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Interpretive Notice Concerning the Application of MSRB Rule G-17 to Underwriters of Municipal Securities
Under Rule G-17 of the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB), brokers, dealers, and municipal securities dealers (“dealers”) must, in the conduct of their municipal securities activities, deal fairly with all persons and must not engage in any deceptive, dishonest, or unfair practice. This rule is most often cited in connection with duties owed by dealers to investors; however, it also applies to their interactions with other market participants, including municipal entities[1] such as states and their political subdivisions that are issuers of municipal securities (“issuers”).
The MSRB has previously observed that Rule G-17 requires dealers to deal fairly with issuers.[2] With the passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,[3] the MSRB was expressly directed by Congress to protect municipal entities. Accordingly, in 2012, the MSRB provided additional interpretive guidance that addressed how Rule G-17 applies to dealers acting in the capacity of underwriters in the municipal securities transactions described therein (the “2012 Interpretive Notice”).[4]
This notice supersedes the MSRB’s 2012 Interpretive Notice, dated August 2, 2012, concerning the application of Rule G-17 to underwriters of municipal securities, as well as the related implementation guidance, dated July 18, 2012, and frequently-asked questions, dated March 25, 2013 (the “prior guidance”).[5] The prior guidance will remain applicable to underwriting relationships commencing prior to March 31, 2021. Underwriters will be subject to the amended guidance provided by this notice for all of their underwriting relationships beginning on or after that date. For purposes of this notice, an underwriting relationship is considered to have begun at the time the delivery of the first disclosure is triggered as described under “Timing and Manner of Disclosures” below (i.e., the earliest stages of an underwriter’s relationship with an issuer with respect to an issue, such as in a response to a request for proposal or in promotional materials provided to an issuer).
Applicability of the Notice
Except where a competitive underwriting is specifically mentioned, this notice applies to negotiated underwritings only.[6] This notice does not apply to a dealer acting as a primary distributor in a continuous offering of municipal fund securities, such as interests in 529 savings plans and Achieving a Better Life Experience (ABLE) programs. It does not apply to selling group members. This notice does not address a dealer’s duties when the dealer is serving as an advisor to a municipal entity. This notice applies to a primary offering of a new issue of municipal securities that is placed with investors by a dealer serving as placement agent, although certain disclosures may be omitted as described below.
The fair practice duties outlined in this notice are those duties that a dealer owes to a municipal entity when the dealer underwrites a new issue of municipal securities. This notice does not set out the underwriter’s fair-practice duties to other parties to a municipal securities financing (e.g., conduit borrowers). The MSRB notes, however, that Rule G-17 does require that an underwriter deal fairly with all persons in the course of the dealer’s municipal securities activities. What actions are considered fair will, of necessity, be dependent on the nature of the relationship between a dealer and such other parties, the particular actions undertaken, and all other relevant facts and circumstances. Although this notice does not address what an underwriter’s fair-dealing duties may be with respect to other parties, it may serve as one of many bases for an underwriter to consider how to establish appropriate policies and procedures for ensuring that it meets such fair-practice obligations, in light of its relationship with such other participants and their particular roles.
The examples discussed in this notice are illustrative only and are not meant to encompass all obligations of dealers to municipal entities under Rule G-17. Furthermore, when municipal entities are customers[7] of dealers, they are subject to the same protections under MSRB rules, including Rule G‑17, that apply to other customers.[8] The MSRB notes that an underwriter has a duty of fair dealing to investors in addition to its duty of fair dealing to issuers. An underwriter also has a duty to comply with other MSRB rules as well as other federal and state securities laws.
Basic Fair Dealing Principle
As noted above, Rule G-17 precludes a dealer, in the conduct of its municipal securities activities, from engaging in any deceptive, dishonest, or unfair practice with any person, including an issuer. The rule contains an anti-fraud prohibition. Thus, an underwriter must not misrepresent or omit the facts, risks, potential benefits, or other material information about municipal securities activities undertaken with a municipal issuer. However, Rule G-17 does not merely prohibit deceptive conduct on the part of the dealer; it also establishes a general duty of a dealer to deal fairly with all persons (including, but not limited to, issuers), even in the absence of fraud.
Role of Underwriters and Conflicts of Interest
In negotiated underwritings, underwriters’ Rule G-17 duty to deal fairly with an issuer requires certain disclosures to the issuer in connection with an issue or proposed issue of municipal securities, as provided below.[9]
- The disclosures discussed under “Disclosures Concerning the Underwriters’ Role” and “Disclosures Concerning Underwriters’ Compensation” (the “standard disclosures”) must be provided by the sole underwriter or the syndicate manager[10] to the issuer as described below.
- The disclosures discussed under “Required Disclosures to Issuers” (the “transaction-specific disclosures”) must be provided to the issuer by the underwriter who has recommended a financing structure or product to the issuer as described below.[11]
- The disclosures discussed under “Other Conflicts Disclosures” (the “dealer-specific disclosures”) must be provided by the sole underwriter or each underwriter in a syndicate (as applicable) as described below.[12]
Disclosures Concerning the Underwriter’s Role. The sole underwriter or the syndicate manager[13] must disclose to the issuer that:
| (i) | Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board Rule G-17 requires an underwriter to deal fairly at all times with both issuers and investors; |
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| (ii) | the underwriter’s primary role is to purchase securities with a view to distribution in an arm’s-length commercial transaction with the issuer and it has financial and other interests that differ from those of the issuer;[14] |
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| (iii) | unlike a municipal advisor, the underwriter does not have a fiduciary duty to the issuer under the federal securities laws and is, therefore, not required by federal law to act in the best interests of the issuer without regard to its own financial or other interests;[15] |
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| (iv) | the issuer may choose to engage the services of a municipal advisor with a fiduciary obligation to represent the issuer’s interests in the transaction; |
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| (v) | the underwriter has a duty to purchase securities from the issuer at a fair and reasonable price, but must balance that duty with its duty to sell municipal securities to investors at prices that are fair and reasonable; and |
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| (vi) | the underwriter will review the official statement for the issuer’s securities in accordance with, and as part of, its responsibilities to investors under the federal securities laws, as applied to the facts and circumstances of the transaction.[16] |
Underwriters also must not recommend that issuers not retain a municipal advisor. Accordingly, underwriters may not discourage issuers from using a municipal advisor or otherwise imply that the hiring of a municipal advisor would be redundant because the sole underwriter or underwriting syndicate can provide the services that a municipal advisor would.
Disclosure Concerning the Underwriters’ Compensation. The sole underwriter or syndicate manager must disclose to issuers whether underwriting compensation will be contingent on the closing of a transaction. Sole underwriters or syndicate managers must also disclose that compensation that is contingent on the closing of a transaction or the size of a transaction presents a conflict of interest, because it may cause underwriters to recommend a transaction that is unnecessary or to recommend that the size of a transaction be larger than is necessary.
Other Conflicts Disclosures. The sole underwriter or each underwriter in a syndicate must also, when and if applicable, disclose other dealer-specific actual material conflicts of interest and potential material conflicts of interest,[17] including, but not limited to, the following:
| (i) | any payments described below under “Conflicts of Interest/Payments to or from Third Parties”;[18] |
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| (ii) | any arrangements described below under “Conflicts of Interest/Profit-Sharing with Investors”; |
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| (iii) | the credit default swap disclosures described below under “Conflicts of Interest/Credit Default Swaps”; and |
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| (iv) | any incentives for the underwriter to recommend a complex municipal securities financing and other associated conflicts of interest (as described below under “Required Disclosures to Issuers”).[19] |
These categories of conflicts of interest are not mutually exclusive and, in some cases, a specific conflict may reasonably be viewed as falling into two or even more categories. An underwriter making disclosures of dealer-specific conflicts of interest to an issuer should concentrate on making them in a complete and understandable manner and need not necessarily organize them according to the categories listed above, particularly if adhering to a strict categorization process might interfere with the clarity and conciseness of disclosures.
Where there is a syndicate, each underwriter in the syndicate has a duty to provide its dealer-specific disclosures to the issuer. In general, dealer-specific disclosures for one dealer cannot be satisfied by disclosures made by another dealer (e.g., the syndicate manager) because such disclosures are, by their nature, not uniform, and must be prepared by each dealer. However, a syndicate manager may deliver each of the dealer-specific disclosures to the issuer as part of a single package of disclosures, as long as it is clear to which dealer each disclosure is attributed. An underwriter in the syndicate is not required to notify an issuer if it has determined that it does not have any dealer-specific disclosures to make. However, the obligation to provide dealer-specific disclosures includes material conflicts of interest arising after the time of engagement with the issuer, as noted below.
Timing and Manner of Disclosures. The standard disclosures, transaction-specific disclosures, and dealer-specific disclosures must be made in writing to an official of the issuer identified by the issuer as a primary contact for that issuer for the receipt of the foregoing disclosures. In the absence of such identification, an underwriter may make such disclosures in writing to an official of the issuer that the underwriter reasonably believes has the authority to bind the issuer by contract with the underwriter and that, to the knowledge of the underwriter, is not a party to a disclosed conflict.[20] If provided within the same document as the dealer-specific disclosures and/or transaction-specific disclosures, the standard disclosures must be identified clearly as such and provided apart from the other disclosures (e.g., in an appendix).
Disclosures must be made in a clear and concise manner designed to make clear to such official the subject matter of such disclosures and their implications for the issuer in accordance with the following timelines.
- A sole underwriter or syndicate manager must make the standard disclosure concerning the arm’s-length nature of the underwriter-issuer relationship at the earliest stages of the underwriter’s relationship with the issuer with respect to an issue (e.g., in a response to a request for proposals or in promotional materials provided to an issuer).[21]
- A sole underwriter or syndicate manager must make the other standard disclosures regarding the underwriter’s role and compensation at or before the time the underwriter is engaged to perform underwriting services (e.g., in an engagement letter), not solely in a bond purchase agreement.
- An underwriter must make the dealer-specific disclosures at or before the time the underwriter has been engaged to perform the underwriting services.[22] Thereafter, an underwriter must make any applicable dealer-specific disclosures discovered or arising after being engaged as an underwriter as soon as practicable after being discovered and with sufficient time for the issuer to fully evaluate any such conflict and its implications.[23]
- An underwriter who recommends a financing structure or product to an issuer must make the transaction-specific disclosures in sufficient time before the execution of a commitment by an issuer (which may include a bond purchase agreement) relating to the financing, and with sufficient time to allow the issuer to fully evaluate the features of the financing.
