledgement of receipt, the underwriter responsible for making the requisite disclosure may proceed with the engagement after documenting with specificity why it was unable to obtain such written acknowledgement. Additionally, an underwriter must be able to produce evidence (including, for example, by automatic e-mail delivery receipt) that the disclosures were delivered with sufficient time for evaluation by the issuer before proceeding with the transaction. An issuer’s written acknowledgement of the receipt of disclosure is not dispositive of whether such disclosures were made with an appropriate amount of time. The analysis of whether disclosures were provided with sufficient time for an issuer’s review is based on the totality of the facts and circumstances.

Representations to Issuers

All representations made by underwriters to issuers in connection with municipal securities underwritings, whether written or oral, must be truthful and accurate and must not misrepresent or omit material facts. Underwriters must have a reasonable basis for the representations and other material information contained in documents they prepare and must refrain from including representations or other information they know or should know is inaccurate or misleading. For example, in connection with a certificate signed by the underwriter that will be relied upon by the issuer or other relevant parties to an underwriting (e.g., an issue price certificate), the dealer must have a reasonable basis for the representations and other material information contained therein.[28] In addition, an underwriter’s response to an issuer’s request for proposals or qualifications must fairly and accurately describe the underwriter’s capacity, resources, and knowledge to perform the proposed underwriting as of the time the proposal is submitted and must not contain any representations or other material information about such capacity, resources, or knowledge that the underwriter knows or should know to be inaccurate or misleading.[29] Matters not within the personal knowledge of those preparing the response (e.g., pending litigation) must be confirmed by those with knowledge of the subject matter. An underwriter must not represent that it has the requisite knowledge or expertise with respect to a particular financing if the personnel that it intends to work on the financing do not have the requisite knowledge or expertise.

Required Disclosures to Issuers

Many municipal securities are issued using financing structures that are routine and well understood by the typical municipal market professional, including most issuer personnel that have the lead responsibilities in connection with the issuance of municipal securities. For example, absent unusual circumstances or features, the typical fixed rate offering may be presumed to be well understood. Nevertheless, in the case of issuer personnel that the underwriter reasonably believes lack the requisite knowledge or experience to fully understand or assess the implications of a financing structures or products recommended by an underwriter, the underwriter making such recommendation must provide disclosures on the material aspects of such financing structures or product that it recommends (i.e., the “transaction-specific disclosures”).[30]

In some cases, issuer personnel responsible for the issuance of municipal securities would not be well positioned to fully understand or assess the implications of a recommended financing structure in its totality, because it is structured in a unique, atypical, or otherwise complex manner or incorporates unique, atypical, or otherwise complex features or products (a “complex municipal securities financing”).[31] Examples of complex municipal securities financings include, but are not limited to, variable rate demand obligations (“VRDOs”), financings involving derivatives (such as swaps), and financings in which interest rates are benchmarked to an index (such as LIBOR, SIFMA, or SOFR).[32] When a recommendation regarding a complex municipal securities financing structure has been made by an underwriter in a negotiated offering,[33] the underwriter making the recommendation has an obligation under Rule G-17 to communicate more particularized transaction-specific disclosures than those that may be required in the case of the recommendation of routine financing structures or products.[34] The underwriter making the recommendation must also disclose the material financial characteristics of the complex municipal securities financing, as well as the material financial risks of the financing that are known to the underwriter and reasonably foreseeable at the time of the disclosure.[35] It must also disclose any incentives for the recommendation of the complex municipal securities financing and other associated material conflicts of interest.[36] Such disclosures must be made in a fair and balanced manner based on principles of fair dealing and good faith.

The level of transaction-specific disclosure required may vary according to the issuer’s knowledge or experience with the proposed financing structure or similar structures, capability of evaluating the risks of the recommended financing structure or product, and financial ability to bear the risks of the recommended financing structure or product, in each case based on the reasonable belief of the underwriter.[37] Consequently, the level of transaction-specific disclosure to be provided to a particular issuer also can vary over time. In all events, the underwriter must disclose any incentives for the recommendation of the complex municipal securities financing and other associated conflicts of interest.

As previously mentioned, the transaction-specific disclosures must be made in writing to an official of the issuer identified by the issuer as a primary contact for the issuer for the receipt of such disclosures, or, in the absence of such identification, an underwriter may make such disclosures in writing to an issuer official whom the underwriter reasonably believes has the authority to bind the issuer by contract with the underwriter(s), and that, to the knowledge of the underwriter delivering the disclosure, is not a party to a disclosed conflict: (i) in sufficient time before the execution of a contract with the underwriter to allow the official to evaluate the recommendation (including consultation with any of its counsel or advisors) and (ii) in a manner designed to make clear to such official the subject matter of such disclosures and their implications for the issuer.

