Rule G-37, on political contributions and prohibitions on municipal securities business, prohibits any broker, dealer or municipal securities dealer (a "dealer") from engaging in municipal securities business with an issuer within two years after any contribution (other than certain de minimis contributions) to an official of such issuer made by: (i) the dealer; (ii) any municipal finance professional associated with such dealer; or (iii) any political action committee controlled by the dealer or any municipal finance professional. The Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board ("MSRB") has received inquiries regarding the effect of a ban on municipal securities business with an issuer arising from a contribution made after a dealer has entered into a long-term contract to serve as the primary distributor of the issuer's municipal fund securities.

In an interpretive notice published in 1997 (the "1997 Interpretation"), the MSRB stated that a dealer subject to a prohibition on municipal securities business with an issuer is allowed to continue to execute certain issue-specific contractual obligations in effect prior to the date of the contribution that caused the prohibition.[1] For example, dealers that had already executed a contract with the issuer to serve as underwriter or financial advisor for a new issue of debt securities prior to the contribution could continue in these capacities.

The 1997 Interpretation also addressed certain types of on-going, non-issue-specific municipal securities business that a dealer may have contracted with an issuer to perform prior to the making of a contribution that causes a prohibition on municipal securities business with the issuer. For example, the MSRB noted that a dealer may act as remarketing agent for an outstanding issue of municipal securities or may continue to underwrite a specific commercial paper program so long as the contract for such services was in effect prior to the contribution. The MSRB stated that these activities are not considered new municipal securities business and may be performed by dealers that are banned from municipal securities business with an issuer. The MSRB further stated, however, that provisions in existing contracts that allow for changes in the services provided by the dealer or compensation paid by the issuer would be viewed by the MSRB as new municipal securities business and, therefore, rule G-37 would preclude a dealer subject to a ban on municipal securities business from performing such additional functions or receiving additional compensation. The MSRB cited two examples of these types of provisions. The first involved a contract to serve as remarketing agent for a variable rate issue that might permit a fixed rate conversion, with a concomitant increase in the per bond compensation. The second example involved an agreement to underwrite a commercial paper program that might include terms for increasing the size of the program, with no increase in per bond fees but an increase in overall compensation resulting from the larger outstanding balance of commercial paper. In both cases, the MSRB viewed the exercise of these provisions as new municipal securities business that would be banned under the rule.

In the 1997 Interpretation, the MSRB recognized that there is great variety in the terms of agreements regarding municipal securities business and that its guidance in the 1997 Interpretation may not adequately deal with all such agreements. The MSRB sought input on other situations where contracts obligate dealers to perform various types of activities after the date of a contribution that triggers a ban on municipal securities business and stated that additional interpretations might be issued based upon such input.

The MSRB understands that dealers typically are selected by issuers to serve as primary distributors of municipal fund securities on terms that differ significantly from those of a dealer selected to underwrite an issue of debt securities. Issuers generally enter into long-term agreements (in many cases with terms of ten years or longer) with the primary distributor of municipal fund securities for services that include the sale in a continuous primary offering of one or more categories or classes of the securities issued within the framework of a single program of investments.[2] In addition, an issuer may often engage a particular dealer to serve as the primary distributor of its municipal fund securities as part of a team of professionals that includes the dealer's affiliated investment management firm, which is charged with managing the investment of the underlying portfolios.

The MSRB believes that the guidance provided in the 1997 Interpretation, although appropriate for the circumstances discussed therein, may not be adequate to address the unique features of municipal fund securities programs. For example, so long as a program realizes net in-flows of investor cash, the size of an offering of municipal fund securities will necessarily increase over time. Under most compensation arrangements in the market, any net in-flow of cash generally would result in an increase in total compensation, causing any new sales of municipal fund securities that exceed redemptions to be considered new municipal securities business under the 1997 Interpretation. Also, the addition by the issuer of a new category of investments (e.g., a new portfolio in an aged-based Section 529 college savings plan created for children born in the most recent year) could be considered a new offering from which such dealer might be banned, even where such new category may have been clearly contemplated at the outset of the dealer's engagement. Further, the MSRB understands that the repercussions to an issuer of municipal fund securities or investors in such securities of a sudden change in the primary distributor (and possible concurrent change in the investment manager) resulting from a ban on municipal securities business arising during the term of an existing arrangement often will be significantly greater than in the case of an underwriting or other primary market activity relating to the typical debt offering. Issuers could be faced with redesigning existing programs and investors may need to establish new relationships with different dealers in order to maintain their investments.