Unless directed otherwise by an issuer, an underwriter may update selected portions of disclosures previously provided so long as such updates clearly identify the additions or deletions and are capable of being read independently of the prior disclosures.[24]
Acknowledgement of Disclosures. When delivering a disclosure, the underwriter must attempt to receive written acknowledgement[25] from an official of the issuer identified by the issuer as a primary contact for the issuer’s receipt of the foregoing disclosures.[26] In the absence of such identification, an underwriter may seek acknowledgement from an official of the issuer whom the underwriter reasonably believes has the authority to bind the issuer by contract with the underwriter and that, to the knowledge of the underwriter, is not party to a disclosed conflict. This notice does not specify the particular form of acknowledgement, but may include, for example, an e-mail read receipt.[27] An underwriter may proceed with a receipt of a written acknowledgement that includes an issuer’s reservation of rights or other self-protective language. If the official of the issuer agrees to proceed with the underwriting engagement after receipt of the disclosures but will not provide written acknowledgement of receipt, the underwriter responsible for making the requisite disclosure may proceed with the engagement after documenting with specificity why it was unable to obtain such written acknowledgement. Additionally, an underwriter must be able to produce evidence (including, for example, by automatic e-mail delivery receipt) that the disclosures were delivered with sufficient time for evaluation by the issuer before proceeding with the transaction. An issuer’s written acknowledgement of the receipt of disclosure is not dispositive of whether such disclosures were made with an appropriate amount of time. The analysis of whether disclosures were provided with sufficient time for an issuer’s review is based on the totality of the facts and circumstances.
Representations to Issuers
All representations made by underwriters to issuers in connection with municipal securities underwritings, whether written or oral, must be truthful and accurate and must not misrepresent or omit material facts. Underwriters must have a reasonable basis for the representations and other material information contained in documents they prepare and must refrain from including representations or other information they know or should know is inaccurate or misleading. For example, in connection with a certificate signed by the underwriter that will be relied upon by the issuer or other relevant parties to an underwriting (e.g., an issue price certificate), the dealer must have a reasonable basis for the representations and other material information contained therein.[28] In addition, an underwriter’s response to an issuer’s request for proposals or qualifications must fairly and accurately describe the underwriter’s capacity, resources, and knowledge to perform the proposed underwriting as of the time the proposal is submitted and must not contain any representations or other material information about such capacity, resources, or knowledge that the underwriter knows or should know to be inaccurate or misleading.[29] Matters not within the personal knowledge of those preparing the response (e.g., pending litigation) must be confirmed by those with knowledge of the subject matter. An underwriter must not represent that it has the requisite knowledge or expertise with respect to a particular financing if the personnel that it intends to work on the financing do not have the requisite knowledge or expertise.
Required Disclosures to Issuers
Many municipal securities are issued using financing structures that are routine and well understood by the typical municipal market professional, including most issuer personnel that have the lead responsibilities in connection with the issuance of municipal securities. For example, absent unusual circumstances or features, the typical fixed rate offering may be presumed to be well understood. Nevertheless, in the case of issuer personnel that the underwriter reasonably believes lack the requisite knowledge or experience to fully understand or assess the implications of a financing structures or products recommended by an underwriter, the underwriter making such recommendation must provide disclosures on the material aspects of such financing structures or product that it recommends (i.e., the “transaction-specific disclosures”).[30]
In some cases, issuer personnel responsible for the issuance of municipal securities would not be well positioned to fully understand or assess the implications of a recommended financing structure in its totality, because it is structured in a unique, atypical, or otherwise complex manner or incorporates unique, atypical, or otherwise complex features or products (a “complex municipal securities financing”).[31] Examples of complex municipal securities financings include, but are not limited to, variable rate demand obligations (“VRDOs”), financings involving derivatives (such as swaps), and financings in which interest rates are benchmarked to an index (such as LIBOR, SIFMA, or SOFR).[32] When a recommendation regarding a complex municipal securities financing structure has been made by an underwriter in a negotiated offering,[33] the underwriter making the recommendation has an obligation under Rule G-17 to communicate more particularized transaction-specific disclosures than those that may be required in the case of the recommendation of routine financing structures or products.[34] The underwriter making the recommendation must also disclose the material financial characteristics of the complex municipal securities financing, as well as the material financial risks of the financing that are known to the underwriter and reasonably foreseeable at the time of the disclosure.[35] It must also disclose any incentives for the recommendation of the complex municipal securities financing and other associated material conflicts of interest.[36] Such disclosures must be made in a fair and balanced manner based on principles of fair dealing and good faith.
The level of transaction-specific disclosure required may vary according to the issuer’s knowledge or experience with the proposed financing structure or similar structures, capability of evaluating the risks of the recommended financing structure or product, and financial ability to bear the risks of the recommended financing structure or product, in each case based on the reasonable belief of the underwriter.[37] Consequently, the level of transaction-specific disclosure to be provided to a particular issuer also can vary over time. In all events, the underwriter must disclose any incentives for the recommendation of the complex municipal securities financing and other associated conflicts of interest.
As previously mentioned, the transaction-specific disclosures must be made in writing to an official of the issuer identified by the issuer as a primary contact for the issuer for the receipt of such disclosures, or, in the absence of such identification, an underwriter may make such disclosures in writing to an issuer official whom the underwriter reasonably believes has the authority to bind the issuer by contract with the underwriter(s), and that, to the knowledge of the underwriter delivering the disclosure, is not a party to a disclosed conflict: (i) in sufficient time before the execution of a contract with the underwriter to allow the official to evaluate the recommendation (including consultation with any of its counsel or advisors) and (ii) in a manner designed to make clear to such official the subject matter of such disclosures and their implications for the issuer.
The disclosures concerning a complex municipal securities financing must address the specific elements of, and/or relevant products incorporated, into the recommended financing structure, rather than being general in nature.[38] An underwriter making a Complex Municipal Securities Financing Recommendation to an issuer cannot satisfy its fair dealing obligations by providing an issuer a single document setting out general descriptions of the various financing structures and/or products that may be recommended from time to time to various issuer clients that would effectively require issuer personnel to discover which disclosures apply to a particular recommendation and to the particular circumstances of that issuer. Underwriters can create, in anticipation of making such a recommendation, individualized descriptions, with appropriate levels of detail, of the material financial characteristics and risks for each of the various complex municipal securities financing structures and/or products (including any typical variations) they may recommend from time to time to various issuer clients, with such standardized descriptions serving as the base for more particularized disclosures for the specific complex financing the underwriter recommends to particular issuers.[39] In making a recommendation, an underwriter could incorporate, to the extent applicable, any refinements to the base description needed to fully describe the material financial features and risks unique to that financing.[40]
If the underwriter who has made a recommendation does not reasonably believe that the official to whom the disclosures are addressed is capable of independently evaluating the disclosures, the underwriter must make additional efforts reasonably designed to inform the official or its employees or agent. The underwriter also must make an independent assessment that such disclosures are appropriately tailored to the issuer’s level of sophistication.
Underwriter Duties in Connection with Issuer Disclosure Documents
Underwriters often play an important role in assisting issuers in the preparation of disclosure documents, such as preliminary official statements and official statements.[41] These documents are critical to the municipal securities transaction, because investors rely on the representations contained in such documents in making their investment decisions. Moreover, investment professionals, such as municipal securities analysts and ratings services, rely on the representations in forming an opinion regarding the credit. A dealer’s duty to have a reasonable basis for the representations it makes, and other material information it provides, to an issuer and to ensure that such representations and information are accurate and not misleading, as described above, extends to representations and information provided by the underwriter in connection with the preparation by the issuer of its disclosure documents (e.g., cash flows).
Underwriter Compensation and New Issue Pricing
Excessive Compensation. An underwriter’s compensation for a new issue (including both direct compensation paid by the issuer and other separate payments, values, or credits received by the underwriter from the issuer or any other party in connection with the underwriting), in certain cases and depending upon the specific facts and circumstances of the offering, may be so disproportionate to the nature of the underwriting and related services performed as to constitute an unfair practice with regard to the issuer that it is a violation of Rule G-17. Among the factors relevant to whether an underwriter’s compensation is disproportionate to the nature of the underwriting and related services performed, are the credit quality of the issue, the size of the issue, market conditions, the length of time spent structuring the issue, and whether the underwriter is paying the fee of the underwriter’s counsel or any other relevant costs related to the financing.
Fair Pricing. The duty of fair dealing under Rule G-17 includes an implied representation that the price an underwriter pays to an issuer is fair and reasonable, taking into consideration all relevant factors, including the best judgment of the underwriter as to the fair market value of the issue at the time it is priced.[42] In general, a dealer purchasing bonds in a competitive underwriting for which the issuer may reject any and all bids will be deemed to have satisfied its duty of fairness to the issuer with respect to the purchase price of the issue as long as the dealer’s bid is a bona fide bid (as defined in MSRB Rule G‑13)[43] that is based on the dealer’s best judgment of the fair market value of the securities that are the subject of the bid. In a negotiated underwriting, the underwriter has a duty under Rule G-17 to negotiate in good faith with the issuer. This duty includes the obligation of the dealer to ensure the accuracy of representations made during the course of such negotiations, including representations regarding the price negotiated and the nature of investor demand for the securities (e.g., the status of the order period and the order book). If, for example, the dealer represents to the issuer that it is providing the “best” market price available on the new issue, or that it will exert its best efforts to obtain the “most favorable” pricing, the dealer may violate Rule G-17 if its actions are inconsistent with such representations.[44]
Conflicts of Interest
Payments to or from Third Parties. In certain cases, compensation received by an underwriter from third parties, such as the providers of derivatives and investments (including affiliates of an underwriter), may color the underwriter’s judgment and cause it to recommend products, structures, and pricing levels to an issuer when it would not have done so absent such payments. The MSRB views the failure of an underwriter to disclose to the issuer the existence of payments, values, or credits received by an underwriter in connection with its underwriting of the new issue from parties other than the issuer, and payments made by the underwriter in connection with such new issue to parties other than the issuer (in either case including payments, values, or credits that relate directly or indirectly to collateral transactions integrally related to the issue being underwritten), to be a violation of an underwriter’s obligation to the issuer under Rule G-17.[45] For example, it would be a violation of Rule G-17 for an underwriter to compensate an undisclosed third party in order to secure municipal securities business. Similarly, it would be a violation of Rule G-17 for an underwriter to receive undisclosed compensation from a third party in exchange for recommending that third party’s services or product to an issuer, including business related to municipal securities derivative transactions. This notice does not require that the amount of such third-party payments be disclosed. The underwriter must also disclose to the issuer whether it has entered into any third-party arrangements for the marketing of the issuer’s securities.