The disclosures concerning a complex municipal securities financing must address the specific elements of, and/or relevant products incorporated, into the recommended financing structure, rather than being general in nature.[38] An underwriter making a Complex Municipal Securities Financing Recommendation to an issuer cannot satisfy its fair dealing obligations by providing an issuer a single document setting out general descriptions of the various financing structures and/or products that may be recommended from time to time to various issuer clients that would effectively require issuer personnel to discover which disclosures apply to a particular recommendation and to the particular circumstances of that issuer. Underwriters can create, in anticipation of making such a recommendation, individualized descriptions, with appropriate levels of detail, of the material financial characteristics and risks for each of the various complex municipal securities financing structures and/or products (including any typical variations) they may recommend from time to time to various issuer clients, with such standardized descriptions serving as the base for more particularized disclosures for the specific complex financing the underwriter recommends to particular issuers.[39] In making a recommendation, an underwriter could incorporate, to the extent applicable, any refinements to the base description needed to fully describe the material financial features and risks unique to that financing.[40]

If the underwriter who has made a recommendation does not reasonably believe that the official to whom the disclosures are addressed is capable of independently evaluating the disclosures, the underwriter must make additional efforts reasonably designed to inform the official or its employees or agent. The underwriter also must make an independent assessment that such disclosures are appropriately tailored to the issuer’s level of sophistication.

Underwriter Duties in Connection with Issuer Disclosure Documents

Underwriters often play an important role in assisting issuers in the preparation of disclosure documents, such as preliminary official statements and official statements.[41] These documents are critical to the municipal securities transaction, because investors rely on the representations contained in such documents in making their investment decisions. Moreover, investment professionals, such as municipal securities analysts and ratings services, rely on the representations in forming an opinion regarding the credit. A dealer’s duty to have a reasonable basis for the representations it makes, and other material information it provides, to an issuer and to ensure that such representations and information are accurate and not misleading, as described above, extends to representations and information provided by the underwriter in connection with the preparation by the issuer of its disclosure documents (e.g., cash flows).

Underwriter Compensation and New Issue Pricing

Excessive Compensation. An underwriter’s compensation for a new issue (including both direct compensation paid by the issuer and other separate payments, values, or credits received by the underwriter from the issuer or any other party in connection with the underwriting), in certain cases and depending upon the specific facts and circumstances of the offering, may be so disproportionate to the nature of the underwriting and related services performed as to constitute an unfair practice with regard to the issuer that it is a violation of Rule G-17. Among the factors relevant to whether an underwriter’s compensation is disproportionate to the nature of the underwriting and related services performed, are the credit quality of the issue, the size of the issue, market conditions, the length of time spent structuring the issue, and whether the underwriter is paying the fee of the underwriter’s counsel or any other relevant costs related to the financing.

Fair Pricing. The duty of fair dealing under Rule G-17 includes an implied representation that the price an underwriter pays to an issuer is fair and reasonable, taking into consideration all relevant factors, including the best judgment of the underwriter as to the fair market value of the issue at the time it is priced.[42] In general, a dealer purchasing bonds in a competitive underwriting for which the issuer may reject any and all bids will be deemed to have satisfied its duty of fairness to the issuer with respect to the purchase price of the issue as long as the dealer’s bid is a bona fide bid (as defined in MSRB Rule G‑13)[43] that is based on the dealer’s best judgment of the fair market value of the securities that are the subject of the bid. In a negotiated underwriting, the underwriter has a duty under Rule G-17 to negotiate in good faith with the issuer. This duty includes the obligation of the dealer to ensure the accuracy of representations made during the course of such negotiations, including representations regarding the price negotiated and the nature of investor demand for the securities (e.g., the status of the order period and the order book). If, for example, the dealer represents to the issuer that it is providing the “best” market price available on the new issue, or that it will exert its best efforts to obtain the “most favorable” pricing, the dealer may violate Rule G-17 if its actions are inconsistent with such representations.[44]

Conflicts of Interest

Payments to or from Third Parties. In certain cases, compensation received by an underwriter from third parties, such as the providers of derivatives and investments (including affiliates of an underwriter), may color the underwriter’s judgment and cause it to recommend products, structures, and pricing levels to an issuer when it would not have done so absent such payments. The MSRB views the failure of an underwriter to disclose to the issuer the existence of payments, values, or credits received by an underwriter in connection with its underwriting of the new issue from parties other than the issuer, and payments made by the underwriter in connection with such new issue to parties other than the issuer (in either case including payments, values, or credits that relate directly or indirectly to collateral transactions integrally related to the issue being underwritten), to be a violation of an underwriter’s obligation to the issuer under Rule G-17.[45] For example, it would be a violation of Rule G-17 for an underwriter to compensate an undisclosed third party in order to secure municipal securities business. Similarly, it would be a violation of Rule G-17 for an underwriter to receive undisclosed compensation from a third party in exchange for recommending that third party’s services or product to an issuer, including business related to municipal securities derivative transactions. This notice does not require that the amount of such third-party payments be disclosed. The underwriter must also disclose to the issuer whether it has entered into any third-party arrangements for the marketing of the issuer’s securities.