As a result, the MSRB believes that further interpretive guidance is necessary in this area. The MSRB is of the view that, where a dealer has become subject to a ban on municipal securities business with an issuer of municipal fund securities with which it is currently serving as primary distributor, any continued sales of existing categories of municipal fund securities for such issuer during the duration of the ban would not be considered new municipal securities business if the basis for determining compensation does not change during that period, even if total compensation increases as a result of net in-flows of cash. Further, the MSRB believes that any changes in the services to be provided by the dealer to the issuer throughout the duration of the ban that are contemplated under the pre-existing contractual arrangement (e.g., the addition of new categories of securities within the framework of the existing program) would not be considered new municipal securities business so long as such changes do not result in: (1) an increase in total compensation received by the dealer for services performed for the duration of the ban (whether paid during the ban or as a deferred payment after the ban); or (2) in an extension of the term of the dealer in its current role.

Board rule G-11, concerning syndicate practices, among other things, requires syndicates to establish priorities for different categories of orders and requires certain disclosures to syndicate members which are intended to assure that allocations are made in accordance with those priorities. In addition, the rule requires that the manager provide certain accounting information to syndicate members. In particular, rule G-11(h)(i) provides that: "Discretionary fees for clearance costs to be imposed by a syndicate manager and management fees shall be disclosed to syndicate members prior to the submission of a bid, in the case of a competitive sale, or prior to the execution of a purchase contract with the issuer, in the case of a negotiated sale.[1] The purpose of this provision is to provide information useful to syndicate members in determining whether to participate in a syndicate account. The rule also requires that the senior syndicate manager, at or before final settlement of a syndicate account, furnish to the syndicate members "an itemized statement setting for the nature and amount of all actual expenses incurred on behalf of the syndicate." One of the purposes of this section is to render managers accountable for their handling of syndicate funds.

The Board has received inquiries regarding the appropriateness of a per-bond fee for the bookrunning expenses or management fees of the senior syndicate manager. Discretionary fees for clearance costs and management fees may be expressed as a per-bond charge. These expenses, however, must be disclosed to members prior to the submission of a bid or prior to the execution of a purchase contract with the issuer; for example, in the Agreement Among Underwriters. The itemized statement setting forth a detailed breakdown of actual expenses incurred on behalf of the syndicate, such as advertising, printing, legal, computer services, etc., must be disclosed to syndicate members at or before final settlement of the syndicate account. With respect to these fees, the Board has previously noted that managers who assess a per-bond charge for designated sales may be acting in violation of rule G-17 if the expenses charged to members bear no relation to or otherwise overstate the actual expenses incurred on behalf of the syndicate. [2] The Board believes a per-bond fee creates the appearance that it is not an actual expense related to and incurred on behalf of the syndicate.

The Board is concerned about the charging of syndicate expenses and compliance with rule G-11. Managers should exercise care in accounting for syndicate funds, and any charge that has not been disclosed to members prior to the submission of a bid or prior to the execution of a purchase contract may be charged to syndicate members only if it is an actual expense incurred on behalf of the syndicate. The Board will continue to monitor syndicate practices and will notify the appropriate enforcement agency of any complaints it receives in this area. Syndicate members are encouraged to notify directly the appropriate enforcement agency of any violations of these provisions.

[1] The rule defines management fees to include, "in addition to amounts categorized as management fees by the syndicate manager, any amount to be realized by a syndicate manager, and not shared with the other members of the syndicate, which is attributable to the difference in price to be paid to an issuer for the purchase of a new issue of municipal securities and the price at which such securities are to be delivered by the syndicate manager to the members of the syndicate."

[2] Syndicate Managers Charging Excessive Fees for Designated Sales (July 29, 1985), [reprinted in MSRB Reports, Vol. 7, No. 2 (March 1987) at 5].

Rule G-15(a) generally requires that confirmations of municipal securities transactions with customers state a dollar price and yield for the transaction. Thus, for transactions executed on a dollar price basis, a yield must be calculated; for transactions executed on a yield basis, a dollar price must be calculated. Rule G-33 provides the standard formulae for making these price/yield calculations.

It has come to the Board’s attention that certain municipal securities have been issued in recent years with features that do not fall within any of the standard formulae and assumptions in rule G-33, nor within the calculation formulae available through the available settings on existing bond calculators. For example, an issue may have first and last coupon periods that are longer than the standard coupon period of six months.

With respect to some municipal securities issues with non-standard features, industry members have agreed to certain conventions regarding price/yield calculations. For example, one of the available bond calculator setting might be used for the issue, even though the calculator setting does not provide a formula specifically designed to account for the non–standard feature. In such cases, anomalies may result in the price/yield calculations. The anomalies may appear when the calculations are compared to those using more sophisticated actuarial techniques or when the calculations are compared to those of other securities that are similar, but that do not have the non–standard feature.