Profit-Sharing with Investors. Arrangements between the underwriter and an investor purchasing new issue securities from the underwriter (including purchases that are contingent upon the delivery by the issuer to the underwriter of the securities) according to which profits realized from the resale by such investor of the securities are directly or indirectly split or otherwise shared with the underwriter also would, depending on the facts and circumstances (including in particular if such resale occurs reasonably close in time to the original sale by the underwriter to the investor), constitute a violation of the underwriter’s fair dealing obligation under Rule G-17.[46] Such arrangements could also constitute a violation of Rule G‑25(c), which precludes a dealer from sharing, directly or indirectly, in the profits or losses of a transaction in municipal securities with or for a customer. An underwriter should carefully consider whether any such arrangement, regardless of whether it constitutes a violation of Rule G-25(c), may evidence a potential failure of the underwriter’s duty with regard to new issue pricing described above.
Credit Default Swaps. The issuance or purchase by a dealer of credit default swaps for which the reference is the issuer for which the dealer is serving as underwriter, or an obligation of that issuer, may pose a conflict of interest, including a dealer-specific conflict of interest, because trading in such municipal credit default swaps has the potential to affect the pricing of the underlying reference obligations, as well as the pricing of other obligations brought to market by that issuer. Rule G-17 requires, therefore, that a dealer disclose the fact that it engages in such activities to the issuers for which it serves as underwriter. Activities with regard to credit default swaps based on baskets or indexes of municipal issuers that include the issuer or its obligation(s) need not be disclosed, unless the issuer or its obligation(s) represents more than 2% of the total notional amount of the credit default swap or the underwriter otherwise caused the issuer or its obligation(s) to be included in the basket or index.
Retail Order Periods
Rule G-17 requires an underwriter that has agreed to underwrite a transaction with a retail order period to, in fact, honor such agreement.[47]A dealer that wishes to allocate securities in a manner that is inconsistent with an issuer’s requirements must not do so without the issuer’s consent. In addition, Rule G-17 requires an underwriter that has agreed to underwrite a transaction with a retail order period to take reasonable measures to ensure that retail clients are bona fide. An underwriter that knowingly accepts an order that has been framed as a retail order when it is not (e.g., a number of small orders placed by an institutional investor that would otherwise not qualify as a retail customer) would violate Rule G-17 if its actions are inconsistent with the issuer’s expectations regarding retail orders. In addition, a dealer that places an order that is framed as a qualifying retail order but in fact represents an order that does not meet the qualification requirements to be treated as a retail order (e.g., an order by a retail dealer without “going away” orders[48] from retail customers, when such orders are not within the issuer’s definition of “retail”) violates its Rule G-17 duty of fair dealing. The MSRB will continue to review activities relating to retail order periods to ensure that they are conducted in a fair and orderly manner consistent with the intent of the issuer and the MSRB’s investor protection mandate.
Dealer Payments to Issuer Personnel
Dealers are reminded of the application of MSRB Rule G-20, on gifts, gratuities, and non-cash compensation, and Rule G-17, in connection with certain payments made to, and expenses reimbursed for, issuer personnel during the municipal bond issuance process.[49] These rules are designed to avoid conflicts of interest and to promote fair practices in the municipal securities market.
Dealers should consider carefully whether payments they make in regard to expenses of issuer personnel in the course of the bond issuance process, including in particular, but not limited to, payments for which dealers seek reimbursement from bond proceeds or issuers, comport with the requirements of Rule G‑20. For example, a dealer acting as a financial advisor or underwriter may violate Rule G-20 by paying for excessive or lavish travel, meal, lodging and entertainment expenses in connection with an offering (such as may be incurred for rating agency trips, bond closing dinners, and other functions) that inure to the personal benefit of issuer personnel and that exceed the limits or otherwise violate the requirements of the rule.[50]
[1] For purposes of this notice, the term “municipal entity” is used as defined by Section 15B(e)(8) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”), 17 CFR 240.15Ba1-1(g), and other rules and regulations thereunder.
[2] See Reminder Notice on Fair Practice Duties to Issuers of Municipal Securities, MSRB Notice 2009-54 (September 29, 2009); Rule G-17 Interpretive Letter – Purchase of new issue from issuer, MSRB interpretation of December 1, 1997, reprinted in MSRB Rule Book (“1997 Interpretation”).
[3] Pub. L. No. 111-203 § 975, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
[4] See Interpretive Notice Concerning the Application of MSRB Rule G-17 to Underwriters of Municipal Securities (Aug. 2, 2012) (superseded upon the effective date of this notice as described below).
[5] See MSRB Notice 2012-38 (July 18, 2012); MSRB Notice 2013-08 (Mar. 25, 2013).
[6] The MSRB has always viewed competitive offerings narrowly to mean new issues sold by the issuer to the underwriter on the basis of the lowest price bid by potential underwriters – that is, the fact that an issuer publishes a request for proposals and potential underwriters compete to be selected based on their professional qualifications, experience, financing ideas, and other subjective factors would not be viewed as representing a competitive offering for purposes of this notice. In light of this meaning of the term “competitive underwriting,” it should be clear that, although most of the examples relating to misrepresentations and fairness of financial aspects of an offering consist of situations that would only arise in a negotiated offering, Rule G-17 should not be viewed as allowing an underwriter in a competitive underwriting to make misrepresentations to the issuer or to act unfairly in regard to the financial aspects of the new issue.
[7] MSRB Rule D-9 defines the term “customer” as follows: “Except as otherwise specifically provided by rule of the Board, the term ‘Customer’ shall mean any person other than a broker, dealer, or municipal securities dealer acting in its capacity as such or an issuer in transactions involving the sale by the issuer of a new issue of its securities.”
[8] See MSRB Reminds Firms of Their Sales Practice and Due Diligence Obligations When Selling Municipal Securities in the Secondary Market, MSRB Notice 2010-37 (September 20, 2010).
[9] For purposes of this notice, underwriters are only required to provide written disclosure of their applicable conflicts and are not required to make any written disclosures on the part of issuer personnel or any other parties to the transaction as part of the standard disclosures, dealer-specific disclosures, or the transaction-specific disclosures.
[10] For purposes of this notice, the term “syndicate manager” refers to the lead manager, senior manager, or bookrunning manager of the syndicate. In circumstances where an underwriting syndicate is formed, only that single syndicate manager is obligated to make the standard disclosures under this notice. In the event that there are joint-bookrunning senior managers, only one of the joint-bookrunning senior managers would be obligated under this notice to make the standard disclosures. Unless otherwise agreed to, such as pursuant to an agreement among underwriters, the joint-bookrunning senior manager responsible for maintaining the order book of the syndicate would be responsible for providing the standard disclosures. Notwithstanding the fair dealing obligation of a syndicate manager to deliver the standard disclosures under this notice, nothing herein would prohibit an underwriter from making a disclosure in order to, for example, comply with another regulatory or statutory obligation.
[11] Where an underwriting syndicate is formed, the syndicate manager has the sole responsibility hereunder for providing the standard disclosures. Consistent with this obligation placed on the syndicate manager, only the syndicate manager must maintain and preserve records of the standard disclosures in accordance with MSRB rules. Further, the MSRB acknowledges that an underwriter may not know if a syndicate will form at the time that certain disclosures are sent. In instances in which an underwriter has provided a standard disclosure prior to or concurrent with the formation of a syndicate, it shall suffice that the then-underwriter (later syndicate manager) has delivered a standard disclosure, and no affirmative statement is necessary that a disclosure is being made on behalf of any existing or future syndicate members for the syndicate manager to have met its fair dealing obligations in this regard. Notwithstanding the obligation of a syndicate manager to deliver the standard disclosures, nothing herein would prohibit, or should be construed as prohibiting, another underwriter from delivering a standard disclosure in order to, for example, comply with another regulatory or statutory obligation.
[12] Each underwriter, whether a sole underwriter, syndicate manager, or other member of the underwriting syndicate, has a fair dealing obligation under this notice to deliver transaction-specific disclosures where such underwriter has made a recommendation to an issuer regarding a financing structure or product. The fair dealing obligation to deliver such a transaction-specific disclosure, includes, but is not limited to, determining the level of disclosure required based on the type of financing structure or product recommended and a reasonable belief of the issuer’s knowledge and experience regarding that particular type of financing structure or product. In such cases, as further discussed below, a sole underwriter, syndicate manager, or other member of the underwriting syndicate who has not made such a recommendation would not need to deliver transaction-specific disclosures in order to meet its fair dealing obligation under this notice.
[13] See also note 30 infra.
[14] As a threshold matter, the disclosures delivered by an underwriter to an issuer must not be inaccurate or misleading, and nothing in this notice should be construed as requiring an underwriter to make a disclosure to an issuer that is false. For example, in a private placement where a dealer acting as an agent to place securities on behalf of an issuer does not take a principal position (including not taking a “riskless principal” position) in the securities being placed, the standard disclosure relating to an “arm’s length” relationship may be inapplicable and in such case may be omitted due to the agent-principal relationship between the dealer and issuer that commonly gives rise to other duties as a matter of common law or another statutory or regulatory regime – whether termed as a fiduciary or other obligation of trust. See Exchange Act Release No. 66927 (May 4, 2012), 77 FR 27509 (May 10, 2012) (SR-MSRB-2011-09). In certain other contexts, depending on the specific facts and circumstances, a dealer acting as an underwriter may take on, either through an agency arrangement or other purposeful understanding, a fiduciary relationship with the issuer. In such case, it would be appropriate for an underwriter to omit those disclosures deemed inapplicable as a result of such relationship.
A dealer acting as a placement agent in the primary offering of a new issuance of municipal securities should also consider how the scope of its activities may interact with the registration and record-keeping requirements for municipal advisors adopted by the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Commission”) under Section 15B of the Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. 78o-4), including the application of the exclusion from the definition of “municipal advisor” applicable to a dealer acting as an underwriter pursuant to Exchange Act Rule 15Ba1-1(d)(2)(i). See Registration of Municipal Advisors, Exchange Act Release No. 70462 (September 20, 2013), 78 FR 67467 (hereinafter, the “MA Rule Adopting Release”), at 67515 – 67516 (November 12, 2013) (available at https://www.sec.gov/files/rules/final/2013/34-70462.pdf) (stating: “The Commission does not believe that the underwriter exclusion should be limited to a particular type of underwriting or a particular type of offering. Therefore, if a registered broker-dealer, acting as a placement agent, performs municipal advisory activities that otherwise would be considered within the scope of the underwriting of a particular issuance of municipal securities as discussed [therein], the broker-dealer would not have to register as a municipal advisor.”); see also the MA Rule Adopting Release, 78 FR at 67513 – 67514 (discussing activities within and outside the scope of serving as an underwriter of a particular issuance of municipal securities for purposes of the underwriter exclusion).