Profit-Sharing with Investors. Arrangements between the underwriter and an investor purchasing new issue securities from the underwriter (including purchases that are contingent upon the delivery by the issuer to the underwriter of the securities) according to which profits realized from the resale by such investor of the securities are directly or indirectly split or otherwise shared with the underwriter also would, depending on the facts and circumstances (including in particular if such resale occurs reasonably close in time to the original sale by the underwriter to the investor), constitute a violation of the underwriter’s fair dealing obligation under Rule G-17.[46] Such arrangements could also constitute a violation of Rule G‑25(c), which precludes a dealer from sharing, directly or indirectly, in the profits or losses of a transaction in municipal securities with or for a customer. An underwriter should carefully consider whether any such arrangement, regardless of whether it constitutes a violation of Rule G-25(c), may evidence a potential failure of the underwriter’s duty with regard to new issue pricing described above.

Credit Default Swaps. The issuance or purchase by a dealer of credit default swaps for which the reference is the issuer for which the dealer is serving as underwriter, or an obligation of that issuer, may pose a conflict of interest, including a dealer-specific conflict of interest, because trading in such municipal credit default swaps has the potential to affect the pricing of the underlying reference obligations, as well as the pricing of other obligations brought to market by that issuer. Rule G-17 requires, therefore, that a dealer disclose the fact that it engages in such activities to the issuers for which it serves as underwriter. Activities with regard to credit default swaps based on baskets or indexes of municipal issuers that include the issuer or its obligation(s) need not be disclosed, unless the issuer or its obligation(s) represents more than 2% of the total notional amount of the credit default swap or the underwriter otherwise caused the issuer or its obligation(s) to be included in the basket or index.

Retail Order Periods

Rule G-17 requires an underwriter that has agreed to underwrite a transaction with a retail order period to, in fact, honor such agreement.[47]A dealer that wishes to allocate securities in a manner that is inconsistent with an issuer’s requirements must not do so without the issuer’s consent. In addition, Rule G-17 requires an underwriter that has agreed to underwrite a transaction with a retail order period to take reasonable measures to ensure that retail clients are bona fide. An underwriter that knowingly accepts an order that has been framed as a retail order when it is not (e.g., a number of small orders placed by an institutional investor that would otherwise not qualify as a retail customer) would violate Rule G-17 if its actions are inconsistent with the issuer’s expectations regarding retail orders. In addition, a dealer that places an order that is framed as a qualifying retail order but in fact represents an order that does not meet the qualification requirements to be treated as a retail order (e.g., an order by a retail dealer without “going away” orders[48] from retail customers, when such orders are not within the issuer’s definition of “retail”) violates its Rule G-17 duty of fair dealing. The MSRB will continue to review activities relating to retail order periods to ensure that they are conducted in a fair and orderly manner consistent with the intent of the issuer and the MSRB’s investor protection mandate.

Dealer Payments to Issuer Personnel

Dealers are reminded of the application of MSRB Rule G-20, on gifts, gratuities, and non-cash compensation, and Rule G-17, in connection with certain payments made to, and expenses reimbursed for, issuer personnel during the municipal bond issuance process.[49]  These rules are designed to avoid conflicts of interest and to promote fair practices in the municipal securities market.

Dealers should consider carefully whether payments they make in regard to expenses of issuer personnel in the course of the bond issuance process, including in particular, but not limited to, payments for which dealers seek reimbursement from bond proceeds or issuers, comport with the requirements of Rule G‑20. For example, a dealer acting as a financial advisor or underwriter may violate Rule G-20 by paying for excessive or lavish travel, meal, lodging and entertainment expenses in connection with an offering (such as may be incurred for rating agency trips, bond closing dinners, and other functions) that inure to the personal benefit of issuer personnel and that exceed the limits or otherwise violate the requirements of the rule.[50] 

The Board has received an inquiry concerning a situation in which a municipal securities dealer that is acting as a syndicate manager sells bonds "short" for its own account to the detriment of the syndicate account. In particular, the Board has been made aware of allegations that certain syndicate managers, with knowledge that the syndicate account on a particular new issue of securities is not successful, have sold securities of the new issue "short" for their own accounts and then required syndicate members to take their allotments of unsold bonds. The syndicate managers allegedly have subsequently covered their short positions when the syndicate members attempt to sell their allotments at the lower market price.

Rule G-17, the Board’s fair dealing rule, provides:

In the conduct of its municipal securities business, each broker, dealer, and municipal securities dealer shall deal fairly with all persons and shall not engage in any deceptive, dishonest, or unfair practice.