The Board reminds dealers that, under rule G-17, dealers have the obligation to explain all material facts about a transaction to a customer buying or selling a municipal security. Dealers should take particular effort to ensure that customers are aware of any non-standard feature of a security. If price/yield calculations are affected by anomalies due to a non-standard feature, this may also constitute a material fact about the transaction that must be disclosed to the customer.

Campaign for federal office. This is in response to your letter dated May 5, 1995, concerning the application of the Board's rule G-37 to a campaign for President of the United States. You ask specifically about the application of rule G-37 to contributions to Governor [name deleted] presidential campaign. The Board reviewed your letter at its May 18-19, 1995 meeting and has authorized this response.

As you know, rule G-37, among other things, prohibits any broker, dealer or municipal securities dealer (dealer) from engaging in municipal securities business with an issuer within two years after any contribution to an official of such issuer made by: (i) the dealer; (ii) any municipal finance professional associated with such dealer; or (iii) any political action committee controlled by the dealer or any municipal finance professional. The only exception to rule G-37's absolute prohibition on business is for certain contributions made to issuer officials by municipal finance professionals. Specifically, contributions by such persons to officials of issuers would not invoke application of the prohibition if the municipal finance professional is entitled to vote for such official, and provided that any contributions by such municipal finance professional do not exceed, in total, $250 to each official, per election. Rule G-37(g)(i) defines the term "contribution" as any "gift, subscription, loan, advance, or deposit of money or anything of value made: (A) for the purpose of influencing any election for federal, state or local office..."

The Board previously has clarified that rule G-37 does not encompass all contributions to candidates for federal office. Rather, for federal office, the rule encompasses only those contributions to a current issuer official who is seeking election to federal office.[1]

You ask whether the Governor of [a state] is an "official of an issuer" for purposes of rule G-37. Rule G-37(g)(vi) defines the term "official of an issuer" as "any person (including any election committee for such person) who was, at the time of the contribution, an incumbent, candidate or successful candidate: (A) for elective office of the issuer which office is directly or indirectly responsible for, or can influence the outcome of, the hiring of a broker, dealer or municipal securities dealer for municipal securities business by the issuer; or (B) for any elective office of a state or of any political subdivision, which office has authority to appoint any official(s) of an issuer..." as defined above. The Board has not provided any exemptions from, or exception to, the definition "official of an issuer" as set forth in rule G-37.

The Board does not make determinations concerning whether a particular individual meets the definition of "official of an issuer." The Board believes that because such determinations may involve particular issues of fact, such decisions must generally be the dealer's responsibility. The Board has, however, provided guidance in this area by recommending that dealers review the scope of authority conferred upon the particular office (and not the individual) to determine whether the office is directly or indirectly responsible for, or can influence the outcome of, the hiring of a dealer for municipal securities business.[2] For example, a state may have certain issuing authorities whose boards of directors are appointed by the governor. In such circumstances, the Board previously has stated that it intended to include the governor as an official of the issuer.a [3]

You ask whether rule G-37 applies to candidates for President of the United States. As noted above, the term "contribution" as defined in rule G-37(g)(i) includes payments "for the purpose of influencing any election for federal, state or local office." [Emphasis added]. Thus, rule G-37 is applicable to contributions given to officials of issuers who seek election to federal office, such as the House of Representatives, the Senate or the Presidency.

You ask whether rule G-37 unfairly impinges upon Governor [name deleted] equal protection and freedom of speech and association rights in the context of the Presidential election since he is, at this time, the only candidate with respect to whom those covered by the rule face "disqualification" from municipal securities business for making contributions. You also state that rule G-37 violates the First Amendment rights of association or speech by limiting the ability of municipal finance professionals to contribute to Governor [name deleted] presidential campaign. In its order approving rule G-37, the Securities and Exchange Commission stated that:

any resulting hardship to candidates for federal office who are currently local officials is not a reason for eliminating these requirements. The MSRB cannot overlook potential conflicts of interest solely because there are candidates for the same federal office who do not face the same conflicts. In any event, the resulting burden to current local officials does not appear to be significant.[4]

The Board believes that rule G-37 is not the product of governmental action and is not subject to Constitutional review. However, as you may be aware, these issues currently are pending before the D.C. Court of Appeals.

You ask whether the creation of the District of Columbia Financial Responsibility and Management Assistance Authority means that the President of the United States is an "official of an issuer" and that all candidates for President now fall under rule G-37. Rule G-37(g)(vi) defines "official of an issuer" as "any person ... who was, at the time of the contribution, an incumbent, candidate or successful candidate: (A) for elective office of the issuer which office is directly or indirectly responsible for, or can influence the outcome of, the hiring of a broker, dealer or municipal securities dealer for municipal securities business by the issuer; or (B) for any elective office of a state or political subdivision, which office has authority to appoint any official(s) of an issuer." [Emphasis added]. The President does not hold an elective office of an "issuer" of municipal securities. In addition, the President is not, and would not become, an issuer official by virtue of his authority to appoint members to the D.C. Financial Responsibility and Management Assistance Authority because the Presidency is not an elective office of a state or political subdivision.