[15] Id.
[16] In many private placements, as well as in certain other types of new issue offerings, no official statement may be produced, so that, to the extent that such an offering occurs without the production of an official statement, a dealer would not be required to disclose its role with regard to the review of an official statement.
[17] For purposes hereof, a potential material conflict of interest must be disclosed if, but only if, it is reasonably likely to mature into an actual material conflict of interest during the course of the transaction between the issuer and the underwriter.
[18] The third-party payments to which the disclosure standard would apply are those that give rise to actual material conflicts of interest or potential material conflicts of interest only.
[19] The specific standard with respect to complex financings does not obviate a dealer’s fair dealing obligation to disclose the existence of payments, values, or credits received by the underwriter or of other material conflicts of interest in connection with any negotiated underwriting, whether it be complex or routine.
[20] Absent red flags, an underwriter may reasonably rely on a written statement from an issuer official that he or she is not a party to a disclosed conflict. The reasonableness of an underwriter’s reliance on such a written statement will depend on all the relevant facts and circumstances, including the facts revealed in connection with the underwriter’s due diligence in regards to the transaction generally or in determining whether the underwriter itself has any actual material conflicts of interest or potential material conflicts of interest that must be disclosed.
[21] See also note 30 infra.
[22] In offerings where a syndicate is formed, the disclosure obligation for an underwriter to make its dealer-specific disclosures is triggered – if any such actual material conflicts of interest or potential material conflicts of interest must be so disclosed – when such underwriter becomes engaged as a member of the underwriting syndicate (except with regard to conflicts discovered or arising after such co-managing underwriter has been engaged). Consistent with the obligation of sole underwriters and syndicate managers, each underwriter in the syndicate must make any applicable dealer-specific disclosures discovered or arising after being engaged as an underwriter in the syndicate as soon as practicable after being discovered and with sufficient time for the issuer to fully evaluate such a conflict and its implications.
[23] For example, an actual material conflict of interest or potential material conflict of interest may not be present until an underwriter has recommended a particular financing structure. In that case, the disclosure must be provided in sufficient time before the execution of a contract with the underwriter to allow the issuer official to fully evaluate the recommendation, as described under “Required Disclosures to Issuers.”
[24] The MSRB acknowledges that not all transactions proceed along the same timeline or pathway. The timeframes expressed herein should be viewed in light of the overarching goals of Rule G-17 and the purposes that the disclosures are intended to serve as further described in this notice. The various timeframes set out in this notice are not intended to establish strict, hair-trigger tripwires resulting in mere technical rule violations, so long as an underwriter acts in substantial compliance with such timeframes and meets the key objectives for providing disclosure under the notice. Nevertheless, an underwriter’s fair dealing obligation to an issuer in particular facts and circumstances may demand prompt adherence to the timelines set out in this notice. Stated differently, if an underwriter does not timely deliver a disclosure and, as a result, the issuer: (i) does not have clarity throughout all substantive stages of a financing regarding the roles of its professionals, (ii) is not aware of conflicts of interest promptly after they arise and well before the issuer effectively becomes fully committed – either formally (e.g., through execution of a contract) or informally (e.g., due to having already expended substantial time and effort ) – to completing the transaction with the underwriter, and/or (iii) does not have the information required to be disclosed with sufficient time to take such information into consideration and, thereby, to make an informed decision about the key decisions on the financing, then the underwriter generally will have violated its fair-dealing obligations under Rule G-17, absent other mitigating facts and circumstances.
[25] An underwriter delivering a disclosure in order to meet a fair dealing obligation must obtain (or attempt to obtain) proper acknowledgement. When there is an underwriting syndicate, only the syndicate manager, as the dealer responsible for delivering the standard disclosures to the issuer, must obtain (or attempt to obtain) proper acknowledgement from the issuer for such disclosures.
[26] Absent red flags, and subject to an underwriter’s ability to reasonably rely on a representation from an issuer official that he or she has the authority to bind the issuer by contract with the underwriter, an underwriter may reasonably rely on a written delegation by an authorized issuer official in, among other things, the issuer’s request for proposals to another issuer official to receive and acknowledge receipt of a disclosure. The reasonableness of an underwriter’s reliance upon an issuer’s representation as to these matters will depend on all of the relevant facts and circumstances, including the facts revealed in connection with the underwriter’s due diligence in regards to the transaction generally.
[27] For purposes of this notice, the term “e-mail read receipt” means an automatic response generated by a recipient issuer official confirming that an e-mail has been opened. While an e-mail read receipt may generally be an acceptable form of an issuer’s written acknowledgement under this notice, an underwriter may not rely on such an e-mail read receipt as an issuer’s written acknowledgement where such reliance is unreasonable under all of the facts and circumstances, such as where the underwriter is on notice that the issuer official to whom the e-mail is addressed has not in fact received or opened the e-mail.
[28] The need for underwriters to have a reasonable basis for representations and other material information provided to issuers extends to the reasonableness of assumptions underlying the material information being provided. If an underwriter would not rely on any statements made or information provided for its own purposes, it should refrain from making the statement or providing the information to the issuer, or should provide any appropriate disclosures or other information that would allow the issuer to adequately assess the reliability of the statement or information before relying upon it. Further, underwriters should be careful to distinguish statements made to issuers that represent opinion rather than factual information and to ensure that the issuer is aware of this distinction.
[29] As a general matter, a response to a request for proposal should not be treated as merely a sales pitch without regulatory consequence, but instead should be treated with full seriousness that issuers have the expectation that representations made in such responses are true and accurate.
[30] In the circumstance where a dealer proposing to act as an underwriter in a negotiated offering recommends a financing structure or product prior to the time at which an underwriting syndicate is formed, such dealer shall have the same obligations to make any applicable standard disclosures, as if it were a sole underwriter or syndicate manager for purposes of the obligations described under “Required Disclosure to the Issuer” (e.g., to make the standard disclosure concerning the arm’s-length nature of the underwriter-issuer relationship at the earliest stages of the underwriter’s relationship with the issuer with respect to an issue), including complying with corresponding requirements to maintain and preserve records.
[31] If a complex municipal securities financing consists of an otherwise routine financing structure that incorporates a unique, atypical, or complex element or product and the issuer personnel have knowledge or experience with respect to the routine elements of the financing, the disclosure of material risks and characteristics may be limited to those relating to such specific element or product and any material impact such element or product may have on other features that would normally be viewed as routine.
[32] Respectively, the London Inter-bank Offered Rate (i.e., “LIBOR”), the SIFMA Municipal Swap Index (i.e., “SIFMA”), and Secured Overnight Financing Rate (“SOFR”). The MSRB notes that its references to LIBOR, SIFMA, and SOFR are illustrative only and non-exclusive. Any financings involving a benchmark interest rate index may be complex, particularly if an issuer is unlikely to fully understand the components of that index, its material risks, or its possible interaction with other indexes.
[33] For purposes of determining when an underwriter recommends a financing structure in a negotiated offering or recommends a complex municipal securities financing in a negotiated offering (a “Complex Municipal Securities Financing Recommendation”), the MSRB’s guidance on the meaning of “recommendation” for dealers in MSRB Notice 2014-07: SEC Approves MSRB Rule G-47 on Time-of-Trade Disclosure Obligations, MSRB Rules D-15 and G-48 on Sophisticated Municipal Market Professionals, and Revisions to MSRB Rule G-19 on Suitability of Recommendations and Transactions (March 12, 2014) is applicable by analogy. For example, whether an underwriter has made a Complex Municipal Securities Financing Recommendation is not susceptible to a bright line definition but turns on the facts and circumstances of the particular situation. An important factor in determining whether a Complex Municipal Securities Financing Recommendation has been made is whether – given its content, context, and manner of presentation— a particular communication from an underwriter to an issuer regarding a financing structure or product reasonably would be viewed as a call to action or reasonably would influence an issuer to engage in a such a financing structure or product deemed a complex municipal securities financing structure. In general, the more individually tailored the underwriter’s communication is to a specific issuer about a complex municipal securities financing structure, the greater the likelihood that the communication reasonably would be viewed as a Complex Municipal Securities Financing Recommendation.
[34] An underwriter must make reasonable judgments regarding whether it has recommended a financing structure or product to an issuer and whether a particular financing structure or product recommended by the underwriter to the issuer is complex, understanding that the fact that a structure or product has become relatively common in the market does not reduce its complexity. Not all negotiated offerings involve a recommendation by the underwriter(s), such as where a sole underwriter merely executes a transaction already structured by the issuer or its municipal advisor.
[35] For example, when a Complex Municipal Securities Financing Recommendation for a VRDO is made, the underwriter who recommends a VRDO should inform the issuer of the risk of interest rate fluctuations and material risks of any associated credit or liquidity facilities (e.g., the risk that the issuer might not be able to replace the facility upon its expiration and might be required to repay the facility provider over a short period of time). As an additional example, if the underwriter recommends that the issuer swap the floating rate interest payments on the VRDOs to fixed rate payments under a swap, the underwriter must disclose the material financial risks (including market, credit, operational, and liquidity risks) and material financial characteristics of the recommended swap (e.g., the material economic terms of the swap, the material terms relating to the operation of the swap, and the material rights and obligations of the parties during the term of the swap), as well as the material financial risks associated with the VRDO. Such disclosure should be sufficient to allow the issuer to assess the magnitude of its potential exposure as a result of the complex municipal securities financing. Such disclosures must also inform the issuer that there may be accounting, legal, and other risks associated with the swap and that the issuer should consult with other professionals concerning such risks. If the underwriter who has made a Complex Municipal Financing Securities Recommendation is affiliated with the swap dealer proposed to be the executing swap dealer, the underwriter may satisfy its disclosure obligation with respect to the swap if such disclosure has been provided to the issuer by the affiliated swap dealer or the issuer’s swap or other financial advisor that is independent of such underwriter and the swap dealer, as long as the underwriter has a reasonable basis for belief in the truthfulness and completeness of such disclosure. If the issuer decides to enter into a swap with another dealer, the underwriter is not required to make disclosures with regard to that swap product under this notice. The MSRB notes that a dealer who recommends a swap or security-based swap to a municipal entity may also be subject to rules of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission or those of the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”).