Syndicate managers act in a fiduciary capacity in relation to syndicate accounts. Therefore they may not use proprietary information about the account obtained solely as a result of acting as manager to their personal advantage over the syndicate’s best interests. The Board is of the view that a syndicate manager that uses information on the status of the syndicate account which is not available to syndicate members to its own benefit and to the detriment of the syndicate account (e.g., by effecting "short sale" transactions for its own account against the interests of other syndicate members) appears to be acting in violation of the fair dealing provisions of rule G-17.

The Board has received inquiries whether individuals who solicit new account business on behalf of municipal securities dealers must be qualified under the Board’s rules. In particular, it has come to the Board’s attention that nonqualified individuals are making "cold calls" to individuals and, by reading from prepared scripts, introduce the services offered by a municipal securities dealer, prequalify potential customers, or suggest the purchase of specific securities currently being offered by a municipal securities dealer.

Board rule G-3(a) defines municipal securities representative activities to include any activity which involves communication with public investors regarding the sale of municipal securities but exempts activities that are solely clerical or ministerial. In the past, the Board has permitted nonqualified individuals, under the clerical or ministerial exemption, to contact existing customers in very limited circumstances. In an interpretive notice on rule G-3, the Board permitted certain ministerial and clerical functions to be performed by nonqualified individuals when municipal securities representatives and principals who normally handle the customers' accounts are unavailable, subject to strict supervisory requirements. These functions are: the recording and transmission in customary channels of orders, the reading of approved quotations, and the giving of reports of transactions. In this notice, the Board added that solicitation of orders by clerical personnel is not permitted. The Board is of the view that individuals who solicit new account business are not engaging in clerical or ministerial activities but rather are communicating with public investors regarding the sale of municipal securities and thus are engaging in municipal securities representative activities which require such individuals to be qualified as representatives under the Board’s rules.

Finally, under rule G-3(i)[*], a person serving an apprenticeship period prior to qualification as a municipal securities representative may not communicate with public investors regarding the sale of municipal securities. The Board sees no reason to allow nonqualified individuals to contact public investors, except for the limited functions noted above, when persons training to become qualified municipal securities representatives may not do so.

[*] [Currently codified at rule G-3(a)(iii)]

Agency transactions: yield disclosures. I am writing in connection with your previous conversations with Christopher Taylor of the Board's staff concerning the application of the yield disclosure requirements of Board rule G-15 to certain types of transactions in municipal securities. In your conversations you noted that dealers occasionally effect transactions in municipal securities on an "agency" basis. In these transactions the customer's confirmation would typically show as the dollar price of the transaction the price paid by the dealer to the person from whom it acquired the securities; the dealer's remuneration, received in the form of a commission paid by the customer, is typically shown separately, as a charge included in the summing of the total dollar amount due from (or to) the customer in connection with the transaction. You inquired whether, in such a transaction, the yield to the customer disclosed on the confirmation should be derived from the price shown as the dollar price of the transaction or from the total dollar amount of the transaction (i.e., whether the yield should show the effect of the commission charged).

This will confirm Mr. Taylor's advice to you that the yield shown on the confirmation of such a transaction should be derived from the total dollar amount of the transaction, and therefore should show the effect of the commission charged to the customer on the transaction. As the Board has previously stated, the yield disclosure on customer confirmations is intended to provide customers with a means of assessing the merits of alternative investment strategies and the merits of the transaction being confirmed. The disclosure of the yield after giving effect to the commission charged the customer best serves these purposes. MSRB interpretation of July 13, 1984.

The Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board has recently received a number of inquiries from members of the municipal securities industry and others concerning certain of the provisions of rule G-33 on calculations. In particular, such persons have inquired concerning the acceptability under the rule of the practice of interpolation as a method of determining dollar price from yield. Such persons have also asked whether the rule permits a dealer effecting a transaction at a yield price equal to the interest rate on the securities to presume that the dollar price on the transaction is "100."

The Board wishes to remind members of the industry that both of these practices are no longer permissible. Board rule G-33 generally requires that yields and dollar prices on transactions effected by municipal securities brokers and dealers be computed in accordance with the formulas prescribed in the rule directly to the settlement date of the transaction. Subparagraph (b)(i)(C) of the rule permitted, until January 1, 1984, the use of the dollar price "100" as the presumed result on transactions in securities with a redemption value of par effected at a yield price equal to the interest rate on the securities. Subparagraph (b)(i)(D) of the rule permitted, until January 1, 1984, the use of interpolation as a method of deriving a dollar price. Since the effectiveness of both of these provisions lapsed as of January 1, 1984, therefore, these practices are no longer in compliance with the requirements of the rule; dollar prices on all transactions effected on a yield basis (including transactions effected on a yield basis equal to the interest rate) should therefore be computed directly to the settlement date of the transaction.