You ask a number of questions concerning what activities are permissible by those individuals covered by the rule. You ask whether the $250 de minimis contribution exception in rule G-37 applies to Presidential candidates. As noted previously, the only exception to rule G-37's absolute prohibition on business is for certain contributions made to issuer officials by municipal finance professionals. Specifically, contributions by such persons to officials of issuers would not invoke application of the prohibition if the municipal finance professional is entitled to vote for such official, and provided that any contributions by such municipal finance professional do not exceed, in total, $250 to each official, per election. The Board previously has stated that, if an issuer official is involved in a primary election prior to the general election, the municipal finance professional who is entitled to vote for such official may contribute up to $250 for the primary election and $250 for the general election to each such official.[5]

[Two paragraphs deleted.][6]

You ask whether an individual covered by rule G-37 may raise money from others on behalf of Governor [name deleted]. Rule G-37(c) provides that no dealer or any municipal finance professional shall solicit any person or political action committee to make any contribution, or shall coordinate any contributions, to an official of an issuer with which the dealer is engaging or is seeking to engage in municipal securities business. A violation of rule G-37(c) does not trigger a two-year ban on engaging in municipal securities business with an issuer; however, if the appropriate enforcement agency finds that a violation of rule G-37(c) has occurred, the enforcement agency will determine the appropriate sanction.[7] You ask whether the de minimis exception applies to solicited and bundled contributions of $250 and less. Solicitations of contributions are prohibited by the rule (for those covered); therefore, there is no de minimis exception.

You ask whether a covered individual may hold a party in his home for a Presidential candidate if contributions are raised at the party. The Board has stated that rule G-37 is not intended to restrict municipal finance professionals from engaging in personal volunteer work.[8] Personal expenses incurred by the municipal finance professional in the conduct of such volunteer work, which expenses are purely incidental to such work and unreimbursed by the dealer (e.g., cab fares and personal meals), would not constitute a contribution. However, the expenses incurred for hosting a party to solicit contributions would be viewed as a contribution.[9] The Board also has stated that if a dealer's or a municipal finance professional's name appears on fundraising literature for an issuer official for which the dealer is engaging or seeking to engage in municipal securities business then there is a presumption that such activity is a solicitation by the dealer or municipal finance professional in violation of section (c) of the rule.[10] 

Finally, you ask whether spouses and eligible children of covered personnel may contribute to a Presidential candidate. The Board has stated that contributions to issuer officials by municipal finance professionals' spouses and household members are not covered by rule G-37 unless these contributions are directed by the municipal finance professional, which is prohibited by section (d) of the rule.[11] MSRB interpretation of May 31, 1995.
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[1] See MSRB Reports, Vol. 14, No. 3 (June 1994) at 14.

[2] Id.

[3] See MSRB Reports, Vol. 14, No. 4 (August 1994) at 24.

[4] See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 33868 (April 7, 1994) at 41-42; 59 FR 17621.

[5] See MSRB Reports, Vol. 14, No. 3 (June 1994) at 13.

[6] An interpretation on determining whether a municipal finance professional is "entitled to vote" for an issuer official was withdrawn by the Board in January 1996. The Board has issued a revised interpretation of "entitled to vote" which states that a municipal finance professional is "entitled to vote" for an issuer official if the municipal finance professional's principal residence is in the locality in which the issuer official seeks election. In such instances, a municipal finance professional is able to make a de minimis contribution without resulting in a ban on municipal securities business. For example, if an issuer official is a governor running for re-election, anyone residing in that state may make a de minimis contribution to the official without causing a ban on municipal securities business with that issuer. In the example of an issuer official running for President, anyone in the country can contribute the de minimis amount to the official's Presidential campaign. The Securities and Exchange Commission approved this revision on February 16, 1996. See MSRB Reports, Vol. 16. No. 1 (January 1996) at 31-34.

[7] The enforcement agencies are: for securities firms, the National Association of Securities Dealers; and for bank dealers, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Federal Reserve Board, or the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency.

[8] See MSRB Reports, Vol. 14, No. 3 (June 1994) at 15.

[9] Id.

[10] See MSRB Reports, Vol. 14, No. 5 (December 1994) at 17.

[11] See MSRB Reports, Vol. 14, No. 3 (June 1994) at 15.