[36] For example, a conflict of interest may exist when the underwriter who makes a Complex Municipal Securities Financing Recommendation to an issuer is also the provider, or an affiliate of the provider, of a swap used by an issuer to hedge a municipal securities offering or when an underwriter receives compensation from a swap provider for recommending the swap. See also “Conflicts of Interest/Payments to or from Third Parties” herein.
[37] Even a financing in which the interest rate is benchmarked to an index that is commonly used in the municipal marketplace (e.g., SIFMA) may be complex to an issuer that does not understand the components of that index or its possible interaction with other indexes.
[38] See note 19 supra.
[39] Page after page of complex legal jargon in small print would not be consistent with an underwriter’s fair dealing obligation under this notice.
[40] Underwriters should be able to leverage such materials for internal training and risk management purposes.
[41] Underwriters that assist issuers in preparing official statements must remain cognizant of their duties under federal securities laws. With respect to primary offerings of municipal securities, the SEC has noted, “By participating in an offering, an underwriter makes an implied recommendation about the securities.” See Exchange Act Release No. 26100 (Sept. 22, 1988) (proposing Exchange Act Rule 15c2-12) at text following fn. 70. The SEC has stated that “this recommendation itself implies that the underwriter has a reasonable basis for belief in the truthfulness and completeness of the key representations made in any disclosure documents used in the offerings.” Furthermore, pursuant to Exchange Act Rule 15c2-12(b)(5), an underwriter may not purchase or sell municipal securities in most primary offerings unless the underwriter has reasonably determined that the issuer or an obligated person has entered into a written undertaking to provide certain types of secondary market disclosure and has a reasonable basis for relying on the accuracy of the issuer’s ongoing disclosure representations. Exchange Act Release No. 34961 (Nov. 10, 1994) (adopting continuing disclosure provisions of Exchange Act Rule 15c2-12) at text following fn. 52.
[42]The MSRB has previously observed that whether an underwriter has dealt fairly with an issuer for purposes of Rule G-17 is dependent upon all of the facts and circumstances of an underwriting and is not dependent solely on the price of the issue. See MSRB Notice 2009-54 (Sept. 29, 2009) and the 1997 Interpretation (note 2 supra). See also “Retail Order Periods” herein.
[43] Rule G-13(b)(iii) provides: “For purposes of subparagraph (i), a quotation shall be deemed to represent a ‘bona fide bid for, or offer of, municipal securities’ if the broker, dealer or municipal securities dealer making the quotation is prepared to purchase or sell the security which is the subject of the quotation at the price stated in the quotation and under such conditions, if any, as are specified at the time the quotation is made.”
[44]See 1997 Interpretation (note 2 supra).
[45] See also “Required Disclosures to Issuers” herein.
[46] Underwriters should be mindful that, depending on the facts and circumstances, such an arrangement may be inferred from a purposeful but not otherwise justified pattern of transactions or other course of action, even without the existence of a formal written agreement.
[47]See MSRB Interpretation on Priority of Orders for Securities in a Primary Offering under Rule G-17, MSRB interpretation of October 12, 2010, reprinted in MSRB Rule Book. The MSRB also reminds underwriters of previous MSRB guidance on the pricing of securities sold to retail investors. See Guidance on Disclosure and Other Sales Practice Obligations to Individual and Other Retail Investors in Municipal Securities, MSRB Notice 2009-42 (July 14, 2009).
[48] In general, a “going away” order is an order for new issue securities for which a customer is already conditionally committed. See Exchange Act Release No. 62715, File No. SR-MSRB-2009-17 (August 13, 2010).
[49]See MSRB Rule G-20 Interpretation — Dealer Payments in Connection With the Municipal Securities Issuance Process (January 29, 2007), reprinted in MSRB Rule Book.
[50]See In the Matter of RBC Capital Markets Corporation, Exchange Act Release No. 59439 (Feb. 24, 2009) (settlement in connection with broker-dealer alleged to have violated MSRB Rules G-20 and G‑17 for payment of lavish travel and entertainment expenses of city officials and their families associated with rating agency trips, which expenditures were subsequently reimbursed from bond proceeds as costs of issuance); In the Matter of Merchant Capital, L.L.C., Exchange Act Release No. 60043 (June 4, 2009) (settlement in connection with broker-dealer alleged to have violated MSRB rules for payment of travel and entertainment expenses of family and friends of senior officials of issuer and reimbursement of the expenses from issuers and from proceeds of bond offerings).
Reminder Notice on Fair Practice Duties to Issuers of Municipal Securities
The Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (“MSRB”) has recently provided guidance regarding the fair practice and related obligations of brokers, dealers and municipal securities dealers (“dealers”) to investors.[1] Specifically, MSRB Rule G-17, on conduct of municipal securities activities, states that, in the conduct of its municipal securities business, each dealer shall deal fairly with all persons and shall not engage in any deceptive, dishonest, or unfair practice. The MSRB is publishing this notice to remind dealers that the fair practice requirements of Rule G-17 also apply to their municipal securities activities with issuers of municipal securities.
As noted above, the fair practice requirements of Rule G-17 apply to all municipal securities activities of dealers with issuers. In particular, even where other MSRB rules provide for specific disclosures or other actions by, or establish specific standards of behavior for, dealers with respect to or on behalf of issuers, such disclosures, actions or behavior must also comport with the fair practice principles of Rule G-17. The MSRB will continue to review practices with respect to dealer activities with issuers.
[1] See MSRB Notice 2009-42 (July 14, 2009).
[2] See Rule G-17 Interpretive Letter – Purchase of new issue from issuer, MSRB interpretation of December 1, 1997, reprinted in MSRB Rule Book.
[3] See MSRB Rule G-20 Interpretation — Dealer payments in connection with the municipal securities issuance process, MSRB interpretation of January 29, 2007, reprinted in MSRB Rule Book.
Notice Concerning Use of Electronic Confirmations Produced By a Clearing Agency or Qualified Vendor to Satisfy the Requirements of Rule G-15(a)
MSRB Rule G-15 provides confirmation, clearance, settlement and other uniform practice requirements with respect to transactions with customers. Rule G-15(a) requires that, at or before the completion of a transaction in municipal securities with or for the account of a customer, each broker, dealer or municipal securities dealer (collectively “dealer”) give or send to the customer “a written confirmation of the transaction” containing the information specified by the rule. Rule 15(d) provides additional uniform practice requirements for transactions executed with customers on a payment for securities received (“RVP”) or delivery against payment of securities sold (“DVP”) basis (collectively, “DVP/RVP”). In addition to the specific uniform practice requirements of this section, Rule G-15(d)(i)(c) expressly provides that dealers executing DVP/RVP transactions must comply with the requirements of section (a) of the rule pertaining to customer confirmations. Rule G-15(d) also requires dealers that transact with customers on a DVP/RVP basis to use the facilities of a Clearing Agency or Qualified Vendor, as defined in Rule G-15(d)(ii)(B), for automated confirmation and acknowledgement of the transaction.
Securities Exchange Act Rule 10b-10, on customer confirmations of non-municipal securities transactions, provides for confirmation requirements that are similar to Rule G-15(a). Several providers of automated confirmation and acknowledgement services have received no-action letters from the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) staff that allow their dealer clients to rely on the confirmations they produce to satisfy dealer confirmation delivery obligations to certain customers under SEC Rule 10b-10 where the disclosures customarily provided on the back of paper confirmations are provided electronically using a uniform resource locator (“URL”) link.[1] One of the service providers that received a no-action letter, as described above, permitting it to use URL links for its dealer clients, has requested an interpretation of Rule G-15(a) to allow dealers to rely on confirmations produced by this service provider to the same extent as dealers are allowed to use the confirmations produced by the service providers to comply with SEC Rule 10b-10.
In a 1994 Interpretive Notice, the MSRB recognized that the speed and efficiencies offered by electronic confirmation delivery are of benefit to the municipal securities industry.[2] Therefore, the MSRB has interpreted the requirement in Rule G-15(a) to provide a customer with a written confirmation to be satisfied by an electronic confirmation for DVP/RVP transactions sent by a Clearing Agency or Qualified Vendor, as defined in MSRB Rule G-15(d)(ii)(B), where disclosures customarily provided on the back of paper confirmations are provided electronically using a URL link when the following conditions are met: (i) the confirmation sent includes all of the information required by Rule G-15(a); and (ii) all of the requirements and conditions concerning the use of the electronic confirmation service expressed in applicable SEC no-action letters concerning SEC Rule 10b-10 continue to be met.
Build America Bonds: Reminder of Customer Confirmation Yield Disclosure Requirement
On April 24, 2009, the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB) published a notice clarifying that “Build America Bonds” and other tax credit bonds are municipal securities and, therefore, subject to MSRB rules.[1] The MSRB understands that many of these securities contain certain redemption provisions, such as mandatory pro rata sinking funds, and that brokers, dealers and municipal securities dealers (collectively “dealers”) frequently effect transactions on a basis of “yield to average life.” The MSRB reminds dealers that, for transactions effected on the basis of “yield to average life,” Rule G-15(a), on customer confirmations, requires the confirmation to display that yield as well as the yield computed to the lower of an “in whole” call or maturity.
Rule G-15(a)(i)(A)(5) states requirements for dealers to calculate and display yields and dollar prices on customer confirmations. For transactions effected on the basis of yield to maturity, call or put date, the yield at which the transaction was effected as well as a dollar price computed to the lower of an “in whole” call or maturity are required to be shown on a confirmation. Similarly, for transactions effected on the basis of a dollar price, the dollar price at which the transaction was effected along with a yield computed to the lower of an “in whole” call or maturity are required to be shown on a confirmation.
Sinking funds do not represent “in whole” call features. Accordingly, MSRB confirmation requirements do not require dealers to compute yield or dollar price to a sinking fund call date or to compute a “yield to average life” using multiple sinking fund dates. However, dealers should note that if the computed yield otherwise required by Rule G-15(a)(i)(A)(5) is different than the yield at which the transaction was effected, Rule G-15(a)(i)(A)(5)(vii) provides that both the computed yield and the yield at which the transaction was effected must be shown on the confirmation. Therefore, when a transaction is effected on the basis of “yield to average life,” such yield must be displayed on a customer confirmation.