The Board notes that the rule continues to permit a municipal securities broker or dealer to effect a transaction in dollar price terms. Therefore, a dealer wishing to offer or sell a security at par may continue to effect the transaction on a direct dollar price basis at a price of "100."

Issuer consent: financial advisor participation in underwriting. This responds to your letter of March 6, 1984, regarding the application of rule G-23, concerning the activities of financial advisors to the following activities of [name deleted] (the "Company").

Your letter states that the Company serves as a financial advisor to a number of municipal entities with respect to the issuance and delivery of bonds. In the majority of circumstances in which bonds are to be marketed through a competitive bidding process, the Company is requested by the issuer either to bid for the bonds independently for its own account or as a participant with others in a syndicate organized to submit a bid. You state that the Company’s customary financial advisory contract, in almost all instances, specifically reserves to the Company the right to bid independently or in a syndicate with others for any bonds marketed through a competitive bid.

However, to further accommodate these circumstances, you state that it is the Company’s practice to include in the official statement on any bond issue subject to competitive bids specific language, such as:

The Company is employed as Financial Advisor to the City in connection with the issuance of the Bonds. The Financial Advisor’s fee for services rendered with respect to the sale of the Bond is contingent upon the issuance and delivery of the Bonds. The Company may submit a bid for the Bonds, either independently or as a member of a syndicate organized to submit a bid for the Bonds.

In the notice of sale, the following language is included:

The Company, the City’s Financial Advisor, reserves the right to bid on the Bonds.

You add that these two documents, the official statement and the notice of sale, must be approved by formal resolution of the governing authority of the issuer, such as a city council or a board of directors, before bids are requested or on the date of sale. You ask whether the above language printed in the official statement and the notice of sale, which is approved by formal resolution of the governing authority of the issuer, constitutes compliance with rule G-23(d)(ii).

Rule G-23, concerning the activities of financial advisors, is designed to minimize the prima facie conflict of interest that exists when a municipal securities professional acts as both financial advisor and underwriter with respect to the same issue. Specifically, rule G-23(d)(ii) provides that a municipal securities dealer which is acting as a financial advisor may not acquire or participate in the distribution of a new issue unless,

if such issue is to be sold by the issuer at competitive bid, the issuer has expressly consented in writing prior to the bid to such acquisition or participation.

Compliance with the rule’s requirement that an issuer expressly consent in writing to the financial advisor’s participation in the underwriting cannot be inferred from its approval of the official statement and notice of sale. These documents are designed primarily to describe the new issue and a passing reference to the advisor’s possible participation in the underwriting of the bond issue cannot be construed as express approval of such activity since it is not clear that the issuer is provided with a sufficient opportunity to determine whether it is in its best interests to allow its financial advisor to participate in the competitive bidding.

While the Board does not mandate the form of the issuer’s consent, it understands that financial advisory contracts often may include consent language applicable to a specific new issue. Alternatively, financial advisors may obtain the consent of an issuer by means of a separate document. However, a financial advisory contract that reserves to the financial advisor the right to bid for any of the issuer’s bonds marketed through a competitive bid does not satisfy the requirements of rule G-23(d)(ii). The Board has stated that such "blanket consents" do not afford an issuer a sufficient opportunity to consider whether, under the particular circumstances of an offering, the financial advisor’s potential conflict of interest is sufficient to warrant not consenting to the financial advisor’s participation in the sale. MSRB interpretation of April 10, 1984.

Fixed-price offerings. This responds to your letter of February 17, 1984, requesting our view on the applicability of the Board's rules to the following situation:

[Name deleted] the ("Dealer") is an underwriter of industrial revenue bonds. It underwrites on average three or four issues per month and sells them almost entirely on a retail basis to individual investors. The coupon rates are fixed at current market levels. The bonds are then offered to the public at par. Official statements are provided to investors, fully disclosing all pertinent information and making clear note of the fact that the initial offering price of par may be changed without prior notice.

Recently, interest rates dropped significantly during the two or three-week time period needed for the Dealer to sell out a bond issue. This caused the offering price of the fixed rate municipal bonds to rise above the initial offering price stated in the official statement. All of this occurred before the closing of the syndicate account. You ask specifically whether, under the Board's rules, it is permissible to raise the offering price of municipal bonds which are part of a new issue above the initial price before the close of the underwriting period.