[1] See MSRB Notice 2009-15.
Guidance on Disclosure and Other Sales Practice Obligations to Individual and Other Retail Investors in Municipal Securities
On July 14, 2009, the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission, for immediate effectiveness, guidance on disclosure and other sales practice obligations of brokers, dealers and municipal securities dealers to individual and other retail investors in municipal securities. [*] The text of the interpretive notice is contained below.
* * * * *
Significant participation by individual investors has long been a hallmark of the municipal securities market and, consequently, a focus of the core investor protection efforts of the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (the “MSRB”). [1] This Notice reminds brokers, dealers and municipal securities dealers (“dealers”) of their sales practice obligations under MSRB rules as applied specifically to individual and other retail investors. Among other things, this Notice updates guidance to dealers on (i) their obligations to disclose material information about issuers, their securities and credit/liquidity support for such securities in connection with the fulfillment of their disclosure obligations under MSRB Rule G-17, (ii) their obligations to use such material information in fulfilling their suitability obligations under MSRB Rule G-19, and (iii) their fair pricing obligations under MSRB Rules G-18 and G-30. [2] This Notice also applies previous guidance on bond insurance rating downgrades and wide-scale auction failures for municipal auction rate securities (“ARS”) to municipal securities transactions in general and specifically to transactions with individual and other retail investors in variable rate demand obligations (“VRDOs”). [3]
Basic Investor Protection Obligation
Rule G-17 is the core of the MSRB’s investor protection rules. It provides that, in the conduct of its municipal securities activities, each dealer shall deal fairly with all persons and shall not engage in any deceptive, dishonest or unfair practice. The rule contains an anti-fraud prohibition similar to the standard set forth in Rule 10b-5 adopted by the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”). However, it also establishes a general duty to deal fairly, even in the absence of fraud. This general duty to deal fairly places several specific obligations on dealers with respect to their dealings with their customers, including the obligation to disclose material information, as described below. All activities of dealers must be viewed in light of these basic principles, regardless of whether other MSRB rules establish additional requirements on dealers.
Access to Material Information in the Municipal Securities Market
Many of the investor protection obligations established under MSRB rules are premised on dealer access to material information about municipal securities. Such access is fundamental not only to the ability of a dealer to meet its disclosure obligations to customers under MSRB rules but also to the ability of the dealer to undertake the necessary analyses to determine the suitability of a recommended municipal securities transaction and to determine the prevailing market price in connection with establishing a fair transaction price, among other things.
As professionals in the marketplace, dealers use a combination of internal resources and public and proprietary information sources to obtain the information necessary to conduct their business in a professional manner and to meet their disclosure and fair practice duties to investors. In 2002, the MSRB identified certain “established industry sources” in the municipal securities market that were available to and generally used by dealers that effect transactions in municipal securities. [4] While dealers and some institutional investors could readily access information from the established industry sources directly or through information vendors, most investors (and, in particular, individual investors) did not have ready access to many of the established industry sources and were largely limited to the information they could obtain through dealers.
With the advent of the MSRB’s Electronic Municipal Market Access system (“EMMA”) as a new established industry source, the amount, nature, timing and accessibility of information available to the entire marketplace, including both professionals and individual investors, has changed significantly since 2002. Official statements and other primary market disclosure documents, as well as continuing disclosure documents, are available to the general public through the EMMA web portal. Transaction price information is now available on a real-time basis, and comprehensive interest rate information for VRDOs and ARS also is available for the first time. All of this information is made available to the general public, at no cost, through the EMMA web portal, and also is available through subscription feeds to market participants and information vendors. It is expected that information vendors will continue to make this information available to their clients, together with increasing levels of value added products.
Disclosure of Material Information
General Disclosure Duty . Rule G-17 requires a dealer effecting a municipal securities transaction to disclose to its customer all material information about the transaction known by the dealer, as well as material information about the security that is reasonably accessible to the market. [5] Information available from established industry sources is deemed to be reasonably accessible to the market for purposes of this Rule G-17 disclosure obligation. Such disclosures must be made at or prior to the sale of municipal securities to the investor (i.e., when the investor and the dealer agree to make the trade), also referred to as the “time of trade.” This is a key protection mandated by MSRB rules. [6] This disclosure duty applies to any municipal securities transaction, regardless of whether the dealer is acting as a so-called “order-taker” (as when the trade is “unsolicited”), whether the transaction is recommended, or whether the transaction is a primary or secondary market trade. [7] Dealers continue to be obligated to make the required time of trade disclosures to their customers mandated by Rule G-17, notwithstanding the availability to investors of comprehensive information from EMMA and other established industry sources.
In general, information is considered “material” if there is a substantial likelihood that its disclosure would have been considered important or significant by a reasonable investor. [8] The duty to disclose material information to a customer in a municipal securities transaction includes the duty to give a complete description of the security, including a description of the features that likely would be considered significant by a reasonable investor and facts that are material to assessing the potential risks of the investment. [9] For VRDOs, ARS or other securities for which interest payments may fluctuate, such material facts would include a description of the basis on which periodic interest rate resets are determined.
The scope of material information that dealers are obligated to disclose to their customers under Rule G-17 is not limited solely to the information made available through established industry sources. Dealers also must disclose material information they know about the securities even if such information is not then available from established industry sources. It is essential that dealers establish procedures reasonably designed to ensure that information known to the dealer is communicated internally or otherwise made available to relevant personnel in a manner reasonably designed to ensure compliance with this disclosure obligation.
Disclosures with Respect to Credit/Liquidity Enhancement and Ratings . The MSRB previously has provided guidance on specific disclosures that may be required in connection with insured municipal securities, including in particular insured ratings, underlying ratings and potential rating actions disclosed by the rating agencies. [10] The principles enunciated with respect to insured bonds also are generally applicable in connection with any third-party credit enhancement provided with respect to municipal securities, regardless of the type of such enhancement. This disclosure obligation extends to enhancements such as, without limitation, letters of credit, surety bonds, state or federal agency enhancements, and other similar products or programs.
For VRDOs, dealers generally must consider factors relevant to both the long-term nature of the securities as well as short-term liquidity features of such securities. Banks or other financial institutions (collectively, “banks”) may issue letters of credit or similar product (“LOCs”), which provide both long-term credit support (by guaranteeing payment of principal and interest on VRDOs) and short-term liquidity support (by guaranteeing the purchase price of tendered VRDOs). Alternatively, banks may provide only liquidity support for tendered VRDOs, through a standby bond purchase agreement or similar product (“SBPA”). Typically, an SBPA is used when the issuer has a strong credit rating by itself or it is coupled with bond insurance. However, while LOCs are generally irrevocable for the term of the LOC, that is frequently not the case with SBPAs. Some SBPAs are structured so that certain negative credit or other events with regard to the issue or bond insurer result in the immediate termination of the SBPA and the loss of liquidity support, without a prior mandatory tender of the bonds. [11] If such an immediate termination event occurs, investors are left holding long-term, floating-rate bonds with no tender right.
The role of the remarketing agent also may be material to investors. If the remarketing agent for a VRDO has customarily or from time-to-time taken tendered bonds into inventory to make it unnecessary to draw on the liquidity facility for unremarketed bonds (thereby in effect providing liquidity support), the fact that the remarketing agent is not contractually obligated to maintain such practice will generally be material information required to be disclosed to customers to which VRDOs are sold.
The following information will generally be material information required to be disclosed to investors in credit/liquidity enhanced securities, including but not limited to VRDOs, if known to the dealer or if reasonably available from established industry sources: (i) the credit rating of the issue or lack thereof; (ii) the underlying credit rating or lack thereof, (iii) the identity of any credit enhancer or liquidity provider; and (iv) the credit rating of the credit provider and liquidity provider, including potential rating actions (e.g., downgrade). Additionally, material terms of the credit facility or liquidity facility should be disclosed (e.g., any circumstances under which an SBPA would terminate without a mandatory tender). This list is not exhaustive. Other information may also be material to investors in credit/liquidity enhanced securities.
Other Investor Protection Obligations
Although disclosure to investors is a key customer protection duty of dealers under MSRB rules, other important customer protection rules also apply. Thus, dealers are reminded that they are not relieved of their suitability obligations under MSRB Rule G-19 simply by disclosing material information to the customer. They are also not relieved of their fair pricing obligations to their customers under MSRB Rules G-18 and G-30 by disclosing material information to investors. The information known by a dealer in connection with a municipal security, together with the information available from established industry sources, generally should inform the dealer, to the extent applicable, in undertaking the necessary analyses and determinations needed to meet these other customer protection obligations.
Suitability of Recommendations . Under MSRB Rule G-19, a dealer that recommends a municipal securities transaction to a customer must have reasonable grounds for believing that the recommendation is suitable, based upon information available from the issuer of the security or otherwise (including from established industry sources) and the facts disclosed by or otherwise known about the customer. [12] To assure that a dealer effecting a recommended transaction with an individual investor has the information needed about the investor to make its suitability determination, the rule requires the dealer to make reasonable efforts to obtain information concerning the investor’s financial status, tax status and investment objectives, as well as any other information reasonable and necessary in making the recommendation. [13]
Dealers are reminded that the obligation arising under Rule G-19 in connection with a recommended transaction requires a meaningful analysis, [14] taking into consideration the information obtained about the investor and the security, which establishes the reasonable grounds for believing that the recommendation is suitable. Such suitability determinations are required regardless of the apparent safety of a particular security or issuer or the apparent wealth or sophistication of a particular investor. Suitability determinations should be based on the appropriately weighted factors that are relevant in any particular set of facts and circumstances, and those factors may vary from transaction to transaction. Factors to be considered include, but are not limited to, the investor’s financial profile, tax status, investment objectives (including portfolio concentration/diversification), and the specific characteristics and risks of the municipal security recommended to the investor.
The MSRB notes that Section (c) of Exchange Act Rule 15c2-12 provides that it is impermissible for a dealer to recommend the purchase or sale of a municipal security unless the dealer has procedures in place that provide reasonable assurance that it will receive prompt notice of the specified material events that are subject to the continuing disclosure obligations of the rule. A dealer would be expected to have reviewed any applicable continuing disclosures made available through EMMA or other established industry sources and to have taken such disclosures into account in undertaking its suitability determination.