Board rule G-11 generally requires syndicates to establish priorities for different categories of orders and requires that certain disclosures be made to syndicate members which are intended to assure that allocations are made in accordance with those priorities. The rule also requires that the manager provide account information to syndicate members in writing. The Board has described rule G-11 as a "disclosure rule" designed to provide information to new issue participants so that they can understand and evaluate syndicate practices. The rule does not, however, dictate what those practices must be. Thus, rule G-11 does not require that the offering price of new issue municipal securities remain fixed through the underwriting period. The Board considered the issue of fixed-price offerings when it formulated rule G-11 and again when the Public Securities Association, in 1981, asked the Board to consider the adoption of rules governing the granting of concessions in new issues of municipal securities. Since the kind of fixed-price offering system developed for corporate securities has not been the primary means of distributing municipal securities and in light of industry concerns that any such proposed regulations could unnecessarily restrict prices and increase the borrowing costs for municipal issues, the Board determined not to adopt any rules addressing the issue. [1]

Finally, we know of no laws or regulations which purport to require fixed-price offerings for new issue municipal securities, and the NASD's rules in this area do not apply to transactions in municipal securities.[2] Of course, Board rule G-30, on prices and commissions, prohibits a dealer from buying municipal securities for its own account from a customer or selling municipal securities for its own account to a customer at an aggregate price unless that price is reasonable taking into consideration all relevant factors. MSRB interpretation of March 16, 1984.

[1] For a fuller explanation of the Board's review of G-11 in this area, See Notice Concerning Board Determination Not to Adopt Concession Rules, [MSRB Reports, Vol. 2, No. 5 (July 1982) at 7].

[2] See NASD Rules of Fair Practice, Article II, Section 1, subsection (m) [currently codified as NASD Rule 114].

The Board has received inquiries concerning the duty of municipal securities brokers and dealers to allocate partial calls fairly among customer securities held in safekeeping. In particular, it has come to the Board’s attention that certain municipal securities dealers use lottery systems that include only customer positions and exclude the dealer’s proprietary accounts when the call is exercised at a price below the current market value.

The Board recognizes that lottery systems are a proper method of allocating the results of a partial call. Principles of fair dealing require that all such lotteries treat dealer and customer account alike. The Board is of the view that a municipal securities dealer which uses a lottery that excludes the dealer’s proprietary accounts when the call is exercised at a price below the current market value is acting in violation of rule G-17, the Board’s fair dealing rule.[1]

[1] Rule G-17 provides:

In the conduct of its municipal securities business, each broker, dealer, and municipal securities dealer shall deal fairly with all persons and shall not engage in any deceptive, dishonest, or unfair practice.

Callable securities: pricing to call and extraordinary mandatory redemption features. This is in response to your November 16, 1983, letter concerning the application of the Board's rules to sales of municipal securities that are subject to extraordinary redemption features.

As a general matter, rule G-17 of the Board's rules of fair practice requires municipal securities brokers and dealers to deal fairly with all persons and prohibits them from engaging in any deceptive, dishonest, or unfair practice. The Board has interpreted this rule to require, in connection with the purchase from or sale of a municipal security to a customer, that a dealer must disclose, at or before the time the transaction occurs, all material facts concerning the transaction and not omit any material facts which would render other statements misleading. The fact that a security may be redeemed "in whole," "in part," or in extraordinary circumstances prior to maturity is essential to a customer's investment decision about the security and is one of the facts a dealer must disclose prior to the transaction. It should be noted that the Board has determined that certain items of information must, because of their materiality, be disclosed on confirmations of transactions. However, a confirmation is not received by a customer until after a transaction is effected and is not meant to take the place of oral disclosure prior to the time the trade occurs.

You ask whether, for an issue which has more than one call feature, the disclosure requirements of MSRB rule G-15 would be better served by merely stating on the confirmation that the bonds are callable, instead of disclosing the terms of one call feature and not another. Board rule G-15, among other things, prescribes what items of information must be disclosed on confirmations of transactions with customers.[1] Rule G-15(a)(i)(E)[*] requires that customer confirmations contain a materially complete description of the securities and specifically identifies the fact that securities are subject to redemption prior to maturity as one item that must be specified. The Board is of the view that the fact that a security may be subject to an "in whole" or "in part" call is a material fact for an individual making an investment decision about the securities and has further required in rule G-15a(iii)(D)[†] that confirmations of transactions in callable securities must state that the resulting yield may be affected by the exercise of a call provision, and that information relating to call provisions is available upon request.[2]

With respect to the computation of yields and dollar prices, rule G-15(a)(i)(I)[‡] requires that the yield and dollar price for the transaction be disclosed as the price (if the transaction is done on a yield basis) or yield (if the transaction is done on the basis of a dollar price) calculated to the lowest price or yield to call, to par option, or to maturity. The provision also requires, in cases in which the resulting dollar price or yield shown on the confirmation is calculated to call or par option, that this must be stated and the call or option date and price used in the calculation must be shown. The Board has determined that, for purposes of making this computation, only "in whole" calls should be used.[3] This requirement reflects the longstanding practice of the municipal securities industry and advises a purchaser what amount of return he can expect to realize from the investment and the terms under which such return would be realized.

You also ask whether it is reasonable to infer from the discharge of one call feature that no other call features exist. As discussed above, the Board requires a customer confirmation to disclose, when applicable, that a security is subject to redemption prior to maturity and that the call feature may affect the security's yield. This requirement applies to securities subject to either "in whole" or "in part" calls. Moreover, as noted earlier, because information concerning call features is material information, principles of fair dealing embodied by rule G-17 require that these details be disclosed orally at the time of trade.

By contrast, identification of the first "in-whole" call date and its price must be made only when they are used to compute the yield or resulting dollar price for a transaction. This disclosure is designed only to advise an investor what information was used in computing the lowest of yield or price to call, to par option, or to maturity and is not meant to describe the only call features of the municipal security.

In addition, in the case of the sale of new issue securities during the underwriting period, Board rule G-32 requires that ... a copy of the final official statement, if any, must be provided to the customer.[4] While the official statement would describe all call features of an issue, it must be emphasized that delivery of this document does not relieve a dealer of its obligation to advise a customer of material characteristics and facts concerning the security at the time of trade.

Finally, you ask whether the omission of this or other call features on the confirmation is a material omission of the kind which would be actionable under SEC rule 10b-5. The Board is not empowered to interpret the Securities Exchange Act or rules thereunder; that responsibility has been delegated to the Securities and Exchange Commission. We note, however, that the failure to disclose the existence of a call feature would violate rule G-15 and, in egregious situations, also may violate rule G-17, the Board's fair dealing rule. MSRB interpretation of February 10 1984.

[1] Similar requirements are specified in rule G-12 for confirmations of inter-dealer transactions.

[2] The rule states that this requirement will be satisfied by placing in footnote or otherwise the statement:

"[Additional] call features ... exist [that may] affect yield; complete information will be provided upon request."

[3] See [Rule G-15 Interpretation - Notice concerning pricing to call], December 10, 1980 ... at ¶ 3571.

[4] The term underwriting period is defined in rule G-11 as:

the period commencing with the first submission to a syndicate of an order for the purchase of new issue municipal securities or the purchase of such securities from the issuer, whichever first occurs, and ending at such time as the issuer delivers the securities to the syndicate or the syndicate no longer retains an unsold balance of securities, whichever last occurs.

[*] [Currently codified at rule G-15(a)(i)(C)]

[†] [Currently codified at rule G-15(a)(i)(C)(2)(a)]

[‡] [Currently codified at rule G-15(a)(i)(A)(5)]

NOTE: Revised to reflect subsequent amendments.

From time to time, industry members have asked the Board for guidance in situations in which municipal securities dealers have traded securities which either are different from those described ("misdescribed") or do not exist as described ("non-existent") and the parties involved were unaware of this fact at the time of trade. A sale of a misdescribed security may occur, for example, when a minor characteristic of the issue is misstated. A sale of a non-existent security may result, for example, from the sale of a "when, as and if issued" security which is never authorized or issued.

The Board has responded to these inquiries by advising that its rules do not address the resolution of any underlying contractual dispute arising from trades in such misdescribed or non-existent securities, and that the parties involved in the trade should work out an appropriate resolution. Board rule G-12(g) does permit reclamation of an inter-dealer delivery in certain instances in which information required to be included on a confirmation by rule G-12(c)(v)(E)[1] is omitted or erroneously noted on the confirmation or where other material information is erroneously noted on the confirmation. Rule G-12(g)(v) and (vi), however, make clear that a reclamation only reverses the act of delivery and reinstates the open contract on the terms and conditions of the original contract, requiring the parties to work out an appropriate resolution of the transaction.

The Board wishes to emphasize that general principles of fair dealing would seem to require that a seller of non-existent or misdescribed securities make particular effort to reach an agreement on some disposition of the open trade with the purchaser. The Board believes that this obligation arises since it is usually the seller's responsibility to determine the status of the municipal securities it is offering for sale. The extent to which the seller bears this responsibility, of course, may vary, depending on the facts of a trade.

The Board notes that the status of the underlying contract claim for trades in non-existent or misdescribed securities ultimately is a matter of state law, and each fact situation must be dealt with under applicable state law, and each fact situation must be dealt with under applicable contract principles. The Board believes that the position set forth above is consistent with general contract principles, which commonly hold that a seller is responsible to the purchaser in most instances for failing to deliver goods as identified in the contract, or for negligently contracting for goods which do not exist if the purchaser relied in good faith on the seller's representation that the goods existed.

Parties to trades in misdescribed or non-existent securities should attempt to work out an appropriate resolution of the contractual agreement. If no agreement is reached, the Board's close-out and arbitration procedures may be available.