With regard to credit-enhanced securities, facts relating to the credit rating of the credit enhancer may affect suitability determinations, particularly for investors who have conveyed to the dealer investment objectives relating to credit quality of investments. For example, if a customer has expressed the desire to purchase only “triple A” rated securities, recommendations to the customer should take into account information from rating agencies, including information about potential rating actions that may affect the future “triple A” status of the issue. In the case of recommended VRDOs or any other securities that are viewed as providing significant liquidity to investors, a dealer must consider both the liquidity characteristics of the security and the investor’s need for a liquid investment when making a suitability determination. Facts relating to the short-term credit rating, if any, of the LOC or SBPA provider, or of any other third-party liquidity facility provider, generally would affect suitability determinations in such securities. To the extent that an investor seeks to invest in VRDOs due to their liquidity characteristics, a suitability analysis also generally would require a dealer, in recommending a VRDO to an individual investor, to consider carefully the circumstances, if any, under which the liquidity feature may no longer be effectively available to the customer.
It is incumbent upon any dealer wishing to market municipal securities to customers that it understand the material features of the security, particularly if such dealer is to fulfill its obligation to undertake a suitability determination in connection with a recommended transaction. Dealers should take particular care with respect to new products that may be introduced into the municipal securities market, [15] existing products that may have complex structures that can differ materially from issue to issue, and outstanding securities that may trade infrequently, may be issued by less well-known issuers, or may have unusual features. Dealers are reminded that they must review the relevant disclosure documents to become familiar with the specific characteristics of the product, including the tax features, prior to recommending such products to their customers.
Fair Pricing . MSRB Rule G-30(a) establishes the pricing obligation of dealers in principal transactions between dealers and customers. The rule provides that the aggregate transaction price to the customer must be fair and reasonable, taking into consideration all relevant factors. A “fair and reasonable” price is one that bears a reasonable relationship to the prevailing market price of the security. [16] Dealers have a similar obligation with respect to the price of securities sold in agency transactions pursuant to Rule G-18. Dealer compensation on a principal transaction is considered to be a mark-up or mark-down that is computed from the inter-dealer market price prevailing at the time of the customer transaction, while compensation on an agency transaction generally consists of a commission. As part of the aggregate price to the customer, the mark-up or mark-down also must be fair and reasonable, taking into account all relevant factors. [17] Similarly, under Rule G-30(b), the commission on an agency transaction must be fair and reasonable, taking into account all relevant factors.
As a general matter, in addition to information about prices of transactions effected by such dealers and other market participants in such security, material information about a security available through EMMA or other established industry sources may also be among the relevant factors that the dealer should consider in connection with ensuring fair pricing of its transactions with investors. Among other things, dealers would be expected to have reviewed any applicable continuing disclosures made available through EMMA or other established industry sources and to have taken such disclosures into account in determining a fair and reasonable transaction price. In addition, dealers should consider the effect of ratings on the value of the securities involved in customer transactions, and should specifically consider the effect of information from rating agencies, both with respect to actual or potential changes in the underlying rating of a security and with respect to actual or potential changes in the rating of any third-party credit enhancement applicable to the security.
Finally, many issuers currently include a retail order period in the marketing of new issues. The retail order period is intended to provide an opportunity for individual investors to place orders in advance of institutional investors. Dealers are reminded that an issuer’s use of a retail order period based on a perception that the retail order period will improve pricing of the new issue for the issuer does not create a safe harbor for dealers to engage in pricing that violates the fair pricing obligation under Rule G-30. Large differences between institutional and individual prices that exceed the price/yield variance that normally applies to transactions of different sizes in the primary market provide evidence that the duty of fair pricing to individual clients may not have been met.
[1] See Federal Reserve Flow of Funds , Table L-211 (June 11, 2009) available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/Current/ (The household category in the Table reflects direct investments by individual investors, as well as investments by trusts, investment advisors, arbitrageurs, and various other accounts that do not fall into other tracked categories).
[2] See Reminder of Customer Protection Obligations in Connection With Sales of Municipal Securities , MSRB Notice 2007-17 (May 30, 2007) (the “Fair Practice Notice”); Interpretation on Customer Protection Obligations Relating to the Marketing of 529 College Savings Plans , MSRB Notice 2006-23 (August 7, 2006) (the “529 Notice”).
[3] See Application of MSRB Rules to Transactions in Auction Rate Securities , MSRB Notice 2008-09 (February 19, 2008) (the “ARS Notice”); Bond Insurance Ratings Application of MSRB Rules, MSRB Notice 2008-04 (January 22, 2008) (the “Bond Insurance Notice”).
[4] See Rule G-17 Interpretation – Interpretive Notice Regarding Rule G-17, on Disclosure of Material Facts, March 20, 2002 , reprinted in MSRB Rule Book (the “2002 Disclosure Notice”). The 2002 Disclosure Notice described these established industry sources as including such sources as the system of nationally recognized municipal securities information repositories (“NRMSIRs”) established by the SEC under Exchange Act Rule 15c2-12 for continuing disclosures by issuers and other obligors, the MSRB’s Municipal Securities Information Library ® (MSIL®) system for official statements and advance refunding documents, the MSRB’s Transaction Reporting System for prices of transactions in municipal securities, rating agency reports, and other sources of information on municipal securities generally used by dealers that effect transactions in the type of securities at issue.
[5] See 2002 Disclosure Notice, supra n.4.
[6] Additional MSRB disclosure requirements under Rule G-15, relating to trade confirmations, and Rule G-32, relating to official statements, focus on information to be provided after the investment decision and do not fulfill the Rule G-17 disclosure obligation because they are not provided at or prior to the investment decision. Recent amendments to MSRB Rule G-32 in connection with electronic dissemination of official statements to investors purchasing municipal securities in a primary offering do not alter this time-of-trade disclosure obligation.
[7] A dealer’s specific investor protection obligations, including its disclosure, fair practice and suitability obligations under Rules G-17 and G-19, may be affected by the status of an institutional investor as a Sophisticated Municipal Market Professional (“SMMP”). See Rule G-17 Interpretation – Notice Regarding the Application of MSRB Rules to Transactions with Sophisticated Municipal Market Professionals, April 30, 2002, reprinted in MSRB Rule Book.
[8] See ARS Notice and Bond Insurance Notice; see also Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988). The SEC has described material facts as those “facts which a prudent investor should know in order to evaluate the offering before reaching an investment decision.” Municipal Securities Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No. 26100 (September 22, 1988) at note 76, quoting In re Walston & Co. Inc., and Harrington, Exchange Act Release No. 8165 (September 22, 1967).
[9] See, e.g., Rule G-17 Interpretation – Educational Notice on Bonds Subject to “Detachable” Call Features, May 13, 1993, reprinted in MSRB Rule Book; Rule G-17 Interpretation – Notice Concerning Disclosure of Call Information to Customers of Municipal Securities, March 4, 1986, reprinted in MSRB Rule Book.
[10] See Bond Insurance Notice, supra n.3.
[11] The termination of the SBPA may result in other changes to the terms of securities, such as the loss of any rights to tender the securities for purchase or an interest rate to be determined based on a floating rate index or in another manner, which may produce a yield that is substantially below market for a fixed rate bond of comparable maturity. Such facts may be material to investors.
[12] See, e.g., Fair Practice Notice, supra n.2. The MSRB has previously stated that most situations in which a dealer brings a municipal security to the attention of a customer involve an implicit recommendation of the security to the customer, but determining whether a particular transaction is in fact recommended depends on an analysis of all the relevant facts and circumstances. See Rule G-19 Interpretive Letter – Recommendations, February 17, 1998, published in MSRB Rule Book. The MSRB also has provided guidance on recommendations in the context of on-line communications in Rule G-19 Interpretation – Notice Regarding Application of Rule G-19, on Suitability of Recommendations and Transactions, to Online Communications, September 25, 2002, published in MSRB Rule Book.
[13] Rule G-8(a)(xi)(F) requires that dealers maintain records for each customer of such information about the customer used in making recommendations to the customer.
[14] See 529 Notice n.2; Fair Practice Notice n.2; Bond Insurance Notice n. 3.
[15] From time to time, the MSRB provides guidance on specific new products introduced into the municipal securities market. For example, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 authorized state and local governments to issue two types of Build America Bonds (“BABs”) as taxable governmental bonds with federal subsidies for a portion of their borrowing costs. The MSRB has previously provided guidance to dealers regarding the application of MSRB rules to BABs, including fair practice rules. See Build America Bonds and Other Tax Credit Bonds, MSRB Notice 2009-15 (April 24, 2009) ; Build America Bonds: Application of Rule G-37 to Solicitations of Issuers , MSRB Notice 2009-30 (June 9, 2009) . In addition, the MSRB has provided guidance on dealer transactions in registered warrants, or IOUs, issued by the State of California. See Applicability of MSRB Rules to California Registered Warrants, MSRB Notice 2009-41 (July 10, 2009) . Nonetheless, dealers must understand the material features of any security they recommend, regardless of whether specific guidance is provided by the MSRB.
[16] See Review of Dealer Pricing Responsibilities, MSRB Notice 2004-3 (January 26, 2004) (the “Dealer Pricing Notice”).
[17] Dealer Pricing Notice, supra.
MSRB Publishes Interpretive Letter Regarding Solicitation Activity on Behalf of an Affiliated Company Pursuant to Rules G-37 and G-38
MSRB PUBLISHES INTERPRETIVE LETTER REGARDING SOLICITATION ACTIVITY ON BEHALF OF AN AFFILIATED COMPANY PURSUANT TO RULES G-37 AND G-38
The Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board has published an interpretive letter pursuant to Rule G-37, on political contributions and prohibitions on municipal securities business, and Rule G-38, on solicitation of municipal securities business, concerning the activities of a broker-dealer on behalf of an affiliated company. The text of the interpretive letter is included below. Questions regarding the interpretive letter may be directed to Leslie Carey, Associate General Counsel, or Ronald W. Smith, Senior Legal Associate.
July 2, 2009
* * * * *
TEXT OF INTERPRETIVE LETTER
Rules G-37 and G-38 Interpretive Letter – Solicitation activity on behalf of affiliated company. This is in response to your April 29, 2009 letter seeking guidance regarding Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (“MSRB”) Rule G-38, on solicitation of municipal securities business, and MSRB Rule G-37, on political contributions and prohibitions on municipal securities business. Your letter relates to the formation of a joint venture broker-dealer (“JV B-D”) by two existing broker-dealers (the “legacy firms”). You state that JV B-D will not engage in municipal securities business[1] and that the employees of JV B-D will not retain their employment status with the legacy firms, but will be associated persons of both legacy firms.