[1] Rule G-12(c)(v)(E) requires that confirmations contain a description of the securities, including at a minimum the name of the issuer, interest rate, maturity date, and if the securities are limited tax, subject to redemption prior to maturity (callable), or revenue bonds, an indication to such effect, including in the case of revenue bonds the type of revenue, if necessary for a materially complete description of the securities and in the case of any securities, if necessary for a materially complete description of the securities, the name of any company or other person in addition to the issuer obligated, directly or indirectly, with respect to debt service or, if there is more than one such obligor, the statement "multiple obligors" may be shown.

Delivery requirements: mutilated coupons. I am writing in response to your recent letter concerning the provisions of Board rule G-12(e) with respect to inter-dealer deliveries of securities with mutilated coupons attached. You indicate that your firm recently became involved in a dispute with another firm’s clearing agent concerning whether certain coupons attached to securities your firm had delivered to the agent were mutilated. You request guidance as to the standards set forth in rule G-12(e) for the identification of mutilated coupons.

As you are aware, rule G-12(e)(ix) indicates that a coupon will be considered to be mutilated if the coupon is damaged to the extent that any one of the following cannot be ascertained from the coupon:

(A) title of the issuer;

(B) certificate number;

(C) coupon number or payment date...;

or

(D) the fact that there is a signature... (emphasis added)

The standard set forth in the rule (that the information "cannot be ascertained") was deliberately chosen to make clear that minimal damage to a coupon is not sufficient to cause that coupon to be considered mutilated. For example, if the certificate number imprinted on a coupon is partially torn, but a sufficient portion of the coupon remains to permit identification of the number, the coupon would not be considered to be mutilated under the standard set forth in the rule, and a rejection of the delivery due to the damage to the coupon would not be permitted. In the case of the damaged coupon shown on the sample certificate enclosed with your letter, it seems clear that the certificate number can be identified, and confusion with another number would not be possible; therefore, this coupon would not be considered to be mutilated under the rule, and a rejection of a delivery due to the damage to this coupon would not be in accordance with the rule's provisions.

Your letter also inquires as to the means by which dealers can obtain redress in the event that a delivery is rejected due to damaged coupons which are not, in their view, mutilated under the standard set forth in the rule. I note that rule G-12(h)(ii) sets forth a procedure for a close-out by a selling dealer in the event that a delivery is improperly rejected by the purchaser; this procedure could be used in the circumstances you describe to obtain redress in this situation. Further, the arbitration procedure under Board rule G-35 could also be used in the event that the dealer incurs additional costs as a result of such an improper rejection of a delivery. MSRB interpretation of January 4, 1984.

Yield disclosures: yields to call on zero coupon bonds. I am writing in response to your letter of October 18, 1983 concerning the appropriate method of disclosing on a confirmation a call price used in the computation of a dollar price or yield on a transaction in a zero coupon, compound interest, multiplier, or other similar type of security. In your letter you indicate that the call features on these types of securities often express the call prices in terms of a percentage of the compound accreted value of the security as of the call date.[1] You note that, in computing a price or yield to such a call feature, it is necessary for the computing dealer to convert such a call price into its equivalent in terms of a percentage of maturity value (i.e., into a standard dollar price), and use this figure in the computation. You inquire whether, in circumstances where the confirmation of a transaction is required to disclose a yield or dollar price computed to such a call feature, the call price used in the calculation should be stated on the confirmation in terms of the percentage of the compound accreted value or in terms of the equivalent percentage of maturity value.

The requirement which is the subject of your inquiry is set forth in Board rule G-15(a)(i)(I)[*] as follows:

In cases in which the resulting dollar price or yield shown on the confirmation is calculated to call or par option, this must be stated, and the call or option date and price used in the calculation must be shown...[2]

The Board is of the view that, in the case of a computation of a yield or dollar price to a call or option feature on a transaction in a zero coupon or similar security, the call price shown on the confirmation should be expressed in terms of a percentage of the security's maturity value. The Board believes that the disclosure of the call price in terms of the security's maturity value would provide more meaningful information to the purchaser, since other confirmation disclosure on these types of securities are also expressed in terms of the security's maturity value. This form of disclosure therefore presents the information to a purchaser in a consistent format, thereby facilitating the purchaser's understanding of the information shown on the confirmation. The Board notes also that this form of disclosure is simpler and requires less confirmation space to present. MSRB interpretation of January 4, 1984.

[1] For example, the selected portions of an official statement describing one of these types of issues enclosed with your letter indicate that the security in question is callable on October 1, 1993 at 108% of the security's compound accreted value on that date (which is indicated elsewhere in the official statement to be $146.02 per $1,000 of maturity value).

[2] Comparable requirements with respect to inter-dealer confirmations are set forth in Board rule G-12(c)(v)(I).

[*] [Currently codified at rule G-15(a)(i)(A)(5)]