Specifically, you request guidance on the following two issues: (i) whether the employees of the JV B-D may solicit municipal securities business, under Rule G-38, on behalf of the legacy firms; and (ii) whether an employee who solicits municipal securities business on behalf of one of the legacy firms will be considered a municipal finance professional (“MFP”) [2] solely of the legacy firm on whose behalf the MFP solicits municipal securities business under Rule G-37, rather than of both legacy firms. The Board has reviewed your letter and authorized this response.
JV B-D Employee Solicitation of Municipal Securities Business on Behalf of Legacy Firms: You ask whether employees of JV B-D, who are the prior employees of the legacy firms, may solicit municipal securities business on behalf of such firms under Rule G-38. Rule G-38(a) prohibits a broker, dealer or municipal securities dealer (“dealer”) from providing, directly or indirectly, payment to any person who is not an affiliated person[3] of the dealer for a solicitation of municipal securities business on behalf of such dealer.
You state that JV B-D will be controlled by the legacy firms and, as such, should be viewed as an affiliated company[4] of the legacy firms. Under Rule G-38, if JV B-D is controlled by the legacy firms, JV B-D and its employees should be viewed as affiliates of the legacy firms. Based on the control relationships you describe, Rule G-38 will not be violated if employees of JV B-D are paid by a legacy firm for a solicitation of municipal securities business on behalf of such legacy firms.
JV B-D Employee Status as Municipal Finance Professional for Legacy Firm on Behalf of Which the Employee Has Solicited Municipal Securities Business: You also ask whether an employee of JV B-D who solicits municipal securities business on behalf of one of the legacy firms will be considered an MFP solely of the legacy firm on whose behalf the employee solicits municipal securities business, rather than of both legacy firms. Rule G-37(g)(iv)(B) defines MFP, in relevant part, as any associated person (including, but not limited to, any affiliated person of the dealer, as defined in Rule G-38) who solicits municipal securities business (a “solicitor MFP”). You note that this language does not expressly limit MFP status to the dealer on whose behalf the municipal securities business was solicited.
The MSRB is of the view that implicit in the concept of a solicitor MFP, as set forth in Rule G-37(g)(iv)(B), is the notion that an associated person who solicits municipal securities business on behalf of a dealer becomes an MFP of such dealer.[5] Although an individual who solicits municipal securities business on behalf of one dealer with which he or she is associated thereby becomes an MFP of such dealer, the solicitation does not by itself result in the individual becoming an MFP of a different dealer with which such individual may be associated but for which he or she has not solicited municipal securities business. Rather, such individual would have to undertake a solicitation or another activity described in Rule G-37(g)(iv) on behalf of the second dealer in order to become an MFP of such second dealer.
The MSRB notes that Rule G-38(b)(i) defines solicitation broadly to mean, any direct or indirect communication with an issuer for the purpose of obtaining or retaining municipal securities business. The MSRB has previously provided guidance regarding the types of communications that are viewed as solicitations of municipal securities business.[6] Depending upon specific facts and circumstances, a direct solicitation of municipal securities business by an individual on behalf of a dealer with which such individual is associated (the “directly-benefited dealer”) might also be considered an indirect solicitation of business on behalf of another dealer with which such individual is associated (the “indirectly-benefited dealer”). In conversations with issuers or other third parties, the individual must clearly indicate for which dealer he or she is soliciting business. For example, an individual who describes to issuer personnel two or more affiliated dealers as leading underwriting firms in that issuer’s state but only explicitly asks such personnel to hire one dealer (i.e., the directly-benefited dealer) would likely be considered to have indirectly solicited business on behalf of the other dealer as well (i.e., the indirectly-benefited dealer). An important factor in determining whether a direct solicitation on behalf of a directly-benefited dealer could also be considered an indirect solicitation on behalf of an indirectly-benefited dealer is whether the individual solely identifies his or her affiliation with the directly-benefited dealer or also identifies an affiliation with the other dealer.[7] To the extent that multiple dealers are identified directly or indirectly, dealers would need to take extra precautions to ensure that the solicited issuer personnel understand that the solicitation is solely on behalf of the directly-benefited dealer and that the identification of the other firm is limited and does not serve to promote the other firm.[8] In circumstances similar to those described in this letter, dealers should have in place effective procedures to ensure that the solicitations for municipal securities business are tracked in a way that will properly classify individuals making solicitations as MFPs of the appropriate dealer. MSRB Interpretation of June 23, 2009.
Build America Bonds and Other Tax Credit Bonds: Application of Rule G-37 to Solicitations of Issuers
On April 24, 2009, the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (the "MSRB") published Notice 2009-15 on Build America Bonds and Other Tax Credit Bonds (the "April 2009 Notice"). In the April 2009 Notice, the MSRB explained that Build America Bonds and the other tax credit bonds described in the April 2009 Notice are municipal securities and are, therefore, subject to MSRB rules, including Rule G-37 on political contributions.
The MSRB understands that, for the purpose of obtaining municipal securities business as defined in Rule G-37,[1] personnel from the taxable desk of brokers, dealers, or municipal securities dealers ("dealers"), or personnel from other departments or divisions of dealers that do not traditionally engage in municipal securities business, may participate in presentations to potential issuers of Build America Bonds or other tax credit bonds in response to requests for proposals or in other pre-selection meetings with such potential issuers to discuss the structuring, pricing, sales, and distribution of taxable bonds. Dealers are reminded that such participation generally will make those personnel "municipal finance professionals" under Rule G-37(g)(iv)(B), because the personnel are considered to have solicited municipal securities business.[2]
Pursuant to Rule G-37(b)(ii), political contributions made by such personnel to an official of the issuer solicited by such personnel within the two years prior to the solicitation would need to be examined by the dealer to determine whether the two-year ban on municipal securities business imposed by Rule G-37(b)(i) is triggered by the solicitation.[3] By engaging in solicitation activities, such personnel would become municipal finance professionals and subsequent political contributions to issuer officials by such personnel would also be subject to Rule G-37.
[1] Rule G-37(g)(vii) defines municipal securities business as "(A) the purchase of a primary offering (as defined in rule A-13(f)) of municipal securities from the issuer on other than a competitive bid basis (e.g., negotiated underwritings); or (B) the offer or sale of a primary offering of municipal securities on behalf of any issuer (e.g., private placement); or (C) the provision of financial advisory or consultant services to or on behalf of an issuer with respect to a primary offering of municipal securities in which the dealer was chosen to provide such services on other than a competitive bid basis; or (D) the provision of remarketing agent services to or on behalf of an issuer with respect to a primary offering of municipal securities in which the dealer was chosen to provide such services on other than a competitive bid basis."
[2] Any associated person of a dealer who solicits municipal securities business is a municipal finance professional pursuant to Rule G-37(g)(iv)(B), regardless of whether such associated person engages in any other municipal securities activities for the dealer. Pursuant to Rule G-37(g)(ix) and Rule G-38(b)(i), solicitation of municipal securities business consists of any direct or indirect communication with an issuer for the purpose of obtaining or retaining municipal securities business.
Once a dealer has been selected to engage in the underwriting of the new issue, communications with the issuer necessary to undertake that engagement are not considered solicitations for purposes of Rule G-37. See Rule G-38 Interpretation - Interpretive Notice on the Definition of Solicitation Under Rules G-37 and G-38 (June 8, 2006).
[3] Thus, if a municipal finance professional has made a political contribution to an official of an issuer, other than a "de minimis" contribution under Rule G-37(b), during the preceding two years, the dealer would be banned from engaging in municipal securities business with such issuer if the municipal finance professional were to participate in the solicitation of such business. Political contributions made by a municipal finance professional to an issuer official for whom such municipal finance professional is entitled to vote are considered de minimis and would not result in a ban on municipal securities business if such contributions, in total, did not exceed $250 per election.
Build America Bonds and Other Tax Credit Bonds
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 added a provision to the Internal Revenue Code that authorizes state and local governments to issue two types of “Build America Bonds” as taxable governmental bonds with Federal subsidies for a portion of their borrowing costs.
The first type of Build America Bond provides a Federal subsidy through Federal tax credits to investors in the bonds. The tax credits may also be “stripped” and sold to other investors, pursuant to regulations to be issued by the Treasury Department. In its Notice 2009-26, the Treasury Department refers to this type of Build America Bond as “Build America Bonds (Tax Credit).”
The second type of Build America Bond provides a Federal subsidy through a refundable tax credit paid to state or local governmental issuers by the Treasury Department and the Internal Revenue Service. The Treasury Department refers to this type of Build America Bond as “Build America Bonds (Direct Payment).” This Notice refers to both Build America Bonds (Tax Credit) and Build America Bonds (Direct Payment) as “Build America Bonds.”
Some municipal market participants have requested guidance on whether Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board rules are applicable to Build America Bonds. Build America Bonds are municipal securities, because they are issued by States and their political subdivisions and instrumentalities. Accordingly, all of the MSRB’s rules apply to transactions effected by brokers, dealers, and municipal securities dealers (“dealers”) in Build America Bonds, including rules regarding uniform and fair practice, political contributions, automated clearance and settlement, the payment of MSRB underwriting and transaction assessment fees, and the professional qualifications of registered representatives and principals.
For example, dealers in the primary market should note that current Rule G-36 requires underwriters to submit official statements to the MSRB, accompanied by completed Form G-36 (OS), for most primary offerings of municipal securities. Dealers also have official statement delivery responsibilities to customers under Rule G-32. Once final, recently proposed revisions to Rule G-32 will require underwriters to satisfy their official statement submission obligations electronically through use of the MSRB’s Electronic Municipal Market Access system (“EMMA”) and will allow dealers to satisfy their official statement delivery obligations by means of appropriate notice to customers.
The MSRB understands that many Build America Bonds may be sold by dealers’ taxable desks and reminds dealers that Rule G-27 requires that municipal securities principals must supervise all municipal securities activities, including such sales.
Dealers in the secondary market should note that Rule G-14 requires that all transactions in municipal securities must be reported to the MSRB within certain prescribed time periods.
The following additional types of tax credit bonds are also municipal securities subject to MSRB rules: Recovery Zone Economic Development Bonds, Qualified School Construction Bonds, Clean Renewable Energy Bonds, New Clean Renewable Energy Bonds, Midwestern Tax Credit Bonds, Energy Conservation Bonds, and Qualified Zone Academy Bonds.
This Notice does not address the securities law characterization of the tax credit component of Build America Bonds (Tax Credit) or other tax credit bonds, whether the credits are used by investors in the bonds or stripped and sold to other investors.